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Summary 
 
Pertinent domestic and international developments involving issues related to tensions 
affecting religious or belief communities have been increasingly occupying the international 
law agenda. Those who generate and, thus, shape international law jurisprudence are in the 
process of seeking some of the answers to these questions.  Thus the need for 
reconceptualization of the right to freedom of religion or belief continues as demands to the 
right to freedom of religion or belief challenge the boundaries of religious freedom in 
national and international law.  
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the process of “re-conceptualization” by exploring the 
notion of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief with a view to advance the 
protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief. The case of Turkey provides a useful 
test case where both the domestic legislation can be assessed against international 
standards, while at the same time lessons can be drawn for the improvement of the standard 
of international review of the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief. 
 
The right to freedom of religion or belief, as enshrined in international human rights 
documents, is unique in its formulation in that it provides protection for the enjoyment 
of the rights “in community with others”.1 It cannot be realized in isolation; it crosses 
categories of human rights with aspects that are individual, aspects that can be 
effectively realized only in an organized community of individuals and aspects that 
belong to the field of economic, social and cultural rights such as those related to 
religious or moral education.2   
 
This study centers on two primary questions; first, what is the scope and nature of 
protection afforded to the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief in 
international law, and, secondly, how does the protection of the collective dimension 
of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey compare and contrast to international 
standards? Section I explores and examines the notion of the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief, and the scope of its protection in international law with 
particular reference to the right to acquire legal personality and autonomy 
religious/belief communities. In Section II, the case study on Turkey constitutes the 
applied part of the thesis; here, the protection of the collective dimension is assessed 
with a view to evaluate the compliance of Turkish legislation and practice with 
                                                        
1
 Found both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. doc. A/810, p. 71, 1948 
(hereafter, “the Universal Declaration”, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), p. 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 16.12.1966 
(entered into force on 23.03.1976) (hereafter the “ICCPR”) and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocol No. 11, Rome, 4 November 1950, U.N.T.S. 213:222, (entered into force on 3.09.1953) (hereafter 
“ECHR”), and the Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, GA Res. 
36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), p. 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51, 1981 (hereafter “1981 Declaration”).  
2
 Martin Scheinin, “Article 18”, in Gudmundur Alfredsson and Asbjord Eide (eds.) The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, A Common Standard of Achievement, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1999), 
p. 392. 
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international norms as well as seeking to identify how the standard of international 
review of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief can be improved.   
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 Sammanfattning 
 
Relevanta nationella och internationella utvecklingar som involverar frågor kring spänningar 
som påverkar religiösa eller tros samhällen har börjat allt mer att ockupera internationella 
rättens agenda. De som genererar och därmed utformar internationella rättens rättspraxis 
försöker att söka några av svaren på dessa frågor. Därmed behovet av re-konceptualisering 
av rätten till religions- och trosfrihet fortsätter som krav för rätten till religions- och trosfrihet 
som utmanar gränserna för religionsfriheten i nationell och internationell rätt. 
 
Detta examensarbete syftar till att bidra till processen med "re-konceptualisering" genom att 
utforska begreppet av kollektiva dimensionen av religions- och trosfriheten i syfte att främja 
skyddet av rätten för religions- och trosfrihet. Fallet med Turkiet ger ett användbart testfall 
där både den inhemska lagstiftningen kan bedömas mot internationella standarder, medan 
samtidigt lärdomar kan dras för att förbättra standarden på internationell granskning av 
skyddet av den kollektiva dimensionen av religions- och trosfrihet. 
 
Rätten till religions- och trosfrihet, såsom de fastställs i internationella handlingar om 
mänskliga rättigheter, är unik i sin formulering i det att den ger skydd för åtnjutandet 
av de rättigheterna "i gemenskap med andra". Det kan inte inses isolerat; den korsar 
kategorier av mänskliga rättigheter med aspekter som är individuella, aspekter som 
effektivt kan realiseras endast i en organiserad gemenskap av individer och aspekter 
som hör till området för ekonomiska, sociala och kulturella rättigheter, tex som rör 
religiös eller moralisk utbildning. 3 
 
Denna studie kretsar kring två primära frågor; första, vad är omfattningen och arten av 
skydd som ges till den kollektiva dimensionen av religions- och trosfrihet i 
internationell rätt, och för det andra, hur skyddet av den kollektiva dimensionen av 
religions- och trosfriheten i Turkiet är jämfört och är kontrast till internationella 
                                                        
3
 Martin Scheinin, “Artikel 18”, i Gudmundur Alfredsson och Asbjord Eide (eds.) Den allmänna 
förklaringen om mänskliga rättigheter, en gemensam riktlinje, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1999), p. 
392. 
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standarder? Avsnitt I utforskar och undersöker begreppet av den kollektiva 
dimensionen av religions- och trosfriheten, och omfattningen av dess skydd i 
internationell rätt med särskild hänvisning till rätten att få status som juridisk person 
samt autonomi religiösa/ tros samhällen. I avsnitt II, fallstudien om Turkiet utgör 
tillämpad del av examensarbetet; här bedöms skyddet av den kollektiva dimensionen i 
syfte att utvärdera Turkiets lagstiftning och praxis med internationella standarder samt 
att försöka identifiera hur standarden på internationell granskning av den kollektiva 
dimensionen av religions- och trosfriheten kan förbättras. 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  
 
1.2 The Significance of the Collective Dimension of Freedom of Religion or Belief 
 
 Pertinent domestic and international developments involving issues related to 
tensions affecting religious or belief communities have been increasingly occupying the 
international law agenda. As a matter of fact, these issues have been always pertinent for 
suppressed belief communities all over the world, however, together with the challenges of 
accommodating diverse religious traditions in the West, intensified by a particular security 
context in which they are perceived, there appears to be greater focus on these issues. 
Amidst legislation and practices that do not seem to provide adequate solutions to new, and 
indeed long-standing, demands related to the protection of freedom of religion or belief, 
international law and adjudicators are ever more given the task of providing answers to how 
we can live with our differences- in particular those of a religious nature- in peace, while 
respecting human rights, in particular freedom of religion or belief. Indeed human rights law, 
in particular provisions pertaining to the right to freedom of religion or belief, may provide 
some of the answers. Or, perhaps more accurately, those who generate and, thus, shape 
international law jurisprudence are in the process of seeking some of the answers. Freedom 
of religion or belief is in need of re-conceptualization, yet again, both as a matter of national 
and international law.4 The need for re-conceptualization continues as demands pertaining 
to the right to freedom of religion or belief challenge the boundaries of religious freedom in 
national as well as international law. This thesis aims to contribute to the process of “re-
conceptualization” by exploring the notion of the collective dimension of freedom of religion 
or belief with a view to advance the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief. 
The case of Turkey provides a useful test case where both the domestic legislation can be 
assessed against international standards, while at the same time lessons can be drawn for 
                                                        
4
 W. Cole Durham Jr. “Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework” in J.D. van der Vyder 
and J.Witte Jr. (Eds.) Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996). 
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the improvement of the standard of international review of the protection of the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief. 
 
The right to freedom of religion or belief is a fundamental part of the indivisible and 
interdependent human rights protection scheme.  It is “far-reaching and profound; it 
encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to 
religion or belief, whether manifested individually or in community with others.” 5 It is a 
multi-faceted right that has bearings on many areas of the lives of individuals and groups of 
believers. For many individuals it is the right to be as they chose to be- rooted deeply in the 
autonomy of the individual. For many religious/belief communities it provides vital 
guarantees for their survival.  The right to freedom of religion or belief, as enshrined in 
international human rights documents, is unique in its formulation in that it provides 
protection for the enjoyment of the rights “in community with others”.6 It is a human right 
that cannot be realized in isolation, indeed, it crosses categories of human rights with aspects 
that are individual, aspects that can be effectively realized only in an organized community of 
individuals and aspects that belong to the field of economic, social and cultural rights such as 
those related to religious or moral education.7 While freedom of religion or belief can be 
exercised individually it is generally the case that persons sharing the same belief organize 
themselves in various ways and thus engage in acts they do “together”.   
 
Two important assumptions have served as starting points for this thesis. The first 
assumption is the recognition of a need to advance the effective  international and national 
protection of the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or belief that is 
firmly grounded on the international provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion or 
                                                        
5
 U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994), General Comment No.22 of the Human Rights Committee on 
Article 18 para.1.  
6
 Found both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. doc. A/810, p. 71, 1948 
(hereafter, “the Universal Declaration”, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), p. 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 16.12.1966 
(entered into force on 23.03.1976) (hereafter the “ICCPR”) and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocol No. 11, Rome, 4 November 1950, U.N.T.S. 213:222, (entered into force on 3.09.1953) (hereafter 
“ECHR”), and the Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, GA Res. 
36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), p. 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51, 1981 (hereafter “1981 Declaration”).  
7
 Martin Scheinin, “Article 18”, in Gudmundur Alfredsson and Asbjord Eide (eds.) The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, A Common Standard of Achievement, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1999), 
p. 392. 
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belief.8 This assertion does not, however, imply that the individual dimension is sufficiently 
protected, inferior or less important, nor does it assert that there is a greater need to focus 
on the collective dimension compared to the individual dimension. On the contrary, there is a 
need to improve the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief both in its 
individual and collective dimensions in very many diverse states as it is reflected in the 
annual and thematic reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief.9 
The thesis, however, chooses to focus and examine the collective dimension. The second 
assumption pertains to the case of Turkey; a better understanding and implementation of 
the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief would greatly advance the 
protection of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey. It has been assumed that many 
unresolved issues outstanding in Turkey which are at the core of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief could be resolved if applicable international human rights standards would 
be implemented.   
 
Originally, an ambition for this thesis has been to seek to understand how the Turkish public 
authorities made decisions concerning the rights that are explored herein. The nature of 
criteria used by public authorities and the manner in which they balanced interests would 
have provided crucial insight into these important processes. However, this has proved to be 
an impossible task due to the reluctance on the part of public administrators to give 
interviews or when agreed to give an interview, having provided very little and general 
information.  Would it have been possible to enlist their full cooperation the thesis would 
have provided a more whole picture of the situation. 
 
The important work of Arcot Krishnaswami entitled “Study of Discrimination in the Matter of 
Religios Rights and Practices” has been an important inspiration for this thesis. 10 
Krishnaswami’s study presents a broad view of the manifestations of religion or belief and a 
                                                        
8
 General Comment 22, supra note 2. 
9
 The reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief are full of vivid examples of 
restrictions of both individual and collective dimensions of freedom of religion or belief. Thematic 
reports such as on the right to conversion and issues of recognition of religious communities also present 
the problems and sensitivities surrounding both dimensions. On the right to conversion see Interim 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, A/67/303, 13.08.2012. On freedom of 
religion or belief and recognition issues see A/HRC/19/60, 22.12.2011. 
10
 A. Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 60. XIV.2 (1960). 
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realistic description of the the various forms of tensions at play in relation to states’ ensuing 
obligations.11 This broad view was a result of a willingness and readiness to be informed by 
the diverse manifestations of religion or belief of believers following diverse religious or 
belief traditions from around the world. He recognized the distinct character of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief based on the unidentical demands 
religions or beliefes make of their followers.12 In particular, however, his early recognition of 
the importance of the collective aspect of freedom of religion or belief, precisely because 
interventions and regulations on the part of states are more frequent  when manifestations 
are performed “in community with others” than when they are performed “alone”, has  
concurred with my own observations in the Middle East and Turkey, in particular. This has 
led me to further explore the scope of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief and seek to advance its protection as it appeared to have a key function in advancing 
the protection of human rights and specifically the right to freedom of religion or belief by 
way of creating normative demands to correct state practice.    
 
Turkey,  at first glace, with its reference to 99% Muslim population may give the impression 
of a religiously homogenous society.13 However a slightly closer look reveals that Turkey is a 
true test case  for freedom of religion or belief for individuals and communities with its 
diverse Muslim denominations and “other” religious/belief groups such as Jews, Christians, 
the Bahai, the Yezidi, atheists and the unconcerned who exist in a secular State and a 
predominantly Sunni-Muslim society where both  are influenced by the Sunni-Muslim 
religious tradition. Turkey has undertaken international human rights obligations applicable 
to the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief as well as having 
a general constitutional commitment to protect freedom of conscience and worship.14 
Nevertheless, national legislation and practice lags far behind international norms.  The 
                                                        
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 The reference to 99% Muslim population is widely made by politicians and policy makers however, it 
has not been possible to confirm this assumption by any public institution. An e-mail inquiry to the 
General Directorate of Civil Registration and Nationality was answered stating that “statistical 
information pertaining to the religious affiliation of our public is not kept” Email correspondence with 
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paradoxical arrangements ensuing the unique state-religion affair, such as the constitutional 
institution of the Diyanet and compulsory Religious Knowledge and Ethic lessons,  the narrow 
scope of freedom of conscience, religion or belief and particular understanding of secularism 
and nationalism are presented as only some of the challenges.  In this complex context the 
collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief is viewed with suspicion and suffers, 
specifically because of its collective nature. The complexity of the Turkish case presents itself 
as an exceptionally useful case to test national complience with international norms and the 
standard of international review.   
 
1.2. Objective, Method and Outline of the Study 
 
This study centers on two primary questions; first, what is the scope and nature of protection 
afforded to the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief in international human 
rights law, and, secondly, how does the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief in Turkey compare and contrast to international standards? Thus the study 
consists of two main sections. Section I explores and examines the notion of the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief, and the scope of its protection in international 
law with particular reference to the right to acquire legal personality and autonomy 
religious/belief communities. In Section II, the case study on Turkey constitutes the applied 
part of the thesis; here, the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief is assessed with a view to evaluate the compliance of Turkish legislation and practice 
with international norms as well as seeking to identify how the standard of international 
review of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief can be improved.     
 
In Section I, the discussion primarily draws from the applicable international human rights 
instruments, in particular the ICCPR and the ECHR,15 and the jurisprudence of the HRCttee 
and Strasbourg organs and to a certain degree from the work of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Religion or Belief. Documents of a soft law nature, such as guidelines are also 
included in the analysis. Secondary resources, such as books, journal writings as well as 
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22
reports have also been relied upon. The choice of normative sources- the UN protection 
scheme and the reginoal CoE protection schemes- has been deliberate in order to benefit 
from and provide a comparative view that this choice will provide. Throughout the study it 
has become clear that there are considerable diffrences in the conceptions of these 
adjudicators of the respective systems. 
 
Section II employs the case-study method to study the protection of the collective dimension 
of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey. The case study method is particularly suitable for 
this project as it gives the opportunity to study a phenomenon in a real life context, as well as 
allowing for an in depth and nuanced study of a complex situation.  The scope of the study is 
limited to the exercise of the collective dimension outside the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (The 
Presidency of Religious Affairs, hereafter, the Diyanet or DİB hereafter) framework. In order 
to ensure a holistic approach, the thesis does not attempt to examine situations of religious 
communities individually. Instead the study has a thematic approach and will refer to 
individual cases to the extent that they are relevant for the thematic consideration. The 
scope of the investigation is confined to the themes that are explored in the theoretical part 
of the thesis, namely, the right to acquire legal entity status and the right to freedom in the 
internal matters of religious/belief communities. The study does not seek to be exhaustive, 
which is not possible, rather seeks to provide a comprehensive account and examination of 
the extent of protection of the collective dimension.   
 
The choice of the normative framework, the collective dimension of the right to freedom of 
religion, as opposed to a minority rights framework, has proved to be strategically effective 
in the Turkish context. In brief, Turkey adopts a narrow approach (recognizing only Greek, 
Armenian and Jewish communities as minorities based on a restrictive interpretation of the 
Lausanne Peace Treaty, 1923) for the definition of minorities.16 On the other hand, so far as 
legal commitments are concerned the right to freedom of religion or belief is protected 
through Turkey’s international obligations (in particular the ICCPR and the ECHR) as well as 
through constitutional and other legislative provisions. Thus, while not underestimating the 
obligation of protection within the Lausanne framework, a fundamental set of legal 
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obligations under Turkey’s national and international legal commitments that provide a 
potentially effective normative protection in its own right as well as being complementary to 
the Lausanne protection scheme exists. Moreover, in contrast to Lausanne, the international 
human right treaties that Turkey is a party to have more comprehensive compliance review 
mechanism. This approach has had the added advantage of being inclusive of, not only 
minority communities, but all belief communities, including the majority Sunni Muslim 
community in Turkey. Turkey’s legal and political commitments in the sphere of freedom of 
religion or belief offer critical potential for advancing freedom of religion or belief. The scope 
of protection provided through the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief 
provisions lends itself to an effective legal framework for the protection of acts that many 
religious/belief communities engage in collectively.   
 
In the case of Turkey, the primary normative sources have included the Turkish legislation 
and case-law. In order to assess the compatibility of national legislation and practice with 
international law pertinent to the key aspects of the collective dimension of freedom for 
religion or belief first of applicable legal framework are described. The case study focuses 
largely on primary sources such as legal instruments, judgments, administrative body 
decisions and interview material. Secondary sources, including books, journal articles, reports 
and newspaper articles have also been used, in particular with reference to historical, 
political and sociological background.   The approach of the Turkish judiciary is submitted 
through a critical analysis of case law and relevant executive and administrative decisions are 
included. Yet, the method employed in this study assumes that analysis based on only 
written national laws will be inadequate to assess domestic compliance with international 
standards. This assumption is based on observations made during interviews with various 
religious community representatives who pointed to important administrative processes that 
determine rules and outcomes relevant for their internal affairs. Some of these 
administrative processes have not become the subject of legal disputes but the 
administrative processes and decisions are indicative of applied rules and practice in the field 
of freedom of religion or belief. For this reason it has been necessary to determine the 
content and nature of rules that are applied and patterns established through the decisions 
of public administrators affecting communities or persons’ exercising their rights.  Finally, it is 
assumed that the rights holders need to be included in the research on compliance control in 
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order to acquire knowledge on practice and a genuine understanding on trends and current 
issues that belief communities face in Turkey.   
 
The interviews that were conducted with representatives of religious/belief communities 
were not concerned with the collection of quantitative data, instead with gaining insight into 
relevant issues and the context, thus in depth interview method was employed which is 
considered a key tool for hearing and understanding in social science.17 The interviews 
guided the identification of practice and patterns, applicable rules or lack of rules and the 
extent to which these meet the needs of the various religious/belief communities and thirdly, 
problem areas. Finally, they were an effective means of including the perspective of 
religious/belief communities who provided a primary source and guidance for the research.18 
On the other hand, some methodological challenges were encountered as regards access to 
information. Interviews that have been conducted and interview requests that have been 
turned down, demonstrate that confidentiality was a concern for interviewees and potential 
interviewees. Those who agreed to interviews, at times, showed reluctance to provide 
specific references (case number, name of institutions etc.) on relevant cases or 
administrative processes and decisions. The interviews were conducted in Turkish and then 
the findings were translated as they have been incorporated into this work. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the notion of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief. 
Key provisions guaranteeing freedom of religion protect the right of individuals to, either 
alone or in community with others and in public and private, to manifest their religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  It is argued that the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief are based, both on the acts that are protected 
which are either exercised in community with others or those who benefit from protected 
acts are groups and the diverse forms of collectivities that exercise this right. The state-
religion relations that are deeply contextual are highlighted in this context as being 
challenged by the normative demands created by obligations ensuing from the provisions 
protecting the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief. The attempt to identify 
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these normative demands reveals that the latter are less than clear and that the restraint of 
international adjudicators has an undermining effect on the protection of freedom of religion 
or belief for all.  
 
When it comes to individuals coming together in the exercise of their right to freedom of 
religion, the right to acquire legal personality gains a significant role as an enabling and 
empowering right. Chapter 3 seeks to explore the protection of the right to acquire legal 
personality for religious or belief communities in relation to relevant human rights law. 
Firstly, the importance and implications of legal personality on the enjoyment of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief for religious/belief communities are examined. Secondly, 
grounds for restrictions and other legal problems that arise in the application of restrictions 
are analyzed with a view to assess and draw out the potential of international review to curb 
repressive legislation and practice.   
 
Chapter 4 explores the notion of autonomy -freedom in the internal matters- of  
religious/belief communities. Considering that autonomy can have a potentially extensive 
scope, to a great extent, determined by the comprehensiveness of the dogma of the religion 
or belief in question, a broad approach to autonomy and its manifestations may be 
employed. So far, autonomy has been generally viewed as restricted to the organizational 
matters of religious/belief communities and this sphere has been respected. It is argued that 
if autonomy perspective is included as an interpretive tool in the review of cases or domestic 
protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief than states may be 
asked to accommodate the autonomous features of religious/belief communities have a 
greater burden to justify restrictions imposed. In the autonomous sphere many different 
aspects of the community’s manifestations of religion or belief are found, both prescribed 
and motivated by the belief in question such as freedom in dogma and teaching, inter alia, 
establishment of places of worship, teaching of religion or belief, freedom in internal 
organization. In addition,  the use of religious law in certain matters may be a protected form 
of manifestation of religion or belief in practice in international law is explored.   
 
Section II of the thesis aims to present a case study on the protection of the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief; the case study on Turkey focuses on two key 
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aspects of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief; the right to acquire legal 
personality and freedom in the internal affairs of religious/belief groups with particular 
reference to the right to establish places of worship, the right to teach religion or belief in 
suitable places, the right to elect and appoint religious leaders and the right to observe days 
of rest and holidays in accordance with religion or belief.   
 
The Turkish context is introduced in Chapter 5, with a view to provide the demographic and 
historical background as well as the legal basis for the themes to be examined in the next two 
chapters. This Chapter critically examines the protection of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief in the domestic legal framework. Here Turkey’s international human rights 
commitments including its minority protections scheme ensuing the Lausanne Peace Treaty 
and the Constitutional protection of freedom of religion or belief is presented. In addition to 
and analysis of the principle of secularism (laiklik), the Presidency of Religious Affairs (the 
Diyanet) and the compulsory Religious Culture and Ethics lessons which stand out as 
paradoxical state-religion arrangements. Moreover, the boundaries of the right to freedom 
of religion or belief, particularly in its individual dimension, are outlined by considering key 
issues such as coercion to disclose religion or belief,  manifestation of religion or belief- 
religious symbols- in public sphere and conscientious objection to military service.  It will be 
argued that manifestations of religion or belief are, often, restricted based on the aims to 
protect national security, secularism and upholding nationalism which seem to be in affect 
ultimately protecting the interests of the state. Moreover, in order to illustrate the changing 
paradigm pertaining to state-religion relations in Turkey in the context of freedom of religion 
or belief a complementary historical overview is presented. It is assumed that these are 
indispensible for our understanding of the relevant legislative, judicial and administrative 
rules, interpretation of the law and measures pertaining to the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief and challenges and opportunities therein. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the question of to what extent, if any, the right to acquire legal 
personality is protected in the Turkish legislation and practice. Due to the availibility of 
relevant case-law it has been possible to engage in extensive analysis of jurisprudence in this 
part. In Turkey, currently, no religious/belief group may acquire legal personality, as such. 
The Chapter seeks to examine the Turkish legislation and practice pertaining to acquisition of 
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legal personality – to the extent that is applicable for belief communities- and make an 
assessment of compatibility with international standards determined in Chapter 3. Therefore 
the available forms of legal entity, namely associations and foundations, are critically 
assessed, particularly regarding their accessibility, suitability and adequecy for 
religious/belief groups. It will be demonstrated that the denial of the right to acquire legal 
personality for belief/religious groups, per se, and that the existing alternative formulas lag 
far behind the standards created by relevant international law provisions. Because of the 
relevance of the historical conceptions and developments pertaining to legal personality of 
religious/belief communities a complemantary historical account is included.    
 
The legislation and practice pertaining to the right to establish places of worship, the right to 
teach religion or belief in suitable places, the right to elect and appoint religious leaders and 
the right to observe days of rest and holidays in accordance with religion or belief are 
examined in Chapter 7 with a view to critically assess the extent of protection afforded to the 
freedom of religious/belief groups in their internal matters.  To this end, in addition to 
relevant legislation, administrative practices that illustrate the rules of practice and outcomes 
that indicate the effectiveness of the domestic protection schemes are included in the 
discussion. Unfortunately, many issues covered in this Chapter have not, yet, been the 
subject of domestic court cases, therefore, the discussion had to focus on administrative 
processes. This examination has inevitably included, state involvement in religion through 
the provision of religious services, in particular places of worship and training of religious 
personnell and teaching of religion, and implicitly raised questions concerning the 
ramification of such involvement in the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief 
and the duty on the part of the state to observe the principle of neutrality and ensure 
pluralism.  
 
Finally, some consideration of this thesis’ contribution to the accumulated academic research 
is due. The issue of religious freedom in Turkey has been the subject of limited academic 
study. The focus of study has been the principle of laicite, as well as sociology of religion.  The 
right to freedom of religion or belief has been discussed with laicite in the center and in a 
limited way in relation to minority rights and fundamental rights in general. As far as the 
study of the right to freedom of religion or belief in the legal academia is concerned the 
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interest has emerged with the study of relevant international norms in this field. The doctoral 
thesis of Emre Öktem in 2002 has provided the first comprehensive study on the right to 
freedom of religion or belief in international law.19   The study of Berke Özenç on the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Freedom of belief,20 and Hande Seher Demir’s 
masters thesis dealt with domestic religious freedom issues in the context of ECtHR 
judgments on Turkey, such as the headscarf issue, the religion section on national identity 
cards and compulsory Religious Culture and Ethics courses. 21   More recently, a 
comprehensive overview and analysis of constitutional protection of freedom of religion and 
the approach taken in judicial assessment has been a valuable contribution to the field.22  
Considering the limited, yet in the recent years, increasing academic study on the right to 
freedom of religion or belief of Turkey’s normative field, this thesis is, yet, another 
complementary addition to the knowledge and discussions in this field. There is no study that 
explicitly focuses on the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or belief and 
aims to discuss domestic issues in light of international law and vice versa, discuss 
international law issues in light of domestic issues. Therefore this thesis makes a substantial 
contribution to the academic knowledge in Turkey. 
 
Since we do not yet have a coherent and well-developed theory of the ‘collective dimension 
of freedom of religion or belief’ or a comprehensive theory of it in legal doctrine” the aim of 
this thesis has been to promote an understanding of the matter. Thus the thesis offers 
original comparative insights pertaining to the understandings of the UN Human Rights 
Committee and the Strasbourg organs – and, to a lesser extent, that of the OSCE – to the 
scope and protections relating to the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief. In 
addition the thesis offers an introduction to the Turkish system of protection of freedom of 
religion or belief to an international audience.  
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Chapter 2 
The Notion of the Collective Dimension of Freedom of Religion or Belief 
 
 2.1. Introduction 
 The right to freedom of religion or belief includes interrelated and 
interdependent individual and collective aspects; without one or the other the 
understanding and protection of this right would be incomplete. Indeed, the right to 
freedom of religion or belief crosses between individual and collective categories of 
human rights; it comprises of  individual aspects, where an individual can enjoy the 
right to having a thought, religion or belief and manifesting it in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance as well as collective aspects  that can only be enjoyed through 
organized community activity or acts that are enabled through the establishment of 
institutions.  
 
The term collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief or religious group rights, 
is often referred to in relation to the rights of religious and/or charity institutions,23 and 
the possible tensions between a religious group and individuals affiliated with the 
group in question.24  Yet, such a constricted understanding based on these categories is 
bound to lead to a narrow or selective approach to understanding the collective 
dimension of the right to freedom of religion or belief. The variety of collectivities and 
the acts that are protected within the scope of the provisions protecting the right to 
freedom of religion or belief compels a broader and holistic understanding. A broad 
understanding of the collective dimension would be an important tool for the 
identification of the various forms of acts and subjects that are protected. In addition, 
the legal framework created with the relevant religious freedom provisions has the 
added advantage of demarcating the boundaries of the collective dimension of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief considering that the exercise of this right may 
potentially lead to interferences in the rights of others.  It is argued that a better 
understanding of the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or belief 
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will contribute to the improvement of the protection of the right to freedom of religion 
or belief as a whole. 
 
Amidst legislation and practices that do not seem to provide adequate solutions to new 
(and indeed long-standing) demands related to the protection of freedom of religion or 
belief, international law and adjudicators are increasingly given the task of providing 
answers to how we can live with our religious differences- in particular those of a 
religious nature- in peace, while respecting human rights- in particular freedom of 
religion or belief. Indeed human rights law, in particular provisions pertaining to the 
right to freedom of religion or belief, may provide some of the answers. Or, perhaps 
more accurately, those who produce and thus shape international law jurisprudence 
may be in the process of seeking some of the answers.  In this context, as will be 
explained below, the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief is particularly relevant in providing the standards foreseen in international 
human rights law that must be protected in domestic legal systems.  
 
This chapter presents the legal basis of the collective dimension of freedom of religion 
or belief and explores its substantive scope in terms of the acts it protects, the nature 
of the rights holders and its boundaries. It is argued that, although firmly grounded in 
the international provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief, more 
often than not, the collective dimension of freedom of religion is poorly protected, 
constitutes a challenge to traditional state-religion relations and therefore has a 
formative effect on the latter and that the improvement of the protection of the 
collective dimension will greatly advance the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief. This Chapter constitutes a key part of the thesis as by seeking to 
clarify the notion of the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief in international law it attempts to improve our understanding of this right. It is 
assumed that a better understanding will contribute to advancing its protection.  
 
It is perhaps helpful to already flag up in the beginning that this thesis does not assume 
that the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief is more important and 
should enjoy extra protection than the individual dimension of freedom of religion or 
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belief or hierarchically superior to the latter. In fact the inter-dependency and inter-
connectedness of these complementary dimensions would inevitably make such 
attempts futile. As it has been underlined in the Introduction Chapter, it is believed 
that the notion of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief is a helpful 
framework for advancing the right to freedom of religion or belief as a whole. 
 
An assumption of this thesis is that there is reluctance on the part of states to protect 
the collective dimension, precisely because of the collective nature of the right. This 
reluctance results in a failure to keep up with the standards foreseen in international 
law.  Krishnaswami insightfullly observed that: 
 Intervention by the State to regulate or to limit manifestations of a religion or belief are [sic] 
 more frequent when these manifestations are performed “in community with others” than 
when  they are  performed “alone”.
25
 
 
It must be ackonowledged, however, that the collective dimension is intrinsic to the 
protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief and warrants protection as such.  
 
2.2. The Relevance of State-Religion Relation 
 Since historically and contextually fashioned state-religion relations play a 
significant role in the nature and degree of protection conferred to the right to 
freedom of religion or belief, the collective dimension in particular, it is important to 
highlight it as an important overarching theme in this Chapter. This brief analysis does 
not change the essential legal question of the Chapter, however, demonstrates the 
multi-dimensional (inter alia, political, historical, policy) nature of the protection of the 
collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief. Following a presentation of the 
implications of state-religion relations for the protection of the collective dimension 
the nature of the normative demands made by international law is outlined below. 
 
The position and role of religion or the role of a particular religion in a state or the role 
it had in the history of a state have an immense influence on existing structures related 
to and relations between state and religious communities and attitudes towards newly 
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emerging religious groups.  In his pivotal study Krishnaswami drew attention to the fact 
that interference by the states to management of religious affairs varies according to 
the relations between state and religious communities and cautioned against 
discrimination in situations where the State is separated from religion but in its 
regulatory role prescribes uniform treatment to religions or beliefs which in fact make 
different demands to their adherents and attach varying degrees of importance to 
different manifestations.26 Indeed, the relationship between religious/belief groups 
and state does not have a standard form but takes very many different forms in each 
society.27  While in some countries there appears to be a somewhat clear separation 
between religion and State, such as France, according to a world survey, a large 
number of countries conceive a relationship between the state, its institutions and 
administration and a current or historically, predominant religion or religions of its 
citizens where this relationship is quite diverse and reflects constant adaptation.28 
Scheduled Caste status and the individual’s religious affiliation in the Indian 
Constitution,29  the special status given to the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church in the Georgian Constitution,30 the recognition of Islam as the state religion in 
numerous countries,31 are only a few examples. It is not difficult to imagine that hardly, 
in any country, do belief groups enjoy freedom of religion or belief in a substantively 
equal manner.  The variety of religious demographics and different perceptions as to 
appropriate relationship between religious institutions and State lead some to consider 
that “it is necessary to consider arguments in favor of freedom of religion or belief that 
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do not rely on strict separation between Church and State.”32 In contrast, however, 
others have called for a right to religiously neutral government.33 
 
International human rights law provisions relevant for the protection of the right to freedom 
of religion or belief, mindful of the diverse types of state-religion arrangements, abstain from 
imposing a particular way of association between state and religion. They do not explicitly 
identify particular forms of state-religion identification as a condition for compliance with 
human rights norms, nor do they explicitly condemn particular models of state-religion 
relations.34 Temperman argues that this situation should be considered as “realities of 
international law and international relations”.35 Nevertheless, they do not provide a carte 
blanc to states in this sphere, either. Normative demands created by international human 
rights law provisions protecting the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief as 
well as others, inevitably have implications for state-religion relations. These legal provisions 
have significant political consequences,36 and therefore, often, require alteration in the 
established state-religion relations where these give rise to unjustified interferences in the 
exercise of the right to freedom of religion or belief.37 It also follows, then, that the effective 
protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion will be a factor that may, 
through normative demands, shape state-religion relations so as to bring them in line with 
the requirements of human rights law. The fulfillment of the obligation on the part of the 
state to ensure pluralism, equality and non-discrimination in the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief in addition to observing the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality in the exercise of its regulatory powers, often, compel changes in long-standing 
state-religion relations. On the other hand, this influence is not without problems. The 
substantive content of state obligations may not be clearly set out and/or understood, 
international review mechanisms may employ a certain restraint. Such restraint may result in 
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the failure to address issues that are at the centre of state-religion relation and, yet, result in 
interferences in human rights, in particular freedom of religion or belief. Political debates and 
conflicts regarding these issues at both national and international levels can determine the 
contours of the margin given to states in balancing their relevant human rights obligations 
and the diverse manifestations of existing state-religion relations, often to the detriment of 
human rights and disadvantaging minority religious/belief groups. Indeed, a survey of State 
practice raises concerns that practices such as the establishment of a religion by the State, in 
fact amount to certain preferences and privileges being given to the followers of that religion 
and are therefore discriminatory.38 Bearing in mind that human rights are a one-way street 
this tension is hardly sustainable.      
 
As a matter of fact, the nature of normative demands created by international law as well as 
the approach of international adjudicating bodies to cases raising questions about issues that 
involve privileged or complex arrangements with various religious groups or institutions 
remains less than evident.  
 
The HRCttee, in its General Comment on Article 18 maintains that,  
 “…the fact that a religion is recognized as a State religion or that it is established as official or 
traditional  or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, should not result in any 
impairment of the  enjoyment of any rights under the Covenant, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any 
discrimination  against adherents to other religions or non-believers.”
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 It is clear that the HRCttee is not concerned with laying rules or envisaging an 
arrangement pertaining to the relations between states and religions, religious communities 
religious institutions in the context of the right to freedom of religion or belief. However this 
is realized is up to states. What concerns the Committee is that the enjoyment of the 
protections for the manifestations that are covered by Article 18 without undue interference 
is ensured.  Undue interference in this context is, inter alia, interference that is not 
prescribed by law, necessary for one of the legitimate grounds for restriction,40 and that is 
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disproportionate.41  The criteria for the HRCttee seems to be that everyone enjoys the right 
to freedom of religion or belief without any discrimination and states are free in their 
structures or organizations as long as they achieve the former. The HRCttee expressed 
concern on the paramount role of a given religious institution while considering state 
reports. For example, in the case of Costa Rica, with respect to Article 18 of the Covenant, 
the Committee expressed concern over the pre-eminent position accorded to the Roman 
Catholic Church.42  Similarly in the case of Iran where there is a state religion the Committee 
emphasized that recognition of a religion as a state religion should not result in any 
impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including Articles 18 
and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents of other religions or non-believers, since 
the right to freedom of religion and belief and the prohibition of discrimination do not 
depend on the recognition as an official religion or belief.43 Measures restricting eligibility for 
government service to members of the predominant religion, or giving economic privileges to 
such persons, or imposing special restrictions on the practice of other faiths were considered 
incompatible with the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the 
guarantee of equal protection under Article 26.44 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has also challenged the 
privileged position given to a certain religion; she voiced concern over abuses that can 
happen where there is a State or official Religion has been expressed and the unavoidable 
detrimental effects of ‘formal or legal’ distinctions between religions have been underscored.  
 The notion of an official or State religion must never be exploited at the expense of the rights of 
 minorities and the rights linked to citizenship. Formal or legal distinctions between different kinds of 
 religious or faith-based communities carry the seed of discrimination insofar as such a distinction in 
 their status implies a difference in rights or treatment. Consequently, the Special Rapporteur has 
voiced  her concerns that the legalization of such a distinction between different categories of religion is liable 
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 to pave the way for future violations of the right to freedom of religion or for discrimination on the 
basis  of religion or belief.
45
 
 
The ECHR and the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs shed further light to the 
nature of normative demands created by international law. Consistent with the ICCPR 
regime, the ECHR does not prescribe a certain state-religion or state-religious 
institutions paradigm, either. The ECtHR has dealt with numerous applications claiming 
violations of Article 9 that involved issues pertaining to the nature of state-religion 
relations of the countries concerned. Two, arguably less than consistent, trends appear 
to be key features of relevant jurisprudence. On the one hand, it is possible to observe 
a rigorous stance against coercion by the state to adopt a certain religion or to refuse 
someone to leave a religious institution,46 and an emphasis on the obligation on the 
part of the state to observe impartiality and neutrality and ensure pluralism, 
particularly, when the interference concerns the involvement of the state in the 
internal organization of a religious community or institution. It has been underscored 
by the ECtHR that “in exercising its regulatory power in this sphere [religion] and in its 
relations with the various religions, denominations and beliefs, the State has a duty to 
remain neutral and impartial.”47   
 
A certain restraint or reluctance, and as a result reliance on a wide margin or 
appreciation,48 continue to raise questions as to the extent and nature of the 
normative demands created by international law. According to the ECtHR the scope of 
the margin of appreciation will vary, depending on “the circumstances, the subject-
matter and its background”,49 and it always goes hand in hand with European 
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supervision.50 Where a common European standard exists the international scrutiny 
will be stricter, the absence of such a common standard would lead to granting a 
margin of appreciation to states. The latter has been used to justify interferences which 
would seem to be difficult to reconcile with the obligation to observe the principle of 
neutrality and the prohibition of non-discrimination; having a state church would not 
necessarily be contrary to the Convention,51 privileged state funding for a religious 
institution does not confer other religious institution an entitlement to secure 
additional funding from the state budget and the refusal to do so would not result in a 
breach of Article 9,52 a cross in a classroom of a public school classroom would not 
necessarily undermine the rights of non-Christians to freedom of religion.53  
 
It has been observed that the ECtHR seems to also heavily rely on states’ discretion for 
the differential treatment of religions.54 Despite diversity of historical and political 
traditions the ECtHR is appealed to seek “progressively to narrow the margin of 
appreciation” that is allowed to state parties to enforce different standards that 
privilege the majority religious groups.55   Evans and Thomas rightly call for a more 
searching scrutiny where there is differential treatment between religions when a 
church-state relations dimension is involved.56 Where restrictions of manifestations are 
based on the protection of secularism the ECtHR jurisprudence demonstrates an even 
broader margin of appreciation for that state concerning its church-state relations in 
the broad sense.57 
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 It follows from the above that the approach of the HRCttee and the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief demonstrate a greater readiness and 
willingness to tackle freedom of religion or belief claims that also raise issues of state-
religion relations in a way to challenge historically conferred privileges conferred to 
certain religions or religious institutions. It is important to note that the UN system 
involves states with a much diverse forms of state-religion or state-religious institutions 
relations than the Council of Europe states. Thus while the UN deals with a wider 
spectrum of state-religion relations, therefore a lack of common standards in the 
countries concerned, it does not rely on a margin of appreciation.  
 
In contrast, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence does not reflect a uniform and predictable 
standard of review. Where the right to freedom of religion or belief overlaps with other 
rights such as freedom of expression or freedom of association to which the Strasbourg 
system is profoundly committed, the ECtHR holds states up to their international 
obligations. On the other hand, there appears to be a certain restraint or insecurity to 
firmly hold states up to their international obligations where differential treatment of 
the traditional religions or religious organizations are concerned. A coherent and 
continued systematic approach is indispensible for ensuring that international norms 
are respected at the domestic level. When the international adjudicators emphasize 
the particular circumstances of the case and the margin of appreciation granted to 
states the higher the risk that national courts will feel the freedom not to strictly follow 
international jurisprudence. Arguably, we might say that the ECtHR is still in a 
“searching phase”, constantly evolving and being challenged, and has not yet reached 
the point where it will have a principled and established jurisprudence pertaining to 
freedom of religion or belief. A greater preparedness to invalidate laws that are 
discriminatory or are routinely used in a discriminatory manner would be a good step.58 
The unforeseeable standard of international review will, however, not least, reinforce 
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the existing power balance on the axis of privileged and non-privileged religious 
groups. 
 
In conclusion, it is important to note that while on the one hand international law 
poses normative demands on state-religion relations, the nature of these obligations 
remain less than clear.  
  
 2.3. The Legal Basis and Scope of the Collective Dimension of Freedom of Religion or 
Belief 
2.3.1. Relevant Notions 
 The notion of the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief is firmly founded on the international provisions protecting the right to freedom 
of religion or belief. An examination of the basis of, acts protected by, rights holder of 
as well as the significance of the collective dimension is presented below.   
 
Conceptions analogous to the “collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion 
or belief” have always been part of the normative discourse on religious freedom and 
the protection of religious minorities. The protection of the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief is deeply embedded in the historical protection of 
freedom of religion or belief.  In the past, the international protection of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief has been, to a great extent, protected via group rights and 
minority rights,59 rather than individual rights. As far as international protection of 
groups- including religious groups- is concerned Lerner divides these into three major 
periods; (1) non-systematic protection of groups by way of protective clauses in 
international treaties60, (2) the minority system established within the League of 
Nations after WW I, (3) the United Nations period after the WW II.61  While efforts to 
                                                        
59
 See Yoram Dinstein, “Freedom of Religion and the Protection of Religious Minorities”, in Y. Dinstein 
and M. Tabory (Eds.), The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights (Dortrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1992), p. 145-169.  
60
 For an overview of various treaty protection schemes in Europe see, M.D. Evans, Religious Liberty and 
International Law in Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 42-82.  
61
 Natan Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, (Dortrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2002), p. 7.The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive description and 
assessment of “minority, group, collective rights” debate but rather to offer a brief historical overview by 
highlighting major trends.  
40
insert a provision on religious freedom into the Covenant of the League of Nations had 
failed, these efforts paved the way to the minority treaties that followed.62 The 
minority system established between the two World Wars was based on protective 
provisions for racial, linguistic and religious minorities.63  Minority treaties strived for 
two aims; one, to grant legal equality to individuals belonging to minorities at the same 
level as the other nationals of the State and the second, to make the preservation of 
the characteristics, traditions and modalities possible.64  It should be noted, however, 
that not all members of the League of Nations were under the system; the scope was 
mostly limited to Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey where it was thought to be 
risky for minorities.65 Hence, this protection scheme was selective, based on concern 
for certain religious groups in certain countries.66 
 
Together with end of the League of Nations and the subsequent establishment of the 
UN, a new approach to the issue of group rights and their protection developed.67 A 
switch occurred, from a group protection system to an individual protection system, as 
it is reflected in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights which does not refer 
to minorities.68 Interference with rights, based on one’s race, religion or ethnic or 
national origin was to be dealt with on an individual basis through the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination. Thus minority protection ceased to be the primary 
means of addressing freedom of religion or belief on the international plane.69   
    
Despite a shift towards the individual protection scheme in human rights law the right 
to freedom of religion or belief maintained its collective dimension. This is based on the 
two intrinsic collective elements found in the relevant provision. First, the phrase “in 
community with others” or “together with others” reflecting the way believers often 
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tend to act together. Secondly, by the nature of the acts that these provisions aim to 
protect, such as establishing places of worship, training of clergy, that are generally 
enjoyed collectively. The collective aspect is intrinsic to the right because of the way 
individuals and religious or belief communities exist, interact and the ways in which 
they enjoy the right to freedom of religion or belief. Here, it is also good to bear in 
mind that the notion of the collective dimension of freedom of religion is not an 
alternative to the terms, religious group and/or religious minority rights rendering such 
notions unnecessary. The collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief may include aspects that overlap with minority, group, corporate rights and the 
rights of individuals exercised in community with others. Indeed, minority rights 
discourse at a political level might be more effective in securing exemptions, special 
rights for a group.  
 
Numerous scholars acknowledge the collective aspect of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief. Hammer has used the terms, ‘group notion of religion or belief’, 
‘group oriented approach’, ‘group dimension.’70 He maintains that a group-oriented 
approach is important for the human rights system in light of minority communities 
and other groups and highly beneficial for the individual members of particular 
groups.71 Evans employs terms like, ‘the religious collective’, ‘group oriented 
approach’, ‘group dimension’ and takes the group dimension of freedom of religion to 
mean, ‘where a community of believers are protected as an entity in its own right.’72 
The term has also been used by Durham, although generally in relation to the right to 
acquire legal entity status for religious/belief groups.73  Freedom of religion or belief, 
due to its manifestation aspects has also been called categorically, a collective right.74 
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Even scholars who approach the collective aspect of this right cautiously recognize a 
certain collective dimension; Scolnikov calls it a “communally exercised individual 
right”.75  
 
2.3.2. Legal Sources 
As far as legal sources are concerned, the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief is founded quite simply in the relevant provisions protecting freedom 
of religion or belief. Yet, it is useful to remember that, due to the inter-dependent  
nature of human rights protection, other rights, inter alia,  freedom to associate, right 
to a fair trial (judicial protection), right to property and minority rights are also relevant 
whenever they relate to the protection of the collective enjoyment of manifestation of 
freedom of religion or belief. These are complementary rights that facilitate, enhance 
and complete the protection of the collective dimension of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief. It has been argued that freedom of conscience and religion is “a 
particularly clear example of the fact that human rights cannot be isolated from each 
other but are realized only as a totality”,76 because of the many civil and political as 
well as economic, social and cultural rights that are relevant. Below, the appraisal of 
the “notion of the collective dimension” will be based on international legal provisions 
protecting freedom of religion or belief.     
 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) in Article 18 stipulates:  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes… 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
77 
 
 Two binding instruments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also contain alike 
provisions. The ICCPR, following the UDHR with minor changes, enshrines the following 
in Article 18:  
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Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion…. freedom, 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
78
 
  
 Article 9 of the ECHR adopts the same language: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes… 
freedom, either alone or in community with others… to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
79
 
 
 In these provisions the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief is 
founded on two pillars. The first one is the phrase “in community with others” and this 
is most commonly referred basis for the recognition of the collective dimension.80 This 
phrase reflects the way individuals and religious or belief communities exist, interact 
and the manner in which they manifest the right to freedom of religion or belief. While 
it may be quite obvious, it is useful to reiterate here that this phrase does not merely 
obligate states to ensure the right of either an individual or a group to manifest religion 
or belief but to ensure that religion or belief may be manifested in either way.81 It is a 
matter of choice on the part of the believer. As we will explore in detail below the 
collectivity is not specified, rightly so, as the collectivity varies. 
 
The acts that are protected constitute the second pillar for the collective dimension; 
international provisions protect the right to manifest religion or belief in “worship, 
teaching, practice and observance”. These encompass a non-exhaustive list of acts that 
have a collective nature; inter alia, establishment of places of worship, charitable and 
educational institutions. Thus, regardless of who exercises the right, the action itself 
may have a collective aspect. Hence, when one considers the collective dimension, it is 
not only the rights of religious organizations, this approach would indeed be narrower 
than the nature of protection afforded in the international provisions protecting the 
right to freedom of religion or belief.   
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The HRCttee provides an elaboration of the protected acts that are enjoyed both 
individually and  “in community with others” in General Comment 22 on Article 18.82 
Here, the HRCttee lists a broad range of acts which constitute manifestations of religion 
or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching such as, “ritual or ceremonial 
acts giving direct expression of belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, 
including the building of places of worship, the use of ritual formula and objects, the 
display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest.”83 As for the 
observance and practice of religion or belief, these may include not only ceremonial 
acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations and the use of a 
particular language customarily spoken by a group. The practice and teaching of a 
religion or belief includes acts integral to the conduct by “religious groups of their basic 
affairs”, such as the “freedom to chose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the 
freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom to prepare and 
distribute religious texts and or publications.84  In addition to a non-exhaustive list of 
acts that are generally exercised by groups or “in community with others” there is the 
explicit reference to “acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic 
affairs” and the “use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group.” The 
latter two further acknowledge the “collective notion” through the reference to the 
“group”.  
 
Apart from the phrase “manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, observance and 
practice” found in Article 9 of the ECHR we do not have an explicit “list” of acts 
protected under the collective dimension of this unique provision the collective 
dimension has been established by the case-law of the Strasbourg organs.  Nor are the 
precise meanings of the terms worship, teaching, observance and practice defined. The 
terms worship and observance have been considered to be self-evident, whereas there 
have been more discussion on the scope of teaching and practice.85 The first explicit 
reference to the “collective” dimension was found in the case of Svya Mychaylivska 
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Parafiya v. Ukraine that dealt with the refusal of the re-registration of the religious 
association by domestic authorities and the subsequent restriction on the ability of the 
religious group concerned, that had no legal entity status, to exercise the full range of 
religious activities and activities normally exercised by registered non-governmental 
legal entities.86 While finding a violation of Article 9 read in light of Article 11, the 
European Court of Human Rights noted that “one of the means of exercising the right 
to manifest one’s religion, especially for a religious community, in its collective 
dimension,” is the possibility of ensuring judicial protection of the community, its 
members and its assets.87 It is well established in the ECtHR case law that that Article 9 
should be interpreted and applied in conjunction with Article 11 on freedom of 
association, in such a way that religious communities should have the possibility to 
associate. The ECtHR held that:  
Moreover, since religious communities traditionally exist in the form of organized 
 structures, Article 9 must be interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention, which 
 safeguards associative life against unjustified State interference. Seen in that perspective, the 
 right of believers to freedom of religion, which includes the right to manifest one’s religion in 
 community with others, encompasses the expectation that believers will be allowed to 
associate  freely, without arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of 
religious  communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue 
at the very  heart of the protection which Article 9 affords.
88
  
  
  While not a binding instrument, the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief (the 1981 
Declaration henceforth) reflects a substantive acknowledgement of the group or 
collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief in the enumeration of freedoms 
that are enjoyed collectively by religious groups.89 Indeed, the 1981 Declaration, 
contributes greatly to the understanding of the collective notion through, inter alia, the 
enumeration of the “acts” that freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief will 
include, in Article 6: 
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain 
places for these purposes. 
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(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions; 
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related 
to the rites or customs of a religion or belief; 
 (d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;  
 (e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes; 
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and 
institutions; 
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the 
requirements and standards of any religion or belief; 
(h) To observe days of rest and the celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the 
precepts of one’s religion or belief; 
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of 
religion and belief at the national and international levels.
90
 
 
 The above listed acts are hardly enjoyed individually and they are typical of 
what religious or belief communities tend to do in community or together. 
Interestingly, Article 6 does not refer to the subject of the rights, instead, lists acts that 
are protected. The list is the most extensive enumeration of specific acts found in legal 
and quasi-legal documents and as such one of the most significant contributions made 
by the Declaration.91 Such rights cannot be adequately protected unless the rights of 
religious  communities as such are recognized and ensured beyond the purely 
individualistic freedoms.  These forms of manifestation have been described as “the 
major concrete components of religious freedom that are to be recognized and 
guaranteed by the state”.92 Yet, it is important to note that the list is not exhaustive as 
indicated by the words “inter alia” at the beginning of the list. For example, clearly 
omitted are the rights in the area of religious jurisdiction.  Also, the right to teach and 
learn the sacred language of each religion or right to a burial ceremony in accordance 
with the religion of a deceased person.93 These, however, may be protected under 
manifestation of religion or belief in practice. As pointed out by Lerner, however, 
“Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration deals with rights at the individual level as well as 
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collective rights and rights that can only be exercised by the group as such….  In 
general, paragraphs (b), (g) and (i) of Article 6 show a degree of acceptance of the 
rights of the group as an entity.”94 The 1981 Declaration articulates religious freedom 
in explicit terms beyond the purely individualistic approach.  
 
The nature of protection is also relevant and whether states have positive obligations 
to protect the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief have significant 
implications on the in/effective enjoyment of this right by groups of believers. The 
obligation to ensure the protection of human rights by states assumes that states will 
undertake the necessary measures for the effective enjoyment of human rights. The 
implementation of economic social and cultural rights has been approached with the 
“obligation to respect”, which requires the state’s organs and agents not to commit 
violations themselves; the “obligation to protect”, which requires the state to protect 
the owners of rights against interference by third parties and to punish the 
perpetrators; and finally the “obligation to implement”, which calls for specific positive 
measures to give full realization and full effect to the right.95 In the context of freedom 
of religion or belief the UN Special Rapporteur has referred to proactive state 
intervention where structural vulnerability of a certain group was concerned.96 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has adopted a different approach where states’ 
obligations are divided into two categories; namely, negative obligations and positive 
obligations.97  The obligation not to interfere in the enjoyment of rights, the negative 
aspect, has been considered to be intrinsic to the protection granted by the ECHR. The 
development of the positive obligations however has been gradual; starting with the 
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Belgian linguistics case.98  Since then the ECtHR has developed this jurisprudence 
constantly expanding the category of positive obligations with the addition of new 
elements, to the point where virtually all the standard-setting provisions of the 
Convention now have “a dual aspect in terms of their requirements, one negative and 
the other positive”.99 Positive state obligations under Article 9 of the ECHR appear to 
be fairly modest in comparison with the positive obligations attributed to other ECHR  
provisions.100  
 
Generally speaking, states are to ensure that individuals will not be disturbed,101 or 
interfered with when manifesting their religion or belief; thus have permissive role.   
The extent of positive obligations under Article 9, on the other hand, are not always 
clear, limited and particularly restricted in certain areas such as in the field of 
employment.  States may have to engage in mediation to help factions resolve internal 
dispute within religious communities.102 States may be required to permit religious 
adherents to practice their faith in accordance with dietary requirements, the 
obligation, however, may be limited to ensuring there is reasonable access to the 
necessary food, rather than access to production facilities for the ritual preparation of 
meat.103 In the public or private work place, however, the employers may not be 
required to make arrangements for manifestations of religion or belief.104  
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The limited nature of positive obligations may result from policy considerations and the 
ECtHR may see little public interest in the assurance of the effective enjoyment of the 
right to manifest religion or belief by individuals and religious/belief groups.105 
Considering that a wider margin of appreciation is granted to states in relation to 
positive obligations and the tendency of the ECtHR to rely on the margin of 
appreciation in relation to Article 9 in certain matters, it might be argued that 
European supervision suffers even more when both factors are in play at the same 
time. However, as a fundamental right that is protected with the ECHR, the necessary 
positive obligations for the effective protection of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief must be specifically and firmly drawn through jurisprudence. The effect of the 
less than rigorous nature of positive obligations concerning freedom of religion on the 
protection of the collective dimension needs to be further explored. 
 
2.3.3. Who is the Right Holder? 
The question of the right holder of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief is also a relevant one. Who can avail oneself and/or themselves of the protection 
provided within the scope of the collective dimension? Is it the individual, is it the 
naturally existing belief group in a given country, is it a religious legal entity or is it the 
belief or religion? Who has standing to seek judicial review? How is it relevant in 
procedural issues? Who is this right significant for? And in what processes is the nature 
of the right holder important? Are existing mechanisms adequate for the rights holders 
or is it necessary to develop new mechanism in order to improve the protection of the 
collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief for each category of right holders? 
These are the kinds of questions that I will seek to explore in this section. 
 
Surely, everyone has the right to freedom of religion or belief. Apart from the 
individual, the international provisions protecting freedom of religion or belief do not 
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provide any explicit “subject” or rights holder for this right. In fact, proposals to include 
“freedom of religious denominations or religious communities to organize themselves, 
to perform missionary, educational and medical work, to enjoy civil or civic rights, etc.” 
in Article 18 of the ICCPR were not successful.106  There is no reference to the notion of 
‘group’ found in international law.107 Yet, as it has been observed above, the intrinsic 
collective dimension is found in the phrases “in community with others” or “together” 
which is derivative of the way religious or belief communities naturally exist or operate 
and the protected acts which are indicative of the subject of the right since the acts are 
performed by a variety of collectivities. Thus the form of the collectivity may vary; 
natural religious/belief groups, individuals coming together to form informal groups or 
indeed a corporate legal entity may be exercising this right. Yet, the nature right holder 
is usually determined through jurisprudence.   
 
Natural religious/belief groups that have “unifying and spontaneous factors essentially 
beyond the control of the members of the group”,108 and whose members have not 
formed a voluntary formal religious organization enjoy a variety of acts protected 
within the scope of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief.109 An 
example of a natural religious/belief group would be the Jewish community in a given 
country. If Saturday, when Jews generally come together for worship, is a public 
holiday, Jews together may collectively- as well as individually- benefit from the right to 
observe a special day of worship. It is not necessary to form a legal entity to exercise 
this right.  Indeed, they may enjoy certain rights protected under religious freedom 
provisions irrespective of whether they have legal personality under domestic law. 
Where the natural belief or religious group is also recognized as a minority there may 
be situations where the religious minority group is granted a certain legal personality 
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depending on the domestic legal arrangement.  
 
When believers intentionally come together, informal belief groups may be formed, yet 
they, perhaps, may not wish or feel the need to establish a legal entity. An example of 
this is when believers informally assemble for worship or informal teaching or 
education within the community without establishing a formal educational institution 
that can provide a certificate or a diploma program. In order to provide the latter the 
community would, generally, have to establish a legal entity and fulfill certain legal 
requirements.  For the former however, they do not formally associate and establish a 
legal entity. In such a situation they form a group and perform acts collectively thus 
enjoy the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or belief.  
 
There are also belief groups that come together and formally associate and acquire a 
legal personality and enjoy their right to freedom of religion or belief through this new 
corporate entity. A religious community often has to associate in order to actually 
enjoy certain rights that are protected within the scope of the collective dimension. A 
right exercised by a belief community, as such, has a corporate dimension since it is 
through a corporate legal entity, that a belief community exercises the right. In this 
context the right to acquire legal personality stands out as an enabling right. It has 
been suggested that the lack of legal personality “eradicates almost every possible 
form of collective manifestation”.110 Nevertheless, legal personality enables a belief 
community to assume a separate legal entity status and exercise rights no longer as 
individuals coming together but as a collective. The corporate legal entity is distinct 
from the individuals. An example might be the purchase of a place of worship by a 
religious entity, in this case it is no longer the individual members that hold the 
ownership but the assumed group.    
 
As a sub-point, whether defining religious groups raises problems in the protection of 
freedom of religion or belief is a relevant question when considering the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief. Scolnikov argues that the state would 
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inevitably engage in defining religious groups when according them legal status and 
legal personality and that this would be a problem because in its implementation “the 
state must accept a certain determination of the group and its representative 
leadership”.111 Accordingly, in granting religious communities the legal power to 
perform state functions, the allocation of state budget to religious organizations, 
registration and freedom of religious association, claims/recognition of religious 
leadership the question of “inherent” problems of defining religious groups in the 
context of recognition by the state of religious group rights and thus “possibly 
breaches” state neutrality.112 Yet, Scolnikov concludes that the problems of conflicting 
group claims support the argument that freedom of religion or belief is an individual 
right but these claims also show that without recognition of groups as claimants, 
important aspects of religious freedom will be meaningless.113 It is important to 
remember that “problems” of definition are frequently faced by state authorities as 
well as the judiciary when they deal with manifestations of freedom of religion or belief 
and thus are not unique to the collective aspect of freedom of religion or belief. 
Whether a certain belief constitutes a belief or religion or whether a certain symbol or 
practice constitutes a form of manifestation within the meaning of international human 
rights provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief are some of the 
examples.  Such decisions may amount to decisions pertaining to the determination by 
the state of the legitimacy of a religion or belief or indeed discrimination based on 
religious affiliation belief groups or states may fail to observe the principle of 
impartiality. Whether freedom of religion or belief is an individual right or perceived as 
a group right is largely irrelevant for problems of definitions. It is the duty of the state 
to seek impartial treatment and adjudication regardless of whether claims originate 
from individuals or religious groups whether natural or having a legal entity status.  
 
As far as the individual is concerned, the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief holds significance for both individuals and groups of believers, regardless of 
whether they are affiliated with majority and minority religions, and  with corporate 
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entities established by belief communities. There are many cases of interference in the 
right to freedom of religion or belief of members of belief communities which 
demonstrate the inter-connectedness of the individual and collective dimensions of 
this right.  The reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 
are packed with such cases from many parts of the world;  the arrest and detention of 
persons on grounds of belonging to an allegedly illegal religious organization, such as 
Falun Gong in China,114 the difficulties experienced by  individuals who have converted 
from Islam to Christianity to change their religious affiliation in legal documents as a 
result of alleged arbitrary unwillingness on the side of domestic authorities stemming 
from complex state-religion relations that allow for certain religious rules to influece 
national law in Egypt,115 the charging of members of the Methodist Church in Fiji for 
attending an “unauthorized meeting” under the public emergency regulations, 116 the 
killing of members of the Ahmadiyyah community resulting from strong societal 
intolerance complicated by the theologically based prohibition for the Ahmadi to call 
themselves Muslim in Pakistan.117  
 
The individual suffers when the collective identity is not respected or the collective act 
is not protected.  When the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief is interfered with, this does not only affect the group of believers’ enjoyment of 
their right in ‘community with others’, but individual believers’ enjoyment also suffers. 
The individual cannot worship in a place of worship when the rights to establish and 
maintain places of worship or assemble for worship purposes by groups of believers 
are not protected. Hence the protection of the collective dimension is not only for the 
enjoyment of the rights as a community but also essential for the individual enjoyment 
of the right in question. As it has been held by the ECtHR, "Were the organisational life 
of the [religious] community not protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all other 
aspects of the individual's freedom of religion would become vulnerable".118 The 
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individual freedom of religion, “may be nullified unless complemented by a collective 
human right of the religious group to construct the infrastructure making possible the 
full enjoyment of that freedom by individuals.”119  
 
The protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief has 
implications and is relevant for all the collectivities and individuals described above. 
And it is important that those tasked with interpreting the right to freedom of religion 
or belief understand and pay attention to the collectivities involved in the claims under 
examination. Important elements to consider appear to be that the group in question 
exercise, or wish to exercise a certain act together or that they are collectively affected 
by the protection or non-protection of the right to act in a certain way. 
 
 2.3.4. Standing 
When exploring the issue of the right holder, the question of standing in 
procedural matters needs to be reviewed as well. Here I will examine the issues of 
standing for the natural belief group, the individual, religious legal entity, informal 
group of believers in the context of bringing a complaint for international adjudication.  
   
While a natural religious group may enjoy rights protected within the scope of the 
collective dimension can the natural group itself bring the claim even if they have not 
formed a legal entity?120 So far there is no precedence of such applications to 
international mechanisms. If a natural belief group does not, at the same time, have a 
representative body, who could make the application? In a case concerning alleged 
violations of Article 1 and 27 of the ICCPR while the HRCttee recalled that the Optional 
Protocol allowed only for the submission of complaints by individuals for individual 
rights, it held, however, that “no objection to a group of individuals, who claim to be 
similarly affected, collectively to submit a communication about alleged breaches of 
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their rights”.121 Hence the group, qua group, cannot claim the enforcement of a right, 
however, individuals can claim the enforcement of a right of a collective nature.  Within 
the ECHR protection scheme, natural groups do not have a standing to bring 
complaints against states parties. Perhaps non-adjudicatory compliance control 
mechanisms may be the key processes where the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief may be addressed in the context of the natural belief group.   
 
In the case of the HRCttee, in accordance with the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR the 
Committee can receive and consider communications only from individuals.  This is why in a 
number of cases that have dealt with the rights of religious organizations the claims were 
brought by a number of individuals who were members of religious organizations.  From the 
perspective of religious or belief organizations, the possibility of application to ECtHR as an 
organization rather then individuals is advantageous, whereas a communication to the 
HRCTTEE would necessarily mean that individuals take up the responsibility on themselves to 
carry on with the pursuit of the claim which might cause hesitations where a particular belief 
group experiences discrimination and persecution.  
  
Although an informal group of believers, they chose not to, or cannot, establish a legal 
entity, cannot file a complaint in case of interference in the enjoyment of rights as a 
legal entity, they could file a complaint individually- each separately or together, yet 
without losing their individual standing. This could be either for interference in the 
individual enjoyment of the right or for the collective enjoyment of the right.   
  
Whether an established religious organization as a right holder has the right to bring a 
complaint before Strasbourg organs and the HRCttee varies. The First Optional Protocol 
of the ICCPR does not foresee standing of a corporate religious group that has a legal 
entity status.122 In the HRCttee opinion on the complaint of Sister Immaculate Joseph 
and 80 Teaching Sisters et. Al. v. Sri Lanka, the religious order as a legal entity could not 
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file a communication with the HRCttee, instead, individuals could claim the 
enforcement of a collective right, namely the right to establish a corporation for charity 
purposes.123 In the ECHR framework the recognition of the standing of a religious 
organization has been gradual. Initially, the European Commission on Human Rights 
held that religious organizations had no right to bring claims under Article 9.124    
 
The rationale was that it was the members of the church and not the church itself that 
had a right to freedom of religion or belief.125 The complaint was dismissed because “ a 
corporation being a legal and not a natural person, is incapable of having or exercising 
the rights mentioned in Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Convention and Article 2 of the 
First Protocol”.126 This position was however rightly corrected, about a decade later, in 
the case of X and the Church of Scientology v. Sweden relating to the prohibition of 
advertisements of the ‘E-meter’.127 The Commission explained the reversal of its 
position by stating that “the Commission is now of the opinion that the… distinction 
between the Church and its members under the Article 9(1) is essentially artificial”.128 
The Church was perceived as applying “on behalf of its members” with a representative 
capacity.129 Evans has noted that the right of a Church to bring a claim is derivative, 
“based on the aggregating of the rights of its member” and that it could not claim a 
breach of its own rights.130 Bearing in mind that the entity is established by members, 
one must take into account the fact that once a legal entity is established by a group of 
believers the legal entity has a separate identity, or personhood, from the members 
that established it. Thus is not necessary to aggregate the rights of individual members. 
The legal entity, as such, can claim the breach of its own rights under Article 9. Indeed, 
later, the European Commission, has held that religious organizations are rights holders 
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bring claims in their own right.131 In subsequent jurisprudence the Court held that only 
organizations analogous to religious organizations may bring claims under Article 9, 
however, including “associations with religious and philosophical objects”.132 
  
The possibility of bringing complaints through a religious organization, instead of an 
individual or a group of individuals, is significant in a number of contexts. In the case of 
repressed minority religious groups, where it would be very difficult to challenge the state on 
an individual basis, the use of the religious organization standing empowers such vulnerable 
groups.133 Equally, the possibility to bring individual complaints concerning a right of a 
collective nature is also important. This would open the way for challenging for example 
macro public policies that disadvantage a religious group. For example, individuals could seek 
the enforcement of the right to establish religious schools on par with other groups even if 
they are themselves not victims of an alleged violation. Allowing churches and similar 
organizations to apply has enabled belief communities to access European supervision and 
opened the way for the latter in “a whole new façade of freedom of religion and belief which 
otherwise was destined to be dismissed by the ECHR bodies on the basis of being a technical 
matter”.134  
 
Standing, however, is not sufficient to bring broad-scale repression to the Court, there 
must also be a direct connection between the entity and the acts complaint of which 
would establish the said entity as a victim. The case of the Scientology Kirche 
Deutschland v. Germany illustrates the situation well.135 Here the applicants 
complained exactly of this kind of wide-spread ‘administrative practice’ of violations 
against itself and its members; inter alia, strategies adopted by the federal Government 
and the Governments of the Lander with the purpose of reducing the influence of 
Scientology organizations, in Bavaria schools were ordered to inform pupils about the 
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operating procedures of Scientology, a decree was issued in Stuttgart prohibiting the 
public distribution of printed materials published by Scientology organizations, the 
Bavarian Government announced that Scientologists would be banned from civil 
service.136 The applicants complained of these and other administrative practices 
against which there was no effective remedy. They particularly claimed that the 
administrative practices rendered the remedies which are available in individual cases 
but were not able to stop the policy or practice or challenge the fundamental political 
assessment of the Government which lies at the heart of these practices.137 Finally, the 
Commission found that domestic remedies were not exhausted and there was no 
evidence that there were administrative practices in Germany that rendered judicial 
remedies ineffective hence the application was found to be inadmissible.138   
 
Before arriving at this conclusion, the Commission made some observations that are 
helpful in identifying problems with applications from religious organizations that deal 
with broad-scale practices directed against them and those affiliated with them. The 
applicants had to show that they as an association have been the victim of a violation 
of the Convention. Firstly, in the Commission’s opinion the applicant could claim to be 
a victim only if there was ‘sufficiently direct connection’ between the applicant and the 
injury he maintains he suffered. In the case in question the Commission held the view 
that clearly the association was not the victim of alleged violations but members and 
only the members, as individuals, could claim to be victims. In addition since the 
association did not produce the identification of the individuals and instructions from 
them demonstrating that the association represents them the association lacked 
ratione persone with the provisions of the Convention. Secondly, the Commission 
observed that the association to a large extent complained of the actions of members 
of parliament, politicians, commercial companies, other non-governmental 
organizations and private parties whereas the Convention could be invoked only when 
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the State party failed to protect rights of the applicant against interferences by private 
persons.139 
 
In countries where religious minorities are not protected in their own right, protection 
of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief holds strategic significance 
for religious or belief communities. Individually exercised rights and non-discrimination 
may not ensure effective protection for the belief groups (informal groups or those 
which have acquired a legal entity status). In such cases, rights protected through the 
collective dimension, inter alia, the right to establish places of worship, the right to 
acquire legal personality, the right to train clergy, the right to be free in their internal 
affairs are crucial for the preservation and sustenance of the religious/belief group. 
This is not to suggest that in such cases minority rights will be redundant and minority 
protection is not necessary. In any case, minority rights play a key role. This is so, 
particularly when in a given country there is a dominant population of a particular 
religious affiliation or when the state becomes the bearer of a role promoting a 
majority religion de jure or de facto. Where both frameworks exist, it may be said that 
both, the collective dimension of freedom or religion or belief and minority rights 
protection, enhance each other’s realization. But in the absence of a minority rights 
protection scheme, the significance of the effective protection of the collective 
dimension increases. In addition, where minorities are recognized, the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief may also play a role in terms of protecting 
minorities within minorities. 
 
As it has been pointed out above in situations where certain religious or belief groups 
are repressed or persecuted religious legal entities may challenge legislation or 
treatment where individuals would be reluctant to do so fearing repercussions.   
 
In sum, it is important to strive to achieve flexibility about the models of legal 
personality in order to ensure that claims can be brought to international adjudicators. 
Lauterpacht had noted that “the range of subject of international law is not rigid and 
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immutable, but capable of modifications and developments in accordance with the will 
of States and requirements of international intercourse”.140 
  
While the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief is intrinsic to this right 
there may be situations where in the exercise of right of collective nature there may be 
conflict of interests with individual rights.141 Surely states cannot accept or protect 
practices that cause violations of individual human rights. It is true that there are 
religious practices that lead to interference in the individual rights of others. Though 
such conflicts do not only arise between a group and an individual, as they can also 
arise between individuals, for example between a parent and a child or among brother 
and sister or among husband and wife, the possible conflict of interest between a 
group of believers exercising the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief 
and an individual is relevant for the study at hand. The specific conflict may arise 
between the right of belief groups to be free in their internal affairs and the human 
rights of individuals that are negatively affected by this freedom. However, we will 
suffice by saying that there is no hierarchy between the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief and the rights of an individual, they need to be balanced 
on a case by case basis. 
 
The question of whether the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief protects beliefs and/or religions needs to be considered. Whether existing 
international human rights provisions have implications for the protection of religions 
or beliefs and whether new international provisions need to be drafted to create 
obligations for states to “combat defamation of religions” have been contemporary 
questions of concern. Such considerations may be based on seeking respect for 
religious diversity and achieve harmony between religions of the world.142 Such 
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arguments may also be used at the domestic level where such interests may manifest 
themselves in blasphemy laws that on the outset seek to ensure social harmony, yet, in 
effect may give rise to human rights violations.143  International provisions protecting 
the right to freedom of religion or belief do certainly not refer to religions or beliefs as 
right holders. Religions, as such, have also not been the subject of international 
jurisprudence. But do they lay down obligations for states to protect religions or belief? 
International jurisprudence has been engaged with this issue to the extent it has 
assessed whether certain “expressions” may be restricted in relation to the obligation 
of states to prohibit any advocacy of religious hatred that constituted incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence,144 obligation to provide legal remedies for unlawful 
attacks on an individual’s honor or reputation, including the connection with his/her 
religion,145 and, obligation to ensure peaceful enjoyment of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief where this may be interfered with because of intensive defamation of 
a certain religion or religious groups that believers are under the threat of violence 
from third parties.146 The latter obligation however does not create a general duty to 
introduce blasphemy laws, rather it would allow for restrictions on expressions where 
these constitute actual threat to enjoyment of freedom of religion or belief by 
others.147 The HRCttee has noted that,  
 Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including 
 blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances 
 envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Such prohibitions must also comply with 
 the strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3, as well as such articles as 2, 5, 17, 18 and 26. 
 Thus, for instance, it would be impermissible for any such laws to discriminate in favor of or 
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 against one or certain religions or belief systems, or their adherents over another, or religious 
 believers over non-believers. Nor would it be permissible for such prohibitions to be used to 
 prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets 
of  faith.
148
  
  
It is also helpful to point out that the collective dimension of freedom of religion 
or belief is distinct from a certain constitutional or legal status given to a particular 
religion. The establishment of religion, with its various forms, cannot be considered a 
political reflection of the collective dimension. However, legal recognition or legal 
status given to one or more religion in a given state may have implications for the 
protection of the collective dimension in a negative, inhibiting freedom of religion or 
belief or a positive manner, facilitating its exercise. Neither does the term imply that 
religions have or ought to have rights.     
  
The collective dimension of freedom of religion exists and an improved understanding 
and willingness to address the collective nature of the right underlying the complaint 
by adjudicating bodies would significantly improve its protection. In addition, to ensure 
better protection in practice, modifications in existing mechanisms and establishment 
of new mechanisms may be explored.  A step forward may be achieved by granting 
natural religious groups the right to bring cases and appear before international 
monitoring mechanisms in relation to claims of violations of rights of a collective 
nature. Potentially, compliance control mechanisms may provide effective agents of 
protection. 
  
Following this line of thought, one could envision a greater positive obligation and role of the 
State, not only as a regulator but as a facilitator of associative life or activities of belief 
communities thus making acquisition of legal personality or legal entity status as easy as 
possible, being meticulous about steering clear of discrimination in drawing legislation and 
implementing it, providing effective safeguards for legal protection that guarantees legality 
and excludes excessive arbitrary decisions by authorities in their role within the recognition 
and registration procedures hence in effect freeing this area of any negative prejudice and 
repression. Some of the belief communities or groups which have been the subject of this 
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chapter may not qualify as minorities but for sure they are smaller groups of persons who 
form sub-groups of religious minorities who, thanks to the collective aspect of the right to 
freedom of religion can benefit from rights that have been traditionally imagined for groups 
that are recognized as minorities.  Hence, a conclusion can be made that Article 27 and 1992 
Declaration, reinforce the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief but does not replace it and there are certainly overlapping aspects of both rights. One 
way to theorize about their correlation might be to view the minority rights framework as the 
broader sketch of freedom of religion with group/minority as the reference point of 
protection and collective aspect of freedom of religion a right with much more flexibility as to 
right holders. On the other hand, if the collective aspect of freedom of belief is not widely 
interpreted belief communities might be afforded better and wider protection with making 
use of provisions that are specifically directed to the protection of religious minorities when 
dealing with widespread discrimination and repression. Conversely, the right to freedom of 
religion/belief, unlike minority rights, provides protection also for members of majority 
groups.  
 
2.4. Compliance Control Mechanisms 
 Compliance control mechanisms are not confined to the examination of concrete 
cases, but, have the advantage of enabling a review process of domestic legislation and its 
application in abstract and provide an assessment of their compatibility of the provisions of 
domestic legislation and the application of these in light of the relevant international 
provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief. These mechanism, due to 
their nature, may have the possibility of addressing broad-scale issues that a court or quasi-
judicial body may restrain themselves from dealing with. The improvement of compliance 
control mechanisms for the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief is not one of the main questions this thesis. While bearing this in mind, the potential of 
compliance control mechanisms for improving such protection will be briefly underscored.149  
 
Article 40 (1) of the ICCPR requires the states parties "to submit reports on the measures 
they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized [in the ICCPR] and on the 
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progress made in the enjoyment of those rights." In addition these reports "shall indicate the 
factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation" of the Covenant in the reporting 
countries. 150  As a result of the reporting process the HRCttee adopts Concluding 
Observations which include an assessment of the state's human rights situation in light of the 
information provided in the state’s report, the answers received to the questions posed by 
the HRCttee members during the examination of the report, and information from other 
sources, inter alia, NGOs, all analyzed in terms of the country's obligations under the 
Covenant. Buergenthal argues that “given their formal character and the care with which 
they are increasingly being drafted by the Committee, the findings set out in concluding 
observations must be viewed as authoritative pronouncements on whether a particular state 
has or has not complied with its obligations under the Covenant”.151 This procedure provides 
the HRCttee with a means to become aware and address broad-scale practices and attitudes 
toward certain religious or belief groups that may be difficult to make subject of a complaint. 
It also gives the representatives of religious groups or their institutions to submit reports or 
even to come to the session to present their case directly to members of the HRCttee. The 
HRCttee also has a possibility to address laws that are incompatible with obligations of States 
under Article 18 even in the absence of a complaint from an affected party. In this context 
the Committee’s comment on the treatment of the Bahai in Iran is a case in point, here the 
Committee expressed concern about he destruction of places of worship or cemeteries and 
the systematic persecution, harassment and discrimination of the Baha'is, which is in clear 
contradiction with the provisions of the Covenant.152 Another example can be found in the 
comments on the report of the Republic of Moldova where the Committee expressed 
concern over the “artificial hurdles” for organizations seeking to exercise their religious 
freedom under Article 18 and commented that the State party should “ensure that its law 
and policy relating to the registration of religious organizations fully respects” the rights of 
persons as required by Article 18.153  The HRCttee can call states to take certain measures to 
improve the protection of human rights, for example, in the context ambiguous registration 
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legislation, the Bulgarian authorities were called to “ensure the training of local authorities 
and law enforcement officials to avoid unnecessary interference with the right to freedom of 
religion.”154 In response to the problems with registration of religious communities in 
Mongolia the HRCttee called for the development of “a thorough analysis of the 
administrative and practical difficulties faced by religious groups to register and therefore 
conduct their activities, and adopt the modifications that are necessary”.155   
  
Within the ECHR system, the task of the Committee of Ministers in follow-up of judgments 
has enormous potential and relevance for eliminating future violations by addressing 
repressive state legislation and practice related to legal personality, recognition and 
registration processes. According to Article 46(2) of Protocol No. 11 of the ECHR, once the 
final judgment of the Court has been transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, the latter 
invites the State to provide information on the steps taken to pay for just satisfaction and 
where proper of the individual and general measures taken to prevent new, similar 
violations.156 When it is clear that the violation occurred due to a particular domestic 
legislation the State party must amend existing laws or draft new appropriate legislation. 
Similarly, where it is not the legislation per se but the case law of domestic courts the change 
in case law may prevent further violations. Perhaps this is another fora that needs to be 
strengthened and rigorously utilized where the Court’s judgments recognize that a particular 
legislation in question is vague or that it has been used against a certain group particularly 
when the Court finds violation on the ground that the limitation was not prescribed by law.  
 
Bearing the aforementioned in mind, findings of violations of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 9, 11 or 6 seem all the more important to tackle wide-spread general repressive 
legislation and practice. Violations of Article 14 would give the CM the possibility to pursue 
this thread and follow-up with measures to seek corrective action by states.  Even in cases, 
where violation is found on other grounds but problems have been noted on the vagueness 
of legislation or on case law or on its application with reference to particular groups the 
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Committee of Ministers, having become aware of the wider issues and having more flexible 
means at its disposal in contrast to the Court, could pursue the introduction of general 
measures by the state in question in order to bring domestic law and practice in line with 
Convention commitments.   
 
As noted above the Committee of Ministers of the ECHR and reporting mechanism of the 
ICCPR have the potential to address these issues however, for this potential to be realized 
the willingness on the part of these bodies to take up these issues with the governments 
would be indispensible. Thus the HRCttee and Committee of Ministers stand out as key 
actors in the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief, in 
particular where broad-scale repression is concerned and where the collectivity in question 
cannot utilize the ECtHR and Optional Protocol of the ICCPR application mechanisms.   
 
 
 
In conclusion, a broad and holistic approach to the variety of collectivities, the acts that 
are protected within the scope of collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief 
would greatly improve the international and national protection of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief. Every compliance control process, be it of an adjudicating 
body or of a body with a mandate of a general review of the domestic protection of 
human rights, a searching and substantive attention must be given to the collectivities 
that are the subject of the right to freedom of religion or belief and the acts that are 
enjoyed in community with others. The shortcomings of existing processes may be 
overcome through the willingness of these bodies to take this step. In order to do this, 
naturally, they must consider these aspects as indispensible dimensions of the general 
protection conferred through the right to freedom of religion or belief. Ultimately, 
much seems to depend on the conception of and status and content attributed to this 
fundamental right.    
 
The limited recognition of positive obligations in relation to the right to freedom of 
religion or belief appears to be a factor directly affecting the enjoyment of this right by 
individuals and various collectivities. The lack of emphasis on positive obligations 
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related to the protected acts strengthens the hand of domestic authorities that remain, 
not least, unconcerned to their obligations under the international provisions 
protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief. The protection of the collective 
dimension suffers when reluctance by states to protect it precisely because of its 
collective dimension is compounded with less than firmly and specifically established 
positive obligations. 
Similarly, the Committee of Ministers and the HRCttee in the reporting process may 
pick up on repressive legislation or recurring repressive practice and seek corrective 
action with the various means at their disposal.  
 
The normative demands created by international provisions protecting the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion constitute a challenge to traditional or entrenched 
state-religion relations. The fulfillment of state obligations in this respect would have 
formative effect on these relations. The hesitation in establishing predictable and 
uniform criteria, particularly by the ECtHR, appears to be a factor that permits the 
continuation of state legislation and practice that raise serious questions in terms of 
state neutrality and non-discrimination and equality.  Such a discord cannot be 
sustainable in the long-run for international adjudicators if they are to continue with 
their key role to advance the protection of human rights, and here the protection of 
freedom of religion or belief, at the domestic level. Bringing the jurisprudence of ECtHR 
in line with an approach that would be willing to substantively tackle freedom of 
religion or belief claims that challenge state-religion arrangements based on consistent 
and predictable interpretive principles without relying on the margin of appreciation 
and without being too concerned with policy considerations would be a step in the 
right direction.  
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Chapter 3 
The Right to Acquire Legal Personality - a Substantive Component of  
the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 Acquisition of legal personality plays a key role in the effective protection of the 
collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief. In spite of the well-established 
international legal guarantee on freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, many 
religious/belief communities encounter varying degrees of restrictions when exercising the 
right to acquire legal personality and various forms of recognition. Religious beliefs may be 
banned entirely, like in the case of Falun Gang in China,157 making it an offense to profess a 
certain religion. Or theological assessments and lack of observance of the principle of 
neutrality on the part of the state officials and ensuing regulations may trigger violent attacks 
on a certain community like in the case of the Ahmaddiya community in Indonesia.158 
Religious activity may be allowed only for registered religious communities and the criteria 
for registration may be difficult to fulfill, like in the case of the religion law in Kyrgyzstan.159 
Sadly, it is possible to enumerate numerous examples here, ranging from non-
accommodation of certain aspects of freedom of religion, such as the right to train clergy for 
religious groups to imposition of conditions that are difficult to meet for acquiring religious 
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entity status that is necessary in order to engage in certain activities and enjoy certain legal 
benefits or privileges.160  All of these macro level regulations also have enormous effects in 
the lives of individuals and doubtless influence their individual enjoyment of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief. 
 
This chapter examines the right to acquire legal personality in international human rights 
law, with particular reference to the right to freedom of religion or belief. First, an overview 
of the legal and practical significance of possessing legal personality for religious/belief 
communities is presented. Secondly, the Chapter sets out to embed the right to acquire legal 
personality of religious or belief communities in human rights law within the UN and CoE 
human rights protection schemes and explores its substantive scope and the nature of 
obligations that have been recognized so far. Thirdly, it demonstrates some of the central 
and recurring limitations imposed by states. It is argued that the right to acquire legal 
personality holds a crucial significance as an enabling right and empowering right within the 
scope of the right to freedom of religion or belief and that precisely for this reason it may be 
the subject of dispute between states and belief groups. It is also argued that while the strict 
interpretation of the restriction clauses of the provisions protecting the right to freedom of 
religion or belief may be a guarantee against arbitrary state legislation and practice there is 
room for improvement of protection against wide-scale repressive practice. Since I endeavor 
in this thesis to trace neutrality and obligation on the part of the state to ensure pluralism as 
an overarching theme, in this chapter the role of state religion relations in the enjoyment of 
religious/belief communities of their right to freedom of religion and belief in the context of 
acquisition of legal personality will be highlighted.  In relation to the whole thesis this chapter 
is significant as it explores the right to acquire legal personality as an enabling right and 
empowering right that is necessary for the engagement in acts and exercise of rights 
protected within the scope of the right to freedom of religion or belief in its collective 
dimension.   
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3.2. The Significance and Function of Legal Personality as an Enabling Right 
 The collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief is generally exercised in a 
highly regulated sphere of interaction between states and groups of believers. Although acts 
carried out in community with others can vary in different belief systems, they can be 
comprehensively covered under a broad interpretation of worship, observance, practice and 
teaching. In national laws many of these activities generally require that the communities 
first have legal personality or a certain formation as a legally recognizable entity.161 Some 
examples of such acts may be founding a religious organization of a certain legal capacity, 
purchasing buildings for the purpose of worship or other communal activities, maintaining 
such places, engaging in financial transactions with individuals and institutions within their 
country and abroad, publishing and disseminating materials related to their belief, providing 
education for their followers and others by way of establishing schools.  This list is certainly 
not exhaustive and may differ in accordance with the acts a group of believers seek to enjoy 
based on their dogma and purposes. Since these acts may, generally, necessitate, inter alia, 
accommodation, allocation, regulation, permits, supervision on the part of states, religious or 
belief communities find themselves in a wide sphere of interaction vis a vis the state. This 
highly regulated and complex sphere of interaction between state with its public 
administrators and institutions and the religious/belief communities reveals many intricacies 
that are involved in the international protection of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief.  
 
The significance of the right to acquire legal personality is best seen in its enabling and 
empowering function. It is an enabling right; as such, it empowers belief communities to 
exercise their rights, including those protected within the scope of the collective dimension 
of freedom of religion or belief.  Legal personality is significant for belief groups because it 
enables religious/belief communities to exist and act, not as members, but as one organized 
body, and engage in the religious or other activities as a composite body. A legal person is a 
legal entity that exists as a body and is so affected by law.162 Such an entity remains 
identifiable as the same entity even when its individual membership changes. By acquiring 
                                                        
161
 Conversely, there are belief groups that reject any kind of official organization and institutional 
relations with the State like the Mormons. 
162
 Ned Beale and Heather Bateman, Dictionary of Law: Over 8,000 Words Clearly Defined( A&C Black, 
2007). 
71
legal personality, a religious/belief community gains a will of its own that expresses it as a 
community, a capacity that allows the community to directly acquire rights and assume 
obligations and the right to sue in court as plaintiffs or defendants. Hence once the 
community has gained legal personality, it is no longer individuals who own a place of 
worship or provide humanitarian assistance or run a faith based school but the community as 
such. It is also crucial that the form of legal entity status a belief/religious community may 
acquire be appropriate and adequate for the nature of belief communities; facilitating the 
exercise of the right to freedom of religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching with certain benefits.  
 
States, more often than not, regulate public activities of religious communities in relation to 
the state and private actors with a view to facilitate and/or control these acts. In this context, 
legal personality is, many times, a pre-requisite and thus an element that may function as a 
form of restriction in national legal systems, in the collective exercise of the right to manifest 
one’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. For religious 
organizations of a considerable size legal entity status is vital as a practical matter because 
otherwise they cannot function effectively and efficiently.163  Without legal status a belief 
community cannot directly and in an empowered capacity rent or own property, collect 
donations, open a bank account, make contracts with employees. Also, the fact that in many 
systems legal entity status confers credibility, legitimacy, respectability and prestige may be 
equally important,164 may be a motivation to acquire a legal entity status. Legal entity status 
has also been seen important for belief groups in the confrontation of opposing groups and 
media organizations.165 
 
In their regulatory role states enjoy a wide room for determining how religious or belief 
communities are to acquire legal capacity thus establish the means, capacity and form in 
which belief communities may engage in direct and indirect relations with states and their 
institutions. In an endeavor to regulate specific collective acts states may require the 
                                                        
163
 W.C. Durham Jr., ”Religious Association Laws” in T. Lindholm, W. C. Durham, Jr., B.G. Tahzib-Lie (Eds.), 
supra note 7, p. 327. 
164
 Ibid. p. 333 
165
 Lance S. Lehnhof, “Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of Religious Organizations to Obtain 
Legal Entity Status under the European Convention”(Brigham Young University Law Review, 2002). 
72
acquisition of legal personality and/or establishment of a certain form of an association. 
Sometimes these may involve some benefits such as tax exemptions.  Or, states may require 
registration or a form of legal personality pursuing a legitimate aim of ensuring that religious 
organizations are acting in accordance with law and do not present any danger for a 
democratic society.  
 
There may be various ways of acquiring legal personality depending on the arrangement in 
individual states. In many European countries religious or belief groups have the possibility of 
acquiring a general form of association or one or more forms of associations particularly 
designed for belief communities.166 In most European legal systems there are several types of 
religious organizations all with different criteria that often result in complicated, multi-tiered 
systems of legal recognition.167  Most OSCE participating States do not require a religious 
organization to register, whereas a few require registration as a condition for operating as a 
religion.168 There are also situations where a state does not have a clear and foreseeable 
regulation that religious communities can take into consideration when they set out to 
acquire legal personality or establish a religious association. The latter arrangement, 
unfortunately, generally results in discriminatory, arbitrary or non-uniform practice. Since 
legislation in this area can so readily facilitate or restrict religious freedom, it has been 
observed that it becomes an important barometer of the general climate of freedom of 
religion in a country.169  The 2011 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief provides a recent and comprehensive account of the obstacles that are 
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created to the effective protection of freedom of religion or belief when an adequate legal 
status framework is not put in place.170  
 
Indeed, when it comes to the exercise of associative rights of religious or belief communities 
state practice generally reflects complex historical and political attitudes toward all or certain 
religious/belief communities particularly as regards their organized activities. Krishnaswami’s 
remarks in his pivotal study on Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices 
are helpful in depicting the sphere of contention; 
History and contemporary practice show a remarkable difference in the attitude of public authorities 
towards these two freedoms [freedom to assembly and associate] when they are applied in the field of 
religion or belief… In many fields freedom of association and the right to organize have been more readily 
conceded than freedom of assembly. But in the field of religion, freedom of association and the right to 
organize have often been, and still are, denied or severely curtailed, whereas freedom of assembly in 
houses of worship has been recognized first, at least for the dominant religion, and later for a number of 
recognized — or even all — religions or beliefs. This difference is not accidental; public authorities 
consider that, in fields other than religion, there is less of a threat o public order and security in the 
existence of permanent organizations than in the congregation in one place of a large number of people. 
In the religious field, on the other hand, a meeting held for purposes related purely to matters of religion 
or belief does not generally present a threat to public order and security, whereas the establishment of a 
new and permanent organization may be considered dangerous because of the considerable impact 
which a religion or belief normally has upon its followers.
171
 
 
 It follows from the above review that legal personality is a crucial enabling right for 
the enjoyment of both individual and collective rights guaranteed under freedom of religion 
or belief provisions.  Indeed, lack of legal personality eradicates almost every possible form of 
collective manifestation.172 It is equally clear that states, aware of its enabling function, 
regulate this key sphere of state-religious/belief community interaction rather heavily. While 
recognizing its enabling function, it is important to remember that legal entity status or 
registration cannot be a pre-condition for manifestations of religion or belief thus 
criminalization of non-registered worship is incompatible with states’ obligations under 
international provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief. 173  The 
significance and therefore that it is highly regulated by states compels strict monitoring of its 
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protection in international and national legal systems. Now let us turn to explore the basis of 
the right to acquire legal entity status within the relevant freedom of religion or belief 
protection provisions.  
 
3.3. The Legal Basis of the Right to Acquire Legal Personality   
 While the right of belief communities to acquire legal personality is not explicitly 
stated in any of the human rights provisions it is deeply embedded primarily and foremost in 
the right to freedom of religion or belief. It is most directly linked to the right to freedom of 
religion or belief depending, however, on the context of each case, other interdependent 
rights become relevant, inter alia, the right to association,174 the right to court,175 and 
prohibition of discrimination. Below, based on the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief and other relevant human rights as they are protected in the ECHR and the 
ICCPR, a comparative legal analysis of the right to acquire legal personality is presented.  
 
The right of a religious/belief community to obtain legal personality has been progressively 
recognized as a part of the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief. It follows from the discussion above that, albeit not explicitly mentioned in the 
relevant legal provisions, legal personality is theoretically and practically an intrinsic part of 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The reason for this is that 
acquisition of such an adequate form of legal personality may be a precondition or a 
necessary means for the enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief. In the case of 
Metropolitan Church of Besserabia and Other v. Modova, the ECtHR held because of the 
absence of recognition a church could not organise itself or operate and lacking legal 
personality, it could not bring legal proceedings to protect its assets, indispensable for 
worship, while its members could not meet to carry on religious activities without 
contravening the domestic legislation.176 Thus providing non-discriminatory procedures and 
processes for the acquisition of an adequate form of legal personality for belief communities 
for the manifestation of belief or religion may be considered a positive obligation for 
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states.177  Indeed, the strongest recognition of states’ obligations in this sphere came 
unequivocally in the Hungarian case where the ECtHR held that “there is a positive obligation 
incumbent on the State to put in place a system of recognition which facilitates the 
acquisition of legal personality by religious communities”.178 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur refers to legal personality as a “necessary provision by the state” 
that is needed by religious or belief communities to be able to take their collective actions.179  
In this context the Vienna Concluding Document of 1989 may also be recalled, it stipulates 
that the participating States  
 will… grant upon the request to communities of believers, practicing or prepared to practice their faith 
 within the constitutional framework of their States, recognition of the status provided for them in their 
 respective countries.
180
  
  
 This commitment is significant not least because it recognizes the need to acquire a 
certain legal personality in order to practice a religion or belief. It does not prescribe a 
particular form of legal personality thus leaving it open to states and the possibility of diverse 
arrangements. States undertake a positive obligation to create a legal status through which 
they can carry out religious activities. 
 
The core freedom of religion or belief provisions stipulated in Article 18 of the UDHR,181 
Article 18 of the ICCPR,182 and Article 9 of the ECHR constitute the basis of the right to 
acquire legal personality. For the purposes of our analysis we will take Article 9 (1) of the 
ECHR: 
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Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public and 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
183
 
  
 It is important to note that “everyone has” the right to freedom of religion or 
belief.184 The provisions do not distinguish between citizens of a country and immigrants, 
residents, stateless persons, refugees and foreign religious personnel hence retains the 
element of universality.185 Hence, in the enjoyment of this right, where for some forms of 
manifestation of religion or belief a certain legal status or official recognition is required as a 
precondition, it follows that non-citizens also have this right. While states may desire or tend 
to place restrictions on the involvement of non-citizens by limiting the scope of religious 
association laws to citizens or permanent residents,186 these restrictions must be in line with 
the permissible limitations clause and not be discriminatory. The ECtHR, dealt with this issue 
in the case of The Moscow Branch of Salvation Army v. Russia where the ‘foreign origin’ of 
the applicant was held by authorities as a ground for refusing re-registration.187 The Russian 
Religions Act prohibited foreign nationals from being founders of Russian religious 
organizations.188 However, the European Court did not find a justification for the difference 
in treatment of Russian and foreign nationals in regards their ability to exercise the right to 
freedom of religion through participation in the life of organized religious communities.189 A 
number of other grounds related to its foreign origin did not have their base in domestic law, 
hence the arguments pertaining to the applicant’s foreign origin were found neither 
“relevant and sufficient” nor “prescribed by law”.190 A restriction based on the foreign origin 
of an individual would need to be justified by national authorities. 
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As Durham has duly stressed, it is important to remember the phrase “has the right”; this 
right is not “something bestowed by the state…but something that individuals and religious 
groups have simply by virtue of their human nature.”191 Such an understanding also supports 
the argument that freedom of religion is not only a right of recognized or registered 
communities and states have to maintain a facilitative approach to this process in order to 
guarantee that everyone can enjoy it. The UN Special Rapporteur recalls applicable 
international obligations:  
 Such an administrative decision [on legal personality] should not be misconceived as an act of mercy, 
 however. Under  international law, States are obliged to take an active role in facilitating the full 
 enjoyment of human rights, including freedom of religion or belief. By not providing appropriate legal 
 options that, de jure and de facto, are accessible to all religious or belief groups interested in obtaining 
a  legal personality  status, States would fail to honour their obligations under the human right to 
freedom  of religion or belief.
192 
 
The question of what constitutes a belief or religion in the context of legal personality 
is also a pertinent question for at least two reasons. First, in order to qualify for the 
protection afforded to manifestation of religion or belief, the belief or religion in question 
has to be considered a “belief or religion” for the purposes of the respective articles. 
Secondly, states often tend to make judgments on religions or beliefs in the context of 
granting legal status to belief groups.  Both the HRCttee and the European Court have 
adopted a broad interpretation of religion or belief so as to cover both theistic and atheistic, 
traditional and non-traditional beliefs.193 According to Evans the lack of a guiding principle 
used by the Strasbourg organs in the determination of which religions or belief are protected 
thus somewhat “made their definition meaningless”.194 Having said that, it is clear that not all 
ideas or views are unhesitatingly regarded as beliefs.  Opinions or views are not protected,195 
under freedom of religion or belief. The ECtHR has held that beliefs must have a “certain 
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level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance”.196 The HRCttee, on the other hand, 
drew the line when it held that a belief consisting primarily or exclusively of the worship and 
distribution of a narcotic drug cannot be brought under the protection of Article 18.197 
 
The HRCttee, in its General Comment on Article 18, has expressed concern over tendencies 
to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are 
newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be subject to hostility on the 
part of the predominant religious community.198 Same approach has been rigorously utilized 
in the review of reports on the implementation of the ICCPR where the HRCttee criticized the 
differential treatment of traditional and non-traditional religious groups in the process of 
acquisition of legal personality.199 The HRCttee has drawn attention to ‘registration or 
recognition procedures’ that affect the enjoyment of Article 18. With regard to Jordan the 
Committee expressed concern about the non-recognition of the Bahai religion.200 Similarly, in 
Iran where only 3 religions are recognized, non-recognized religions, again particularly the 
circumstances of the Bahai community are viewed with concern and the state practice 
incompatible with obligations under Article 18.201 In these cases evidently the state is making 
a judgment on the “legitimacy” of a religion or belief whereas it has no such capacity and this 
is clearly incompatible with Article 18.   
 
Even though the HRCttee does not have comprehensive case-law on the issue, taken 
together with its General Comment 22, its deliberations on a case might be helpful in 
understanding its position on neutrality and impartiality of the State in its relations with 
religious groups. In a case brought before the HRCTTEE, Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third 
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Order of Saint Francis v. Sri Lanka, where Sister Immaculate Joseph together with 80 other 
sisters has applied for incorporation in order to advance their activities in the area of 
teaching and other charity work, the Committee considered justifiability of restrictions that 
resulted with the refusal of incorporation status.202 The Bill establishing the incorporation 
was objected to and filed in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which upheld the objection 
taking into account several articles of the Sri Lankan Constitution; the non-recognition of a 
right to propagate a religion, the special provision giving Buddhism the foremost place and 
the State’s duty to protect and foster Buddha Sasana.203 Hence the Supreme Court held that 
the propagation and spreading of Christianity as expressed in the terms of clause 3 of the Bill, 
which listed a number or activities such as humanitarian assistance, teaching and spreading 
of knowledge of Catholic religion, would not be permissible as these would impair the 
existence of Buddhism.204 In the proceedings before the HRCttee, it was recognized that the 
tenet to spread knowledge, to propagate beliefs and provide assistance to others is a central 
part of many religions hence these aspects are part of an individual’s manifestation of 
religion protected by Article 18 paragraph 1. Hence the Supreme Court’s determination of 
the unconstitutionality of the Bill establishing the incorporation needed to be justified under 
paragraph 3 of Article 18. The justification for Supreme Court’s decision was that the Order’s 
activities would, by means of provision of material and other benefits to vulnerable people, 
improperly propagate religion. However the HRCttee found that the grounds set forth in the 
case did not form sufficient grounds to show that these restrictions were necessary on the 
grounds enumerated in the Covenant.  
 
This case is important in that it involves constitutional protection and support of a certain 
belief, namely Buddha Sasana. The HRCttee, noted that the decision of the Supreme Court 
provided no justification for the conclusion that the Bill would impair the very existence of 
Buddhism hence the violation of Article 18 (1). This finding, however, raises the question of 
whether the HRCttee’s decision would be different if there was evidence indicating that 
actually the activities of the Sisters’ incorporation could impair the existence of Buddhism? 
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Whether, in light of the premise that states should be impartial guarantors of freedom of 
religion or belief and co-existence of various belief communities, this constitutional clause 
would have been incompatible with ICCPR calls for further examination and clarification. One 
belief group may very well, by advancing its teachings and increasing the number of its 
followers, constitute a threat towards the existence of another belief. This decision of the 
HRCttee, raises the question of whether at the universal level there is greater respect 
afforded to ‘maintaining’ religion as opposed to greater protection provided for propagation 
of religion and possibility of ‘changing’ of religion. Such a difference in approach would be 
reflective of the debate at the UN level on the ‘right to change one’s religion’ and ‘the right 
to maintain one’s religion’ evident in the preparatory work for the drafting of ICCPR Art. 
18.205 
 
On the other hand, the ECtHR unequivocally held that “the right to freedom of religion or 
belief, “excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious 
beliefs or means used to express such beliefs are legitimate”.206 Therefore assessments of 
legitimacy in the decisions and processes concerning the acquisition of legal personality 
would not be permissible. The significance of this stance cannot be overestimated for 
vulnerable groups such as religious minorities or minorities within religious majorities in 
relation to decisions concerning their associative activities which are questioned by states as 
a result of being influenced by the dominant religious doctrine.  
 
The ECtHR addressed the issue of legitimacy of belief in the case of Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia v. Moldova where the applicants claimed that the authorities’ refusal to recognize 
their church infringed their freedom of religion, since only religions recognized by the 
government could be practiced in Moldova.207 While assessing the State’s arguments for 
justifying the restrictions, the European Court referred to its established case-law which 
recognizes that in a democratic society where several religions coexist within one and the 
same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to 
reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are 
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respected.208 Therefore the role of restrictions is viewed as having the purpose of ensuring 
various groups’, coexistence not one of eliminating certain groups so that some groups can 
exist without experiencing conflict. In ensuring this coexistence the state enjoys a regulatory 
power in the use of which it has the duty to remain neutral and impartial. The State’s role is 
envisaged as the “neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise of various religions, faiths 
and beliefs”.209 In addition, this defined role is perceived as “conducive to public order, 
religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society”.210 The principle of neutrality 
requires that any assessment on the part of the state regarding the legitimacy of religious 
beliefs or ways in which these beliefs are expressed is not acceptable. Consequently, in 
processes pertaining to acquisition of legal personality or recognition of religious groups 
states have no room for the assessment of the legitimacy of the religion of the group in 
question. What is relevant and significant in our context is that “religion or belief” is to be 
broadly interpreted when states draft and apply rules concerning the acquisition of legal 
personality, recognition and registration of religious or belief communities and likewise 
authorities have to be guided not by ‘whether a religion or belief is legitimate or not’, but by 
whether it is a ‘religion or belief’ as understood by the respective treaty provisions. 
Unfortunately, so far, neither the Court nor the Committee have provided a definition that 
can serve as a guide for States.211  
 
Bearing also in mind the complexities posed by state-religion relations, as it has been 
underscored in Chapter 2, it may be concluded that the substantive scope given to the 
respective international provisions so far, considers the assessment of legitimacy of religion 
or belief incompatible with the ICCPR and the ECHR. On the other hand, while differential 
treatment of various religious groups may be questioned, as in the case of Sister Immaculate 
Joseph v. Sri Lanka,212 this does not imply a willingness on the part of adjudicators to require 
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of a neutral state or a state that observes equal distance to the diverse religions found in the 
country. A certain restraint seems to withhold a more rigorous scrutiny in this sphere. 
 
An important related question pertains to the types of legal personality that the right to 
freedom of religion or belief extends to. What is the scope of protection and where is the 
limit drawn? While a comprehensive examination of the various forms of legal entities belief 
groups may establish is beyond the scope of this paper, it is useful to note a number of key 
guiding principles. The acts that are protected under the right to freedom of religion or belief 
provisions in the ECHR and the ICCPR extend to manifestations of religion or belief “in 
worship, observance, practice and teaching.”213 The scope of acts protected under these 
provisions also determines the scope of the types of legal entity belief groups have a right to 
establish. Domestic legal entity options must be suitable and adequate for belief groups to 
engage in acts necessary for manifesting their religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching. The content of these categories is, therefore, important as it will 
determine the extent of protection. An adequate and appropriate form of legal personality is, 
practically and theoretically, a requirement for the enjoyment of collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief in virtually all its components. Therefore it is an integral part of 
the protection. The nexus between legal personality and manifestation of religion or belief 
lies in the enabling function of the former. The legal question, then, is whether the absence 
of legal personality or the particular form of it or regulations concerning it, are compatible 
with the right to manifest one’s religion or belief in community with others in its collective 
dimension. Supervisory bodies assess whether interference in the process of acquisition of 
legal personality constitutes an unjustified interference in the right to have a belief or 
religion or to manifest religion or belief.  The ECtHR have confirmed that denying legal 
personality can amount to an interference with the right to freedom of religion as protected 
in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights,214 thus the Court first moved 
toward embracing a right to legal personality, albeit implicitly. However, in 2014, a positive 
obligation on the part of the states to provide  a system of recognition which facilitates the 
                                                        
213
 ECHR, Article 9 and ICCPR Article 18. 
214
 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova, supra note 20.  
83
acquisition of legal personality by religious communities was recognized explicitly.215 Further 
the Court stated that: 
The Court further considers that there is no right under Article 11 in conjunction with Article 9 for 
religious organisations to have a specific legal status. Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention only require 
the State to ensure that religious communities have the possibility of acquiring legal capacity as 
entities under the civil law; they do not require that a specific public-law status be accorded to 
them.
216
 
 
The jurisprudence of Strasbourg organs have not provided any description of these 
categories and what forms of manifestations are protected in each of them.  The Commission 
has said that Article 9 primarily protects personal beliefs and religious creeds and “acts which 
are intimately linked to these, such as worship and devotion.”217 Here the important criterion 
has been that the act must be intimately linked to the belief in order to qualify for a form of 
manifestation in worship. However, in a case involving the wearing of a small cross on a 
necklace at workplace, the ECtHR appears to have significantly moved away from this strong 
link that must be established by individuals.218 The European Court has not considered cases 
pertaining to associative acts of belief groups solely on the basis of Article 9, instead it relied 
on either Article 9 interpreted in light of Article 11 or on Article 11 interpreted in light of 
Article 9. This application may be indicative of a certain narrow view of the acts protected 
under manifestation of religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. A 
broader view of manifestations of religion or belief through associative acts would enable the 
European Court to decide such cases solely under Article 9.  On the other hand, the strong 
protection of associative rights in the ECHR system may be the reason for the strong 
protection of the associative rights of belief groups found in this system.  
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In contrast to the narrow view concerning manifestation of the ECHR system, the HRCttee 
holds that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief encompasses “a broad range of 
acts.”219  The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct 
expression to belief and practices integral to such acts, including the building of places of 
worship, the use of ritual formula and objects, the display of symbols and the observance of 
holidays and days of rest.220 As for the observance and practice of religion or belief these 
may include, in the Committee’s view, not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the 
observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings, 
participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life and the use of a particular 
language customarily spoken by the group.221 Practice and teaching may also include acts 
integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to 
choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or 
religious schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts and 
publications.222 These “broad range of acts” constitute the basis of the types of legal entity 
status that may be protected; belief groups must be able to acquire the type of legal entity 
status that will make it possible in their domestic settings to engage in the “broad range of 
acts”.  
 
The HRCttee considered a claim pertaining to associative acts of a belief group solely under 
Article 18 while noting that the claim also raised issues under Article 22.223 In this respect the 
HRCttee and the ECtHR differ in their approach. The HRCttee seems to take a broader view of 
the scope of Article 18 so as to include associative acts of belief groups. 
 
In this context it is important to remember that Article 6(b) of the 1981 Declaration protects 
the right to “establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions.”224 
Traditionally religious or belief groups engage in benevolent acts towards to poor, sick and 
vulnerable groups and depending on the domestic laws they may need to establish a certain 
                                                        
219
 General Comment 22, supra note 37, para. 4. 
220
 Ibid. 
221
 Ibid. 
222
 Ibid. 
223
 Sergei Malakhovsky and Alexander Pikul v. Belarus, 26 July 2005, Human Rights Committee, No. 
1207/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/1207/2003. 
224
 The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Based on Religion, See UN Doc. 
Yearbook of the United Nations 1981, p. 880-881. 
85
form of association to do this. It would be likely that under the ICCPR this would be decided 
under Article 18 as it has been in the case of Sister Immaculate Joseph v. Sri Lanka.225 On the 
other hand, the ECtHR may decide such claims under Article 9 or Article 11 viewing it 
primarily as a matter of the right to association where Article 9 would provide the context 
where religious purpose is evident. While the right to establish charitable or humanitarian 
organizations is not unrestricted given the strong protection of the right to association in the 
ECHR regime, it would not be wrong to expect that the right of religious or belief groups to 
establish such institutions would enjoy substantial protection.    
 
Whether based solely on the provision protecting freedom of religion or belief or based on 
complementary provisions protecting the right to associate, the scope of protection appears 
to be fairly broad. However, manifestations of religion that seek to establish judicial systems 
may be where international protection may draw the line. The most relevant case in this 
respect is the Refah Partisi v. Turkey,226 which dealt with the dissolution of a political party 
that sought, among others, to establish the sharia and a multi-juridical system. Although the 
case is decided on the right to freedom of association and not the right to freedom of religion 
or belief, its significance lies in the fact that it reveals the European Court’s reservation to the 
establishment of religious jurisdiction in the context of the right to associate and implicitly in 
the context of the right to freedom of religion or belief.   
 
Considering the enabling and empowering function of legal personality it is reasonable to 
attribute a positive obligation to states to provide an adequate form of legal entity 
possibility.227 A belief community may need a certain legal entity status in order to engage in 
acts that manifest their religion or belief. Without legal personality they cannot establish and 
maintain places of worship,228 establish charitable or humanitarian institutions,229 establish 
an run institutions for the dissemination of relevant publications, 230  cannot establish 
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institutions for teaching religion or belief;231 thus the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief may be significantly undermined. There may be situations where without a 
proper legal entity the community may run a risk of interference by the state. Such a risk is 
also unacceptable, they must be able to expect to carry on with their affairs without the fear 
of interference. In The Moscow Branch of Salvation Army v. Russia the ECtHR took into 
consideration that the applicant  “continuously ran the risk of having its accounts frozen and 
its assets seized”.232 The Court holds that believers’ right to freedom of religion encompasses 
the expectation that the community will be allowed to function peacefully, free from 
arbitrary state intervention. 233  Therefore, situations where authorities do not directly 
interfere but also do not provide necessary legal status or conditions for a religious 
community to peacefully enjoy being free from possible interference become more alarming 
particularly when same grounds have been used against others. Where an organization could 
continue to profess their faith, hold services of worship and ceremonies and guide their 
followers, nevertheless, where the legal position is affected the refusal to register may lead 
to a claim to be a victim even if there was no prejudice and damage.234  
 
In the context of states’ positive obligation to ensure that an adequate form of legal 
personality is accessible for belief groups who desire to manifest their religion or belief via a 
legal entity, guidelines developed to ensure compliance with international law by non-
adjudicatory bodies are useful in pointing to good practice. According to the OSCE-Venice 
Commission guidelines, registration should not be mandatory, althoughregistration for 
acquiring legal personality is considered as appropriate.235 Similarly, lengthy existence in the 
State before registration is not deemed appropriate, other burdensome constraints or time 
delays before obtaining legal personality are questioned, caution against excessive 
governmental discretion in giving approvals is expressed and requirements for re-
registrations are called for questioning, in particular provisions operating retroactively or that 
fail to protect vested interests. It continues:     
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 ...out of deference for the values of freedom of religion or belief, laws governing access to legal 
 personality should be structured in ways that are facilitative of freedom of religion or belief;  at  a 
 minimum, access to the basic rights associated with legal personality – for example, opening a bank 
 account, renting or acquiring property for a place of worship or for  other religious uses, entering into 
 contracts, and the right to sue and be sued – should be available without excessive difficulty. In many 
 legal systems, there are additional legal issues that have substantial impact on religious life that are 
 often linked to acquiring legal personality – for example, obtaining land use or other governmental 
 permits; inviting foreign religious leaders, workers, and volunteers into a country; arranging visits 
 and ministries in hospitals, prisons, and the military; eligibility to establish educational institutions  
 (whether for educating children or for training clergy); eligibility to establish separate religiously 
 motivated charitable organizations...
236
 
  
Recognition or registration requirements imposed by states may constitute a significant 
administrative/legal obstacle to the enjoyment of the collective aspects of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief for belief communities.  The detrimental effects of registration 
requirements on the exercise of freedom of religion have been captured in the reports of the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief with scores of examples of 
unreasonable registration requirements established by states which amount to a complete 
denial of the possibility to register and consequently the inability of legal exercise of the 
collective manifestation of religion or belief.237 The reports note that these requirements are 
often used by states as a means to limit the right of freedom of religion or members of 
certain religious communities.       
 
The challenge for legislation pertaining to the acquisition of legal personality remains that it 
must strike a balance between facilitating the enjoyment of the right to freedom of 
religion/belief by belief communities and pursuing the legitimate aim of guaranteeing that 
the actions of these groups do not present any danger for a democratic society and that they 
do not involve activities directed against the interests of public safety, public order, health, 
morals or the rights and freedoms of other.238   
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3.4. The Restriction Clause of the Right to Freedom of Religion: An Effective Means of 
Protecting the Right to Acquire Legal Personality?  
 Often, religious or belief communities that bring their cases to the HRCttee or the 
ECtHR come with great hopes to find a remedy not only for their specific case but also, to 
change the legislation or practice that may constitute the basis of general repression of their 
communities. Indeed, it appears that international review through adjudication by the 
HRCttee and the ECtHR do have significant potential to curb unjustified use of power. In 
particular the rigorous application of the requirement that the restrictions be prescribed by 
law and that grounds for restrictions be relevant and sufficient as well as being proportionate 
to the aim pursued may be effective interpretive tools to block repressive violations. A 
rigorous and probing assessment of restrictions is, nevertheless, necessary for these tools 
and the approach of international adjudicatory bodies prove to be adequate to effectively 
respond to general repression that are often at the root of restrictions and violations of the 
right to acquire legal personality.  Here the assessment will be based on the consideration of 
the relevant adjudicatory bodies of restrictions applied by states in cases dealing with the 
acquisition of legal personality; key elements of the restrictions regime that offer an 
important potential for improving domestic protection in relation to the right to acquire legal 
personality. This approach will also help us in understanding common ways of curbing this 
right by states.  
 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject to limitations only under certain 
circumstances. The ICCPR Article 18(3) and the ECHR Article 9(2) respectively establish 
criteria for permissible limitations on manifestation of religion or belief with subtle 
difference. ECHR stipulates: 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
239
 
 
The differences of the formulation in the two provisions are not substantive; 
permissible limitations must be, cumulatively, prescribed by law and based on grounds to 
protect public safety, order, health or morals or fundamental rights and freedoms of others 
and necessary in a democratic society.  Although there is not a vast number of 
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communications concerning Article 18 that have been dealt with by the HRCttee under the 
Optional Protocol, it is possible to find the Committee’s elaboration on its interpretation of 
the restrictions clause of Article 18 in its General Comment 22.240  In addition, the European 
Commission and Court decisions supply vast material to draw from concerning the 
application of limitations in general and those related to Article 9 in particular.241  
 
Limitations must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society. The 
restriction clause enshrined in ICCPR Article 18(3) omits the phrase “necessary in a 
democratic society.”242  There is also a difference as regards one of the grounds for 
restrictions, namely, ICCPR allows limitations that are necessary to protect the 
“fundamental” rights and freedoms of others whereas the ECHR omits the phrase 
“fundamental” and refers to “rights and freedoms of others”. Both of the clauses do not 
include “national security” as a ground for limitation which indicates that they lay down a 
more restricted list of grounds for limitations compared to other rights enshrined in the ECHR 
and the ICCPR.243 It has been observed that there is not a difference in the manner the 
Strasbourg organs have applied the restriction clause of Article 9 and those of Articles 8, 10 
and 11; the emphasis has been on “whether a restriction is necessary” rather than what 
interest it relies on.244 As for the HRCttee it has stressed that Article 18(3) has to be “strictly 
interpreted”.245 
 
When the HRCttee and the ECtHR dealt with applications dealing with criteria to register in 
order to acquire legal entity as a religious/belief community they have not found the 
existence of certain requirements, as such, incompatible with international human rights law. 
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The approach has been to consider the question of whether the criteria, as it has been 
implemented, constitutes interference in the right to freedom of religion or belief or the right 
to association or the former in the light of the latter and vice versa. Where interference has 
been found, the assessment has moved on with the three-thronged test to consider, whether 
the restriction has been prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and whether it was 
necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the aim pursued. 
 
The significance of these aforementioned elements that must be taken into account when 
considering the legitimacy of restrictions cannot be overemphasized for religious groups or 
belief communities, whose right to freedom of religion or belief can be unduly restricted by 
laws that are drafted too vaguely or who suffer as a consequence of a general negative 
attitude in society against them where this can be reflected in the decisions of administrative 
authorities. Measures stemming from explicit or implicit negative bias against certain belief 
groups are evident, inter alia, in laws lacking precision paving the way for extensive 
discretionary powers by public authorities. In spite of the fact that prescription by law and 
discretion of officials are distinct, in terms of their effect they are highly inter-connected. The 
existence or lack of law and the precision of its formulation determines the nature of its 
application by domestic authorities. Where there is a lack of legislation or where legislation is 
too general or vague and therefore lacks specific guidance for those who are affected by it 
and for those who implement it, conditions conducive for extensive discretion on the part of 
the officials may be created. In addition, those who are affected by the law in question are 
left in the dark as to the nature of their rights and obligations.  
 
Related to the “prescribed by law” test is its consequence of extensive discretion that is 
created for those who apply the law. Conversely, extensive or unfettered discretion can be 
an indicator that the relevant law does not meet the standard quality of law required.  As 
keenly observed and eloquently depicted by Podoprigora, in actual fact, the most typical 
violations take place not in the form of legislation but in the form of administrative action 
which prevents believers from engaging in religious activities that are properly protected 
both by international human rights law and in most cases in domestic constitutions.246 
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Religious communities, organizations have to make applications and receive permissions 
from officials who sit in administrative positions and use their discretion in determination of 
numerous issues that have considerable effects on the lives of belief communities; these 
decisions can range from major issues such as recognition or registration decisions to 
relatively minor decisions on building permits, licenses for clergy, permits for worship places 
as well as public worship and gatherings for teaching or celebration purposes.247 Such 
decisions may be routine or they can be arenas for discrimination and arbitrary practices 
depending on the “applicable legal standards that govern approvals, the attitudes of relevant 
governmental officials, the attitudes of the wider populace, the ability of the populace to 
exert political pressures on decision makers and a variety of other factors.”248   
 
Since ensuring a fair and non-arbitrary process related to acquisition of legal personality, 
recognition and registration is important the quality of legislation and its implementation by 
public officials is a vital issue for the question at hand, the requirement that restrictions be 
“prescribed by law” stands out as a key element for the improvement of review of 
compliance with international norms and deserves further elaboration. When Article 29 of 
the UDHR was drafted the use of the words “prescribed by law” were proposed to underline 
the need for “legal form” however in a short while it became evident that it was equally 
necessary to qualify the nature of laws that states applied.249  As for 18(3) of the ICCPR, the 
formulation “prescribed by law”, according to Nowak, means that interference must be 
recorded in legislation or an unwritten norm of common law in such a way as to adequately 
specify provisions for the enforcement organs.250 The HRCttee, outlines its views on the 
limitations of Article 18 in its General Comment 22 paragraph 8 which calls for a strict 
interpretation of the limitation clause. The Committee holds that “the limitations imposed 
must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights 
guaranteed in Article 18”.251 The nature of the cumulative criteria with regard to permissible 
restrictions is further emphasized by the Committee’s views that the limitations may only be 
applied for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and 
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proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. 252  Furthermore, 
noteworthy is the clarification by the Committee on the meaning of “unlawful” and “arbitrary 
interference” in relation to the right to privacy.253 According to the Committee, the term 
“unlawful” means that no interference can take place except in cases that are envisioned by 
law, in addition interference that is authorized by states can only take place on the basis of 
law and this law must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the ICCPR. The 
concept of “arbitrariness” is used with the intention to guarantee that even interference 
provided by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant and reasonable in the particular circumstances.  
 
The HRCttee adopted a probing approach where conditions related to premises may 
constitute an obstacle to obtaining legal status. In a communication brought before the 
HRCttee, S. Malakhovsky and A. Pikil v. Belarus254, the applicants sought to register as a 
religious association, however, their application was denied because they did not fulfill one 
of the conditions for registration, namely, the requirement to have an approved legal address 
that satisfied certain health and fire safety standards necessary for the purposes such as 
religious ceremonies.255  In Belarus only religious associations are entitled to establish 
monasteries, religious congregations, religious missions and spiritual institutions or invite 
foreign clerics to visit the country for the purpose of preaching or conducting other religious 
activity.256 Here the HRCttee drew a distinction between conditions for the use of premises 
for religious activities and conditions for a religious association to be registered to have a 
legal address that not only meets the standards required for the administrative seat of the 
association but also those necessary for premises used for purposes of religious ceremonies, 
rituals and other group undertakings and found that the latter was unnecessary. While 
making this assessment the Committee also considered such a limitation’s impact on the 
applicants, namely the impossibility of establishing educational institutions and inviting 
foreign clergy to visit the country and found that the restriction on the applicants’ right to 
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manifest their religion was disproportionate.257 Hence the HRCttee found that the limitations 
imposed in the form of unnecessary and disproportionate requirements amounted to a 
violation of Article 18 of the ICCPR.    
 
The evidentiary or factual basis of restrictions is also questioned by the HRCttee. In Sister 
Immaculate Joseph v. Sri Lanka where a Christian Order applied for incorporation of 
association and this was found unconstitutional, the grounds for interference were that the 
Order’s activities would through the provision of material and other benefits to vulnerable 
people, coercively or otherwise improperly propagate religion.258 The Committee did not 
refer to the preventive character of such a restriction but noted that this assessment lacked 
any evidentiary or factual basis hence underscored the necessity for evidence substantiating 
prevention of activities that would happen in the future.259   
 
Indeed, qualifying the nature of laws has also been a matter of focus for Strasbourg organs as 
well. It has been established by case law that the requirement for the limitations to be 
prescribed by law does not mean only a literal conformity with national law, instead, it 
implies a quality of law that has three essential components.260 First, the law must be 
adequately accessible; the individual must have an adequate indication as to which legal 
rules are applicable in a given situation. Secondly, the law must be formulated in a manner 
that has sufficient precision so that individuals can foresee the consequences of a given 
act.261 It follows that laws of an especially general or vague character that do not lay down 
restrictions in a defined manner may not be able to pass the “prescribed by law” test.  Having 
said that, it has also been noted that legislation that has a somewhat vague character or that 
is drafted in a broad manner can be given sufficient precision by the interpretation of 
domestic courts or agencies that apply the legislation.262  
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The third component required for the quality of law is defined as a corollary of the 
foreseeability test; to be exact, adequate safeguards against abuses must be extended in a 
manner that would delineate the extent of the authorities’ discretion and define the 
circumstances in which to be exercised.263  The requirement that restrictions be prescribed 
by law has been employed in numerous cases and is rightly accounted to “provide a potent 
source of restraint upon abuse of power.”264 
 
The strategic role of the prescribed by law requirement to potentially improve the protection 
of freedom of religion or belief in the context of interaction in the formal processes where 
religious groups deal with public authorities is seen in the case of Manoussakis and others  v. 
Greece. The real change where the potential is realized, however, has been in the case of 
Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria.265 Even though both of these cases do not directly concern the 
acquisition of legal personality the findings of the European Court are relevant and 
informative for the review of processes related to legal personality. 
 
Manoussakis and others v. Greece was initiated with the complaint of 3 Jehovah’s Witnesses 
who were convicted for unauthorized use of a place of worship.266 A room was rented to be 
used for all kinds of meetings of Jehovah’s Witnesses and in June 1983 an authorization to 
use the room as a place of worship from the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs 
(MERA) was requested.267 By December 1984 the applicants had received five letters from 
MERA stating that a decision was not reached on their case as more information was being 
collected.268  Finally, on March 1986, criminal proceedings were instituted against the 
applicants where they were accused of establishing and operating a place of worship for 
religious meetings and ceremonies of followers of Jehovah’s Witnesses without authorization 
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from the recognized ecclesiastical authorities.269 After establishing that the conviction of the 
applicants for using the premises without prior authorization was an interference with their 
exercise of their freedom to manifest their religion in worship and observance, the ECtHR 
considered whether this interference was prescribed by law.270 The applicants’ complaint 
was not so much directed towards the treatment they have encountered in the process, 
namely the abuse of power, but more the ‘general policy of obstruction’ pursued in relation 
to Jehovah’s Witnesses when they wished to set up a church.271  
 
In reaching its conclusion the Court made significant observations; the law in question 
allowed a far-reaching interference by the political, administrative and ecclesiastical 
authorities with the exercise of religious freedom, numerous formal conditions conferred a 
very wide discretion to the police, mayor, due to the absence of a time limit the Minister of 
Education and Religious Affairs could defer this reply indefinitely, the decree empowered the 
Minister to asses whether there is a real need for the religious community in question.272 
Thus the nature of this law raised serious issues with regard to the requirement that 
restrictions must be prescribed by law, particularly the quality of law as it has been examined 
above.    The Court observed from the evidence and cases cited by the applicants that the 
State has tended to use the possibilities afforded to it by the provisions to “impose rigid, or 
indeed punitive, conditions on practice of religious beliefs by certain non-Orthodox 
movements, in particular Jehovah’s Witnesses”.273 This deliberation provides a thorough 
criticism of general laws that make extensive discretionary authority by various public 
officials possible and in fact may be used against unwanted belief communities. However, 
exactly here where the Court made a very relevant and significant finding which constitutes 
the crux of the matter, the Court was unable to find a violation. The Court appeared reluctant 
to deal with this issue under the requirement that limitations imposed had to be “prescribed 
by law” and moved on with its assessment and found a violation of Article 9 on other 
grounds. The case was decided on proportionality; the conviction of the applicants had such 
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a direct affect on the applicants’ freedom of religion that it could not be perceived as 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.274  
  
In contrast, in a later case, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, which dealt with interference by 
the authorities in the organization and leadership of the Muslim community in Bulgaria, the 
case was decided on the fact that the interference was not prescribed by law.275 The 
European Court found a failure by the authorities to remain neutral in the exercise of their 
powers in relation to the internal organization of the Muslim Community and this failure 
amounted to interference in the believers’ freedom to manifest their religion.276 The Court 
found that the relevant law did not provide for a substantive criteria on the basis of which 
the domestic authorities register religious denominations and changes of their leadership in 
the situation of internal divisions and conflicting claims for legitimacy and this taken together 
with lack of adversarial safeguards led the Court to find that the interference was not 
prescribed by law, arbitrary and based on legal provisions which allowed unfettered 
discretion to the executive.277  
  
According to Taylor, ECtHR criticism of the legal provisions in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 
may suggest that there is a willingness on the part of the Court to attack repressive 
legislation and in the future use the prescribed by law condition to condemn state measures 
that are basically preventive in regulating the practices of religious minorities.278 Certainly, 
compared to the European Court’s position in Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, the Court 
has come closer to addressing general repressive legislation that is conducive for arbitrary 
decisions by public authorities through the utilization of the interpretive tools found in the 
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Article 9.  In this context, Taylor also warns against potential legal problems that may end up 
at the European Court as a result of recently adopted anti-sect laws in Europe which lack 
precision and allow excessive discretion to domestic authorities to dissolve religious 
organizations.279 Others have also voiced concern about strict restrictions imposed on cults, 
sects and other allegedly dangerous formations of religious communities in a number of 
European countries, but they appear less confident that the European Court will be willing to 
“ward off such governmental intrusions.”280 So far Jehovah’s Witnesses have challenged the 
relevant law in France with an application to the European Court complaining that they 
would potentially be a victim of the application of the law. But their application was found 
inadmissible due to the fact that the law was not invoked against them.281  
 
Questioning the evidentiary basis of decisions of public authorities that have not been based 
on “relevant and sufficient” grounds has also proved to be important tools to curb arbitrary 
decisions. In the case of The Moscow Branch of Salvation Army v. Russia, the grounds applied 
by domestic authorities in order to refuse the applicants’ application for re-registration were, 
according to the Court, “lacking evidentiary basis and arbitrary” and those pertaining to its 
alleged “foreign origin” were not “relevant and sufficient”, nor “prescribed by law”.282  The 
domestic public authorities had held that the applicants did not set out their religious 
affiliation and practices in a precise manner and omitted to describe all of its decisions, 
regulations and traditions, however the ECtHR found that the Religions Act did not lay down 
any guidelines on the description of religious affiliation or denomination of an 
organization.283 Hence there was no apparent “legal basis for the requirement to describe all 
“decisions, regulations and traditions.”284  Here the Court placed the “task to elucidate the 
applicable legal requirements and thus give clear notice how to prepare the documents” with 
the State.285   
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 In addition, the ECtHR clearly underscored the unacceptability of “arbitrary and mere 
speculations” to deny registration. In its assessment, the Court also took into account that 
“other religious associations professing the faith of The Salvation Army have successfully 
obtained re-registration.”286 Thus on both of the above accounts the Court found that 
Moscow authorities neglected their duty to act in “neutrality and impartiality.”287 The District 
Court inferred from the applicant’s articles of association that the members of the applicant 
branch would “inevitably break Russian law in the process of executing The Salvation Army’s 
Orders and Regulations and the instructions of the Commanding Officer”.288 Referring to its 
caselaw from Refah Partisi and Partidul Comunistilor the ECtHR noted that indeed, an 
association’s program may in certain cases “conceal objectives and intentions different from 
the ones it proclaims” and in order to verify this the content of the program must be 
compared with the actions of the association’s leaders and the positions they embrace.289 
However in the case at hand there was no such evidence indicating that the members or 
founders were engaged in other activities than those outlined in the articles of associations, 
hence the findings of the District Court were found to lack evidentiary basis and was 
arbitrary.290  Similarly, in Metropolitan Church of Besserabia v. Moldova, the Court dismissed 
the argument of the Government that, once recognized, the Church “might” constitute a 
danger to national security and territorial integrity as “mere hypothesis” which in absence of 
evidence could not justify a refusal to recognize it.291 Indeed, in spite of the fact that 
‘national security’ does not constitute one of the permissible grounds for interference in 
manifestation of religion or belief, issues regarding religious communities that have intricate 
ties and relations with other countries can be highly sensitive political matters that may 
cause a broad application of restrictions rooted in national security matters. In Metropolitan 
Church of Besserabia v. Moldova, the ECtHR considered the Government’s arguments putting 
forward the activities of the Church in the political sphere with the aim of achieving 
reunification with Romania as being a threat to national security and territorial integrity.292 
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The European Court observed that the Government had not substantiated the alleged 
political activity.293 It is interesting that the Court noted, even if the Church were linked to 
the political activities that allegedly were working towards the reunification of Moldova with 
Romania, the Government had not maintained that these activities were illegal. Therefore 
political activity, per se, would not necessarily constitute a ground for restriction.  
 
It is clear from the above account that both HRCttee and ECtHR strictly require evidentiary 
and factual basis for preventive interferences. This places the burden on states to 
substantiate with evidence that their preventive measures were necessary, as opposed to 
relying on hypothetical possibilities. The result of this requirement for belief communities is 
that they will not be subjected to practices that are based on perceptions of threat 
reinforced by the particular sensitivities in individual state by the authorities, which is often 
the case for belief groups that are seen as marginal. 
 
Restrictions on the right to acquire legal personality must pursue a legitimate aim  to protect, 
‘public safety’, ‘order’, ‘health’ or ‘morals’ or the ‘fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others’. Both the United Nations and Strasbourg institutions do not carry out a rigorous 
exemination when it comes to determining whether a certain restriction is aimed at 
protecting one of the enlisted grounds.294 It appears that, for example, states can easily get 
away with claiming that certain criteria layed out for the acquisition of legal personality is 
aimed at protecting public order or the rights and freedoms of others and that might be 
difficult to conclusively refute since it is a sphere where public regulation is generally viewed 
as normal. Thus adjudicating bodies accept that measures “pursued a legitimate aim” and 
move on with their assessment of the restrictions.295 
  
In order to be legitimate any restriction must be necessary in a democratic society.296 It, 
moreover, must be necessary in order to protect the aim the state claims.  
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EctHR employes the margin of appreciation doctrine. While the Strasbourg organs have 
emplpyed the margin of appreciation and thus accommodated states restrictions in Article 9 
cases that have been based on controversial issues the right to acquire legal personality of 
belief groups have been exceptions. I would like to suggest that the reason for this has been 
the strong protection attributed to the right to associate in the ECHR protection scheme by 
the Convention organs. When the right to acquire legal personality is viewed in the context 
of Article 9 interpreted in the light of Article 11 or vice versa, the threshhold for 
accommodating state restrictions is high. The exception here is presented in the Refah Partisi 
v. Turkey case, which dealt with the dissolution of a political party that sought, among others, 
to establish the sharia and a multi-juridical system.297 Although the case is decided on the 
right to freedom of association and not the right to freedom of religion or belief, its 
significance lies in the fact that it reveals the European Court’s limit in relation to the right to 
associate. Thus demonstrating that when associative rights of religious/belief communities 
including religious jurisdiction are concerned the margin of appreciation doctrine may apply.  
 
When assessing claims concerning the right to acquire legal personality a strict application of 
the respective restriction clauses is necessary in order to heighten the standard of review. In 
particular, the prescribed by law requirement and necessity of restrictions as well as a rigid 
scrutiny of the evidentiary basis of restrictive measures and proportionality appear to be key 
interpretive devices to address relevant violations. When a violation in such cases pertaining 
to recognition or registration of a religious community is found, frequently, the violation may 
be a result of general repression, bias or discrimination against the community in question. 
Yet, the capacity and the willingness to deal with broad issues that are related to vague laws 
creating the possibility for extensive discretion by administrative authorities that may reflect 
unfavorable attitudes towards certain belief communities may not always be there. While in 
the Manoussakis v. Greece the ECtHR clearly demonstrated unwillingness to decide the case 
on the inclination on the part of the authorities to restrict religious practice of non-orthodox 
beliefs in general and Jehovah’s Witnesses in particular,298 in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 
the ECtHR showed willingness to confront repressive legislation and practice. Finding of a 
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violation based on failure for the restrictions to be prescribed by law could potentially have a 
better chance to resonate at the domestic level than another ground. Hence the State in 
question can be challenged to change its law. Surely, for belief communities institutional and 
attitude problems are of crucial importance and yet more difficult to prove and make a 
matter of legal proceedings. While improvement in this area would be welcome this may not 
be without problems even if the Court were willing to take note of wide-scale repressive 
measures against certain belief communities. It would be important that the applicant be 
able to demonstrate the scale of measures taken against the belief community. As 
underscored by Evans since the Court is supposed to be one of the primary organs for 
protecting human rights in Europe it should be ready to take a wider view of cases such as 
Kokkinakis and Manoussakis where it is clear that an oppressive pattern of State behavior 
has been conducted under the law at hand.299 As it has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, the 
consideration of state reports on the implementation of the ICCPR and the enforcement of 
judgments of the ECtHR by the Committee of Ministers may be means of international review 
conducive to tackle broad-scale repressive and discriminatory legislation and practice in this 
area. Where violation of Article 18 of the ICCPR or Article 9 of the ECHR is found extending 
scrutiny of whether there was a discrimination or not may also be a means of improving 
standard of international review. This will be briefly examined below. 
 
3.5. The Prohibition of Discrimination 
 In the process of adjudication, claims concerning discrimination in connection to legal 
personality, recognition and registration claim may be potentially a significant tool to identify 
recurring patterns of discrimination and general repression toward certain groups.300 It is not 
the purpose here to provide a comprehensive examination of the concept of non-
discrimination and its development in international law- an impossible task considering the 
limitations of this paper. Instead here my purpose is to demonstrate that the inclusion of the 
consideration of the principle of non-discrimination is the assessment of claims concerning to 
acquisition of legal entity status can strengthen the claims as well as- where violation is 
found- lead to the formulation of judgments that may potentially point to measures that 
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must be taken to seek corrective action by states. It will be, however, seen below that the 
non-discrimination clauses have not been bring about this potential. 
 
Article 26 of the ICCPR is an autonomous provision protecting against discrimination,301 
thereby extending protections of equality and non-discrimination beyond the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Covenant. The HRCttee underscored the importance of observing 
the principle of non-discrimination in relation to Article 18(3) in its General Comment 22; “in 
interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, States parties should proceed from 
the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, including the right to equality 
and non-discrimination on all grounds specified in Articles 2, 3 and 26”.302 In addition, 
“restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory 
manner”.303 States must ensure that “the fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion 
or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of 
the population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under 
the Covenant, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents to 
other religions or non-believers”.304 In particular, “certain measures discriminating against 
the latter, such as measures restricting eligibility for government service to members of the 
predominant religion or giving economic privileges to them or imposing special restrictions 
on the practice of other faiths, are not in accordance with the prohibition of discrimination 
based on religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under Article 26”.305 
Indeed, the HRCttee has consistently criticized differentiation in the treatment of 
“traditional” and other religions, in particular when it comes to the official registration of a 
Church or religious community and the acquisition of legal personality” and deemed these to 
raise issues both under Article 18 and Article 26.306  Even though there is ample case-law 
regarding Article 14 in the jurisprudence of the HRCttee there have not been cases that have 
specifically dealt with Article 14 in the context of religious or belief organizations. The 
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HRCttee has expressed that Article 14 is “a key element of human rights protection and 
serves as a procedural means to safeguard the rule of law”.307   
 
The ECtHR has not been consistent in its utilization of Article 14 in relation to Article 9 in or 
Article 11 in light of Article 9. In a number of cases where the applicants have raised 
complaints regarding Article 14 in addition to Article 9, the ECtHR has held that the alleged 
inequality has been sufficiently taken into account in the assessment that has led to a 
violation of Article 9 or Article 11 in light of Article 9 and saw no reason for separate 
examination of the facts from the standpoint of Article 14.308 In other cases, the ECtHR has 
simply not seen it necessary to adjudicate under Article 14 even though there have been 
indications in the consideration of the case under Article 9 that the interference in question 
may include a discriminatory pattern.309 
 
In another case concerning the refusal by domestic authorities of registration as a religion of 
an organization of Muslims the European Court did not find the requirement of presenting 
the Government a document setting out the fundamental principles of their religion.310 The 
Court held that (the State could not establish the authenticity of the organization seeking 
recognition as a religion and whether the denomination in question presented a danger for 
democratic society).311 Interestingly, when considering Article 14, the European Court did not 
find substantiation of this claim by not showing (that the requirements of the Religious 
Denominations Act were applied more strictly to it in comparison with other organizations 
seeking recognition(.312 Were the applicants able to present that other groups were not 
asked same criteria as they, this may have made it possible for the European Court to view 
this information as a substantiation of the claim under Article 14. It appears that applicants 
bringing relevant claims under Article 14 may have a better chance if they can provide 
statistical information and examples demonstrating their differential treatment.   
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One way of establishing whether there has been discrimination or not may be through the 
demonstration of statistical information. The fact that the ECtHR has recently shown 
willingness to consider statistical evidence will strengthen such claims.313 However, the fact 
that ECtHR requires “undisputed official statistics” in order to take them into account,314 may 
be a factor to harden the proof of discrimination for applications. Where there is strong 
suspicion that there may be discriminatory practice and when there is no relevant official 
statistics the Court may as the state to demonstrate, perhaps through statistical information, 
that there is no discrimination. For example, if the case involves restrictions on acquisition of 
legal personality where the belief group in questions claims to be denied such status through 
unsuccessful applications, the state may be asked concerning similar applications by groups 
belonging to the same religion or belief, whether their applications have been successful, or 
the total number of applications and the total of successful applications etc. This type of 
probing and inquisitive assessment may be a means of determining discriminatory patterns 
against certain religious or belief groups.       
 
In the case of Religionsgemeinschft der Zeugen Jehovahs and Others v. Austria, however, the 
ECtHR was persuaded that the differential treatment of the applicant, based on the allegedly 
discriminatory criteria required for the recognition as a religious society, amounted to a 
violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9.315 Under Austrian law religious societies 
enjoyed a privileged treatment, yet, inter alia, twenty years existence of a religious 
association was one of the requirements for the recognition of a religious society.  The Court 
held that it could accept such a time period in exceptional circumstances as, for example, a 
newly established religious groups, but hardly acceptable in regards religious groups with 
long international existence. It was held that,        
  In respect of such a religious group (Jehovah’s Witnesses), the authorities should be able to verify 
 whether it fulfils the requirements of the relevant legislation within a considerably shorter period. 
 Further, the example of another religious community cited by the applicants shows that the Austrian 
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 State did not consider the application on an equal basis of such a waiting period to be an essential 
 instrument for pursuing its policy in that field.
 316
 
  
Hence, the Court found that the difference in treatment was not based on any 
“objective and reasonable justification”.317   
 
While the case of the Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria does 
not resemble to the aforementioned cases concerning registration, they do have 
commonalities in terms of discriminatory rules. Yet, the ECtHR does not seem to take the 
route of consistently considering each case substantively under Article 14 in addition to 
Article 9 or Article 11 in light of Article 9.  
  
Now let us turn to explore other rights that constitute basis for the right to acquire legal 
personality for religious/belief groups. The right to court and the right to association together 
also establish “a fairly strong right to entity status”.318 
 
3.6. The Right to Fair Trial- Judicial Protection   
 The right to fair trial has important implications for enabling judicial protection of 
belief communities or organizations and their assets and in this respect it is closely linked to 
having legal personality. The absence of legal personality of a belief community may amount 
to and result in, more often than not, an absence of judicial protection of the community’s 
assets which might be essential for manifesting religion or belief and certain religious 
activities. Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR, respectively protect the right to 
fair trial in civil and criminal cases. The HRCttee’s General Comment No. 32 on Article 14 of 
the ICCPR holds that the right to fair trial includes the right to a public hearing before an 
independent and impartial tribunal within reasonable time, the presumption of innocence, 
and other minimum rights for those charged in a criminal case.319 As far as belief groups are 
concerned it is vital that they have legal personality so that they can have judicial protection. 
Alternately, to benefit from judicial protection they need to have legal entity status, this link 
demonstrates the empowering function of legal personality. 
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 The ECtHR holds that Article 6 (1) “secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to 
his civil rights and obligations brought before a court”, hence embodies a “right to court”, “a 
right to access a court”.320 While this right may be restricted, the restriction may not be such 
that the very essence of the right is impaired.321 According to established ECtHR case-law,  
 … one of the means of exercising the right to manifest one’s religion, especially for a religious 
 community in its collective dimension, is the possibility of ensuring judicial protection of the 
community,  its members and its assets so that Article 9 must be seen not only in the light of Article 11, but 
also in  the light of Article 6.
322
       
 
The link between lack of legal capacity and the resulting restrictions on activities of a church 
was addressed in Canea Catholic Church v. Greece on the basis of Article 6 of the ECHR.323 
The case concerned a very old church that was never established as a legal entity but 
nevertheless acquired movable and immovable property, concluded contracts and taken part 
in notarized transactions. The validity of these actions had never been contested, however, 
the church was denied access to court because it lacked legal personality. In response to the 
Government’s argument that the Church in one way or another could have sought to carry 
out formalities in order to acquire some form of legal personality, the Court maintained that 
this was unacceptable as there was nothing to suggest that one day they would be denied 
access to court.324 Hence the burden was not on the Church to seek a form of legal 
personality. This may be significant in establishing that in cases where there is lack of a 
regulation for procedures related to legal entity of religious communities, or where such 
regulations are unclear, it is the responsibility of the state to make regulations that are clear 
and foreseeable so that belief communities can know what is expected of them. Similarly, in 
the case of Holy Monasteries v. Greece the Court found that by depriving the monasteries 
from the possibility of bringing a complaint in relation to their right to own property, they 
might take against the Greek State, third parties or Greek Church to courts the law in 
question impairs the very essence of their “right to court.”325  
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 3.7. The Right to Freedom of Association 
 Article 11 (1) of the ECHR stipulates: 
 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others[…]  
 
 When belief communities associate for the purposes of manifesting their religion or 
belief through acts protected under Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR, inter 
alia, establishing places of worship, teaching and training their own clergy they may establish 
associations that are also protected respectively by Article 11 (ECHR) and Article 22 (ICCPR). 
The European Court affirms that “citizens should be able to form a legal entity in order to act 
collectively in a field of mutual interest” and considers the formation of a legal entity as an 
important aspect of the right to freedom of association “without which the right would be 
deprived of any meaning”.326 Thus establishing firmly the nexus between the right to 
association and legal entity status. Groups of believers can also base their claims to acquire 
legal entity status on their right to freedom of association. Since belief communities also “act 
collectively in a field of mutual interest”, namely their shared belief, where this requires the 
acquisition of a legal entity status, it would reasonably follow that the right to freedom of 
association would protect this claim. Krishnaswami notes that the generality of the terms of 
the article protecting freedom of association, leaves no doubt that it extends to the sphere of 
religion or belief.327 There is no reason for religious associations to be treated less favorably, 
on the contrary, claims of religious or belief communities have the added protection of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief. Also if a religious or belief community were to be 
denied legal entity status as it is required by the right to association, based on their “religious 
nature” this may give rise to questions on prohibition of discrimination as protected by 
Article 14 of the ECHR.328    
 
When it comes to belief groups the European Court views Articles 9 and 11 as 
complementary provisions. The fact that the Court feels the need to rely on both Articles 
implies that it does not view solely Article 9 as a sufficient legal basis for the protection of 
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associative acts of belief groups. In Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, the Government argued 
that the organization and leadership of the Muslim community in Bulgaria, needed to be 
analyzed mainly from the angle of Article 11 protecting freedom of association.329 Here the 
European Court took a clear stand saying,  
 Where the organization of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 of the Convention must be 
 interpreted in the light of Article 11, which safeguards associative life against unjustified State 
 interference… Were the organizational life of the community not protected by Article 9 of the 
 Convention, all other aspects of the individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable.
330
   
  
 The Court was of the opinion that this particular case would not be better dealt with 
solely under Article 11, as suggested by the Government, in their view such an approach 
would take the applicants’ complaints out of their context and disregard their substance.331 
Hence in the Court’s view the ideal way to deal with the complaint was to examine it under 
Article 9 of the Convention as interpreted in light of Article 11. The need to bring in Article 11 
indicates that the substantive scope of Article 9, as such, is not viewed as broad to include 
the associative acts as manifestations of belief or religion.     
 
Regarding complaints raised by belief organizations in relation to legal entity status in the 
context of re-registration procedures, the European Court held that the complaints raised 
issues both under Article 11 and Article 9.332 A refusal by domestic authorities to grant legal 
status to an association of individuals amounts to an interference of the right to association 
and where an organization of a religious community is at issue, such refusal also constitutes 
and interference of the right to freedom of religion or belief.333  In The Moscow Branch of 
Salvation Army v. Russia, it was a violation of Article 11 read in light of Article 9.334  It seems 
that where there are complaints regarding an already established organization established by 
a religious community then the Court looks at whether there is an interference with Article 
11 read in light of Article 9.   When there is not yet an organization established then the 
Court assess whether there has been an interference with Article 9 read in light of Article 11.  
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The HRCttee dealt with complaints in Sisters of the Holy Cross v. Sri Lanka under Article 18, 
dealing with a claim concerning the establishment of a charity institution. Article 22 was not 
raised by the applicant, nor by the State. However in S. Malakhovsky and A. Pikul v. Belarus, a 
case about re-registration requirements, the HRCttee dealt with the case solely under Article 
18, while also noting that it also raised issues under Article 22 so as to merit admissibility.  
 
The associative acts of religious groups that are necessary to carry out their collective acts, 
however, are not solely protected by Article 9 in the European scheme as there the European 
Court relies on the protection of Article 9 interpreted in light of Article 11 and the protection 
of Article 11 in light of Article 9.  These acts need to be able to protected solely under Article 
9. Belief groups need not raise their complaints related to their associative rights under 
freedom of association. Nevertheless, this does not preclude that possibility of same issues 
being raised under the right to freedom of association.  While the HRCttee observes that 
associative acts of belief groups raise issues both under Articles 18 and 22 of the ICCPR, it 
takes a broad view of the scope of Article 18 so as to base its deliberation solely on Article 
18.  The difference in the approach of the ECHR and HRCttee reflects a difference in the 
interpretation of the respective religious freedom clauses in how far they extend to 
associative acts, the HRCttee certainly seems to have a broader view.    
 
 
In conclusion, for belief groups, the right to acquire an adequate form of legal personality for 
the enjoyment of the right to manifest religion or belief is a key enabling and empowering 
right without which groups of believers generally cannot effectively exercise their right to 
manifest religion or belief in community with others in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance; they cannot own or rent property, including places of worship, establish schools 
and seminaries, engage in charity activity which is integral to very many religions. The 
process of acquiring legal personality, however, remains a highly regulated legal sphere by 
states where state-religion relation becomes an important denominator of the nature of this 
sphere. Conversely, in the exercise of this right, the particular state-religion relationships that 
have been historically and contextually shaped bring in various privileges or prejudices, 
cooperation and co-existence between states and religious groups. Normative demands of 
international obligations constitute a challenge to the ways in which this sphere has been 
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traditionally regulated; the observance of the principles of neutrality and impartiality in the 
exercise of the regulatory powers of states is given importance by both the ECtHR and the 
HRCttee. Yet, when international review mechanisms employ self-restraint, in particular the 
ECtHR, giving substantive content to relevant international provisions will be delayed and 
lacking.    
 
The right of a religious/belief community to obtain legal personality has been progressively 
recognized as a part of the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief.  Considering that positive obligations ensuing from the right to freedom of religion or 
belief are less than clearly established in international jurisprudence the recognition of the 
right to acquire legal personality gives the latter a high rank within the constellation of 
elements making up together the scope of the right to freedom of religion or belief, 
particularly in its collective dimension. Since states are required to ensure the effective 
protection of human rights, including the right to freedom of religion or belief, there is a 
positive obligation on the part of states to create an accessible and adequate form of legal 
personality. While the right to acquire legal personality is first and foremost protected within 
the scope of the right to freedom of religion or belief, other inter-dependent and 
complementary rights such as the right to association, the right to friar trial and rights of 
minorities are also relevant.  
  
The ECHR and the ICCPR have demonstrated similarities and differences in the way they have 
dealt with claims pertaining to legal personality issues. Conceptually, the most striking 
difference is the basis of the right to legal personality; for the ECHR such claims may be 
addressed under Article 9 interpreted in the light of Article 11 or where the issues concerns 
an already established organization Article 11 in light of Article 9. It follows that the ECtHR 
does not view associative acts of belief groups as a matter that is grounded solely on Article 
9, while the latter creating the context in which the right is exercised. The HRCttee, on the 
other hand, while observing that Article 22 may also be applicable, has dealt with similar 
cases solely under Article 18, including in its observations on state reports on the 
implementation of the ICCPR. The different approaches of the two bodies reflect a narrow 
view of the scope of manifestations on the part of the Strasbourg organs and a broader view 
of the HRCttee. On the other hand, as regards the ECtHR, the strong protection afforded to 
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the right to association has lent strong protection, not leaving room for a margin of 
appreciations to states, to the right to acquire legal personality by believers as long as these 
are compatible with democracy. 
 
In the adjudication of cases involving acquisition of legal personality, recognition and 
registration of religious groups both the HRCttee and the Strasbourg organs have 
underscored that states must be strictly guided by restriction clauses enshrined in the 
provision regulating freedom of religion; only such limitations, as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others. The requirement, for restrictions imposed on the manifestation of 
religion or belief in the context of the right to acquire legal personality, recognition and 
registration for religious/belief communities, be “prescribed by law” has immense potential 
against vague laws and arbitrary actions of domestic authorities at various levels. This is 
particularly strengthened by the subsequent developments in case law of both ECHR and the 
HRCttee and the General Comment on the restrictions clause of Article 18 of the HRCttee 
where they have elaborated on the quality of law. The role of precise, clear, forseeable 
legislation in this sphere is crucial in order to avoid arbitrary and discretionary practices.  
 
A more effective utilization of the principle of non-discrimination in the assessment of claims 
concerning the acquisition of legal personality for belief groups will strengthen these claims 
and result in the construction of judgments that may lead to more specific measures that 
must be taken by states in order to ensure that similar violations happen again. 
  
While the application of permissible restriction clauses has been an important means of 
blocking arbitrary practice by states it appears that international compliance review 
mechanisms may be improved to avert wide-spread repressive legislation and practice. A 
substantive focus by the adjudicatory bodies to the wider legislative or application issues 
where this leads to the case being decided on these issues may improve protection.  When 
the cases are decided based on broader issues then the enforcement of the judgments and 
follow of opinions may have the capability of seeking broader corrective action by states. A 
foreseeable disadvantage of such an approach may be that states may consider the ECtHR 
and the HRCttee too “active” and be critical of judgments. However, in the long run such an 
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approach would greatly increase the effect of international review of individual cases on the 
improvement of national protection. The weakness however lies in the inability or 
unwillingness to address wider issues related to how the formulation of laws and their 
applications affects certain religious/belief groups.   
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 Chapter 4 
The Right of Religious/Belief Groups to Freedom in their Internal Affairs   
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The right to freedom in the internal affairs or autonomy of religious or belief groups 
constitutes an integral part of the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion 
or belief. Its scope is, however, far from clear. International provisions protecting the right to 
freedom of religion or belief do not provide an exhaustive list of rights that would provide an 
all-encompassing list of acts that are protected under the right to autonomy of religious/belief 
communities.  And this is rightly so, considering that issues that may arise under the notion of 
“autonomy of religious/belief communities” are likely to cover a wide range of acts based on 
the wide range of beliefs and dogma relevant to their internal affairs.  
 
This Chapter aims to explore the international protection of the right to freedom in the 
internal matters of religious or belief groups with a view to examine its scope and, possibly, 
improve the standard of international compliance review. To start with, the notion of 
autonomy of belief groups and its substantive scope is briefly discussed with reference to the 
relevant international provisions protecting religious freedom and the jurisprudence of the 
HRCttee and the Strasbourg organs. Adopting a broad approach that conceptualizes autonomy 
beyond organizational freedom of religious institutions, key aspects of autonomy are analyzed 
by taking the acts listed in Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance 
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief as the legal framework of analysis.335 Paul 
Taylor has provided a helpful and comprehensive comparative analysis of UN and European 
standards based on Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration.336 The same legal framework will be 
used here while being mindful that there are countless forms of manifestations/acts protected 
under the religious freedom provisions that may or may not exactly correspond to the 
categories listed in this framework. Then, following the question of whether a right to form 
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and implement religious jurisdiction may also be protected within the scope the right to 
freedom in the internal matters is investigated. This overview demonstrates that when 
positive obligations- thus policy considerations- of states are concerned, international 
adjudicators tend to adopt a narrow interpretation of the scope of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief, whereas, where negative obligations are concerned, they tend to engage 
into greater scrutiny. There also appears to be more scrutiny where freedom of religion or 
belief overlaps with freedom of expression and freedom of association which constitute 
prominent aspects of international human rights protection schemes. Whether or not and to 
what extent, viewing rights as also raising questions under autonomy, can be viewed as 
interpretive tool that requires rigorous scrutiny of restrictions is explored as well. In regards to 
its relation to the whole of the thesis, this Chapter complements the previous Chapter on legal 
personality by exploring the other aspects of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief in a comprehensive- albeit not exhaustive- manner.  
 
4.2. Autonomy/ The Right of a Religious/Belief Community to Freedom in Their Internal 
Matters   
  
Autonomy of religious or belief communities in constructing their own affairs has been 
considered one of the crucial features of any meaningful system of freedom of religion or 
belief.337 The scope and nature of autonomy or internal affairs is to a great extent determined 
by the comprehensiveness of the religion or belief in question. Autonomy may be defined in a 
narrow fashion to include “the right of self-determination of religious bodies” and their ability 
to decide freely about “the teaching and offices, the range of their activities and the shape of 
their structures”.338 Religious autonomy has, however, been defined also as a potentially 
expansive issue.339 The community life lived as envisioned by a religion or belief constitutes 
the basis of the right to autonomy and arguably it is a “specialized and heightened form of the 
                                                        
337
 Roland Minnerath, ”The Right to Autonomy in Religious Affairs” in Facilitating Freedom of Religion or 
Belief: A Deskbook, T. Lindholm, W.C. Durham and B. G. Tahzib-Lie (Eds.)  (Martinus Nijhof, 2004), p. 291. 
338
 W. Cole Durham, “The Right to Autonomy in Religious Affairs” in Church Autonomy - A Comparative 
Survey, Gerhard Robbers (Ed.), (Peter Lang, 2001), p. 5. 
339
 Perry Dane, ”The Varieties of Religious Autonomy” in Gerhard Robbers (ed.) Church Autonomy - A 
Comparative Survey, (Peter Lang, 2001), p. 117. 
115
right to association”.340 Indeed, taking into account religions that envision and prescribe broad 
legal systems, autonomy may be defined broadly to include matters of “personal law” such as 
marriage, divorce and inheritance. Whatever the form and scope of autonomy it will be 
complex and deeply contextual.341  
 
The scope, variety and nature of organizations that are formed by religious/belief groups and 
their acts are largely governed by the dogma embraced by them. Religious or belief 
communities, on the one hand, tend to form their own organized structures for a variety of 
purposes; these may be, inter alia, charities or humanitarian institutions, places of worship, 
educational institutions, publication houses, radio or broadcasting institutions, or similar 
associations. In addition, they tend to engage in acts, such as assemble and/or worship, 
provide charity/assistance, teach/train, elect leaders, publish printed material, receive or 
provide financial contributions, use materials related to their rituals, observe days of rest and 
holidays and ceremonies in accordance with their religion or belief. The conception of internal 
affairs as solely “the organizational structure” would imply that other acts they engage in are 
not included. Such a conception would fail to sufficiently capture the acts that constitute the 
“internal affairs” of religious/belief groups and their inter-connected nature as manifestations 
of religion or belief. When assessing claims pertaining to manifestations of religion or belief, 
the adoption of a broad view of autonomy of religious/belief communities may improve the 
standard of international review. Were it possible for international adjudicators to see the 
issues raised in terms of autonomy, in addition to, manifestation of religion or belief, 
restrictions by states may be probed and scrutinized more thoroughly.    
 
The right to freedom in internal affairs is not explicitly stated in the core freedom of religion or 
belief articles, rather it follows from the phrase “freedom to manifest religion or belief 
individually or in community with others in worship, observance, practice or teaching”.342  
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The HRCttee states explicitly that freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching encompasses a broad range of activities. The terms 
“worship, observance, practice and teaching” are usually understood as providing protection 
to all possible manifestations of religion or belief.343 Later decisions of the Committee also 
support its position that manifestations listed in paragraph 4 are not meant to be exhaustive.  
The HRCttee in its General Comment 22 on Article 18 includes a catalog of acts that fall within 
the sphere of freedom in the management of internal affairs.344 It is evident that this list is not 
meant to be exhaustive but illustrative; it was clearly expressed in the drafting discussions; “all 
ways of manifesting one’s religion or belief”,345 are meant to be protected. Although the 
General Comment does not create a general category as “autonomy in internal organization” it 
contains the phrase “acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such 
as the freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers.”346 Exactly what acts fall 
into the category of “integral to the basic affairs” would naturally be dependent on the 
teachings and interpretations of the religious/belief community in question which avails itself 
of this freedom. There are, however, two key words to the understanding of the scope of 
protection afforded here. The first one is the word “integral.” The ordinary meaning of this 
word is “necessary or constituent”,347 emphasizing that these acts have to form an essential 
part of the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs. It would follow that not all acts 
that constitute part of the religious groups’ internal affairs are protected under Article 18.  As 
it is often the case this determination process proves to be problematic as the believer, the 
State and the HRCTTEE may have different views on it. During the drafting of the boundaries of 
admissible acts of religious manifestations it was stated that “the features of a religion or 
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belief are to be ascertained by the adherents of the underlying religion or belief only”.348 
Surely such an insider’s approach,349 would be most welcomed by believers.350 
 
The second key word is the phrase “basic affairs.”351 The practice and teaching of religion or 
belief includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs. Again here 
is a term that is qualifying the acts protected, namely, Article 18 protects only the conduct of 
basic affairs. A number of acts are listed as illustrations of what these might mean; freedom to 
choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers and acts that are particularly related to 
teaching such as freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools, freedom to establish 
places of worship and freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publication. It has 
been suggested generally on the whole of the acts listed in paragraph 4, that the list could 
have provided the states parties with more guidance as to the substantive content of Article 
18 and particularly with regard to the organizational matters of religious groups the following 
have been proposed for inclusion; freedom to organize and maintain local, regional, national 
and international associations in connection with one’s religion or belief, to participate in their 
activities.352  
 
Whether states take a broad or narrow view of manifestations will always determine the scope 
of protected acts. Therefore the stance taken by international organs authorized to interpret 
relevant religious freedom provisions is crucial, as domestic authorities will be required to 
follow international interpretation. While a comprehensive list may be appreciated it is 
important to remember that the understanding on what constitutes manifestation of religion 
or belief will continue to be a crucial element determining the scope of protection. Evans 
argues that the acts listed in General Comment 22 are limited to “religious rites and customs” 
and that forms of behavior or activities that may flow from religious beliefs are not covered. 
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353 However, this may not be certain, it may be possible to connect behavior or acts to 
worship, teaching, practice, or observance, depending on one’s conception of worship, 
teaching, practice and observance. Still, the lists of General Comment 22 and Article 6 of the 
1981 Declaration still a fairly broad construction of manifestations, considering that it is 
illustrative. It is important to underscore the fact that while the latter constitutes an 
illustrative list of acts that are protected the main criteria is that in order to be protected, an 
act has to be considered a manifestation of religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice or 
observance. For example, worship extends to, inter alia, assembly for worship and 
establishing, maintaining and repair of places of worship as well as use articles necessary in 
worship. Teaching, practice and observance also have substantive content that extend to 
cover diverse acts. All of the acts under Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration may be qualified as 
forms of manifestation in worship or teaching or practice or observance and some acts may be 
covered under more than one category. Therefore it is important not to read to extensively 
into set categories.  
 
It has to be remembered that forms of manifestations of religion or belief are integrated and 
interrelated spheres so one should not read too extensively into set categories of rights.  For 
example what, at first glance, may be the right to worship, most of the time includes the rights 
to establish a place of worship, to acquire legal personality, to use a particular language held 
sacred, to publish sacred books, produce or import necessary materials used in the act of 
worship. Article 6 of the 1981 goes farthest in summarizing a broad list of rights. While this list 
is by no means exhaustive or definitive, it is an indication of the extent of these freedoms,354 
having an illustrative function. Similarly, while Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR 
do not include lists akin to Article 6, in their relevant jurisprudence as well as the General 
Comment of the HRCttee on Article 18, they do extend the sphere of protection to many acts 
covered by the former.  
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The terms “worship, observance, practice and teaching” are not defined in the ECHR and the 
preparatory documents do not provide any insight into what these categories consist of.355 
Subsequent decisions and judgments of the Strasbourg organs have not provided any 
description of these categories and what manifestations are protected in each. Worship has 
been given the highest status of the manifestations listed in Article 9 (1).356 The Commission 
has said that Article 9 primarily protects personal beliefs and religious creeds and “acts which 
are intimately linked to these, such as worship and devotion.”357 Here the important criterion 
has been that the act has to be intimately linked to the belief in order to qualify as a form of 
manifestation in worship. As for observance, the Commission and the Court have not given 
this category of manifestation a separate consideration, yet. Evans, concludes that 
“observance” seems to have been conflated into a slightly extended notion of worship and 
that they are considered together as “worship and observance” without a particular 
distinction.358 While “teaching” has not been defined either, it has been subject to more 
detailed discussion. In a number of cases acts such as proselytizing, religious teaching in school 
curriculum and in religious institutions have been considered under the right to manifest 
religion or belief in teaching.359  
 
The term practice has proved to be the most difficult one to define. The ordinary meaning of 
this term is, “to do or perform often, customarily, or habitually”,360 which would mean in the 
context of religion or belief, to act according to the beliefs and customs of a particular religion 
or belief. It has been pointed out that if one takes a broad view of practice then it would be 
inevitably understood as covering all acts of “worship, observance and teaching.”361 On the 
other hand, it can also be construed in a narrow manner, meaning only acts similar to worship. 
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The Commission and the Court had drawn the limits of protection in relation to practice by 
repeatedly stating that “the term practice…does not cover each act which is motivated and 
influenced by religion or belief.”362 The approach taken by Strasbourg organs had been further 
narrowed by the “necessary expression” test whereby it is asked whether a certain act is 
necessary for the fulfillment of the obligations of believers of a certain religion or belief. 
However, this position appears to have been abandoned with the finding on Eweida and 
Others v. the UK where the ECtHR repudiated the necessity test and accepted that the 
applicant has a sense of obligation to wear the cross necklace.363 Obviously, here a crucial 
question is who determines what is necessary; the individual believer, the Court or even an 
expert opinion may differ on what exact acts are necessary for the precepts of a certain 
religion or belief and it makes sense to strongly defer to the believer’s view.  
 
  
 
More recently, in the Grand Chamber judgment concerning the case of Fernandez and 
Martinez v. Spain the ECtHR, instead of balancing between the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion and individual human rights, the Court accepted the Spanish courts’ 
categorical balancing to the benefit of church autonomy instead.364 It will be interesting to see 
the implications of this evolved position for future cases involving individual rights in relation 
to employment and rights of religious communities. 
 
The analysis below will follow the paragraphs of Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration. As noted 
above the Article 6 does not encapsulate all possible forms of acts that belief groups engage 
within the scope of their internal affairs. For example pilgrimage or membership in a belief or 
religious community are not included. Still Article 6 is used since it offers a helpful legal 
framework for the examination of the right of belief communities to freedom in their internal 
affairs. It is worth remembering that Article 6 does not refer to “individuals” as the right-
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holder or does not refer to the right to “manifest individually or in community others”. Instead 
it refers to “freedoms” that the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief includes 
which are then listed as “acts”. And these acts are usually carried out collectively. Moreover, 
the issue of religious jurisdiction will be examined. The analysis and assessment will be based 
on the core freedom of religion or belief provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR and the 
jurisprudence of their respective bodies with interpretive authority. These jurisprudential 
sources do not provide equally substantive content on each category that is considered below. 
Therefore in order to gain a better understanding of the relevant legal issues, factual 
developments, challenges and guidance provided by the UN Special Rapporteur is also 
included. It should be borne in mind that while there may be differences in the approaches of 
these respective organs resulting from their function and context the standards set by them 
should not be contradictory.    
 
OSCE-Venice Commission addressed the issue of autonomy and self determination of religious 
or belief communities in its Guidelines for Legislative Reviews of Laws Affecting Religion or 
Belief.365 It is a helpful tool for understanding the scope of autonomy for religious or belief 
communities and providing guidance for State action when actions resulting from autonomy 
conflict with interests of individuals or society. The OSCE-Venice Commission, in line with 
HRCttee and ECHR acknowledges that States can have varying practices regarding autonomy of 
religious or belief communities.366 The Commission, however, places the duty to engage in 
careful and nuanced weighing of interests where there is a conflict between the interests of 
religious or belief groups and other societal interest. It elaborates on this weighing of interests 
by stating that there should be a strong deference towards autonomy except in cases where 
autonomy is likely to lead to a clear and identifiable harm.367 The Commission also draws 
attention to situations where autonomy issues are particularly likely to arise, namely in 
contexts where religious or belief organizations are engaged in activities such as operating 
hospitals, schools or businesses and where individuals assert that they discriminate on 
grounds such as gender or membership in the religion.368 The competing values of autonomy 
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and non-discrimination are particularly worth paying attention to when the employers receive 
public financing or tax deductions for their activities. These guidelines are important in that 
they affirm the autonomous character of religious or belief communities and also offer 
concrete guidance to State interference for situations where conflicts with societal interest 
may arise. In this context the Commission draws particular attention to discrimination. 
 
4.2.1 To worship or assemble in connection with religion or belief and to establish and 
maintain places for these purposes 
 The right to manifest religion or belief includes the right to establish places of 
worship.369   The right to worship and assemble for worship and establish and maintain places 
of worship is widely restricted by near explicit denials to certain belief/religious groups and 
often through restrictions that appear to be imposed through planning regulations, 
registration requirements and relevant administrative processes.370 Worship that takes place 
“in community with others” and “in public” stands out as an essential element of the 
manifestation of the right to freedom of religion or belief in its collective dimension; the great 
majority of religious communities or communities of belief need a place of worship where 
their members can manifest their faith. Unlike other forms of violations of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief, attacks or other forms of restriction on places of worship or 
other religious sites and shrines in many cases violate the right not only of a single individual, 
but the rights of a group of individuals forming the community that is attached to the place in 
question.371 Krishnaswami observed early on that the right to manifest religion or belief in 
worship is often curtailed through “unreasonable regulations”; by arbitrarily withholding 
licenses for opening places of worship, or by imposing criteria that is “onerous or difficult to 
comply with”, which in effect “negate” the right to worship.372  Factual developments, at the 
global scale, show that these challenges remain, Taylor observed that “in recent years 
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registration procedures have taken centre stage in the means by which States constrain the 
structural aspects of religious practice”.373 Villaroman suggests that the non-compliance 
results from the ‘bare and austere’ language of international provisions protecting the right to 
freedom of religion or belief thus leading to a ‘normative gap’.374 This will be considered 
below. 
 
The HRCttee has rigorously criticized restrictions on establishing and building places of worship  
as well as discriminatory treatment of particular religious groups.375 While considering the 
implementation of the ICCPR by Iran the HRCttee has expressed concern over a ban on 
conducting Christian services in Farsi.376 Considering the Report of Israel the HRCttee 
expressed concern at frequent disproportionate restrictions on access to places of worship for 
non-Jews.377 Similarly the Egyptian government was asked to respond to the alleged 
obstruction experienced by the Coptic Church in Egypt “in obtaining permits to repair and 
build places of worship”.378  
 
The use of registration or acquisition of legal entity status processes for religious/belief 
groups to restrict the right to establish places of worship has been underscored by the 
UN Special Rapporteur.379  The link between legal entity status and the right to 
establish places of worship is a vital one. The Special Rapporteur explains: 
 Legal status enables religious groups to act as juridical persons in the court system; it entitles religious 
 communities to build places of worship, exempts religious communities from customs duties, entitles the 
 community to open bank accounts, secures their standing as officially registered denominations and 
 means that such communities can be fully fledged partners with the Government.
380
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 In the case of S. Malakhovsky and A. Pikul v. Belarus, that concerned the refusal by the 
authorities to grant the status of religious association to the applicants, the HRCttee held that 
the limitations imposed must be “assessed in the light of the consequences which arise for the 
authors and their religious association”.381 While the case concerned the registration of a 
religious association and not the establishment of a place of worship the approach taken by 
the HRCttee is interesting to note. The HRCttee’s questions in its assessment, consideration of 
the necessity of the conditions, consequences for the applications and the proportionality of 
the restrictions on the right of the applications under Article 18(3) may be interpretive devices 
that may also be used in regards to places of worship. Inquisitive assessment of the necessity 
of restrictions shifts the burden of proof for the justification of the imposed restrictions to 
states and may be useful in detecting discriminatory patterns.    
 
In a number of cases, the Strasbourg organs have held that the refusal to grant authorization 
or planning permission for places of worship constituted an interference with the right to 
manifest their religion.382 On the other hand, the scrutiny of restrictions has not been strong; 
in ISKCON and 8 Others v. United Kingdom, Johannische Kirche and Peters v. Germany and 
Vergos v. Greece the proportionality of the interference with the applicants’ rights to manifest 
religion or belief was not considered.383 Planning regulations were considered to be prescribed 
by law and to pursue a legitimate policy aim, however, were not considered from the point of 
view of their suitability for the religious groups in question. The European Commission on 
Human Rights considered that the restrictions placed on an applicant for a place of worship 
were necessary for the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”, the residents of a 
nearby village.384 It also stressed that “the Commission does not consider that Article 9 of the 
Convention can be used to circumvent existing planning legislation, provided that in the 
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proceedings under that legislation, adequate weight is given to freedom of religion”.385 In 
Vergos v. Greece, instead of requiring the State to provide a ‘pressing social need’ to justify the 
interference with the right, the ECtHR held that the applicant had not sufficiently established 
the ‘social need’ for a ‘True orthodox Christian’ place of worship in his town.386    
 
Granting  ‘the wide margin of appreciation of the Contracting States in planning matters’ by 
the Strasbourg organs,387 without  giving due weight to the consideration of restrictions in 
question are proportionate to the aim pursued appears to be a factor making it difficult for 
belief groups to achieve positive response to their applications. In addition, the lack of 
consideration of whether the planning requirements take into account the specific nature of 
place of worship requirements of the religious community in question, the consideration of 
whether there is really a need for a particular place of worship by the Strasbourg organs seems 
to confer to states a regulating role that does not need to justify restrictions. Were a 
facilitating role that takes on a positive obligation to create the conditions so that belief 
groups can establish place of worship had been conferred to states, states would have had a 
greater burden to justify the restrictions. Likewise, a greater burden to justify restrictions by 
states would be necessary were the rights to worship and establish places of worship viewed 
as “internal matters” of religious/belief communities.    
 
The wide margin of appreciation conferred to States in planning matters together with a lack 
of consideration of proportionality and lack of development and focus on the positive 
obligations on the part of the states to create the conditions for the effective enjoyment of the 
right to establish places of worship contribute to non-identification of general repression of 
certain groups and whether a pattern of discrimination against a religious community exists. In 
the future the adoption of a more inquisitive review of the proportionality of planning and 
registration/recognition processes would help identify systematic discrimination. In order to 
ascertain that systematic discrimination does not exist, the Strasburg organs could as states to 
present statistical evidence proving that such discrimination does not exist. States may be 
asked to demonstrate the numbers of applications and the positive and negative results 
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attained. This would shift the burden of proof to the state to show that legislation and practice 
are not discriminatory.  
 
In addition, Berry’s comparison of the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs, to the Advisory 
Council (AC) on the Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM) presents a striking 
difference; whereas the Strasbourg organs prioritize the planning regulations that are 
prescribed by law and pursue a legitimate aim, mostly the protection of public order and the 
rights and freedoms of others,388 the AC “has focused on obstacles to minority communities 
gaining permission to build or reconstruct places of worship, as well as access to appropriate 
burial sites on a non-discriminatory basis”.389  Berry agues that identification by the AC of a 
widespread denial of the right to establish places of worship to minorities ensures that states 
are not able to justify such practices on a case-by-case basis.390  The HRCttee and the UN 
Special Rapporteur are also in positions to have such a broad approach as the FCNM, they 
have the advantage of being able to focus on majorities as well. The findings of the afore 
mentioned bodies could be used to inform the review of individual cases by the ECtHR and the 
HRCttee. In the process of assessment of claims, the inclusion of certain questions in order to 
establish whether the applicant group is treated in a discriminatory manner or whether there 
is systematic denial of the right to establish places of worship would improve the international 
review of standards. For example, inter alia, these questions may be asked; have members of 
the same community been able to establish places of worship, are same standard of 
requirements applied to other religious or belief groups, statistical information of successful 
applications, do the neutral planning regulations take into account the needs of diverse 
religious communities.   
 
The distinct approaches of Strasbourg organs and the HRCttee reflect that a wide margin of 
appreciation is conferred to states by the former which makes it difficult to detect 
discrimination or unnecessary restrictions and an inquisitive assessment on the part of the 
latter seeking substantiation by states indicating the necessity of the restrictions and a focus 
on the consequences of such restrictions on the manifestation of religion or belief by 
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applicants. Were the ECtHR adopt the inquisitive approach of the HRCttee the standard of 
review may be improved.  
 
4.2.2  The right to establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions 
 Religious or belief groups have been historically and traditionally involved in 
establishing and running charitable institutions helping vulnerable groups and humanitarian 
institution aiming to assist humanity. The Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR do 
not contain an explicit reference to the right to establish and maintain charitable or 
humanitarian institutions. The right to acquire legal personality and establish associations has 
been thoroughly considered in Chapter 3 of this thesis. This right is protected to the extent 
that it is considered a form of manifestation of religion or belief and/or to the extent it is 
viewed as an overlapping aspect of the rights to freedom of religion or belief and to 
association.391 In the drafting process of Article 18 of the ICCPR it was proposed that freedom 
of religion should include freedom of religious denominations or communities to organize 
themselves, to perform missionary, educational and medical work, to enjoy civil or civic rights 
etc.392 On the one hand it was stressed that any religious sect or order, as a corporate body 
should have an inherent right to perpetuate its own mode of life and to propagate its doctrine, 
on the other hand these proposals were viewed with a degree of concern that missionary 
activities of one religion might  undermine the fundamental faith of another religion and might 
therefore constitute a source of interreligious misunderstanding or friction.393 The General 
Comment 22 of the HRCttee does not refer to the right to establish and maintain charitable 
and humanitarian institutions. However, it is clear that the HRCttee envisages “a broad range 
of acts” that are protected under Article 18 and in Sister Immaculate Joseph and 80 Sisters v. 
Sri Lanka the HRCttee referred Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration which provides: "…. the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the following 
freedoms: …the right to establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian 
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institutions".394 This is however not an unlimited right both subject to the restrictions clause 
found in Article 18 and the reference to the phrase “appropriate” found in the provision.  
 
The Strasbourg organs have not directly dealt with a claim where the right to establish and 
maintain charitable or humanitarian institutions was restricted. However, it is clear that while 
a narrow understanding of manifestations has been adopted, the associative right of 
religious/belief groups has been understood and recognized, in part through reliance on the 
right to associate, be it Article 9 interpreted in light of Article 11 or Article 11 being interpreted 
in light of Article 9. Were the ECtHR faced with such a claim it is likely that first whether this 
constitutes an interference in the rights protected under Article 9 or Article 11 would be 
considered, where an interference is found, followed by the consideration of permissible 
restrictions. In the assessment of the case of the Metropolitan Church of Besserabia v. 
Moldova, while observing the negative outcomes of not having legal personality, the ECtHR 
noted the refusal of entry of humanitarian goods sent from abroad to the Church.395 Taylor, 
notes this reference as an “inclusion within Article 9 of humanitarian practices if only by 
implication”.396 Were the main legal question raised by the case interference in the 
establishment or maintenance of a charity or humanitarian organizations, it is likely that such a 
right would be recognized by the ECtHR. On the other hand, it is possible to envisage situations 
where this right would be permissibly restricted for example where the nature of what is 
proposed as “charity” or “humanitarian” overlaps with public services or functions of the state, 
or where funds are raised for funding illegitimate acts or in order to escape from taxes.  
  
4.2.3 The right to make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary article and 
materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief 
 
Manifestation of religion or belief in worship, teaching, observance and practice may require 
the use of various articles and materials ranging from the use of printed material such as holy 
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books and prayer books to ritual wine.397 The scope of this provision is difficult to determine; it 
is very much dependent on the dogma and practices of the particular religion or belief in 
practice. A narrow interpretation of Article 6(c) would limit the application of this provision to 
materials that are used in the context of a rite, for example, ritual wine may be used in a 
church building in the act of worship or religious ceremony thus be strictly related to a ritual 
that may take place in a worship place. Yet, considering the many different religious traditions 
of the world, such articles and materials may vary in their nature and the context in which they 
are used. A broad interpretation may accommodate the use of halal meat for Muslims which 
involves the consumption of it in every day life, not only in a ritual in a worship place.   
 
Taylor notes that there may be overlaps between Article 6 (c) and other Articles of the 1981 
Declaration,398 or indeed other forms of manifestation of religion or belief.  While it may be 
possible to include, for example, the protection of the use of religious clothing under Article 
6(c), the right to manifest one’s belief individually or in community with others in “observance 
and practice” may be better suited to address such claims.399 Strasbourg organs and the 
HRCttee have dealt with claims related to religious dress as manifestations in “observance and 
practice”.400 
 
4.2.4 The right to write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas 
 
 Publications that are used in religious services such as holy books and other literature 
as well as other material that may be used in, inter alia, worship and teaching a religion or 
belief to its followers as well as others. From the perspective of the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief such publications are usually produced taking into account the 
needs of religious or belief communities and play a significant role in manifesting religion or 
belief in worship, practice, teaching and observance as well as the preservation and 
transmission to new generations of a religious group’s identity. 
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 The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief extends the protection to the import 
of such publications.401 Similarly, the arrest of persons who have received religious material 
from oversees is questioned.402 Were such cases assessed by the ECtHR and the HRCttee 
perhaps a closer examination would look in the case of importation, whether the production 
of the publications is possible domestically.  If the applicants would establish that they need 
the publications to manifest their religion in worship, teaching, practice or observance then 
states would be asked to justify restrictions on import in accordance with Articles 9 of the 
ECHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR.  
 
The right to freedom of expression may be viewed as the more appropriate legal provision 
applicable to publications of a religious nature. Indeed, Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 19 of 
the ICCPR would also protect religious expressions in writing and publications. Having said 
that, the listing of this right within Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration underscores that to write, 
issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas is also protected by freedom of 
religion or belief. Since relevant publications may be used in worship and teaching, naturally, 
Article 6(d) is connected to both Article 6 (a) and Article 6 (e).  
 
Taylor observes that the HRCttee, when reviewing state reports has followed up on the 
freedom to write, issue and disseminate religious publications.403 The inclusion of 
“dissemination of publications” implies that the provision covers promotion or propaganda of 
religion or belief. The HRCttee has expressed concern reviewing Turkmenistan’s 
implementation of Article 18 that the State party strictly regulates the number of copies of 
religious texts that religious organizations may import, and change legislation so that 
“individuals can import religious texts in quantities they consider appropriate”.404 
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As far as the ECHR jurisprudence is concerned there has not been consideration of a case 
where the right of an individual or religious or belief group to write, issue and disseminate 
publications has been addressed. If that were the case it is likely that the Strasbourg organs 
would view this as freedom of expression (Article 10), because its content is best addressed 
under Article 9.405 Considering the prominent status of freedom of expression in the 
Convention system, it is likely that the right to write, issue and disseminate publications would 
be strongly protected as long as it does not give rise to religious intolerance and what the 
ECtHR would consider improper proselytism.406 
 
4.2.5 To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes 
 Forms of teaching can vary to a great extent; inter alia, teaching/training of religious 
personnel, teaching of children, youth and adults of the religious/belief and teaching for 
proselytism purposes.  The teaching of one’s congregants, particularly the children and youth, 
is a key to preserve and transmit the religious dogma, tradition and identity of religious/belief 
groups and therefore may be considered a key component of the autonomous acts of 
religious/belief groups. Moreover, state practice regarding religious or philosophical education 
as well as theological education for training religious personnel is diverse. 
 
Since both the ICCPR and ECHR protect the right to manifest religion or belief in “teaching”,407 
it is certainly an explicitly protected form of manifestation.  In addition, both instruments 
include provisions that create obligations for states to respect the rights of parents and legal 
guardians to raise their children in line with their religious or philosophical beliefs.408 Children 
cannot be required to take instruction in religious or philosophical education against their 
parents’ wishes. Compulsory education about religions or worldviews may be permissible 
however, the religious and ideological concerns of parents on behalf of their children must be 
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observed and exemptions must be put in place in a non-discriminatory manner. General 
Comment 22 on Article 18 refers to “freedom to establish seminaries or religious school”.   
  
In the review of state reports the HRCttee has expressed concern over reports of prohibition 
of private religious education at all levels.409 Although not a straightforward case on the 
autonomy of religious organizations, in the W. E. Delgado Paez v. Colombia case,410 HRCttee 
provides an implication on the autonomy the Church enjoys in theological teaching matters in 
Colombia public schools. In this case the applicant’s teaching of religious education class was 
allegedly interfered with because of his views on liberation theology which differed from that 
of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia. While the case has other dimensions as well, the HRCttee 
maintained that, without violating Art. 18, Colombia can allow the Church authorities to 
decide who may teach religion and in what manner it should be taught. Although it is not 
stated as a right of the Church to autonomy in theological matters, in its role as the religion 
educator in public schools411, it is stated as a possibility that would not violate Art. 18. When 
considering teachers’ freedom to teach their subjects in accordance with their own views 
under Art. 19, the right to freedom of expression, the Committee was willing to accept that 
the requirement of the Church to teach religion in a certain way did not violate Art. 19.  It 
would have been interesting to see how the Committee would balance the autonomy of the 
religious organization in theological education and the right to freedom of expression of 
teachers in delivering this teaching. 
 
 The OSCE Guidelines elaborate on this in relation to establishment of private schools where 
parents may educate their children “emphasizing ideological values”.412  States have a sphere 
of oversight in this context, however. They are permitted to establish neutral criteria for the 
teaching of standard subjects such as mathematics, history, science and they can regulate 
teacher certification.413 Yet non-discrimination rule applies and states are not to discriminate 
between belief groups, including recognized religious or ideological groups.  
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 4.2.6. To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and 
institutions 
Contributions received by religious/belief communities from individuals or institutions 
are often a sensitive issue for states,414 particularly when religious communities who are 
viewed with suspicion or those who are connected to religious communities abroad are 
concerned.  The focus of attention for states may easily turn to the implications of such 
contribution to national security, instead of the contribution in question may help meet the 
needs of belief groups for the manifestation of religion or belief. This may result in outright 
prohibition or intensive regulation or monitoring of financial or other contribution, particularly 
from abroad.   
 
The UN Special Rapporteur expressed his concern over violations of the right to solicit and 
receive voluntary financial and other contributions, inter alia, in relation to Tibet, the Special 
Rapporteur criticized the requirement that funds donated to Buddhist monasteries could only 
be deposited in a particular bank account and could not be withdrawn without first securing 
government approval.415 In relation to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Special 
Rapporteur expressed concern over the arrest of Christians allegedly for receiving financial 
donations from overseas sources.416  
 
The provision does not specify whether it pertains to reception of national or international 
contributions.  It is reasonable to assume that it covers both, from within the country and from 
other countries. Religious organizations depend on donations from their members for their 
existence hence must have the possibility of receiving donations. In addition, for many small or 
minority religious communities donations from abroad may constitute a life breather, 
particularly in situations where there is virtually no contribution from the state. Financial 
assistance from abroad is more likely to be monitored or restricted by states because these 
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may be viewed as interference into domestic issues by other states or groups within them. The 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief noted that the right to receive funding is 
not unlimited, yet, restrictions must be prescribed by law and must be necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, for 
example in order to prevent such institutions being misused to advance their cause through 
violence.417  
 
Strasbourg organs or the HRCttee have not dealt with complaints that have   directly raised 
issues with the freedom to solicit and receive financial or other contributions from individuals 
and institutions. The HRCttee has not raised this issue with states while deliberating state 
reports on the implementation of Article 18. The latter may be indicative of the status or 
attention given to this right as remaining at the periphery of the scope of protection afforded 
to freedom of religion or belief. However, for a meaningful review of the protection of 
freedom of religion or belief states must be asked to demonstrate that they have an adequate 
legal framework and facilitating and non-discriminatory practice for the believers, individually 
and in community with others to “solicit and receive voluntary financial and other 
contributions from individuals and institutions.” For example, the ability of establish a legal 
entity which can open a bank account, receive and send money transfers without a 
burdensome bureaucratic procedure and state-monitoring, non-discriminatory benefits or 
advantages for such collections are a few practicalities that need to be put in place.418 Where 
this right is recognized as a core aspect of freedom of religion or belief, international review 
would require a positive obligation on the part of states to create the legal framework and 
ensure that any restrictions must be prescribed by law and must pursue a legitimate aim, as 
enumerated in the relevant provisions and necessary in a democratic society. Based on the 
jurisprudence concerning the application of restrictions, one may assume that restrictions 
based on merely hypothetical suspicion on the states with national security or public order 
concerns in mind cannot be justified under international law.  The OSCE-Venice Commission 
draws attention to the need to observe the principle of non-discrimination when regulating 
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this right.419 Also, as a general rule states may provide some limitations, associations should be 
allowed to raise funds as long as they do not “violate other important public policies”.420  
  
4.2.7. To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the 
requirements and standards of any religion or belief 
 
The many diverse religious traditions and beliefs of the world and indeed their sub-groups, 
prescribe a wide variety of internal organizational structures and leadership patterns. While 
some have central leadership others reject central or hierarchical leadership structures and 
profess that each believer is capable of interpreting sacred texts or performing rituals. Some 
have structures that transcend national borders while others have numerous autonomous 
congregations/communities in a city.  Certain religious communities’ organizational structures 
and or leadership are under the authority of the State while others enjoy nearly complete 
separation. Some communities have detailed rules or procedures about leadership structures 
and ways in which leaders are elected or appointed while others reject such elaborate 
procedures as too formal. Whatever their form or lack of form, belief communities organize 
themselves in a way that is particular to them. All too often the ways or organization in itself is 
in fact an expression of their beliefs, mostly deeply embedded in their understanding or 
interpretation of sacred texts or traditions.421   
 
“The freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers” has been viewed as 
“conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs” in the GC 22 on Article 18 prepared by the 
HRCttee.422 This issue has been subject of frequent inquiry when reviewing state reports by 
the Committee, where the Committee has been critical of state interference in the 
appointment of religious leaders.423  
 
The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief affirms that the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief also includes the freedom to train, appoint, elect or 
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designate by succession appropriate leaders. “Undue interferences in the training of religious 
leaders” that can lead to a “shortage of appropriate leaders” have been viewed with 
concern.424 The practice of some states to impinge on the appointment procedure of religious 
leaders or the requirement approval by the authorities for certain promotions within religious 
groups has also been reported.425 For example, concern has been expressed over the “grave 
interference with the Tibetan Buddhists who have the right to determine their clergy in 
accordance with their own rites” upon allegations that Nyima, then aged 6, had disappeared 
three days after being recognized as the eleventh reincarnation of the Panchen Lama by the 
Dalai Lama.426 
 
Krishnaswami observed that in some cases public authorities have to adjudicate between rival 
elements within a religion, where judges must decide between the conflicting claims by 
interpreting the provisions of the religious law.427 This necessarily implies some interference in 
the management of religious affairs, he pointed out, however, that “the line between 
legitimate interference and undue pressure is in many cases extremely thin”.428  
  
ECHR had the opportunity to address the matter of autonomy in internal structure and 
selection of leadership in a number of cases brought before it. In this regard Serif v. Greece,429  
Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria430 and Supreme Holy Council of Muslim Community v. Bulgaria431 
are particularly important in revealing the Court’s view toward autonomy of religious 
communities and the protection given in Article 9. In Sherif v. Greece, a case which dealt with 
criminal proceedings brought against Serif who allegedly assumed the role of a minister, mufti, 
of ‘a known religion’, the Court ruled that, in democratic societies, the State need not take 
measures “to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified 
leadership”.432 It should be borne in mind, however, that the Court noted that Serif did not 
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attempt to exercise judicial and administrative functions of an officially recognized mufti.433 
This indicates that measures pursuing a legitimate aim may be taken to protect those whose 
legal relationships might be affected by acts of ministers from deceit.  Clearly the Court does 
not provide a carte blanche to all activities within the community for the sake of autonomy but 
takes into account rights of others. It is also interesting to note, in order to understand the 
ECtHR’s conception of the right to freedom of religion or belief that these cases have been 
decided solely on Article 9 – not relying on Article 11 in any way- which is indicative of the fact 
that the right to appoint and select religious leaders is viewed within the ambit of Article 9. 
 
While recognizing that where there is room for autonomy, conflict and tension within the 
community are unavoidable.434 In fact, in all three of the cases mentioned above there is 
rivalry in leadership within religious communities and State interference aimed at eliminating 
competition in leadership and thus securing a unified leadership. But the ECtHR firmly held 
that “the role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by 
eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.”435  The 
attribution of a strong importance to the protection of the right to autonomy in the 
appointment of leaders stands out as an aspect of freedom of religion or belief that is given 
priority to. If there were a ranking of rights that comprise the collective dimension of freedom 
of religion or belief  
 
The ECtHR holds that “the internal structure of a religious organization and the regulations 
governing its membership must be seen as a means by which such organizations are able to 
express their beliefs and maintain their religious traditions”.436  In Hasan and Chaush v. 
Bulgaria,437 the applicants complained that the authorities interfered with the organizational 
life of the Muslim community by replacing the legitimate leadership of the community and in 
refusing recognition of the re-elected leadership.438  The applicants claimed that the 
discretionary power of the government to change religious leadership at will in the absence of 
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a clear procedure comprising of a system of ad hoc letters, had profound consequences ad 
amounted to replacement of the whole organizational structure of the Muslim community and 
a complete destruction of normal community life.439    
   
In the case of the Supreme Holy Council of Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, dealt with the same 
conflict the European Court considered whether the involvement by domestic authorities in 
the organizational structure and leadership appointment of the applicant organization violated 
the rights of the applicants under Article 9.440 Here the rival groups within the organization had 
asked the Directorate of Religious Denominations for assistance in holding a unification 
conference.441 The Government claimed that this assistance flowed from the authorities’ duty 
under the Constitution to help maintain a climate of tolerance in religious life.442  While the 
Court was in agreement with the Government on the existence of such a duty, and noted that 
“neutral mediation between groups of believers would not in principle amount to State 
interference with believer’s rights under Article 9” cautioned about the sensitivities in this 
delicate area.443  Two considerations, however led to finding a violation. First, domestic law 
required all believers affiliated with a particular religion to form a single structure, headed by a 
single leadership even if the community were divided, without the possibility for those 
supporting other leaders to have an independent organizational life and control over part of 
the community’s assets.444  However, State measures seeking to compel the community or 
part of it to place itself under a single leadership against its will would constitute an 
infringement of the freedom of religion.445 Secondly, even though the initial participation of 
the Directorate was only neutral mediation the fact that the Directorate insisted on unification 
even though the applicant organization’s leaders decided to withdraw was problematic 
because the state imposed a particular way to resolve the problem.446    
 
Naturally, general restriction grounds, public safety, order, health or morals or the 
fundamental rights or freedoms of others apply. In addition the ECtHR, acknowledges that a 
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boundary to this autonomy can be drawn with the possible State action when it is necessary to 
‘reconcile the interests of various religions and religious groups that coexist in a democratic 
society.’447 This could be an elaboration of the restriction ground ‘fundamental rights or 
freedoms of others’ in the context of specifics of the case although it is not expressly stated. 
However, still the State’s role is basically one that is ‘regulatory’ in its relations with religions, 
denominations and beliefs.448  At times, providing autonomy to religious communities and 
neutrality of the State are closely connected. The State has the positive duty to remain neutral 
and impartial in the exercise of its regulatory power.      
 
4.2.8. The right to observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in 
accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief 
This provision is a potentially broad in scope because of the many possible forms of 
manifestations related to worship, practice and observance it can cover; again it is a helpful 
example of how one should not read too extensively to the set categories as each category 
may be intimately linked to or extend into other categories. The core religious freedom 
provisions do not include an explicit reference to the right to observe days of rest and 
celebrate holidays in accordance with one’s religion or belief. Yet, the HRCttee’s General 
Comment 22 explicitly refers to “the observance of holidays and days of rest” as a form of 
manifestation protected as such under Article 18.449 The phrase “to observe ceremonies in 
accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief” is potentially an expansive issue 
depending on the dogma of a religion belief. “Ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct 
expression to the belief” and “use of ritual formulae and objects” are explicitly mentioned in 
General Comment 22.450 Thanks to the rich and diverse examples from all over the world 
captured by the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur it is possible to gain insight into the 
extent and nature of these manifestations/ceremonial acts The Special Rapporteur, has listed 
such acts as, inter alia,  
 …in one country, the religious practice of the circumcision of male children is not permitted; similarly, 
 obstacles are placed in the way of religious traditions such as the celebration of marriage and funeral 
 ceremonies according to the rites of a religion. In another country, certain rites and ceremonies peculiar 
 to tribal religions have been banned. Elsewhere, it is extremely difficult in practice for the followers of a 
 certain religion to bury their dead in accordance with religious ritual. Sometimes a conflict of interest is 
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 visible between religious requirements and health requirements, particularly in the case of children. 
Thus,  in one country, the courts decided in certain cases against ritual practices when the latter were believed 
 to constitute a direct danger to children's lives. 
451
 
 
In addition, Taylor suggests that the use of religious names could be protected under 
Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration.452 “The use of a particular language customarily spoken by a 
group” that is mentioned in paragraph 4 of the General Comment 22 may also be protected 
under this provision. 
 
Many religions and beliefs have special days when believers take days of rest or engage in acts 
of worship in community with others; often, on these days they perform or abstain from 
performing certain activities according to the requirements of their religion or belief. 
Community life is generally arranged around observing these days that are significant based on 
the dogma and traditions of a belief group. Therefore in order to properly observe these days 
and participate in religious ceremonies believers may need to take these days off from work. 
Where these days are not included in the national holidays communities and/or members of 
belief groups have difficulty manifesting their religion or belief in worship, practice and 
observance. In addition, the observance of religiously significant days is crucial for the 
preservation of the collective identity of religious groups and the transmission of traditions 
and values to new generations. It is precisely this cultural aspect that may be often viewed 
with suspicion by the authorities and combated by them.453 The UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief has expressed concern over conflicts arising when the authorities 
fail to take account of religious requirements concerning days of rest,454 and commended 
legislation granting recognition to the religious holidays of the Christian, Jewish and Muslim 
communities.455  
 
Weekly days of religious holidays and/or days of rest as well as annual religious holidays, 
generally, tend to be arranged according to the traditions of the majority’s religion. Indeed, 
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one of the most common instances of public authorities giving effect to the practices of the 
religion of the majority or dominant religious group appears to be in the designation of the 
holidays and days of rest of the latter group as the official holidays and days of rest.456 Perhaps 
this is understandable from a historical perspective and policy considerations, after all, making 
arrangements for the majority of the population seems practical. This situation inevitably leads 
to preferences of certain religions or beliefs to others by states and make this right subject to 
concerns of feasibility as a public policy.457 Individuals who do not belong to the majority 
religion are more burdened that the individuals belonging to the majority religion.458  
 
Moreover, in order to effectively protect believers right to observe days of rest and celebrate 
holidays, macro level arrangements of accommodation by states are necessary.  Yet, the 
nature of the obligation on the part of states in this regard is highly unclear. The assumption of 
early days of UN standard setting that the “right to observe days of rest and holidays and 
ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief” does not create an 
obligation on the part of the states to declare all days of rest and holidays observed by the 
religions or belief in a given country.459  The OSCE- Venice Commission Guidelines reflect a less 
than positive obligation to accommodate stating that “to the extent possible, state laws should 
reflect the spirit of tolerance and respect for belief”. 460 While it seems tempting from a policy 
perspective to maintain the status quo in terms of the national and religious holidays, 
Temperman argues that still this must be scrutinized as regards the implications for religious 
minorities and non-religious people.461 Also, this since an arrangement that only benefits the 
group of believers of the majority or dominant religion, this treatment must be justified with 
“objective and reasonable” criteria.462 In the course of international review, such 
differentiation may be considered as justifiable based on public order in light of underlying 
policy considerations. Nevertheless, since the right to “observe days of rest and holidays and 
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ceremonies” is a component of the right to freedom of religion or belief it needs effective 
protection and this implies more than just a passive non-interference in the right. States must 
recognize this right and strive for a legal framework that would accommodate ensuing claims. 
Given the increasingly pluralistic nature of societies, the normative demands of this right are in 
need to be clarified. Creating obligations for public and private employers to make reasonable 
accommodation adjustments may be a way to move forward.463  
  
Dealing with a limited number of relevant cases, the Strasbourg organs have avoided the 
question of whether individuals have a right to observe days of rest and religious holidays and 
the ensuing questions of positive obligation on the part of states to ensure they can effectively 
exercise this right. Concerning the case of a Muslim teacher whose request to take time off 
from work in order to attend Friday prayers was refused, the European Commission held that, 
since he had taken the position accepting the conditions of the employment there was no 
violation of Article 9.464 While the European Commission noted that there may be positive 
obligations to respect for the individual’s freedom of religion, it avoided the question of 
whether there was an obligation on states parties to ensure accommodation to ensure that 
believers may take time off from public and private employment to observe religious holidays 
if they so wish. In Konttinen v Finland, which dealt with a man working at the state railways 
who joined the Seventh Day Adventist Church for which Saturday is the day of rest, starting 
with the sunset of Friday.465 The European Commission found that his dismissal for these 
unauthorized absences did not raise issues under article 9(1) as these absences were not 
accepted as manifestations of his religion.466  In a case originating from Macedonia the 
applicant who was known to observe Christian holidays but did not work on two Muslim 
holidays, wanted to benefit from the exemption permitting the observance of Muslim 
holidays, based on his conversion to Islam.467 Since he was not able to substantiate his 
‘sincerity’ through objective facts at the national courts the case was taken to the ECtHR. The 
European Court held that where “the employee seeks to rely on a particular exemption, it is 
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not oppressive or in fundamental conflict with freedom of conscience to require some level of 
substantiation”.468      
 
Clearly, an imposition of a positive obligation on states and private sector employers to take 
necessary measures for accommodating requests for observance of religious holidays or days 
of rest is not foreseen in the Council of Europe context.  There seems to be an emphasis on the 
choice or autonomy of employees in making their contracts.469 Where such accommodation is 
already made available in a given state the European Court may supervise this process 
assessing whether it gives rise to questions concerning Article 9 and prohibition of 
discrimination.  
 
In conclusion, the right to observe religious holidays and special days of rest seems to have 
gained greater support at the UN human rights protection scheme whereas at the Council of 
Europe it has not reached the level of recognition as a right that would require states to take 
positive steps to accommodate the needs of believers and belief groups in this field. 
Nevertheless, states have the obligation to facilitate the full enjoyment of the right to freedom 
of religion or belief in all of its components, including the right to observe days of rest and 
holidays in accordance with religion or belief. Mere policy considerations cannot account for 
negation of this right. It should be remembered that once, the designation of the existing days 
of rest or holidays also had policy consequences. Naturally, it is not an absolute right and 
restrictions may be considered as in the case of other components of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief. Relevant international standard setting must recognize this right and perhaps 
seek modalities of how it can be effectively protected in domestic settings.470 Reasonable 
accommodation may be a way to move forward.  Also, whilst monitoring the right to freedom 
of religion or belief, a closer and rigorous assessment of this right as an aspect of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief in its collective dimension would bring international review closer 
to advancing its protection. The creation of conditions for belief groups and members of belief 
communities to enjoy effectively the right to observe special days of rest and holidays in 
accordance with the precepts of their religion or belief will have the effect of advancing the 
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recognition and support of diversity within a society and thus bring states closer to ensure 
pluralism.  
 
4.2.9. To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters 
of religion or belief at the national and international levels. 
This freedom accommodates the need and tendency of belief communities to 
cooperate and interact with akin communities within the religious sphere both nationally and 
internationally.471 Acts such as “inviting foreign clergy to visit the country or establish 
monasteries” have been regarded by the HRCttee as activities forming part of the right to 
manifest one’s belief.472 The reports of the UN Special Rapporteur is filled with examples of 
restrictions on such communications particularly at the international level.473 International 
communication or cooperation is of particular importance for minority religious groups whose 
existence might be dependent on support from co-religionists abroad in variety of ways. There 
may be situations where there is organic relationship with groups outside the country because 
of the trans-border nature of religious organization hence international communication would 
be indispensible. In most cases, when communication is denied more fundamental rights are 
denied as a result.474  
 
The resistance to or “seemingly not well recognition”,475 of this right particularly at the 
international level may be explained by its likely overlap or competition with national security 
concerns or national interests. Foreign “interference” through communication with domestic 
religious groups, in particular minorities, is generally viewed with suspicion. However, this is an 
essential right such as the right to worship and restrictions need to be subject to rigorous test 
based on the relevant human rights provisions.  
  
4.3. Freedom Religious Communities  to Apply Religious Law in Spheres Analogous to 
Civil/Criminal Law and Dispute Settlement 
                                                        
471
 For drafting history see Taylor, supra note 39, p. 287. 
472
  Sergei Malakhovsky and A. Pikul v. Belarus, supra note 47, para. 7.2. 
473
 See, inter alia, the restrictions on the Ahmadi community in Pakistan, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.1, 
paras. 23-24, 45 and 85 and on charges against a Chech priest for his contacts with religious orders 
E/CN.4/1988/45, para. 48. 
474
 For an overview see Taylor, supra note 39, p. 288-289. 
475
 Ibid., p. 289. 
145
 Norms derived from religion in a broad sense govern many aspects of life for religious 
or belief communities and individual believers. Depending on the scope of precepts of the 
religion or belief in question, rules or laws and conceptions may influence the foods that can 
and cannot be consumed, the clothes that can and cannot be worn, the manner in which 
religious authority is structured and appointed as well as the manner in which finances are 
handled within a religious community and what substances are used in worship rituals. The 
education of children, community and religious teachers and clergy are also determined by 
religious norms or rules. Religious norms and values may also shape the conception of the 
roles of women and men in marriage and society and leadership, the methods of conflict 
resolution and arbitration, how evils in the form of illnesses, natural disasters or misfortune 
are dealt with as well as the attitudes towards relations with the state. In addition, 
explanations provided by religions on fundamental issues of life, form cultures’ understandings 
of many issues which in turn play a role in shaping the common law amongst a community. 
These may be rules and mechanisms, governing the activity of communal life and are 
sometimes referred as customary law as opposed to formal law.476  In some cases religions 
provide highly complex and detailed rules, analogous to civil and criminal law, concerning 
regulation of marriage, divorce and inheritance and rules related to conduct in trials and 
methods of punishment. There are also rules that may not be directly derived from religion 
but religion can form a basis for legitimizing certain rules and forms of behaviour.  
 
It is clear that implication of laws and rules derived and condoned by religion or law are highly 
divergent, complex and comprehensive and the dynamics of the establishment, development, 
modification and elimination of such practices in a given community, society or country vary 
significantly in each situation and are deeply contextual. Sometimes traditional religion cannot 
be separated from custom which makes it difficult to determine what is derived from religion 
and what is derived from tradition.477 Another complicating factor is that believers, indeed, do 
not have a monolithic view when it comes to the place of religious law in the perception of 
their belief.  The complexity is further increased by issues that arise when normative rules 
derived directly or indirectly from religious precepts or value systems have an impact on 
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human rights of individuals. The religious law itself, interpretations of it and social custom that 
is derived from it or justified by reference to the religious law may conflict with human 
rights.478 These are some of the forms of illustrative interactions that can be observed when 
attempting to put use of religious law into a legal framework for study. 
 
Before moving any further, it is necessary to determine the scope of discussion in this section. 
As illustrated above religious law may be applied in various spheres of life and hence there can 
be countless variety of implications that this notion may have for human rights. However, here 
the assessment is limited to the use of religious laws or laws derived or condoned by religion, 
in situations analogous to civil/criminal law and in dispute settlement by religious or belief 
communities as a form of manifestation of religion or belief as understood in its individual and 
collective dimensions. Hence the term religious law in this section means unwritten and 
written norms that regulate issues similar to those regulated by private law as well as those 
used in alternative dispute settlements which are derived from the dogma of a religion or 
belief. The interest of this thesis in use of religious law by religious/belief communities is 
derived from the general theme of the thesis, the collective dimension of freedom of religion 
and in autonomy of religious communities as a right flowing from the former. 479 It is observed 
that when religions are as comprehensive as to include religious law as described above, the 
use of it by individuals and religious/belief groups becomes a way of manifestation of religion 
or belief and preservation and development of religion and/or culture. 
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Plural legal orders are, more often than not, viewed in the context of indigenous populations, 
cultural rights and accommodation of minority cultures and identities.480 This is 
understandable  since, traditionally, non-state legal orders may rarely be based solely on 
religious law, instead tend to have diverse sources. This does not, however, eliminate the 
freedom of religion or belief dimension which this section endeavours to highlight.   
 
Then the question is whether within the international norms protecting the right to freedom 
of religion or belief protect the right to use religious law by individual believers in community 
with others. In so far as, religious law provides for rules regulating relations in family and 
dispute settlement, that for the individual believers embracing the belief or religion in 
question as such, clearly these would qualify as “practice” when the term is understood as not 
closely linked to worship but in a broader fashion.  
 
 Both ICCPR and ECHR include, in their respective articles, that the right to freedom of religion 
or belief includes “the freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public 
or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching.”481 While these four categories are exhaustive, the specific acts that constitute 
protected forms of manifestation under each heading is doubtless a subject of unending 
debate, particularly as unusual or non-traditional forms of manifestations and traditional 
manifestations in new settings confront the HRCttee and the European Court.  
 
The discussions on the drafting of the General Comment 22 disclose a strikingly different 
approach from the one held by Strasbourg organs. The discussions indicate that there seems 
to be a general agreement that only believers themselves can decide what is and is not a 
genuine religious belief and as for manifestations Article 18(3) existed to prevent these from 
violating rights of others.482 The approach of the HRCttee is to leave the determination of 
whether an act is a manifestation of religion or belief to the believers and if there is a need to 
restrict to employ the use of restrictions clause. Krisnaswami also affirms this approach,  
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 Bearing in mind that on the one hand the Declaration [UDHR] was prepared with a view to bringing all 
 religions or beliefs within its compass, and on the other hand that the forms of manifestation, and the 
 weight attached to each of them, vary considerably from one religion or belief to another, it may safely 
be   assumed that the intention was to embrace all possible manifestations of religion or belief 
within the  terms “teaching, practice, worship and observance.
483
  
 
There is no explicit or direct reference to whether the use of religious law is a form of 
manifestation that is protected by the right to manifest religion or belief in community with 
others. So far the most comprehensive list of manifestations have been compiled in the study 
prepared by Arcot Krishnaswami where in addition to many manifestations linked to worship, 
observance and teaching, explicit reference to celebration and dissolution of marriage was 
made.484 However, the latter were not included in the core freedom of religion or belief 
clauses485 and General Comment 22 of the HRCttee.486  The reason might be the lack of a 
uniform practice among states as to whether these are viewed in the realm of regulatory acts 
of the modern State or that of a religious/belief community. For instance even though not 
explicitly articulated, disciplinary acts within religious communities may be seen as covered 
under freedom of religious communities in their internal affairs. An example of this could be 
“excommunication or shunning” of Jewish Courts.487 
 
In spite of the absence of explicit allusion to religious law which governs issues similar to 
family law and dispute settlement, these can be best categorized as practices in the ordinary 
sense of the word; “to act according to the beliefs and customs of a particular religion.” 
Obviously, depending on the nature of religion or belief and whether and to what extent such 
religious law is an integral part of the religion or belief in question. Individual believers may 
wish, in community with others, to act in accordance with their own beliefs in sphere that may 
overlap with family law, private law or dispute settlement. Quite apart from the question of 
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potential problems in relation to human rights law to influence judgment, manifesting religion 
in practice would cover such acts.  
 
As for the ECHR, the terms “worship, observance, practice and teaching” are not defined in the 
Convention and the preparatory documents do not provide any insight into what these 
categories consist of.488 Subsequent decisions and judgments of the Strasbourg organs have 
not provided any description of these categories and what manifestations are protected in 
each. Worship has been given the highest status of the manifestations listed in Article 9 (1).489 
The Commission has said that Article 9 primarily protects personal beliefs and religious creeds 
and “acts which are intimately linked to these, such as worship and devotion.”490 Here the 
important criterion has been that the act has to be intimately linked to the belief in order to 
qualify as a form of manifestation in worship. As for observance, the Commission and the 
Court have not given this category of manifestation a separate consideration, yet. Evans, 
concludes that “observance” seems to have been conflated into a slightly extended notion of 
worship and that they are considered together as “worship and observance” without a 
particular distinction.491 While “teaching” has not been defined either, it has been subject to 
more detailed discussion.   
 
The term practice has proved to be the most difficult one to define. The ordinary meaning of 
this term in the context of religion is, “to act according to the beliefs and customs of a 
particular religion.”492 It has been pointed out that if one takes a broad view of practice then it 
would be inevitably understood as covering all acts of “worship, observance and teaching.”493 
On the other hand, it can also be construed in a narrow manner, meaning only acts similar to 
worship. The Commission and the Court have drawn the limits of protection in relation to 
practice by repeatedly stating that “the term practice…does not cover each act which is 
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motivated and influenced by religion or belief.”494 Similarly many times, the act in question 
was not specified as belonging to a particular category of manifestation but was rather, 
viewed as manifestation of religion or belief. This approach has led to focus on whether an act 
constitutes manifestation of religion or not rather then development of detailed 
understanding of what each category includes.495 The approach taken by Strasbourg organs 
has been further narrowed by the “necessary expression” test whereby it is asked whether a 
certain act is necessary for the fulfillment of the obligations of believers of a certain religion or 
belief. This position appears to be changed in the case of the Eweida and Others v. the UK, 
however, it will be necessary to see future cases in order to ascertain if there has been a 
permanent change toward adopting a broader approach to manifestations.496 Obviously, the 
question is who determines what is necessary; the individual believer, the Court or even an 
expert opinion may differ on what exact acts are necessary for the precepts of a certain 
religion or belief. Having said this, where religious communities are granted rights in national 
systems to act according to their religious law on certain matters, there is nothing in the 
Convention and its Protocols to prevent from viewing these acts as a manifestation of religion 
or belief. For instance, as regards marriage Article 12, regulating the right to marry and found 
a family, states that “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and found 
a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right”. Hence, the 
Convention here takes note of the possibility that legal systems vary among States Parties; 
where for instance in some States religious marriage ceremony is attached the legal 
consequence of matrimony, while in others it is not. 497  
 
While the approach taken by the European Court may not at first sight look very promising, 
due to the narrow view it has taken of manifestation of religion or belief as outlined above, 
this may not necessarily mean a categorically negative answer to our question. ECHR has taken 
a very open and inclusive approach to the collective dimension of freedom of religion 
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particularly in terms of associative rights of religious/belief communities,498 recognizing their 
autonomous existence of religious communities and their protection as such, as a prerequisite 
of pluralistic democracy. Legal pluralism may be a suitable way of furthering freedom of 
religion of communities belonging to different religions,499 and cultural rights.  As far as 
religious/belief communities are concerned, the use or application of religious law in matters 
such as family law or dispute settlement is just another sphere where norms of a 
religion/belief are implemented. All are derived from their respective dogma, are considered 
authoritative and individual believers, in community with others, either informally or formally 
put them into practice in their internal matters.500  
 
A possible reason that the European Court may not be willing to conclude that there exists 
under Article 9 a right to use religious law would be that such an interpretation may be 
considered by states parties as an undue intervention into their domestic affairs, in particular 
state-religion relations. Another reason might be that they may not view such manifestation as 
“closely linked to worship.” It may be that the European Court does not view the use of 
religious law by individual believers as protected under Article 9 but within the ambit of Article 
9, similar to its long-standing, however recently changed, approach toward conscientious 
objection to military service.501 This would not be without any benefit to religious 
communities. Where a state facilitates the use of religious law by a group of believers other 
groups claiming the same right may be protected by the prohibition of discrimination. It is also 
highly likely that the European Court could, without making a decision on whether it is a 
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manifestation of religion or belief or not, move to considering restrictions clause, and find the 
State would be justified in its measures or apply the notion of margin of appreciation by taking 
into consideration national law.   
 
The most explicit claim on matters relating to religious jurisdiction came with the Refah Partisi 
v. Turkey case,502 where the applicants alleged in particular that the dissolution of Refah by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court and the suspension of certain political rights of the other 
applicants, who were leaders of Refah at the material time, had breached, inter alia, Articles 9, 
10, 11, 14. The case is interesting in that it provides some insight into the European Court’s 
view on plural legal systems and private law rules of religious inspiration. Although the Court 
noted that it will not express an opinion in the abstract on the advantages and disadvantages 
of a plurality of legal systems, in the Court’s view, plural legal system, as proposed by Refah, 
was clearly incompatible with the Convention system because Refah’s policy was to apply 
some of sharia’s private law rules to a large part of the population, namely Muslims, within the 
framework of plurality of legal systems.503 One crucial factor in the Court’s view was that such 
a policy went beyond the private sphere to which Turkish law confines religion. This approach 
once again indicated the Court was taking the national accommodation of religious freedom as 
a reference point. In response to the applicants’ argument that prohibition of a plurality of 
private-law systems amounted to discrimination against Muslims who wished to live their 
private lives in accordance with the precepts of their religion the Court emphasized that 
manifestation of religion was primarily a matter of individual conscience which is quite 
different than field of private law.504  
 
While the Court’s approach in the Refah Partisi v. Turkey case is not one that wholeheartedly 
welcomes legal pluralism with the introduction of sharia, it cannot be definitely concluded 
that the Court could not envision within the framework of the Convention, a pluralist legal 
system where religious laws can be implemented. It seems it would be subject to the content 
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of the religious law proposed, to what extent national legal systems allow it and whether it will 
be imposed on individuals based on their religious affiliation. Malcolm Evans points out that 
according to the Court if religious communities are to be welcomed as participants in the 
public life of the State, it is on the condition that they respect the principles of democracy and 
human rights; of tolerance and pluralism.505 And if they threaten either, then the State may or 
might be obliged to take steps. This in his view gives the State an interventionist and 
regulatory role rather then a restricted one which is that of facilitation in accordance with 
Article 9 itself.506 It has been also suggested that the ECHR has been all too sweeping in order 
to strike a proper balance in the issue of accepting the exercise of certain regulatory powers of 
religious entities in relation to their members.507 Scheinin, views this judgment as an indication 
that the ECHR clearly excluding, as a matter of principle, the diversification of rights and 
obligations in a multicultural society according to religious affiliation and through the 
delegation of certain regulatory authority to religious entities.508 In my view this is not so 
certain, ECtHR seems to reject this possibility as it is proposed by Refah,509 and therefore may 
be open to other propositions. Also, the national legislative arrangements concerning and 
acceptance of legal plurality may play a role in rejection or openness of the ECtHR. 
 
There seems to be a number of conclusions that one can draw in relation to where the 
European Court stands in relation to manifestation of religion or belief through the use of 
religious law or private law rules of religious inspiration, as the Court phrases it. The first one 
is, that the Court views manifestation of freedom of religion or belief as primarily a matter of 
individual conscience and is cautious about manifestation in the field of private law. Secondly, 
the Court sees this aspect of manifestation of religion or belief as a matter of national law and 
up to the State in question. That if the application of religious laws in matters such as family 
law are facilitated by a State then the Court not be opposed to this as such but would engage 
in its regular supervisory role. Thirdly, the Court has a certain view of the sharia as static and 
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prejudicial to public order and the values of democracy. Fourthly, it is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that, not a religious community but a political party is propagating this idea 
also plays a role; as a political party may have the possibility of changing the legal system in a 
manner that can impose the religious law on individuals without their consent.   
 
As a way of summary on the question of whether the use of religious law, in areas such as 
family law and dispute resolution, is a form of manifestation that is protected by the right to 
manifest religion or belief in community with others, it follows from the above examination 
that as regards the European Court, it would depend on whether the Court would adopt a 
narrow or wide approach to practice of religion or belief. If the Court views practice in a broad 
manner the use of religious law may be seen within the ambit of Article 9. The second 
important factor for the Court would be the way State party has regulated this sphere. It is 
highly likely that the Court would see this within the discretion of the State hence not 
necessarily within the protection of Article 9 regardless of how it is viewed by the State in 
question. The major challenge may be that religious law endeavours to regulate same sphere 
as the State itself namely family law and dispute settlement. Still the closest the European 
Court comes to protect religious law is in the religious celebration of marriage that has the 
effect of official marriage.510  
 
As regards the universal level, there is not an explicit recognition of the right to apply religious 
law by believers among themselves and in spite of the fact that the General Comment is silent 
and there is no jurisprudence, as of yet, to support it, it is likely that the HRCttee, in principle, 
will consider a claim by a religious community to use religious law within the ambit of 
protection of Article 18 due to its broad approach to manifestations and reliance on believers’ 
views on these matters and the various legal traditions found at the global level.  
 
If one assumes that the right to manifest religion or belief in practice protects the use religious 
law the realization of it would certainly require significant obligation on the part of the State. 
Broadly speaking it is possible envision states’ role as one of facilitation and supervision with 
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an emphasis on legal safeguards. Facilitation would require that the state assists with the 
necessary processes and institutional structures511 and negotiation  with the community in 
question.  The second area of engagement by the state would be in its supervisory role as 
guarantor of human rights. This sphere necessitates that the state takes positive measures in 
the way of legal and real safeguards that would protect individuals against human rights 
abuses by fellow group members while at the same time balancing the interests of the 
collective.  
 
While Krishnaswami provided a very comprehensive catalog of manifestations he also 
recognized that some of these, such as human sacrifice, self-immolation, mutilation, slavery, 
prostitution, subversive activities, polygamy and other practices that may clash with the 
requirements found in Article 29 of UDHR, could be subject to permissible limitations. Where 
traditional religious practices come into conflict with the basic rights of the individual, it is the 
former that have to give way. Thus, these limitations by the State on religious practices have 
increased freedom for Indian society as a whole.512 
 
In conclusion, notwithstanding its limitation, the right to freedom of religion or belief in its 
collective dimension offers substantive protection to the right of belief groups to freedom in 
their internal affairs- autonomy.  Where problems remain, this may not be so much a result of 
a “normative gap” in the international protection of human rights, than a more complete 
understanding of and willingness to enforce the implications of the existing norms is urgently 
needed. A great deal can be learnt from the approaches of the UN HRCttee and the UN Special 
Rapporteur to learn about the proactive steps that may/need to be taken by states and 
positive obligations that (may) arise under Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR.  
Some obligations are more clearly defined than others. The differing approaches of the 
HRCttee and the Strasbourg organs to the various elements of this right, including the nature 
of obligations creates inconsistencies and disparities in international standard setting.   
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The account above indicates that that some aspects of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief are given more attention while others do not receive as much attention in 
international review. Autonomy of religious/belief communities appears as an area of the 
collective dimension that needs to be re-interpreted as an interpretive tool in adjudication. It 
has been suggested that such re-interpretation should seek to employ the term beyond 
organizational matters. This would then have the effect of changing positive obligations on the 
part of the states to accommodate the autonomous acts of belief groups. A greater burden to 
justify restrictions on the part of the states would also be required. 
 
There is a tremendous variety among the legal traditions of the countries of the world on 
whether to allow or provide space for religious communities to apply their religious law and if 
allowed as to the extent it is allowed and the form it takes. An important factor seems to be 
whether, historically or traditionally, a certain sphere is viewed as a sphere regulated by the 
state which sees an interest in it or as a sphere of religious tradition or manifestation. While in 
some countries marriage, divorce, custody and guardianship issues have become codified and 
institutionalized and regulated by the state and is no longer a matter of private concern513 and 
others, in societies where customary law has a wide influence , these matters are viewed 
within the framework of religious affiliation. 
 
It is clear that there is great concern that religiously motivated laws violate particularly 
women’s human rights particularly when freedom of religion is perceived as a group right.514 
While these concerns may be valid these should not be allowed to form a barrier to the right 
to the right to manifest religion or belief in practice through the use of religious law among 
individual believers. These concerns are better addressed in the process of finding a resolution 
between competing interests. 
 
It is very important not to lose sight of the fact that religious communities, like individuals, are 
not static and that they are highly divergent. When they find themselves in the new 
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circumstances they also feel the need to re-evaluate their practices and religious laws are not 
an exception.515 Indeed, human rights is a valuable framework for the development of 
religious traditions.516 Where there are domestic laws that are in serious contradiction with 
religious laws, the community in questions may be able to find a modified version of the 
precept in question. But for this to take place the community first and foremost has to have 
the capacity, means and forum to engage in the development of its laws and interaction with 
the State. 
 
 
In brief, as shown above the right to autonomy of religious or belief communities needs to be 
understood as an issue beyond organizational freedom in the internal affairs religious 
organizations. Depending on the content of the dogma, doctrine and traditions of religious or 
belief groups it can be a significantly expansive issue presenting itself in diverse - sometimes 
unexpected- spheres. Adjudicators need to be willing to see and use the notion of autonomy 
of religious or belief communities as an interpretive tool in cases where the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief can be identified. The discussion above suggests 
that adjudicators have not applied the notion of autonomy consistently – in particular they 
have been unwilling to see the collective dimension and implications for the autonomous 
existence of communities. Where doing so would mean that states would have to take positive 
measures to accommodate and ensure that third parties accommodate for examples days off 
from work for religious rituals or celebrations. The cases on worship places, however, revealed 
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that burdensome positive obligations are not the only reason for preference to overlook issues 
that seem on the periphery of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Similar lack of weight 
given to components of this right can present itself as a result of simply not seeing the 
autonomy issues involved. This may be based on preference and/or differences of conception.  
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CHAPTER 5  
Introduction to the Case Study on Turkey and the General Turkish Legal Framework 
Pertaining to the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief 
5.1. Introduction 
This section aims to examine and assess the protection of the collective dimension of 
the right to freedom of religion or belief in Turkey in light of applicable international 
law standards. Mirroring the structure of the two preceding chapters, the case study 
reviews the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief, in 
particular the right to acquire legal personality and the right to freedom in the internal 
affairs of belief groups as it is exercised in the right to establish and maintain places of 
worship, the right to teach religion or belief in suitable places, the right to train, 
appoint and elect clergy and the right to observe days of rest and holidays. Indeed, the 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief is closely related to the national 
legal structures available to individuals and religious communities to exercise the right 
to freedom of religion or belief without any discrimination.517  
State-religion relations evolve over the course of history and are shaped by the unique 
political experiences of nations. This highly contextual relationship plays a significant 
role on the evolved legal framework pertaining to the protection of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, particularly in its collective 
dimension. Bearing this in mind, this Chapter seeks to briefly present the historical 
evolution of state-religion relation in Turkey in order to present a complementary 
background that is considered necessary to provide the relevant context for the legal 
questions that will be discussed in the following Chapters.  The reason for adopting this 
somewhat broader framework for the case study is to situate the treatment of the 
questions of the thesis in the overall climate of arrangement pertaining to religion and 
protection of freedom of religion or belief, rather then studying them as isolated 
topics. Key aspects of the arrangement of religion in the Ottoman Empire and in the 
period of the establishment of the Turkish Republic and a brief account of current 
trends are presented below.  Tracing this progression is critical to understanding the 
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state-religion arrangement that evolved in Turkey. This account may be useful in 
explaining the current practice, sensitivities and particular interpretations of the 
Turkish judiciary - though it may not necessarily justify them. A presentation of a 
comprehensive account and analysis of the historical formation of state-religion 
relations in Turkey is, however, beyond the scope of this study.  The following account 
aims to follow the thread of the nature of the general legal paradigm of state-religion 
relationship, including neutrality of the state, protection of freedom of religion or belief 
and principle of equality through the Ottoman Empire and the period of the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic.   
Following the brief review of state-religion relations in Turkey, an analytical and critical 
overview of the general Turkish legal framework for the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief is presented. The discussion will touch upon key issues, 
inter alia, the Diyanet, compulsory Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics (DKAB) 
courses, coercion to declare one’s religious affiliation, manifestations of religious 
symbols and conscientious objection to military service. Since issues concerning the 
collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief will be considered in detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7 this Chapter will focus on general matters.  Analysis will be based on 
the relevant legal resources of applicable international instruments that create legal 
obligations for Turkey, including the Lausanne Peace Treaty,518 which creates a special 
legal regime for non-Muslim minorities, relevant principles and provisions of 1982 
Constitution and pertinent legislation.  
5.2. Turkey’s Religious Demographics 
In contrast to the generally presented picture of Turkey as a country with 99% Muslim 
population,519 alternative sources, provide additional information that can contribute 
toward drawing a more complete picture concerning the religious make-up of the 
population in Turkey, including diversity within the Muslim population. Turkey has an 
estimated population of 77.6 million people.520 The General Directorate on Civil 
Registration and Nationality holds that official statistics on religious demographics are 
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not kept.521 Therefore we are depended on other sources. According to the 
International Religious Freedom Report of 2008 released by the U.S. Department of 
State there are an approximate of 500,000 Shiite Caferis; 10,000 Baha'is; 15,000 Syrian 
Orthodox (Syriac) Christians; 5,000 Yezidis; 3,300 Jehovah‘s Witnesses; 3,000 
Protestants; and a small, undetermined number of Bulgarian, Chaldean, Nestorian, 
Georgian, Roman Catholics, and Maronite Christians present in Turkey.522 Among these 
minority religious communities there is a significant number of Iraqi asylum seekers, 
including 3,000 Chaldean Christians.523 
The practice concerning the official statistics on religious demographics raises diverse 
questions concerning the right to freedom of religion or belief in Turkey. The 
population register records religious affiliation;524 the options available for the religion 
field in the register are determined by the Ministry of Interior on the basis of, “views of 
Institutions that provide religious services and Universities and decisions of the Court 
of Cassation, the Court of Appeals and the Constitutional Court”.525 The believers’ 
views on their religion or belief, as such, are not part of the basis on which decisions 
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are made.526 The Bahai faith, Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Alevi faith are, for example, 
not on the list of possible options. While it is not the main focus of this study to 
examine why and how Turkey keeps records on religious affiliation of its citizens, it is 
important to note that Turkey adopts a selective practice about recording religious 
affiliation. Turkey disregards denominational differences and does not recognize 
certain religions, as such.527 This deliberate practice is an indication of the nature of 
state-religion relation in Turkey. One result of this practice is that a perception is 
created that Turkey has a 99% homogenous Muslim society and religious diversity is 
ignored. The state determines what constitutes a religion or belief. In addition, the 
purpose and consequences and the voluntary nature of recording of religious identity 
within the Turkish legal system needs to be further studied.  
5.3. Turkey’s International and National Obligations in the Area of Human Rights with a 
Special Focus on Freedom of Religion or Belief 
5.3.1. International Human Rights Treaties 
Turkey is party to a significant number of universal and regional human rights 
treaties.528 Some of these treaties, however, include reservations that restrict certain 
rights to a significant degree. Within the UN human rights protection scheme, Turkey 
has ratified the ICCPR thereby undertaking the obligation to protect the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief in line with Article 18 of the 
Covenant. Yet, Turkey placed an interpretative declaration on Article 27 of the same 
Covenant, thus reserved the right to interpret and apply the provision on the 
protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in accordance with the related 
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Pornography.  
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provisions and rules of the Turkish Constitution and the Treaty of Lausanne.529 Turkey is 
also party to the ICESCR with reservations to Article 13 (3), right to education, thus 
refusing to undertake to respect the liberty of parents to choose for their children 
schools, other than those established by public authorities and the ensure the religious 
or moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions and 
Article 13 (4).530  Turkey has ratified the CRC with reservations to Article 17, 29 and 
30,531 again reserving the right to interpret and apply the provisions of the said articles 
according to the letter and spirit of the Turkish Constitution and the Treaty of 
Lausanne.532   
Turkey is a founding member of the Council of Europe,533 as well as a party to two of its 
fundamental human rights treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights,534 and 
the European Social Charter,535 and other treaties within the human rights protection 
scheme of the CoE. Turkey has ratified Protocol I of the ECHR, however, placed a 
reservation on Article 2, that protects the right to education and at the same time 
creates an obligation on the part of the states to “respect the rights of parents to 
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions” on account of Law No. 6366 on the unification of 
education.536 Not surprisingly, in line with Turkey’s detached stance to minority rights, 
Turkey is not party to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities.  
Turkey’s reservations or interpretive declarations draw attention to two areas of rights 
that seem to have certain “sensitivity” domestically. Firstly, in the spheres of religious 
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 Ratified on 23 September 2003. Turkey does not accept inter-state complaint under Article 41. On 
November 2006 Turkey also ratified the Optional Protocol I to the ICCPR but placed a reservation on 
Article 5 (2a) thus restricting the receipt of communications of alleged violations that result from acts or 
omissions that occur within the national boundaries of the Republic of Turkey. The latter reservation 
must be a precaution against extra-territorial applicability, such as Cyprus and Northern Iraq. 
530
 Ratified on 23 September 2003. 
531
 Provisions, respectively, dealing with the right to access to information, the right to education and the 
protection of minorities. 
532
 Ratified on 4 April 1995. 
533
 Turkey acceded to the Council of Europe on 09.08.1949. 
534
 Ratified on 18.05.1954. 
535
 Ratified on 24.11.1989. 
536
 Ratified 18.05.1954, see Turkey’s declaration at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=009&CM=7&DF=18/04/2012&CL=
ENG&VL=1 , accessed  28.01.2015. 
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education and secondly, the recognition of minority rights, international obligations are 
avoided. These will be explored further in relevant sections below. 
Legally, not only do Turkey’s international human rights commitments constitute the 
principal standard, but they are also recognized, as such, explicitly as having 
precedence over domestic standards that are found in the Turkish Constitution and 
other legislation.  In 2004, Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution was amended so as to 
recognize the supremacy of ratified international treaties over domestic legislation in 
the sphere of human rights.  Article 90 reads,  
In the case of a conflict between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights 
 and freedoms duly put into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on 
 the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail.
537
  
 The application of this provision by the domestic courts is, however, limited and 
subject to a wide sphere of discretion granted to the judiciary without much guidance 
as to the application of this norm.538  
It is important to note here that numerous ECtHR judgments that have found Turkey to 
have violated of Article 9 or Protocol 1 Article 2 have not been enforced. These are also 
illustrative of how Turkey is reluctant to make changes when they resonate deeply on 
domestically sensitive issues. Some of the key issues that have been decided upon and, 
yet, remain unenforced concern the Compulsory Religious Culture and Ethics lessons, 
the Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey and Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey,539 on 
the coercion to disclose religious affiliation in national identity cards, the Sinan Işık v 
Turkey,540 on conscientious objection to military service, Ercep v.Turkey, Feti Demirtas 
v. Turkey, Mehmet Tarhan v. Turkey, Halil Savda v. Turkey and Osman Murat Ülke v. 
Turkey.541   
                                                        
537
 Article 90 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution. On the applican of this provision see Kemal Başlar, 
“Uluslararası Antlaşmaların Onaylanması, Üstünlüğü ve Anayasal Denetimi Üzerine” [On the Ratification 
and Superiority of International Treaties], Milletlerarası Hukuk ve Milletlerarası Özel Hukuk Bülteni, Prof. 
Dr. Sevin Toluner’e Armağan, 24/ 1-2, (2004), Mesut Gülmez, “Anayasa Değişikliği Sonrasında İnsan 
Hakları Sözleşmelerinin İç Hukuktaki Yeri ve Değeri” [The Place and Value of Human Rights Treaties After 
the Constitutional Amendment], Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Eylül-Ekim 54, 2004. 
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 İbrahim Şahbaz, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin Türk Yargı Sistemindeki Yeri” [The Place of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the Turkish Juridical System], Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, 
Eylül/Ekim 54, 2004, p. 216. 
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 Respectively, Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, 09 October 2007, European Court of Human Rights, 
No. 1448/04 and Mansur Yalçın and Others, 16 September 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 
21163/11.  
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 Sinan Isik v. Turkey, 02 February 2010, European Court of Human Rights, No. 21924/05. 
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Respectively, Ercep v. Turkey, 22 February 2012, European Court of Human Rights, No. 5260/07, Feti 
Demirtas v. Turkey, 17 January 2012, European Court of Human Rights, No. 5260/07, Mehmet Tarhan v. 
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In addition to international legal commitments, Turkey has undertaken political 
commitments to human rights in general and freedom of religion or belief in particular 
within the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe structure.542 Since 1975 
starting with the Helsinki Final Act the participating members of the OSCE have 
affirmed their commitment to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief” as well as non-
discrimination and tolerance as key matters within a comprehensive security approach 
in the region.543 Most of all, the 1989 Concluding Document of Vienna, Principle 16 
entails detailed, explicit and comprehensive principles for the protection of religious 
communities, inter alia, the right to establish places of worship, freedom in internal 
organizational matters, receive financial aid, religious education, training of religious 
personnel.544 Hence the general statement of respect for freedom of religion or belief 
is expanded upon with specific references to the scope of the right.  As an OSCE 
participating state, Turkey is committed to upholding the political commitment to the 
protection of these rights and others that are crucial for the protection of freedom of 
religion or belief in all of its dimensions. Through these commitments Turkey has also 
taken upon itself the obligation to implement them with good will thus reinforcing the 
expectation that international standards, legal and political, in the field of freedom of 
religion or belief, will be adhered to in Turkey.  
For Turkey, a candidate for European Union accession, the Copenhagen political 
criteria,545 including human rights, also have significant implications for the protection 
of freedom of religion or belief. Over the years the European Commission’s Turkey 
progress reports have highlighted a wide range of issues pertaining to the right to 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Turkey, 12 July 2012, European Court of Human Rights, No. 9078/06, Halil Savda v. Turkey, 12 June 2012, 
European Court of Human Rights, Osman Murat Ülke v. Turkey, 24 April 2006, European Court of Human 
Rights, 43965/04. 
542
 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ve-avrupa-guvenli-ve-isbirligi-teskilati-_agit_.tr.mfa (last accessed 
16.04.2012). 
543
 OSCE Human Dimension Commitments, Vol.1, Thematic Compilation, 2
nd
 Edition, OSCE, 2005, Poland, 
p. xxv-xxvi, 106-110. 
544
 Ibid., p. 107. 
545
 “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union.” Declaration of the European Council in June 1993 of rules that define whether 
a country is eligible for European Union membership or not, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm  accessed 
18.01.2015 
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freedom of religion or belief in Turkey.546 The European Commission 2014 Progress 
Report on Turkey captures the state of affairs concerning freedom of religion or belief 
in Turkey observing “there is a need for comprehensive reform of legislation on 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and application of this legislation, in line 
with ECtHR rulings, Council of Europe recommendations and EU standards”.547 
5.3.2. Lausanne Peace Treaty 
The Lausanne Peace Treaty, besides being the founding document of modern 
Turkey,548 is a key Treaty that establishes the minority protection regime for Turkey’s 
non-Muslim communities.549  
The problem of the protection of minorities in Turkey was one of the most sensitive 
issues in the Lausanne Peace Conference negotiations because there was reluctance on 
the part of the Turkish government to commit to any obligations for the protection of 
minorities.550 Bozkurt observes two paramount concerns underlying Turkey’s position. 
Firstly, the minority protection may be only reciprocal and secondly, minority 
protection may not be used to attack Turkey’s existence and integrity.551 The reason for 
this was the century old “East Question”, concerning the Western scheme to dismantle 
the Ottoman Empire.552 The perception that in the Ottoman Empire non-Muslim 
minorities, particularly the Christian minority, were instrumental for the interferences 
of the Western Powers in the internal affairs of the Empire is a crucial point for 
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 See the European Commission’s Turkey Progress Reports published in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
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 European Commission (2014), Turkey 2014 Progress Report, p.16. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-turkey-progress-report_en.pdf 
accessed 28.01.2015. 
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 The Lausanne Peace Treaty was ratified in domestic law by Law No. 340 and is thus part of national 
law.  
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 While minority protection scheme in the Lausanne Treaty pertains primarily to non-Muslims, there 
are certain provisions that give rise to obligations to protect linguistic rights (Article 39/5) for those of 
Turkish descent who speak a language other than Turkish, equality of all before law (Article 39/2) and 
prohibition of discrimination based on religion (Article 39/3) for all of Turks. Yet, Turkey does not accept 
these obligations.      
550
 The Congress records prior the Independence War specifically emphasized that political sovereignty 
and privileges for Christian peoples may not be accepted. Gülnihal Bozkurt refers to this quoted in 
Gülnihal Bozkurt, Azınlık İmtiyazları Kapitülasyonlardan Tek Hukuk Sistemine Geçiş [The Transition from 
Minority Priviledges Capitulations to a Unified Legal System], (Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek 
Kurumu, 1998), p. 44-45. 
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 Ibid., p. 45. 
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 Bilal N. Şimşir, Lozan’a Göre Azınlıklar in 80. Yılında 2003 Penceresinden Lozan Sempozyumu (On its 
Symposium  on 80
th
 Anniversary of Lausanne- from the Window of 2003), (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları 
XVI. Series No. 100, 2003), p. 171. Also see Halide Edip Adıvar, Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri 
(East-West and American Influences in Turkey), (Can Publications, 2009).   
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understanding the spirit and philosophy of the implementation of the provisions 
enshrined in the Lausanne Treaty pertaining to the protection of minorities. The new 
Turkish Government was determined not to give any “privileges” to non-Muslims.    
It is important to understand this historical context and competing interests that were 
at play in relation to the Lausanne Treaty since these have produced and continue to 
keep alive at least four factors that have shaped the interpretation and implementation 
of the minority protection scheme in the Lausanne Treaty to this day. First, the 
protection of minorities, in particular Christian minorities, has been largely congested 
into the foreign relations sphere, rather than being essentially a human and minority 
rights issue. Secondly, the Turkish state, based on historical experiences, has viewed 
the claims for minority protection in Turkey as a functional tool for foreign powers to 
interfere in its sovereignty.553 Thirdly, minority rights have been understood as 
privileges or exceptions that were conceded unwillingly, instead of legitimate 
fundamental rights. Finally, the principle of reciprocity has been strictly observed and 
this has led to a conditional approach based on the expectation that there would be 
reciprocal protection for Muslims particularly in Western Thrace.    
Articles 37-45 of the Lausanne Treaty cover the protection of non-Muslim minorities. 
The principle place that must be given to the Lausanne protection scheme within the 
Turkish legal system is explicitly mandated through Article 37 that obliges Turkey to 
recognize Articles 38-44 as basic law. It also stipulates that there shall not be any laws 
or regulations or official acts that are contrary to, nor take priority over, the said 
Lausanne provisions. This explicit prohibition, however, has not stopped Turkey from 
restricting or preventing non-Muslim minorities from fully enjoying their rights through 
the creation of incompatible laws, bureaucratic obstacles, arbitrary decisions of public 
authorities in relevant official processes.554   
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 This can be clearly observed in the correspondence between the Turkish Chief negotiator in Lausanne 
and the government in Ankara as well as the minutes of the Lausanne Peace Conference. See generally, 
Bilal N. Şimşir, Lozan Telgrafları (1922-1923) [Lausanne Telegrams (1922-1923)], (Türk Tarih Kurumu 
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 For numerous examples see, among others, Dilek Kurban and Kezman Hatemi, Bir Yabancılaştırma 
Hikayesi: Türkiye’de Gayrimüslim Cemaatlerin Vakıf ve Taşınmaz Mülkiyet Sorunu (A Story of Alienations: 
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In contrast to its contemporary minority protection schemes that protected racial, 
linguistic and religious minorities, the Lausanne Treaty identifies solely non-Muslim 
minorities as minority right holders.555 There has been much debate during the 
negotiations and drafting of the document as to which categories of people will have 
the protection afforded in the minority protection scheme.556 The Turkish government 
denied that there were any ethnic groups in Turkey other than Turks and Kurds and 
underlined that no group except for the Greeks demanded “these kind of rights”.557  
Since Turkish authorities regarded the efforts to include protection of ethnic minorities 
as a scheme to incite divisiveness through the Kurdish population by foreign powers, 
Muslim minorities of different ethnic backgrounds were not granted any specific rights.  
However, there are certain provisions that are applicable to all Turkish citizens.558   
The category of groups that the term ‘non-Muslim minorities’ identified was not 
specified.559 Indeed, there appears to be a lack of coherency in this respect throughout 
the time of drafting. In practice, the Turkish government extended the protection only 
to the Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox and Jewish communities, in spite of the 
fact that these names are not mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty. The rights of other, 
then existing, non-Muslim groups, such as the Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Chaldean, 
Latin Catholic, and those of the Bahai faith are not viewed by Turkey as subject to the 
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 Article 39 (3) protects all from discrimination based on religion, denomination and belief and 
paragraph 2 of the same article recognizes equality of all before the law regardless of religious affiliation. 
Article 39 (4) protects freedom to use any language in private or commercial activities as well as public 
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Lausanne protection scheme. For example, Syriac and Chaldean Christians are not able 
to establish their own schools in accordance with Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty. The 
explanation given by the state for this anomaly is that Syriacs had given up these rights 
after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.560 Yet, even if there had been any 
declarations made by religious leaders of this community at the time, certainly they 
were in no position to make such a decision for the members of the Syriac community. 
It should be noted that there have been demands by the members of the Syriac 
community to establish schools, however, these have been denied.561 In addition, 
currently, newer non-Muslim groups like the Jehovah’s Witnesses or Protestants of 
Turkish ethnic origin are also not recognized as non-Muslim minorities as protected 
under the Lausanne Treaty. Hence in practice the Turkish government has been 
interpreting the term “non-Muslim minorities” restrictively so as to include two ethnic-
based Christian communities and the Jewish community. While it may be argued that 
Turkey’s restrictive practice counts as subsequent practice for the application of the 
Lausanne Treaty, this argument is not sustainable since subsequent practice must first 
and foremost be in line with the word of the treaty.562 This restrictive interpretation 
has, however, not been a matter of any national or international legal dispute so far.   
Specific rights protected for non-Muslims are listed below:     
- Article 38 (3), guarantees the right of non-Muslims to movement and migrate on par with 
Turkish nationals.  
- Article 39 (1), ensures that non-Muslims will benefit from all civil and political rights that are 
granted to Muslims. 
- Article 40 protects the rights to establish, manage and control charity institutions, religious 
social institutions, schools, teaching and education institutions and use their own language in 
these freely and freely conduct religious worship services. 
- Article 41 protects the right to education in mother tongue in primary schools where they are 
intensely populated and to receive funding from the national budget. 
- Article 42 (1) protects the right to settlement of disputes in accordance with traditions and 
customs in family and private matters. 
- Article 42 (2) sets forth facilitation for the establishment of religious institutions. 
- Article 43 stipulates that they cannot be forced to act a contrari to their beliefs and religious 
precepts and to engage in official acts during their holidays.
563
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 Turkey has a positive obligation to create the necessary normative framework 
in order to make these rights available and accessible to non-Muslim minorities. 
Beyond negative obligations that require states to avoid interference in the enjoyment 
of rights, positive obligations require states to take necessary steps in order to make 
full and effective equality a reality.  In particular, Articles 41, 42 and 43 obligate Turkey 
to take relevant measures in order to ensure effective protection of the rights in 
questions. However, this has not been the case; for example, the support mentioned in 
Article 41(1) has not been given, special commissions mentioned in Article 42(2) have 
not been applied, the obligations derived from Article 42(3) have not been carried 
out.564    
Article 42(1) maintains a provision that envisages, in general terms, the continuation of 
the plural legal system that existed in the Ottoman Empire. While the Turkish 
government accepted this provision for the time being, there was a strong 
determination to eventually eliminate any “privileges” pertaining to the jurisdictional 
sphere of personal and family law of religious minorities.  The new Turkish government 
had plans to adopt a Civil Code that would be applicable to all without any 
differentiation based on religious affiliation. Later, when the Civil Code was adopted it 
was said that the non-Muslim minorities renounced their rights to resolve family law 
matters according to their own traditions and agreed to be subject to the Civil Code 
that was applicable to all.565  The reluctance to observe obligations in the sphere of 
religious jurisdictions may be explained by the perceived tension between neutral law 
that is applicable to all and special minority arrangements that were seen as 
incompatible with the principle of equality and the sovereignty of the state.  There 
have not been claims by non-Muslim minorities to exercise their rights in this sphere.   
It is important to consider the interpretation and utilization of the principle of 
reciprocity,566 since it constitutes the basis of Turkey’s conditional approach to the 
protection minority rights.  Here, again one has to turn to the underlying spirit that has 
shaped the approach of the Turkish Republic to the issue of minority protection. A 
decree related to the minorities issued by the Misak-i Milli (National Pact of 1920 
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 Article 45 reads “The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem 
minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.” 
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stating the claims of the Ottoman State) demarcates the extent of protection to be 
granted to minorities, “minority rights will be embraced by us and secured, with the 
hope that Muslim people in the neighbouring states would benefit from same rights, 
within the framework of principles enshrined in treaties concluded between the 
members of the Alliance and their enemies or partners.”567  The conditional approach 
based on the expectation that there will be reciprocal protection for Muslims, 
particularly those in Western Thrace, has been an integral part of the constrictive 
application of the general minority rights protection scheme.  While the Lausanne 
Treaty establishes a special legal regime for the protection of the Muslim minority in 
Greece and non-Muslim minorities in Turkey,568 it was clearly stated in the negotiations 
by some representatives that the obligations were parallel obligations and were not 
based on realization of obligations by the other country.569 The reciprocity condition 
continues to constitute a problem up to this day.570 Since, in international law generally 
the subjects of the reciprocity principle are foreigners, it is perceived by some, as an 
indicator that non-Muslim minorities are seen as foreigners instead of citizens.571 On 
the other hand, even if the principle of reciprocity may be accepted, it could only affect 
the rights of the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey in relation to the rights of the 
Muslim population by Greece. Armenian Apostolic and Jewish communities could not 
be subject to the reciprocity principle since there is not a country that is party to the 
Lausanne Treaty that undertakes the commitment to protect the rights of a Muslim 
population reciprocally.   
In conclusion, the Lausanne Treaty creates crucial obligations for Turkey toward its 
non-Muslim citizens thus continues to be a significant legal instrument for the 
protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief, particularly in its collective 
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dimension. Yet, the restrictive interpretation and application of the rights remain as 
serious obstacles before effective protection for non-Muslim minorities.  
5.4. Turkish Constitution and the Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief 
The 1982 Turkish Constitution embodies key elements that reflect Turkey’s approach 
toward religion and manifestations of religion. On the one hand, the Turkish state 
confers the principle of secularism, defined as separation of state and religion, a central 
and supreme position while at the same time permanently instituting state’s 
involvement in religion through, inter alia, the Presidency of Religious Affairs and 
compulsory religion lessons in schools and interpreting secularism so as to create 
blanket restrictions on many forms of manifestation of religion or belief. It is important 
to note that, in addition, a certain form of Turkish nationalism constitutes an 
overarching and pervasive spirit of interpretation and practice in the above 
construction both in society and state administration.572   
5.4.1. Turkish Secularism- Laiklik573   
The concept of Turkish secularism, laiklik, in the Turkish Constitution as a legal 
principle must be explored and understood for the overall purpose of the study 
because of its conceptual significance and its powerful functional effect in 
jurisprudence. The term laiklik formally entered the Turkish legal system through its 
inclusion in the Constitution in 1937.574 The paramount place and particular meaning 
given to the principle of secularism in the Turkish Constitution and its particular 
application by the high courts- in particular the Turkish Constitutional Court,575 and the 
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Council of State576- create the general legal framework and the spirit of interpretation 
concerning cases pertaining to freedom of religion or belief in Turkey. Çağlar observes 
that the meaning of laiklik in Turkey does not include the impartiality of the state, 
instead, it means, “active or militant secularism and the control of the state over 
religion.”577    
In the 1982 Turkish Constitution,578 laiklik is directly or indirectly protected through a 
number of provisions. It is one of the attributes of the Republic,579 that cannot be 
changed,580 and no activity that is contrary to Atatürk’s nationalism, principles and 
reforms that are based on laiklik can find protection.581   The state’s fundamental 
social, economic, political, and legal order cannot be based on religious tenets.582 
Reform laws,583 most of which are directly or indirectly linked to secularism, are under 
Constitutional protection and cannot be understood as contradictory to the 
Constitution.584 Political parties also have to abide by the principle of laiklik or risk 
closure.585 Secularism also finds its reflection in the restriction of fundamental rights 
that cannot be used to establish a state order, or any part of this order, based on 
religion.586  
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The principle of non-interference in the affairs of religious communities that follows 
from the notion of separation of state and religion is not envisioned in the Turkish legal 
framework.587  This has significant implications for freedom of religion or belief, 
particularly in its collective dimension for religious/belief groups- as regards their 
associative rights. This is particularly evident in the substantial restrictions on the 
autonomy of religious communities as well as the state monopoly on certain religious 
services/activities, such as those provided by the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet) and religious education provided by the Ministry of Education and 
universities. The implications of the failure to observe non-interference in the affairs of 
religious communities for the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief are 
critically analyzed in Chapter 7.      
The Turkish Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi, hereafter AYM) understands 
the principle of laiklik to mean, firstly, that religion cannot in any way interfere in state 
affairs and secondly, taking into account historical realities, that the state will reflect an 
interventionist, restrictive, supervisory, controlling approach toward religious 
manifestation.588 The Turkish position is explained by the AYM with reference to the 
unique circumstances in Turkey, observing that the circumstances and the conditions 
of each religion necessitate difference in the overall understanding of secularism in 
different countries.589 It is explained that the difference lies in the conditions of 
Christianity and Islam and in particular the existence of a hierarchical clergy structure 
found in the former in contrast to a lack of clergy class in the latter.590 This particular 
situation in Islam makes it impossible to grant independence in internal affairs to those 
involved in places of worship and religious affairs.591 Since Islam regulates not only 
religious belief in the conscience of individuals but also social relations, state affairs 
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and law, it is argued that an unlimited freedom of religion and independent religious 
associative freedom is dangerous for Turkey.592  
The AYM has expressed the view that the principle of laiklik has a privileged position in 
the Constitution in relation to other rules or principles found in it.593 The AYM 
mandates itself with what Dinçkol refers to ‘active’ approach toward the protection of 
the principle of secularism and views it as the ‘heart’ of the system.594    
In contrast to, or arguably because of, the strong protection of Turkish secularism, in 
Turkey’s state-religion relations, a reciprocal non-interference principle, or strict 
separation of state and religion affairs is not envisioned.595 This is particularly evident 
in the substantial restriction on the autonomy of religious communities as well as the 
state monopoly on certain religious services, such as those provided by the Diyanet and 
religious education provided by the Ministry of Education and the public universities. 
According to the 1982 Constitution religious education is placed under the supervision 
and control of the State. Article 24 (3), introducing compulsory Religious Culture and 
Ethics Knowledge lessons in primary and middle education is a significant change that 
the Constitution brings in terms of regulating religion. The Milli Güvenlik Kurulu 
(National Security Council  hereafter MGK),596 acknowledging that religion is a unifying 
factor in society, advised the drafters of the Constitution that compulsory religious 
education under state control was appropriate however it needed to be in the form of 
religious culture.597 Not surprisingly, the compulsory nature of this education is viewed 
by many as a feature irreconcilable with the secular nature of the state.598  Still, laiklik 
is viewed as the safeguard for a framework that is conducive for freedom of 
conscience.599 It is implied that for true freedom of religion or belief to exist the state 
must be laik. Hence in the Turkish legal system laiklik constitutes the foundation for 
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freedom of religion or belief. Such involvement in the religious sphere is compatible 
with efforts to reconcile religion with laiklik.600   
It is important to note that laiklik is not understood as an abstract concept but as a 
concept that is embodied in the systems of state, law and education.601 This implies 
that religion cannot be involved in these key areas that are envisioned as strictly 
secular and that there is a particular effort to protect secularism within and through 
these systems. The importance of these key spheres also explains the sweeping 
measures that were put in place in order to exclude or drive out religious influences 
from, what was viewed as, the sphere of the state.602 It may also explain the rules 
concerning dress codes for public servants and strict application of these rules and key 
constitutional principles in related cases by the Turkish judiciary.   
More recently, since 2012, however, the AYM has an evolved and new jurisprudence 
on what it calls liberal laiklik according to which "individual preferences and the 
ensuing lifestyles remain outside the interference of the state, instead, they are under 
the protection the state".603 This judgment concerned the controversial change in the 
education system and the introduction of the optional religion lessons in Islam through 
legislation. The AYM held that one of the purposes of the secular state is to establish a 
political order where, while protecting social diversity, individuals of different beliefs 
can live together in peace.604  Accordingly, the state will refrain from interfering in the 
freedom of religion or belief of individuals unless it is necessary.605 It also implies, in the 
AYM's view, that the state should remove obstacles to freedom of religion or belief. 
Despite this, on the outset positive theory of secularism, while applying the principles 
to the facts of the case the AYM attributes to the state a positive obligation to provide 
Islamic religious services – for example in school education because the Turkish state 
holds monopoly over religious education and does not allow private citizens to 
establish institutions that teach religion.606 This approach has wide and possibly 
unforeseeable implications. 
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5.4.2. Special Constitutional and Institutional Arrangement –the Diyanet 
The constitutional and institutional arrangement concerning the Diyanet 
constitutes a key issue for the understanding of state religion relation as well as the 
protection of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey. It is not possible to provide a 
comprehensive outline of all the implications of the Diyanet, here some of the key 
issues will be highlighted so as to present the paradoxical aspects of this institution in 
relation to neutrality of the state and the principle of equality that it must observe.  
The Diyanet is a multi-dimensional and massive organization,607 with far reaching 
activities both at the national and international level.608 The Presidency of Religious 
Affairs was established in 1924 as an institution under the Office of the Prime 
Minister.609 The 1961 Turkish Constitution instituted the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
as a constitutional organization within the state administration610 with the purpose of 
fulfilling the tasks that are enumerated in a special law concerning the organization. 
The 1982 Constitution preserves the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Article 136:  
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The Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its 
duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed 
from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.  
  Consistent with the efforts to protect laiklik and try to reconcile religion with it, 
the Diyanet is to work in line with the principle of laiklik removed from all political 
views and ideas, and aiming to ensure national solidarity and unity.611 The purpose of 
the Diyanet is stipulated in its own law, “Carrying out activities related to the beliefs, 
worship and ethics of the Islamic religion, enlightening the society about religion and 
administrating worship places”.612    
Ensuring the neutral character of “public service” seems difficult considering that the 
DIB has been criticized for being involved only with the needs of the Sunni-Muslims.613 
In addition, on the one hand, the DIB is the only religious institution that receives 
financial state support for all of its activities and personnel, yet on the other hand it is 
under the control of the state- enjoying limited autonomy.614 Through this 
arrangement the Turkish state is involved in and through the religious affairs of a 
particular Islamic tradition, significantly undermining the principle of impartiality.  The 
constitutional principle of equality must be upheld in public services by state organs, 
which is difficult to meet with the massive state support in terms of funding and 
privileges creates significant inequality for those of other beliefs. As for members of 
non-Muslim communities, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 prescribes that their 
communities will provide religious services with their own resources.  In addition, 
Muslim groups that object to the Diyanet’s claims of providing services for all Muslims 
without embracing any particular denomination within Islam, point out that the DIB is 
unconcerned with their needs and does not provide services for them. According to 
Kara, the Diyanet has engaged in a struggle against popular religiosity and the religious 
communities and tarikats,615 that nurture this religiosity and thus weakens the popular 
religiosity and the embodiment of religion in this region.616  Thus the question of 
observing the principle of equality extends beyond making funds available to adopting 
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an inclusive theology. The Diyanet has a mission that is both theoretical and practical. 
While on the one hand it manages certain religious affairs, on the other hand, it is 
tasked with the enlightenment of the society on religion.  As rightly pointed out,  
 The mission to enlighten people on religion makes it necessary to understand religion and 
 enlighten people in accordance with what one understands. For this reason the Diyanet 
 develops an understanding of religion (jurisprudence) enlightens the people in accordance 
 with this understanding (convey) and provides religious services accordingly.
617
   
 The understanding of religion is according to DIB is based on the foundational 
resources of the Islamic religion.618  Gözaydın notes that the emphasis on ‘true religion’ 
has been ever present as a narrative throughout the Republic though there have been 
changes in state-religion relations.619 This claim of true interpretation functions also as 
a point of differentiation from other interpretations of Islam. The DIB is criticized for 
“closing its doors to different interpretations of Islam”, 620 and representing solely the 
Sunni interpretation of Islam. 
Yet, in a controversial decision, the AYM found that the Diyanet and the civil servant 
status of its personnel are compatible with laiklik.621 The decision was based on the 
consideration of firstly, the country’s experience that an understanding of 
“uncontrolled religious freedom and independent religious association” is loaded with 
heavy dangers and, secondly, the nature of Islam which regulates social relations, state 
affairs and law.622 Hence the AYM held that there is no doubt that the regulation o the 
Diyanet in the Constitution and the “civil servant” status of its personnel is a 
requirement in light of historical reasons, facts and circumstances of the country.623 
This decision has been criticized both for its contradiction with the principle of laiklik as 
well as its inconsistency with legal logic by basing normative results on sociological and 
historical observations.624   
Another dimension of the issue concerns the exclusive nature of the existing Diyanet 
framework which results in the Diyanet being the sole subject of the enjoyment of key 
freedom of religion or belief rights. On the one hand, Muslims may be the receivers of 
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this “public service”, on the other hand, they do not have the legal possibility of 
engaging in the exercise of certain rights protected in the right to freedom of religion 
or belief, such as the right to establish places of worship apart from the Diyanet 
structure. Thus this arrangement results with a system where all Muslims, in practice, 
are compelled to enjoy certain rights through the Diyanet. Formal religious associative 
activities for Muslims are quite limited outside of the Diyanet organization and that the 
latter holds monopoly, in law and fact, over key areas of manifestation of religion or 
belief. Only Diyanet can open and establish places of worship, mosques, and administer 
them.625  Similarly, staff for religious services is provided and supervised and trained by 
this institution.626  The Diyanet is also tasked with assuring that the Quran is printed 
accurately and scrutinizing relevant publication and making decision on whether such 
publications may be imported from abroad.  The only organization that can provide 
Quran Courses legally and formally is the Diyanet.  The Diyanet’s mandate and the 
impossibility of enjoyment of key freedom of religion or belief rights outside the 
Diyanet framework create a rather restricted system for Muslims in Turkey.  
The Dİyanet assumes a role for countering religious propaganda that comes from other 
sources,  “Follow-up of publications on religion in and outside of Turkey and decide on 
what they necessitate and prepare counter publication in line with scientific 
contestation”.627 Such counter publications include books on Jehovah’s Witnesses and 
Christian missionary activity.628 Clearly, the Diyanet has assumed an active role in 
propagating its scientific Islam understanding and engaging in counter-propaganda 
against other movements that find their sources in other religions, philosophies and 
Islamic understanding. Such a position might be compatible with an independent 
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religious organization as a manifestation of freedom in dogma and internal matters, 
however it is hard to reconcile it with a public-funded, provider of religious public 
services within a secular state structure that is founded on secularism. 
On the other hand, there are a number of issues raising questions about the autonomy 
of the DIB. It should be noted that the expectation that the DIB complies with criteria 
concerning equality required of public institutions providing public services creates 
tension between theological autonomy of the Diyanet as an institution with a religious 
nature and its role as a public service provider.  Similarly, the fact that the Diyanet must  
“exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of 
secularism”629 creates a restrictive overarching framework in which the Diyanet can 
produce its dogma and exercise its duties.  In terms of appointment of leadership, 
neither Muslims in Turkey nor the Diyanet organization is involved in this decision, 
instead the president of the Diyanet is appointed by the Prime Minister. The Diyanet 
personnel belong to the special category of Religious Services Class, that comprises of 
public servants who have received religious education at various levels.630   
Bearing in mind the above issues raised in relation to the particular constitutional and 
institutional arrangement of the Diyanet, it follows that this institution raises a variety 
of issues pertaining to the obligation on the part of the states to observe neutrality as 
well as the right to freedom of religion or belief. While the existence of an organization 
providing religious services within a state structure may not be incompatible with 
international standards protecting freedom of religion or belief,631 the Diyanet, as such, 
certainly must go through a reform process in order to comply with such standards.  
5.4.3. The Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief- Its Scope and Limits  
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The general protection of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey is reviewed 
below. This examination will be based on constitutional and legislative rules and 
relevant jurisprudence.     
The right to freedom of religion or belief is enshrined in Article 24 of the Constitution,  
 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. 
 Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that 
 they do not violate the provisions of Article 14.  
 (2) No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, 
 to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his 
 religious beliefs and convictions. 
 (3) Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state 
 supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be 
 compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and 
 instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the 
 request of their legal representatives. 
 (4) No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held 
 sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political 
 influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal 
 order of the state on religious tenets. 
 The provision guaranteeing the right to freedom of religion or belief in the 
Turkish Constitution comprises of three key components, apart from its limitation 
clause.632   
The first paragraph constitutes the inviolable part of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief namely the right to freedom of conscience, religion, belief and convictions. This 
right includes the right not to believe and change one’s religion or belief. While the 
notion of conscience has not been invoked as a separate component, it is usually 
referred together with religion as “freedom of religion and conscience” which seems to 
point to the individual’s inner sphere made up of deep convictions that may not 
necessarily be religious. It is however not interpreted as broad as to include the 
protection against being compelled to act against one’s conscience.633  
The second paragraph is evocative of the understanding of the scope of the protection 
conferred to manifestations- even though this term is absent in the provision- which is 
limited to “worship, religious services and ceremonies” in contrast to the protection 
afforded to the non-exhaustive list of manifestations of religion or belief in “worship, 
observance, practice and teaching” stipulated in Article 9 of the ECHR. This narrow 
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scope envisioned by the drafters of the 1982 Constitution, somewhat restricting 
manifestations into places of worship- is in line with restrictions on manifestations of 
religion in public sphere religious symbols and teaching of religion. Sezer, agreeing with 
the narrow scope of protection, observes that one has to differentiate between 
“worship” and “practice”, it is only the right to worship that the Constitution 
guarantees, “practice” that is not worship is not protected.634 This line of interpretation 
is difficult to reconcile with the non-exclusive list of manifestations enshrined 
international provisions protecting the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, in 
particular Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR.635  
Teaching as a form of manifestation of religion is not expressed as a right instead, it is 
referred to in the context of the institution of strict state control in Article 24 (3) 
through the regulation concerning compulsory Religious Culture and Knowledge of 
Ethics classes and other religious instruction which can only be carried out under state 
control. Through this provision the state takes upon itself the role of teaching 
religion,636 - giving it direction, content and function. In addition, all “other” religious 
teaching or instruction that may be carried out by private individuals or religious 
groups must take place under state control. This construction exposes the domestic 
conception of the right to freedom of religion or belief; the right to manifest religion or 
belief in teaching is an area where state control is deemed strictly necessary to the 
extent that it is not recognized as a right, instead it is expressed in the form of a 
regulation thus leading to restrictions. 
As captured succinctly by Çağlar, the case law on the right to freedom of religion or 
belief of the AYM and Council of State in Turkey is constructed on striving to reconcile 
laiklik and freedom of religion or belief.637  There are several constitutional provisions 
that function as restriction clauses for the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion as recognized under Article 24.  
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The limitation enshrined in Article 24 (5) stating that “no one shall be allowed to exploit 
or abuse religion or religious feelings or things held sacred by religion” is a special 
constitutional limitation that is intrinsic to the provision. It is clear from the latter part 
of the paragraph that the purpose of this provision is to restrict the use of religion to 
gain personal or political influence as well as to prohibit the “abuse” of religion in order 
to base the order of the state on religious tenets. The particular position of this 
restriction clause is interesting. It seems to express caution against actions that may 
appear like the exercise of the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, but in effect 
may be religious activity that causes personnel gain or exert political influence. It must 
be noted, however, that “abuse of religious feelings”, “things held sacred by religion” 
are vague terms that may be difficult to reconcile with precision and foreseeablity 
criteria that is required for legal restrictions. 
The general restrictions clause that is applicable to all fundamental rights is found 
under Article 13. It stipulates that fundamental rights may be restricted, “only by law”, 
without “infringing upon their essence” and restrictions may not be “in conflict with 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic order 
of society and the secular Republic and the principle of proportionality.”638 The 
“essence of rights” is a somewhat vague notion which has not been defined by the 
AYM for the right to freedom of thought conscience and religion. Article 13 does not 
include other “general” restriction grounds thus making Article 24 subject to its own 
special constitutional restriction clause. Gözler argues that without a general 
restrictions clause Article 24 cannot be restricted based on for example, the protection 
of health or public order.639 Yet, considering the many potential and explicit restriction 
clauses, including the Preamble, it should not be difficult to find a suitable general 
restriction clause that can be applied to restrict the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.640 
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An additional and somewhat vague restriction clause is found in Article 14 stating that 
“None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with 
the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, 
and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish 
Republic based upon human rights.”641 The requirement of democratic order of society 
has been used to restrict the state whereas the requirement of secular Republic has 
been used to restrict fundamental freedom.642 Interestingly, the same provision goes 
on to create a restriction on the state and on individuals to destroy fundamental rights 
and freedoms embodied in the Constitution. Thus creating an obligation both for the 
state and the individual. 
As far as suspension of fundamental rights are concerned even in times of war, 
mobilization, martial law or in times of emergency, “no one may be compelled to 
reveal his/her religion, conscience, thought and convictions or be accused because of 
them.643  
The unalterable nature of the Reform Laws that are protected under Article 174 of the 
Constitution may also be viewed as another additional limitation clause with 
implications for the restriction of the right to manifest one’s religion or belief. Reform 
Laws protected under this provision relate to a number of issues,644 with direct or 
indirect connection to the protection of laiklik. As a result of this clause, for example, 
the prohibition on wearing religious garments for clergy of any religion or the 
prohibition of the use of certain religious leadership titles and the closure of certain 
places of worship such as dervish lodges may not be challenged on grounds of their 
unconstitutionality. Thus these laws in question enjoy an absolute protection in the 
Turkish domestic legal system, making it impossible to object to them in the domestic 
search for legal remedies.  
It is clear from the review above that the right to freedom of thought, religion or belief 
is subject to a number of restriction clauses with varying degrees of precision and 
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importance. It will not be difficult to presume then, the interpretation and balancing of 
high courts plays an important role in the determination of permissible restrictions. 
(a) Compulsory Religious Culture and Ethics Lessons 
In spite of the concurring national and international court decisions that regard current 
DIBctice in Turkey incompatible with Turkey’s human rights commitments under the 
ECHR, the issue of compulsory religion classes continues to be an unresolved domestic 
issue. National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK hereafter),645 
acknowledging that religion is a unifying factor in society, advised the drafters of the 
Constitution that compulsory religious education under state control was appropriate 
however it needed to be in the form of religious culture.646 Not surprisingly, the 
compulsory nature of this education is viewed by many as a practice that is 
irreconcilable with the laik nature of the state.647   The Constitutional provision on 
religious education stipulates: 
Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision 
 and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the 
 curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall 
 be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their 
 legal representatives. 
 As it is clear from the text above, the Turkish Constitution foresees two 
different kinds of religious instruction and education and creates different legal 
regimes for each. Firstly, there is a reference to “Religious Culture and Knowledge of 
Ethics”  (DKAB) classes that are deemed compulsory in primary and secondary schools. 
Secondly, the third sentence refers to “other religious education and instruction” and 
makes them subject to the individual’s own desire and in the case of children, the 
request of their legal representatives. However, both kinds of religious instruction and 
education have one common element in that they are both subject to state supervision 
and control.  
The lack of a definition for the DKAB classes in the Constitution leaves it to the judiciary 
to interpret what kind of lessons these ought to be. It has been observed that the key 
phrase here is “culture” which seems to indicate that DKAB lessons must provide 
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content that is relevant for all and not only for members of a particular religion.648 Thus 
it would follow from the text, and such an interpretation would exclude, firstly that the 
“religious culture” lessons would be compulsory for all- without any exemption- and 
that they would be compulsory in all primary and secondary schools. In practice, there 
is a general impression that the DKAB lessons are not about Culture of Religion but on 
Sunni Islam. This is demonstrated by the Ministry of Education curricula,649 the 
objections of atheist and Alevi parents,650 as well as the possibility of exemption for 
Christian and Jewish students.651 On the other hand, the majority of the people in 
Turkey consider the DKAB as religion course yet wish them to continue as compulsory 
course.652 
The ECtHR has ruled that the compulsory DKAB lessons in Turkey amount to religious 
instruction in the case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey.653 The case concerned the 
request of an Alevi parent for the exemption of his daughter from the compulsory 
DKAB lessons and the rejection of the Provincial National Education Directorate. The 
ECtHR held that the “religious culture and ethics” classes cannot be considered to meet 
the criteria of objectivity and pluralism, and held that there had been a violation of the 
right to education protected under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.654 
In Turkey, the Council of State (Danıştay) had also ruled that the books taught in DKAB 
classes are based on teaching a particular religion and that practices such as doing the 
namaz and memorization of Arabic prayers are part of these lessons.655 Thus, in light of 
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its content the Council of State held that they cannot be accepted as teaching on 
Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics but that it is “religious instruction”.656 The 
Council of State held that according to Article 24 (4) of the Constitution that this kind of 
religious instruction may only be given subject to the desire of the individual and that 
rules that make it compulsory without a request from parents for such instruction was 
in violation of the Constitution as well as the ECHR.657 Sezer asks the bidding question, 
“what can be the reason for a secular state to desire to give all of its citizens religious 
information in a compulsory manner?” and proposes that “compulsory religion” lies 
behind this practice.658 
At the time of writing this thesis, the DKAB lessons remain compulsory, yet certain 
changes have been made in the program and content. According to a report by the ERG 
(Eğitim Reformu Girişimi- Reform in Education Initiative) changes in the curricula, which 
amount to interjecting information on Alevi and Caferi traditions, do not change the 
nature of the lessons as “instruction in a particular religion” thus the compulsory 
nature of the lessons continues to raise issues with the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief of the child and the right of parents and legal guardians to 
bring up children in line with their religious or philosophical views.659 Unfortunately, 
following the changes in the curricula the Court of Cassation has changed its 
jurisprudence on the compulsory DKAB lessons, stating that the lessons are no longer 
“religious instruction on a particular religion” but “religious culture”.660  
The second kind of religious education is allowed by the Constitution, however, subject 
to individuals’ wishes and must be carried out under state supervision and control. A 
separate regulation concerning “other religious education” also reinforces the 
interpretation that the “Religious Culture” classes ought not be “instruction in a certain 
religion”. There is no constitutional restriction concerning neither the content of “other 
religious education” nor a regulation on the nature of state supervision and control. If 
such education is provided by public institutions one may assume that state 
supervision and control is present, however, there is no constitutional rule concerning 
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how the state supervision and control can be exercised if such education is provided in 
the family, informal arrangements or in religious establishments. Legal regulation exists 
concerning “Quran courses”, which may be only carried out under the Diyanet.661 On 
the other hand, it is not possible for children to receive religious education in an 
institutional framework, apart from the summer Quran courses that are organized by 
the DIB. For non-Muslims an option similar to the summer Quran courses does not 
exist.  
(b) Coercion to disclose religion or belief 
The prohibition of coercion to declare one’s religion or belief is a fundamental 
component of the right to have a thought, religion or belief.662 The AYM had the 
opportunity to address this issue for the first time in an appeal case that concerned the 
request of three individuals to change the religion that was indicated in their national 
identity cards.663 The case was taken to the AYM with the claim that the relevant 
provisions of the Public Registration Law violate the Constitution, in particular the 
provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief, the right to freedom of 
expression, the principle of secularism and the principle of equality. The fundamental 
question was whether the requirement to register one’s religion constitutes coercion 
to disclose one’s convictions and opinions. The AYM did not find a violation and held 
that the said provisions of the Public Registration Law do not include any elements that 
constitute coercion to disclose one’s belief. The decisive factor for the AYM was that 
the said provisions did not require the disclosure of religious convictions and opinions, 
instead “just the religion”. The difference between “religious convictions and opinions” 
on the one hand, and, “just religion” on the other, was not clarified by the AYM. In 
contrast, the dissenting judges drew attention to the fine that is due for the non-
disclosure of religion or belief for population register and identity cards purposes. Thus 
they held that “there is no doubt that there is coercion”.664 They also found the 
requirement to register one’s religion or belief incompatible with the principle of 
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secularism, saying, “for whatever reason and regardless of at what level, the coercion 
of citizens to disclose religious convictions and opinions means nothing short of an 
infringement of secularism.”665   
In a relatively more recent case dating to 1995 the Constitutional Court maintained its 
previously held position on the constitutionality of the requirement in Public 
Registration Law to register religion in public register.666 This time the Court elaborated 
on the difference between “religion” and “religious conviction and opinion” noting that 
religious conviction and opinion is a broader term including one’s religious views on a 
variety of issues whereas religion amounts only to demographic or personal 
information.  Hence the Court maintained that what was prohibited in Article 24 of the 
Constitution protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief, was not the “noting of 
one’s religion”, instead  “the disclosure of one’s religious convictions and opinions in a 
coercive manner”. Bearing in mind the possibilities of changing the religion or erasing it 
through administrative action the Court found that coercive element was non-
existent.667  
The problem of coercion that results from the registration of religious affiliation in 
identity cards or population register is a problem that could have been solved in the 
domestic legal system. Nevertheless, the narrow interpretation of the Turkish judiciary 
caused one such case to be taken to the ECtHR. The Turkish practice concerning the 
registration of religious affiliation in public register and ID cards was the subject of the 
Sinan Işık v. Turkey case considered by the ECtHR.668 Here the the European Court 
found that “when identity cards have a religion box, leaving that box blank inevitably 
has a specific connotation. Bearers of identity cards which do not contain information 
concerning religion would stand out, against their will and as a result of interference by 
the authorities, from those who have an identity card indicating their religious beliefs. 
Accordingly, the Court considers that the issue of disclosure of one of an individual’s 
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most intimate aspects still arises.”669 Yet, the ECtHR did not hesitate to touch upon the 
real issue, namely that the breach did not arise from the refusal to indicate the 
applicant’s Alevi faith, rather, the indication of religion on the identity card, as such.670 
Necessary legislative changes in order to prevent similar violations, however, have not 
been made.  
Individuals are under an obligation to take an oath on “God and honour” in the Turkish 
courts.671 This provision makes it compulsory for everyone, including non-believers to 
take an oath by reference to “one’s God”. This is incompatible with the right to 
freedom of religion or belief, the secular nature of the state which should be impartial 
towards believers and non-believers. This provision has thus far not been the subject of 
consideration by the AYM on its constitutionality.    
(c) Manifestation of Religion- Religious Symbols- in the Public Sphere 
Public work place- Civil servants and dress code672 The Turkish Constitution 
recognizes the right of all Turkish citizens to enter public service and stipulates that no 
criteria other than the qualifications for the office concerned may be taken into 
consideration for recruitment into public service.673  The general provisions of the Law 
on Public Servants, however, have implications for the restriction of manifestations of 
religion or belief.674 As far as public servants working in schools connected to the 
Ministry of Education are concerned, they are subject to a regulation requiring the 
head to be uncovered.675   
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The dress code of public servants is regulated by the Framework Regulation of October 
1982 (the Regulation of October 1982).676 The purpose of the Regulation of October 
1982 is to ensure that public servants have uniformity in terms of clothing and wear 
modest and contemporary clothes that are in line with the reforms and principles of 
Atatürk.677 It is not possible to find a definition in any positive law document of what 
these terms mean or imply for clothing. This was later determined by jurisprudence.    
The Turkish judiciary has interpreted secularism functionally so as to exclude not only 
the headscarf, but also “persons with certain religious affiliations” (dinci), in general, 
from the public workplace.678 This was done by attributing manifestations of religion, in 
particular the headscarf, a meaning and significance that is ideologically incompatible 
with secularism and by the imposition of heavy sanctions upon persons who use these 
symbols.  The judiciary equated the act of wearing the headscarf in a public workplace 
with disrupting the order of an institution for ideological or political purposes thus 
warranting dismissal from work thus transforming the action of wearing the headscarf 
to a different category.679 As a result the effect and strength of the prohibition and its 
sanction has been aggravated.   
The broad approach taken by the judiciary raises questions about the predictability and 
clarity of the application of relevant laws. In the Turkish context, in the assessment of 
compatibility of a civil servant’s actions with the dress code and the principle of 
secularism, dress outside the public workplace,680 “sincerity” in abiding by the relevant 
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regulations,681 manifestations of religion or belief outside the workplace and affiliations 
with certain groups and religious worldview,682 may also be taken into account. It is not 
possible to find a detailed set of reasons as to exactly how the nexus between, on the 
one hand, manifestations of religion, such as religious garb and practice outside the 
workplace and, on the other hand, the threat to secularism is drawn. The assumed 
connection seems to be based on general perceptions and presuppositions rather than 
concrete acts of individuals that pose an immediate and material threat to secular 
nature of public service they are delivering.    
The Turkish judiciary does not seem to take into account the right to freedom of 
religion or belief aspect in its assessment of the permissibility of religious symbols in 
the public workplace.  The right to freedom of religion or belief is protected in the 
Turkish Constitution, as well as through Turkey’s international human rights 
commitments.  The interest of protecting the secular system may be ultimately based 
on the legitimate aims of protecting public order and the rights of freedoms of others. 
However, the balancing of competing interests and proportionality are, absent in the 
reasoning.  
Interestingly, the relationship of religious symbols and state neutrality or impartiality 
and the possible problems in this respect find limited reflection in the jurisprudence. 
Yet, Demir argues that the ban on religious symbols for public servants is a requirement 
of the principle of secularism since the neutrality of the public servant will become 
concrete with her/his outlook and behaviour.683  Hence the protection of secularism as 
the paramount interest functions as a trump card or hierarchically superior interest 
against which other competing interests cannot even be regarded as legitimate 
interests that require balancing. Religious symbols and/or DIBctices are not assessed as 
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legally protected manifestations of religion or belief, but as indicators of certain 
religious affiliations that are viewed as threats to secularism.    
Manifestations of religion or belief in Turkish schools- the headscarf   The extent of 
protection afforded to the right to manifest one’s religion or belief in Turkish schools 
needs to be analysed in relation to the rights of teachers, minor and adult students, the 
state and parents. Due to the constraints of this paper, I will try to evaluate the Turkish 
legislation and practice in these areas focusing on their common feature, namely the 
decisive factor which is the understanding of laiklik by the Turkish high courts. Dress 
code for teachers, be it public or private or, primary or high education, prohibits the 
use of the headscarf.684 Until 2014 students in primary or highschool were not  allowed 
to enter schools wearing a headscarf,685 and only recently, are university students 
allowed to enter university wearing the headscarf.686 Schools where religious 
vocational training takes place have accommodated the wearing of the headscarf since 
they were founded.687 School administrations may not display any religious symbols in 
both public or private schools. State’s obligation to respect parent’s religious or 
philosophical beliefs in education becomes an issue usually in the context of parents 
whose daughters wear the headscarf and are not allowed entry into school.  
The common element in all such cases relates to the privileged protection and 
particular understanding of laiklik which finds it difficult to reconcile the use of the 
headscarf with laiklik. The jurisprudence of the Council of State in a case concerning 
disciplinary measures against a university student who wore the headscarf at university 
is striking.688 The Council of State considered the wearing of the headscarf  as a symbol 
that shows a strong objection to the laik Republic and demonstrates that the students 
embrace a state order that is based on religion.689 The nexus between the act of 
wearing the headscarf and thus being a threat to the laik state appears to be drawn 
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with certain assumptions or perceptions that cannot be regarded as legal facts. Also, 
other “means” of expressing an ideology, whether it is a badge or long beard etc., are 
not treated the same way, thus undermining equality bu singling out the headscarf the 
only prohibited ideological symbol.690  
Constitutional amendments initiated by the National Assembly to overcome the 
restriction on wearing the headscarf by university students were also made ineffective 
by the relevant AYM judgments. The  adoption of Law No. 3511 in 1989,691 and after its 
annulment,692 the adoption of  the Law No. 5735  in 2008,693 also did not lead to a 
solution. The AYM held that the proposed constitutional amendments had the main 
aim of un-restricting religious symbols in higher education institutions without 
eliminating public fears, foreseeing safeguards against abuses and inputting measures 
necessary for the protection of third party rights.694 According to the Court, the 
unlimited use of the religious symbols would create pressure on non-believers and on 
Muslim females and would also damage state neutrality by opening a pathway for 
religion to be used for political purposes.695 
(d) Conscientious Objection to Military Service 
The right to conscientious objection to military service is a highly contested right and 
an indicator that, contrary to common belief, problems pertaining to laiklik do not 
sufficiently explain failures of Turkey’s protection of freedom of religion or belief.696  
Article 72 of the Constitution regulates military service. Article 72 reads:  
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 National service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which this service shall be 
 performed, or considered as performed, either in the Armed Forces or in public service shall 
 be regulated by law.
697
  
 The fact that military service is enumerated as only one of the alternatives of 
national service has important implications. It allows the possibility for national service 
to be performed within the Armed Forces or through public service or it can be 
considered performed under certain circumstances that are prescribed by law. 
According to Article 1 of the Military Code, military service is obligatory for every male 
citizen of the Turkish Republic.698  Military Criminal Code requires that those who have 
the obligation to perform military service, report to their military unit as soon as they 
are called up for recruitment.699 Since there is no legal provision that addresses 
conscientious objection to military service, the only relevant provisions applied to 
objectors are those dealing with disobeying orders and desertion. When a person is 
summoned to perform military service and does not present himself to his unit, in 
accordance with Article 63 of the Military Criminal Code, criminal responsibility occurs. 
Each act of disobedience following the first one is reckoned as insistence on disobeying 
orders.700 Military duties have a strong precedence over acts motivated by belief; 
Article 45 of the Military Criminal Code stipulates that the fact that a person has 
considered an act as necessary according to his conscience or religion does not exempt 
him from punishment.701 
Since military service becomes compulsory through national law it is possible to 
observe a conflict with the provision in the Constitution where it appears to be deemed 
optional. According to Can, since military service is not an obligatory form of national 
service and freedom of conviction is protected as a right that cannot even be 
suspended under a state of emergency, within the constitutional framework there is 
not a conflict or potential restriction on the recognition of the right to conscientious 
objection to military service.702 Furthermore, according to High Court of Appeals 
Prosecutor Eminağaoğlu, exemption from military service for conscientious objectors is 
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not in contradiction with the principle of equality since according to Article 14(2) none 
of the provisions set forth in the Constitution can be interpreted in a way as to provide 
broader restrictions of rights than those prescribed by the Constitution itself.703 
Consequently, in light of Articles 13, 14, 24, 25 and 72 a right to conscientious objection 
to military service is compatible with the Turkish Constitution and in fact Article 1 of 
the Turkish Military Code, and Article 45 of the Military Criminal Code 61 can be 
considered incompatible with the Constitution’s aforementioned provisions. 
Conscientious objection to military service is a critical issue bringing the interest of the 
individual and the interest of the state in dire conflict. The Turkish judiciary has at its 
disposal key international human rights treaties that Turkey has ratified,704 and the 
human rights obligations and a flexible regulation regarding military service found 
within the Turkish Constitution, however, the judiciary has been unable to draw from 
these legal sources in order to deal with conscientious objection cases where national 
security, principle of equality and the right to freedom of religion or belief and other 
substantive human rights are interpreted in an harmonizing manner that would be in 
conformity with existing international human rights jurisprudence.  Exploring factors 
influencing judges in the process of reaching a judgment, a study points to 
preconceptions that are shaped by state ideology and perception of the law system as a 
means of protection of the state rather than a neutral adjudicator of justice.705  
Naturally, the claim to conscientious objection to military service is a key point where 
notions of national security, survival of state and the position of the individual versus 
the state are reference points. Therefore in cases dealing with conscientious objectors, 
preconceptions of prosecutors and judges certainly play a crucial role and constitute an 
obstacle to assess these claims a human rights issue. 
Nevertheless, two recent Turkish military court decisions concerning conscientious 
objection claims have shown a partial recognition of the right to conscientious 
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objection to military service as a human right.706 One concerns a Jehovah's Witness 
conscientious objector, Baris Görmez, the other a Muslim conscientious objector, 
Muhammed Serdar Delice.  In both cases military courts to some degree relied on the 
changed jurisprudence of the ECtHR on conscientious objection following the Bayatyan 
v. Armenia case. However, in both cases a key factor was the declared religions of the 
conscientious objectors. 
It will be remembered that Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution states that in cases of 
conflict between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and 
domestic laws, the provisions of international agreements will prevail.707 This provision 
was applied in both military court judgments. 
Malatya Military Court's Delice decision outlines the Turkish military judiciary's 
interpretation of the right to conscientious objection to military service.708 Delice 
declared his conscientious objection approximately five months after he had been 
conscripted based on his Islamic and nationalist beliefs.709  The Malatya Military Court 
interpreted the ECtHR's approach to the right to conscientious objection as one based 
on the theological position of a religious group, and excluded the beliefs of the 
individual. It ruled out an individual rejecting military service according to his own 
views. Instead, the Military Court relied on the rejection of military service by an 
intellectual, religious or political group, as such. It referred to the example of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, stating: "persons who are members of the Jehovah's Witnesses reject 
military service, because they are part of this group or institution which fundamentally 
rejects military service".710 
Based on this understanding, an individual claiming conscientious objection to military 
service would have to be a member of a religious group considered by a court to be 
categorically opposed to military service. In the Malatya Military Court's view, Delice 
belonged to "Islam which is not a belief or ideological movement that rejects the 
performance of military service".711 
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This view of Islam was a theological statement by the court. But when Delice wanted to 
bring in the mufti of Malatya as an expert witness, the court rejected his request. In 
excluding the mufti, the court cited Law No. 5271- on Criminal Procedure.712 Article 62 
of the latter law states that experts must take an oath saying that they will perform 
their tasks based on science. The Court stated that "the religious sphere is intrinsically 
related to beliefs and is dogmatic, hence any view expressed from this field cannot be 
based on science and includes subjective elements".713 
This explanation seems to contradict the Court's view that Islam does not reject the 
performance of military service. On the one hand, the Court maintains that religious 
views cannot be presented in proceedings by experts, as they are not scientific and 
include subjective elements. Yet on the other, it bases its decision on its own 
theological assessment. 
According to the Military Court, Delice had Islamic and nationalist views when he was 
conscripted and he only declared his conscientious objection to military service after he 
"saw wrongs and deficient aspects of military service for himself and thus declared his 
conscientious objection".714 The Court also argued that Delice did not from the 
beginning of his military service have a "one and undivided purpose" of conscientious 
objection.715 The Court thus ignored in relation to conscientious objection a key part of 
international law's understanding of freedom of religion or belief, which is also found in 
the ECHR's Article 9 – the right to change beliefs.716 Under this ruling, a conscientious 
objector must demonstrate that his objection exists before conscription, and that it is 
his "one and undivided purpose" - i.e. that he has no other reasons for wanting to leave 
military service. 717 
Isparta Military Court recognised the right to conscientious objection to military service 
when it acquitted Jehovah's Witness Baris Görmez on 13 March 2012.718 He had spent 
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a total of four years in prison from November 2007 and had been charged with 
"rejecting wearing of the uniform" and "rejecting orders".719 As in the Delice case, the 
Court relied on the changed jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
In the assessment of conscientious objection claims by public authorities, assessments 
based on theological views must be avoided. Otherwise – as in the Delice case – there 
is a grave risk of making decisions based on a court's or public authority's purely 
subjective views, and not based on the evidence of a particular case.  
 
In brief, the above review of the legal guarantees, issues and, at times, paradoxical 
practices found in the domestic legal system and context present the complexities 
surrounding state religion relation paradigm and the protection of the right to freedom 
of religion or belief in Turkey.  The asymmetrical arrangements and disproportionate 
restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief 
stand in sharp contrast with the normative demands of international standards for the 
protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief. This is also evident in the 
numerous ECtHR decisions pertaining to Article 9 that remain not enforced. 
Manifestations of religion or belief are, often, viewed incompatible with the interests 
of the state, concretized in protecting national security, laiklik and upholding 
nationalism. This tension is seldom resolved by a rigorous application of relevant 
limitation clauses. Instead, the right to manifest religion or belief is given scarce and 
limited consideration in judicial assessments in contrast to the strong protection of 
laiklik, national security and nationalism.  
The recognition of the religiously pluralistic nature of the society in Turkey, compliance 
with the obligation on the part of the state to observe neutrality and impartiality and 
the explicit recognition of the right to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, 
practice, teaching and observance as well as a new conception of laiklik that creates a 
conducive framework for the protection of freedom of religion or belief may be steps 
to move forward.  
In the following Chapters certain components of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief will be closely examined.  
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Chapter 6 
The Right of Religious/Belief Communities to Acquire Legal Personality in Turkey 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 In Turkey no religious or belief community can acquire legal personality, per se. 
Yet, as it has been explained in Chapter 3, in the enjoyment of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief in its collective dimension, whether a belief community can or cannot 
acquire legal personality becomes a significant factor affecting the enjoyment of this 
right.720 The reason for this is that legal personality functions as a crucial enabling 
element and, at times, a precondition for the enjoyment of rights that make up the 
right to freedom of religion or belief or related rights, inter alia, the right to own 
property, the right to establish a place of worship and representation of a belief 
community. Conversely, proper enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief 
in its collective dimension requires an adequate form of legal personality that is 
suitable to the nature of belief communities. Its key function also constitutes the 
reason for contention over this right when states wish to restrict the activities of all or 
certain belief communities. 
 
This Chapter presents an overview of the legislation and legal and administrative 
practice on legal personality in the context of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey. It 
will be argued that the existing forms of legal personality fall short of providing an 
adequate form of legal entity status for belief groups to exercise their right to manifest 
religion or belief in its collective dimension. It will be further demonstrated that the 
absence of an adequate legal personality framework for belief communities is 
incompatible with Turkey’s international human rights obligations. For this purpose, 
first, an overview of key elements of legal personality and the practice in the Ottoman 
era and Turkish Republic is presented. Turkish legislation and practice on the available 
forms of legal personality, namely, vakıfs (foundations) and associations will be 
critically examined. These options will be assessed as to their adequacy as legal 
personality options for belief communities in the exercise of their right to freedom of 
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religion or belief in line with international human rights law without unjustified state 
interference. Finally, some observations are made on the elements that an adequate 
form of legal personality- one that can facilitate the exercise of the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey- should entail.   
 
An effective basic form of legal personality for belief communities must include certain 
elements, such as an entity status that allows a group of believers to act as if they were a 
single composite body for certain purposes. It must allow religious/belief communities to 
exist- if they wish to do so- not as individual members, but as one organized body. Hence 
once the community has gained legal personality, it is no longer individuals who own a place 
of worship or provide humanitarian assistance or run a faith-based school but the community 
as such. While international human rights law provisions do not include an explicit reference 
to the right to acquire a certain form of legal entity status, the right to legal personality has 
gained gradual international recognition in international jurisprudence,721 as well as being 
acknowledged in documents of soft law nature. OSCE and the Venice Commission have 
published a specific document including guidelines for states to follow while creating 
legislation pertaining to legal personality.722 
  
6.2. Legal Personality in the Ottoman and Republic Era 
6.2.1. Ottoman Era 
 While it is not the primary goal of this study to provide an in depth account and 
analysis of associative life of belief communities in the Ottoman era, basic insight into 
its nature makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of relevant current legal 
issues.  The question of whether there was a provision for legal personality in Islamic 
Law and during the Ottoman period, becomes a pertinent one because of its particular 
relevance for the exercise of rights for belief communities that have existed in the 
Turkish geography before the Turkish Republic was founded. The atypical character of 
the arrangement in this sphere in the Ottoman era may have provided ample room for 
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arbitrary administrative and, not least, unpredictable judicial decisions that 
disadvantaged belief communities in the Republic era.  
 
The nature of the notion of legal personality in the Ottoman Empire stands out in its 
distinctness from the idea of legal personality in Roman Law.  Hatemi argues that 
although it is less clear-cut when compared to Roman Law, it is possible to talk about 
certain clues indicating that the notion of legal personality was recognized in the 
Ottoman Empire.723 Reyna and Zonana, on the other hand, state clearly that there was 
no legal personality in the Ottoman State.724 Karaman, argues that while the term 
“legal personality” may be absent in Islamic Law, the concept is not. He observes that 
the notion of legal entity is an assumption that Islamic Law accepts, however, in the 
Ottoman era, there was no need for it to be recognized.725 The Ottoman Mecelle (Civil 
Code) refers to a village and certain professional institutions, of a religious character, as 
entities with responsibilities and certain rights.726  
 
For the study at hand, it is important to note a key difference between legal personality 
in Roman Law and the notion of legal personality in Islamic Law. Roman Law, tends to 
recognize a group of persons as a legal entity and considers property acquired by such 
a group as owned by the legal entity, whereas Islamic Law, through the vakıf 
institutions, tends to consider that the collection of property as having legal entity 
status and the group of persons as “those benefiting” from the property.727 
Beneficiaries of the revenues generated by the property, however, do not have any 
legal personality. The Ottoman vakıf formula, therefore, does not provide a form of 
legal personality that would allow a group of believers to act as a composite entity. It is 
important to note this key conceptual distinction as the vakıf institution is still one of 
the legal personality options available to members of religious communities.  
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Despite a lack of a legal personality- as understood in Roman Law- in the Ottoman 
state,728 the factual situation of religious communities compelled the development of 
certain improvised formulas. For example, religious communities registered their 
property under the name of real people, who only appeared in paper as owners but did 
not claim ownership (nam-ı müstear) or under the names of persons who no longer 
lived, such as saints or respected religious figures (nam-ı mevhum).729 Only in 1912, 
with the passing of an interim law, it became possible to register these properties 
under the name of the respective communities, thus, according to Reyna and Zonana, 
recognizing their legal entity status.730 Still, the interim law, does not go as far as 
formulating a legal entity status. It refers to registering the non-movables that 
belonged to various Ottoman millets in the name of the “corporation” (müessese), yet, 
there was not a clear and complete description of the elements of this “corporation” 
and its legal nature.  Nevertheless, it is possible to observe a certain “limited notion of 
legal personality”. The fact that there were religious communities who in fact owned 
property was recognized for a certain purpose and certain period of time, namely the 
registration of property in their name within a certain time frame.731  Indeed, after the 
specified time it was no longer possible to register property in the name of the religious 
communities. While this arrangement is a move towards embracing the notion of legal 
personality, its nature is far from being complete, lacking elements that would create 
an adequate form of legal personality with a clear and foreseeable legal basis.  
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 As far as belief communities are concerned, the legal framework of legal personality, or 
the lack of it, may suggest that there was an assumption of a customary way of 
organizing, one that does not function through legal personality. On the one hand, 
belief communities existed in their traditional ways yet without a legal entity status. On 
the other hand, their members had the possibility of donating property to establish 
vakıf institutions and/or professional organizations with religious character and thus 
support their communities or engage in actions similar to contemporary civil society 
organizations. It may be argued that this situation is a natural result of the ummah 
understanding, that all Muslims form the Muslim people and the state- as an Islamic 
state- is the ultimate legal entity representing the Muslim people. Secondary 
institutions that have been formed in the West between the state and the individual 
did not exist in Islamic societies. Mardin, argues that the connection of ummah, the 
Islamic millet or community, corresponds to the secondary institutions found in the 
west.732 For non-Muslim communities the millet system may have functioned as a 
substitute, similar to the ummah, each religious community may have been “assumed” 
to be a composite, represented by their respective religious leaders.   
 
In conclusion, it may be observed that the legal framework for the associative life of 
belief communities was one that did not include the notion of legal personality found 
in many contemporary legal systems. The theocratic state constituted the ultimate 
legal personality for the Muslim millet.  As for non-Muslim communities, through the 
recognition of religio-ethnic communities, the millet, and the creation of special legal 
regimes,733 belief communities were recognized as composite entities. It may be 
argued that this legal structure resembled a minority protection scheme rather than 
the granting of a legal entity status to a belief community. In the Ottoman practice, the 
vakıf, stands out as the legal entity, a collection of assets, from which the various belief 
communities benefited as assumed communities which did not have a direct legal link 
to them. It is important to bear in mind this Ottoman arrangement, which partly 
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accounts for irregularities, when considering the transition to the modern legal system 
of the Turkish Republic.     
  
6.2.2. The Republic of Turkey 
 The Turkish legal system does not provide a clear, consistent and coherent law 
and practice on the legal status of belief communities. It is not possible for belief 
communities, as such, to acquire legal personality in Turkey.734 Yet, it is important to 
note that there are certain court decisions recognizing that certain belief communities 
have legal capacity to exercise the right to property or access to court. Despite a lack of 
special legal entity status for belief communities, in the current Turkish legal system, 
members of belief communities may establish associations, foundations or, possibly, 
commercial companies in order to gain a certain legal entity status.735 None of these 
options, however, provide the possibility of acquisition of legal personality for belief 
communities, per se.  
 
Before one examines the legislation and practice on legal personality, it is worthwhile 
to consider briefly some of the possible interests that lie behind the pre-emptive legal 
framework that is designed to bar the very possibility to acquire a direct legal entity 
status for belief groups. As it has been demonstrated above, while no belief community 
in the Ottoman Empire had legal personality, the Islamic nature of the state and the 
millet system have allowed certain belief communities to exist as de facto composite, 
organized bodies under their respective religious leaderships. Yet, with the secular 
modern Republic, this, quasi-legal entity status, the millet categories were abolished. 
The modern Republic also barred members of belief communities to establish vakıfs or 
any other association with the purpose of supporting any, including their, religious 
community.736 Hence not only, did belief communities not have the possibility of being 
recognized as quasi-legal entities (millet or ummah), the possibility of establishing 
vakıfs for the benefit of their communities was also no longer possible.    
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 The underlying conceptions and reasons for this are critical to understanding legal 
interpretation pertaining to relevant restrictions and the assessment of their 
justification.  An essential reason for these restrictions may be found in the 
paradigmatic shift that occurred together with the establishment of the modern 
Turkish Republic. Firstly, in contrast to the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Turkish Republic set out to establish a system of a nation state based on the principle 
of a formal equality of citizens with an emphasis on the relationship of the individual 
and state rather than the millet, religious community and the sultan. Secondly, the 
secular ideal of the Turkish Republic and the revolutionary measures taken for the 
realization of this ideal, were perceived intrinsically in contradiction to the notion of a 
society based on or organized as units of religious communities.  
 
The third major reason underlying the restrictions of religious association may be found 
in the national security interest of the Turkish Republic in decreasing the power of 
religious communities-both Muslim and non-Muslim- in state affairs. Since the secular 
Republic strived to eliminate the role and influence of religion, in particular Islam, in 
state affairs it was crucial to drive them out of the state sphere. Oran argues that the 
clearance of vakıf institutions and their transfer to the various ministries of the state 
sought to diminish the economic power of Muslim vakıfs.737 As far as non-Muslim 
communities were concerned, it was equally crucial to eliminate their influence in state 
affairs through other states. The memories of interference of foreign powers in the 
Ottoman affairs and the role attributed to the cooperation of foreign powers and non-
Muslim minorities, in particular the Greek and Armenian minorities, in the decline and 
occupation of the Empire were still vivid and the founders of the Republic were 
determined to prevent this from happening again.738 Thus, it is not surprising that legal 
personality for belief communities was not created and the weakening of associative 
abilities of all belief communities was actively sought.  
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Bearing in mind the above, it is possible to understand the reasons for the lack of legal 
entity status to belief communities, per se.  As noted in the Venice Commission 
opinion, actually, “to the outside legal observer, there is nothing in the constitutional 
provisions that would explicitly prohibit a legislative reform providing legal personality 
to religious communities”.739  Yet, it is the context which has been briefly described 
above that determines the interpretation of the constitutional and other provisions. 
Turkish particularism in the interpretation of the principle of secularism and the 
determining factor of national security/public order interests have deemed a strict 
control over religious activity and restriction of autonomy of belief communities, 
necessary.  
 
6.3. Current Practice on Legal Personality of Belief Communities 
  A look at the issue of legal personality of belief communities in modern Turkey 
reveals an apparent lack of adequate legislative provisions and vagueness as a result of 
inconsistent and incoherent case-law and administrative practice. The lack of 
legislation pertaining to legal personality of belief communities rules out the possibility 
of acquiring legal personality as a religious/belief community. Yet, case-law and 
administrative practice demonstrate a lack of clarity in respect of whether some belief 
communities, as such, or in some of the cases their leadership, e.g. Patriarchates or 
Chief Rabbinate have legal entity status- that which they may have been acquired 
before the Republic- and if so, the nature of such legal capacity.  
 
Legal personality is an important issue for all belief communities in Turkey, including 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslim communities, per se, do not own mosques in 
Turkey. Mosques are administered by the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of 
Religious Affairs, the Diyanet hereafter) but their ownership varies, such as private 
persons, associations, foundations, General Directorate of Foundations, village 
corporate entities and municipalities. The Diyanet provides religious public services for 
Muslims based on the Hanefi school thus it may be argued that these public services 
make it unnecessary for some Muslim belief communities to seek to organize 
                                                        
739
 The Council of Europe Venice Commission, supra note 15, para. 33. 
209
themselves in a way that non-Muslim communities strive to do.740 However, it is 
important to bear in mind that regardless of the services provided by the PRA there are 
Muslims from various Islamic traditions, including the Hanefi school, who wish to 
manifest their religion or belief in community with others, for example by establishing 
a mosque or a cem house.741     
 
Case-law and administrative practice seem to indicate, albeit constantly in an unclear 
and incomplete manner, the existence of a certain form of legal personality for some 
non-Muslim belief communities that have existed in the Turkish geography before the 
establishment of the Republic. The cases below present legal disputes arising from a 
lack of an adequate legislation pertaining to the structure of various religious 
formations which manifest themselves in issues related to the right to property in 
relation to places of worship or properties that provide revenues for the management 
of their internal affairs. These cases also serve as illuminating examples of how legal 
personality is directly affecting the right to manifest religion or belief in community 
with others and the right to property.   
 
The lack of clarity on the matter of legal personality of belief communities or their 
leadership is apparent in legal and administrative practices. An administrative 
notification,742 serves as an example, “… it is observed that the status of legal 
personality of the owner of the non-moveable, the Chief Rabbinate of Istanbul and its 
subjects [tevabii], is unclear and that it is not a vakıf”.743 For the authorities it is obvious 
that the Chief Rabbinate and its subjects, the Jewish community, are not a vakıf or an 
association. But it is not possible to categorize them legally because there is not a 
suitable legal category. Interestingly, while the communication refers to the lack of 
clarity on the legal entity status of the Rabbinate it refers to it as the owner. It is also 
noteworthy that the communication refers to the “Rabbinate of Istanbul and its 
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subjects” or those who are bound to it, as the owner, thus implying that the whole 
Jewish community under and through the Chief Rabbi exercise the right to ownership. 
 
The decision in court cases brought by governmental bodies against the Chief 
Rabbinate imply the recognition of a certain legal and representative capacity of the 
Chief Rabbinate and are significant for the facilitative factual approach they adopt.744 
Some court decisions recognize the legal entity status of the Office of the Chief Rabbi. A 
first instance court referred to the existence of the Rabbinate as a matter of fact and 
observed that, “its existence cannot be denied”.745 Another court decision concerned 
the rejection of a claim by the Treasury and the registration of a land title in the name 
of the Edirne Jewish Community.746  The decision recognized the representative status 
of the Turkish Rabbinate- albeit without reference to any particular Regulation or 
Lausanne Treaty- by saying, “…the Jewish community is one of the known communities 
in Turkey and is represented by the Rabbinate of Turkey. The Turkish Jewish 
communities are subject to the Rabbinate of Turkey.”747   
In some cases the pre-Republic legal instruments have served as a basis of recognition 
of legal personality. The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:  
 It has been established by the testimonies of the witnesses that the sinagog which is not 
 registered in the land register, is under the de facto possession of [zilliyet, as distinct from 
 lawful ownership] the Jewish Community. According to the Interim Law on the Possession of 
Non- Movables by Legal Persons, communities whose existence is recognized by the state are 
 permitted to  possess non-movables within villages and provinces. The Rabbinate was 
established through the  Regulation of Rabbinate and this Regulation was approved and adopted on 23 
Şevval 1281 [19  March 1865] and thus the community title of the plaintiff is recognized. Therefore the 
appeal objection  is not justified.
748
  
  
 It has been argued that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals, to view the 
Rabbinate as a position rather than a person and recognize his legal capacity to 
represent the Jewish community would be a fair solution.749  While this proposal may 
solve certain problems of the Jewish community concerning legal recognition of the 
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Rabbinate as a representative body that can act on behalf of the Jewish community, it 
falls short of providing a general solution to the problem of legal status of belief 
communities. This is because, first, there is no common agreement on the binding 
nature of the Ottoman Regulations pertaining to the Rabbinate and Patriarchates. Also, 
if the sole justification of the legal entity status of an “office” representing a belief 
community is based on the recognition of the belief community in an Ottoman 
Regulation or the recognition derived from the Lausanne Treaty, again this would have 
limited application-excluding communities for whom these legal sources are not 
applicable. Pre-Republic or Lausanne recognition would not be applicable to non-
Muslim communities that did not exist before the Republic, or that were not 
recognized by way of a Regulation or millet system, such as Muslim and Bahai 
communities. Lausanne justification would exclude non-Muslim communities that are 
not recognized as protected under Lausanne Treaty even though they are non-
Muslim.750 Such a formula might also have the disadvantage of forcing belief 
communities to emulate the Jewish community’s organizational structure and unite 
under one leadership.  
 
A relatively recent judgment by the Court of Appeals directly addressed the question of 
whether the Rabbinate has legal personality and capacity to open a court case.751 The 
case concerned the request of the I. Jewish Community to have the sinagog, which 
they have been using for centuries, to register in the land registry in the name of the 
Jewish community. The State Treasury argued that the Jewish community did not have 
legal personality and requested the rejection of the case.752 The Court, on the one 
hand, contended that the community did not have legal personality and that it was not 
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a community vakıf (cemaat vakfı).753 On the other hand, it was observed that since the 
capacity to acquire property of the applicant community has been recognized through 
the 1912 temporary Law on the Possession of Non-Movables by Legal Persons,754 and 
the Regulation of the Rabbinate,  and by the will of the Sultan, there was no question 
that the applicant community had competence to acquire non-movables and thus has 
active legal capacity to open a court case.755 The Court of Appeals explicitly recognized 
the capacity to acquire property and open a court case thus in effect recognized that 
the Rabbinate possessed a number of key elements of a legal entity status. This, 
however, does not indicate that neither the Rabbinate nor the community have a 
defined legal personality that is sufficiently clear to both the community itself and state 
authorities. 
 
In contrast, certain decisions pertaining to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate present a 
harsh rejection of any representative status or legal capacity. In 1964, the print house 
in the Patriarchate was closed on grounds that it violated the Lausanne Treaty; the 
explanation given to the Patriarchate was that “only legal institutions and legal persons 
can own publishing houses”.756  In a court case concerning a dispute between the 
Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church and a priest of the Bulgarian 
Church, the Patriarch had to appear before the court as a private person even though 
the case concerned an action of the Patriarchate. The case concerned the removal of 
the priest of the Bulgarian Church by the Patriarchate for theological reasons.757 The 
Court of Appeals rejected the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch over the 
Bulgarian Church and found that the disciplinary measures exceeded the authority of 
the Patriarch which was restricted to attend to the religious affairs of Turkish citizens of 
Greek origin and not Bulgarian or other.758 In this case the Court explicitly rejected the 
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argument that the Patriarchate is an entity and relied on the Lausanne travaux 
préparatoires to conclude that the Patriarchate is a “religious institution” that has lost 
all its privileges that it enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire.759  It was held that this religious 
institution had to be considered in light of the Lausanne Treaty Articles 35-45.760 Yet, 
the Court failed to draw from Lausanne Article 40, which protects associative rights of 
non-Muslims in Turkey, that the Patriarchate is protected as a religious institution. In 
contrast to the cases concerning the Jewish Rabbinate that drew from the recognition 
in the Ottoman Empire, the Court of Appeals did not take into account any status given 
to the Patriarchate during the Ottoman period- not even mentioning the Regulation 
Pertaining to the Greek Patriarchate.761 Therefore, the differential treatment of the 
Chief Rabbinate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate by the judiciary regarding recognition 
of belief communities and their leadership organizations, demonstrates vagueness of 
the rules resulting in unforeseeable nature of the law and discriminatory application by 
the judiciary.   
 
The case of a Latin Catholic orders also demonstrates the exiting problems clearly. A 
large number of properties of the Latin Catholic Church across Turkey have been seized 
by the state and since these orders do not have legal personality of any kind - they 
cannot establish community foundations762- property cannot be registered in the name 
of orders or churches.763 For example, the Dominican Order, have been using their 
church building and adjacent property since the 15th century.764 The Dominican Priests 
owned their monastery building, but, a vakıf, not their own, owned the land.765 The 
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property documents of their various properties show the title either blank or say 
“Dominican Priests”.766 In a decision concerning a dispute over the annulment of the 
title, the Istanbul Cadastral Court saw no legal provision or reason for the annulment of 
the title of property that has the name “Dominican Priests” in the owner section.767 
This decision was based on the acceptance of the title by the Ottoman Devlet Şura 
(High Court of Administration) and the Ottoman Irade-i Seniye (Financial Audit 
Committee).768 The Court based its decision on the recognition of the title by the 
Ottoman state.   
 
While the Cadastral Court decision described above is a positive and significant 
decision, the Dominican Priests experience great difficulty in “convincing” other public 
authorities of their legal status.769 Routine procedures, which should be conducted 
easily, are made burdensome as a result of the non-recognition of the, court 
recognized, legal personality of “Dominican Priests”.  For example, the municipality 
officials do not recognize this legal entity status and ask the question, “Who are the 
Dominican Priests?”.770 Interestingly, the same authorities recognize the “Dominican 
Priests” when they claim taxes, “We exist when we need to pay, but we do not exist 
when we want to exercise our rights”, observes Fr. Claudio Monge.771  
 
As a result of the vagueness that results from the absence of a well-defined legal basis 
of their status, the recognition of their legal status is tied closely to the attitude of the 
governing Party towards their community.772 Hence the Dominican Priests are 
confronted with a situation where they will have to engage in a legal battle for each 
administrative procedure they engage in to prove their legal entity status,  or to break 
away from the “weak” legal entity status they seem to have recognized through case 
law and try to fit into a legal status that may be recognized by all, such as a foundation 
or association or claim their ties with the Italian Dominican Priests and assert a foreign 
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legal entity status. The association or foundation status will not fit their nature and 
needs, as will be discussed later, yet, the foreign legal entity status, which Turkey might 
have to recognize due to bilateral agreements between Turkey and Italy may be a 
solution.  As a result of these complexities, the Dominican priests are required to pay 
property tax even though their building is a church, thus a worship place, normally 
qualifying for exemption from property tax.773    
 
In the case above, the legal basis for the recognition of certain key elements of legal 
personality resulted from first, taking a factual approach and secondly, relying on pre-
Republic instruments. The factual approach, which considers the actual facts about the 
belief community and its connection to property and its use of places of worship, 
appears to be the one that has the potential of solving relevant legal questions in the 
absence of an appropriate and adequate legal framework of reference. It has the 
added advantage of being facilitative. The disadvantage of the factual approach is its 
dependency on the adjudicating judge and its inadequacy to afford a solution for daily 
business of belief communities where they are expected to have a legal personality, 
such as making administrative applications at the municipality as a belief community. 
 
The second approach involves relying on legal instruments adopted in the Ottoman 
Empire that predate the Turkish Republic. This requires the assumption that these 
instruments are still in force even though they may not be acknowledged, as such, by 
public authorities. Yet, the question remains whether all provisions of these 
instruments are still valid, or only those that seem compatible with current legislation. 
For instance, the Rabbinate Regulation sets forth the formation of a temporal council, 
dealing with issues such as education and care of elderly community members- in 
addition to the spiritual council- assuming the responsibility of running the 
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community’s worldly affairs.774 Yet, these communities had to abolish their temporal 
assemblies.775  
 
The judgments concerning non-Muslim religious communities demonstrate the fact 
that despite a lack of clear and adequate legal framework, in some cases, there is 
judicial recognition of certain legal personality for certain belief communities and 
certain religious leadership. This judicial recognition seems to be based on, on the one 
hand, Ottoman laws, regulations and documents when the judiciary chooses to rely on 
them. On the other hand, the cases where the judiciary relied on the de facto existence 
and possession and use of the belief communities go toward embracing a right to legal 
personality as a matter of fact. Contrasting decisions concerning the Jewish and Greek 
orthodox community are difficult to reconcile with the principle of equality and 
prohibition of non-discrimination resulting from ambiguity of law that provides public 
authorities with unfettered discretion. This situation stands in strong contrast to 
grounding the protection of freedom of religion or belief in the rule of law, instead of 
making it subject to state interests in a constantly changing political climate, in 
particular, international political developments. Inconsistencies concerning the 
recognition of legal personality by various public authorities appear to be common.   
Vagueness and inconsistencies in practice create unpredictability about the law and 
insecurity and vulnerability for belief communities in the exercise of their rights. A 
significant consequence of non-recognition of legal personality is that religious/belief 
communities, then, are not entitled to pursue judicial protection of their assets and 
activities. Finally, it is striking that the right to freedom of religion or belief is not taken 
into account in any of these cases, instead, the issues are treated exclusively within the 
sphere of the right to property.    
 
The lack of an adequate form of legal personality stands in contrast to empowered and 
enabled belief groups that can enjoy the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
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belief, including the right to association, to own property and to seek judicial 
protection for these. 
 
Now, let us consider the vakıf (foundations) and assess their adequacy as a legal entity 
formula. 
 
6.4. Vakıf (Foundation) Institutions 
 Vakıf institutions are one of the available forms of legal entity in Turkey. There 
are two questions that need to be answered in order to assess their adequacy for the 
exercise of the collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or belief. First 
question relates to their availability to belief communities; can belief communities 
establish vakıf institutions? Second, equally important question, do vakıf institutions 
create a suitable legal entity status for belief communities in the exercise of the 
collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or belief? Considering that 
volumes may be written on vakıfs, it is important to circumscribe the focus of this part. 
Here, I will try to explain the legal nature of vakıf institutions- in the Ottoman era- with 
a view to understand their function and limits in relation to providing legal entity status 
in the context of religious activity.  The Ottoman practice on vakıfs is important for 
today because firstly, the vakıfs belonging to non-Muslims (community foundations),776 
were established in the Ottoman era and secondly many facilities designated for 
Muslim religious activity were created and supported through the Ottoman vakıf 
institutions. The description of changes pertaining to vakıfs that took place in the 
modern Republic era will not be exhaustive instead they will focus on key legal changes 
and actions that had significant impact on the exercise of the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief. With this view, attention will be given to the clearance of 
Muslim vakıf institutions, the unique position of community foundations (cemaat vakfı) 
and the legal and administrative practice on new vakıfs. Current legal framework on 
the vakıf, inherent legal restrictions on the establishment of vakıfs and practice as well 
as the suitability of vakıf institutions for belief communities will be discussed.  
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6.4.1. The Origin and Rational of the Vakıf Institutions 
 Foundations have a long history on Turkish geography with a unique heritage 
and function throughout Ottoman history and a legacy in the Turkish Republic.777 In the 
Islamic tradition the vakıf, property set aside for pious endowment, was dedicated to 
the cause of God and it became the property of God.778 Thus the vakıf, is a privately 
owned property endowed permanently for a charitable purpose and its revenue is 
spent for this purpose- many consider the vakıf as one of the greatest achievements of 
the Islamic civilization.779 It has never been the rationale of the vakıf institution to 
provide a legal entity status for belief communities.    
 
In the Ottoman period, until the period of Tanzimat (Reorganization), there has been a 
lack of legal regulation on vakıf institutions.780 Instead, the practice pertaining to vakıf 
institutions has been left to the discretion of judges.781 Some key components of vakıf 
institutions may, however, be observed for a proper understanding of these 
institutions for the purposes of the study.   Persons affiliated with every millet could 
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establish vakıf institutions. According to Islamic law, the purpose of vakıf institutions 
had to be one that would be a means of fulfilling charity or worship, which was called 
the requirement of kurbet.782 Both Muslims and non-Muslims could establish vakıf 
institutions to support Islamic institutions.783  
 
The non-Muslim community foundations, even in the Ottoman era, maintained a sui 
generis nature. Since neither Muslims nor non-Muslims were allowed to establish vakıf 
institutions to support the building or repair of churches or sinagogs, or to publish and 
distribute the   New Testament or the Jewish Holy Book with the purpose of 
propagating non-Islamic belief,784 the non-Muslim community vakıfs that exist today 
have been all established with Sultan’s decree. They were not vakıfs in a strict sense 
since they were anonymous institutions that lacked a person that endowed property 
and a vakıf deed.785  The reason for this was that the propagation of a religion other 
than Islam could not be justified under Islamic law thus this was not compatible with 
the kurbet requirement.786  The exceptions to this rule would be special non-Muslim 
vakıf institutions established with a Sultan ferman (decree).787  
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It is important to note that the state always maintained a tight control over vakıf 
institutions, yet the control was to be carried out by courts.788 The size of vakıf 
property, substantial amount of land had been endowed for charitable purposes and 
thus transformed into vakıf status.789 Alleged irregularities in the use of their revenues 
have led to increased state supervision.  The autonomous vakıf institutions were 
centralized through the establishment of a Ministry of Vakıfs (Evkaf), thus paving the 
way for state supervision and interference in the vakıf affairs.790 The move was justified 
on the grounds that the vakıf revenues were let to the discretion of dubious 
trustees.791 The rationale of state “interest” in vakıf affairs has been based also on the 
protection of the (vakıf) endowment- the supervision that the initial donor’s 
endowment will be duly administered.   
  
It is important to note that the vakıf institutions of Ottoman period were not 
institutional solutions for the collective exercise of the right to freedom of religion, yet, 
they were a crucial means of maintaining community life through, inter alia, 
educational, charity and health services provided for the benefit of a belief community. 
The purpose of vakıfs was neither to create legal personality for religious communities, 
nor were they primarily a kind of religious organization- even though they may be 
established with religious purposes. The requirement of the kurbet purpose,792 
constituted a serious challenge before equality because it allowed all religious 
communities to engage in charitable actions, however, permitted only Muslim 
communities to establish and maintain worship places or support activities  that would 
propagate their religion. Legally speaking, non-Muslim belief communities could not 
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establish vakıf institutions to support the building of their worship places.793 Also, both 
Muslim and non-Muslim vakıfs could not acquire new property.794 The increasing 
regulation of and supervision over vakıfs had serious implications for the autonomy of 
belief communities. On the other hand, notwithstanding their limitations, their 
function as subsidiary institutions for the support of a limited range of activities of 
belief communities has been of vital importance for the sustainability of the latter.    
 
6.4.2. Legal Developments Pertaining to Vakıf Institutions in the Turkish Republic     
 The developments regarding vakıfs throughout the Republic era are important 
because of the impact they had on the associative rights, of members of belief 
communities, including Muslims and non-Muslims, by significantly depriving them of 
sources that had been used for the benefit of their members and communities, in 
particular for the maintenance and use of their worship places, charitable 
organizations, schools etc. The Turkish Republic continued the process of regulation 
and supervision of the vakıf system that was started by the Ottoman state 
administration. It is not possible to provide a thorough description and analysis of all 
legal and administrative developments on vakıfs spreading over nearly a century in this 
chapter.795 In this section I will examine key developments that continue to impact 
religious communities today; Muslim foundations that were established before the 
1926 Civil Code, non-Muslim community foundations and new foundations.    
 
Regardless of their aim,796 measures aimed at clearance of pre Republic vakıfs had the 
effect of depriving Muslim vakıfs endowed for the support of Muslim religious, 
educational and charitable institutions and activities. These were eliminated and 
transferred to the state thus drastically depriving many Muslim communities from 
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resources and capacity utilized for the realization of religious activity and support and 
sustenance of their community.797 For example, the religiously based schools, medrese 
and related vakıf and property were transferred to the Ministry of Education.798  Some 
of the other actions aimed at the clearance of vakıf institutions include, inter alia, the 
abolition of financial autonomy of vakıfs through the declaration of collection of vakıf 
revenues by the Ministry of Finance; the establishment of a Committee for the 
Abolishment of the Vakıf  and finally the abolishment of all cash vakıfs  and the 
establishment of the Bank of Avakıf (Vakıflar Bankası) with the confiscated capital.799 It 
has been argued that the interest in the clearance of vakıfs was based on a 
determination to control Islamic brotherhoods that were financed by vakıfs.800  
Religious buildings with historical or architectural significance that have been owned by 
foundations were registered in the name of public entities.801 Foundations established 
by Muslims with religious intent have been susceptible to changes in political climate. 
For example, the closure of tekke (dervish lodges) and zaviye,802 led to the inability to 
use these buildings for their purposes, hence the “inability to fulfil their purpose” 
allowed the transfer of these assets to the Ministry of Education and City Private 
Administration.803 
 
As far as non-Muslims were concerned, community foundations, as they are called 
today, are non-Muslim minority institutions that were established by the Ottoman 
Sultan decrees and that have a sui generis legal status in the Turkish Republic.804 The 
religious basis of community vakıf was, on the one hand, considered incompatible with 
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the secular nature of the Republic, yet, on the other hand, obligations arising from the 
Lausanne Treaty, forced the Republic to maintain, albeit imperfectly, the community 
foundations as an exceptional institution within the general vakıf framework. The 
challenge was to create a legal framework that could ensure the circumstances for the 
compatible co-existence of the autonomous community vakıf regime together with and 
within the modern legal regime. A solution to this fundamental problem is still to be 
reached. Their sui generis nature that does not include all components of vakıfs may 
explain the difficulties these institutions have been subjected to when they found 
themselves in a position to where they were obliged to fit the vakıf framework in the 
modern Republic.  
 
Community foundations own the buildings and properties of, for example, the Greek 
Orthodox Church, the Armenian Church, and the Jewish Rabbinate and are run by 
independent vakıf managers.805 In accordance with the Ottoman Regulations, spiritual 
and temporal assemblies would be elected in order to administer the affairs of these 
communities and the vakıfs dedicated to the benefit of them.806 These institutions- 
which are called vakıf- are atypical vakıfs because they did not have any person who 
endowed certain estate for a certain purpose. Thus their anonymous quality sets them 
apart from regular foundations even today, for example they do not have any founding 
deeds.807  
 
Key features of legal and administrative action or inaction pertaining to community 
foundations are considered below under four headings; new legal status for 
community foundations, extensive powers of the VGM and restrictive and 
discriminatory administrative and judicial practice which fed off of each other leading 
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to the deterioration of the capacities of community foundations. These should be 
considered always bearing in mind that the legal entity of vakıf, as opposed to a direct 
ownership of property by a belief community (if they were to have a legal entity status 
of their own) is part of a paradigm that creates vulnerability of religious communities to 
interferences by the state.    
 
It will be seen that, often, legal, and regulations of other kind, and administrative 
practice impacting community foundations have been primarily viewed and 
constructed with national security perceptions and concerns situated as the highest 
interest and have been highly prone to changes in the political climate, in particular 
international politics. For example, the period of transition from a single-party system 
to a pluralist democracy in the 1950s some developments in favour of the vakıf system 
took place.808 Community foundations acquired property through purchasing, 
donations or inheritance.809 On the other hand, a change in the international political 
climate, namely the Cyprus crises between Turkey and Greece, changed the practice 
for Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities. Kurban and Hatemi argue that Turkey has used the 
Greek minority in Turkey in order to gain an advantage over Greece.810 
 
(a) New Legal Status  
 When provisions on new foundations were made in the 1926 Civil Code, 
regulations concerning vakıfs that were established before the adoption of the Civil 
Code were postponed to a later date with a view to draft a special law on 
foundations.811 The drafting of a special law on foundations had significant implications 
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for, both, old (pre-1926) and new foundations. The Law on Foundations adopted in 
1935, standardized the status of vakıfs established before the 1926 Civil Code (old 
vakıfs).812 The community vakıfs were categorized as mülhak vakıf (vakıfs that have 
been added later) thus gaining a new legal status. Mülhak vakıfs were administered by 
their own governing bodies however under the supervision and control of the VGM.813 
Hence this new status opened the way for interference, and in numerous cases the 
seizure of vakıf management, by the VGM. This new legal entity status, under the legal 
representation of the VGM, resulted in a limited or restricted legal personality.814  
(b) The Extensive Powers of the VGM and Restrictive Administrative Practice 
The VGM replaced the Ottoman ministry that administered the vakıfs (Şer'iyye 
ve Evkaf Vekaleti) taking the name General Directorate of Foundations in 1924 as the 
supervisory institution over all foundations.815 The extensive powers- beyond 
inspection- conferred to this institution compromised the autonomous nature of vakıf 
administration. As far as community foundations were concerned, it created conditions 
that were in stark contrast to the rights protecting the autonomous administration of 
non-Muslim minority institutions in Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty. In addition, the 
restrictive regulations and practices directed to the community vakıfs may be 
considered as an indication that the life source of these institutions was being cut in 
order to cause them to die out slowly- somewhat parallel to the diminishing non-
Muslim population.816 The lack of a Regulation specifying the application of the Law on 
Foundations has been identified as a key factor in the lack of clarity and predictability 
of the Law and leading to conditions that were conducive for discretionary decisions of 
administrative bodies, in particular the VGM.817  
 
The VGM’s capacity to take over management and properties of community 
foundations has been gradually increased. In cases where it has not been possible to 
appoint managers or establish a governing body for ten years these vakıfs would be 
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administered and represented by the VGM by a court decision.818 Similarly, vakıfs that 
were not able to fulfil their charitable purpose were seized by the VGM and turned into 
mazbut vakıf.819 This practice gave the mülhak vakıf a new status called mazbut vakıf 
(seized vakıfs). 820 Seized vakıfs were permanently represented and administered 
directly by the VGM thus the management and seizure of property would be 
permanent.821  The diminishing non-Muslim population in Anatolia meant that many 
vakıfs and their properties were seized by the VGM.822  
  
The enormous loss of property of the community vakıfs, and as a result, non-Muslim 
communities benefiting from them, caused by the administrative and legal practice 
related to the 1936 Declaration stands out as an example demonstrating the 
administrative and judicial cooperation guided by political climate/will to diminish the 
capacity of non-Muslim minorities through measures taken related to vakıfs. In 1936 all 
foundations were served notifications requesting them to provide the VGM with a list 
of their non-movables. The list was necessary in order to regularize the land registry of 
the Republic. The community foundations, like other foundations provided a list of 
their property.823 The VGM requested the community foundations to submit their 
founding deeds in order to prove their ownership of non-movables in their disposal, 
fully aware that they were founded by Sultan decrees, thus did not have any founding 
deeds.824 The innovative solution found to this problem by the VGM was to reckon the 
declarations, only a list of non-movables, submitted by the community foundations as 
their founding deed. In the 1960s, together with changes in the international political 
climate, due to the Cyprus crisis, these 1936 Declarations were used against the 
community foundations. The rationale was thus; since these lists did not mention that 
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the respective foundations had the legal capacity to acquire property, the VGM 
deduced from this that they did not have the legal capacity to acquire ownership, the 
legal effect of all acquisition of property since 1936 was declared null and void.825 
Clearly, a list of non-movables could not contain a provision stating that the respective 
vakıfs had the right to acquire property. They were asked to provide a list of their 
property not a description of their purpose and activities. Consequently, property they 
had acquired through purchase, inheritance or donation throughout the period of 
1936-1970s has been seized by the VGM, the Treasury or National Real Estate.826 It is 
interesting to note that these properties were registered in the land register in the 
name of the community vakıfs with a document provided by the governorship.827 
 
The inadequacy of legal regulations, largely caused by the lack of a Regulation that 
should have accompanied the Law on Foundations, following amendments of 1949, 
stipulating the specifics of its application, constituted the basis of various unpredictable 
and discretionary rules that have been applied and these diminished the control of the 
management of community foundations, sometimes to the point of losing the 
foundations and its assets permanently.828 The lack of legal certainty has made it 
possible for the de facto rule-makers,829 to make rules that have increased their sphere 
of influence at the expense of community foundations. For example, over the years 
there have been times when the rules concerning the election of the governing bodies 
of community foundations were not prescribed by law. Instead for many years a police 
order of 1972 constituted the manner in which elections were conducted.830 These 
rules resulted in the loss of control over some community foundations and their 
property. According to this police order, every church parish was considered an 
election district and community foundation administrators had to reside in the election 
district where they were elected. In many districts or cities where non-Muslims did not 
reside any more, for various reasons, including insecurity, discrimination and pressure, 
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elections could not be held thus the VGM seized the management of these community 
foundations- effectively taking away resources belonging to community foundations 
dedicated to the benefit of non-Muslim communities. 831 Another example illustrating 
the lack of legal certainty and its detrimental consequences, concerns the coordination 
of various vakıfs dedicated to the benefit of the Armenian Apostolic community. In 
1954 it was permitted to establish a committee that would administer the various 
properties belonging to all of these vakıfs, in 1960, after the military coup the military 
Governor Refik Tulga ordered the dissolution of this committee.832 Since then all 
community foundations have been administered independently thus decreasing the 
capacity to manage and coordinate foundations for the benefit of the respective ethno-
religious community.  
 
Lastly, a secret rule, thus completely unforeseeable, concerns the payment of a 
contribution fee for the auditing task of the VGM. In 1967 the Law on Foundations No. 
903 stipulated that all foundations had to contribute 5% of their income as a 
contribution towards the “inspection and auditing” expenses.833 In 1979 a decree ruled 
that foundations that were established before the entry into force of the Turkish Civil 
Code would not be liable to pay this contribution.834 In 1981, Article 1 of the Law on 
Foundations was changed and this time the community foundations were to pay the 
contribution, however, the provision said that this contribution may be paid by the 
general state budget by a Decision of the Committee of Ministers.835 Bakar, relates 
that, in the proceedings of a case in 1986 it was disclosed that according to a secret 
decision of the Committee of Ministers the Greek Orthodox community foundations 
listed in the Decision were not to pay the contribution, based on reciprocity principle 
taking into account the practice in Greece.836 The objection to this Decree on the basis 
of the principle of equality was rejected and the case dismissed on grounds saying, “It 
                                                        
831
 Bakar, supra note 66, p. 270. 
832
 Bakar, supra note 66, p. 271. 
833
 Bakar, supra note 66, p. 273. 
834
 Ibid. 
835
 Ibid. 
836
 Ibid. 
229
is not against the principle of equality. The Decree was kept confidential in order to 
avoid polemic”.837    
 
(c) Restrictive Judicial Practice 
As will be seen below, the treatment of non-Muslims as “foreigners” has been 
an innovative and instrumental legal category that facilitated and legitimized the 
discriminatory treatment directed against community foundations.838  
 
The right of the community vakıfs to acquire property was first crippled with 
administrative practice in the late 1960s and then permanently thwarted by the 
judgment of the General Council of the High Court of Appeals (GCHA), setting a 
precedent and establishing subsequent jurisprudence. Documents provided in 
accordance with the Land Register Law for the registration of non-movables were 
denied on grounds that the community foundations lacked legal personality.839 Finally, 
the High Court of Appeals developed a jurisprudence, which was later embraced by the 
GCHA, reasoning that unless a vakıf’s founding deed permits the acquisition of property 
it cannot acquire new property.840 The highly criticized landmark decision by the High 
Court of Appeals in 1971 was based on the complaint by the Balıklı Rum Hastanesi 
Vakfı (Balıklı Greek Hospital Foundation) challenging the legality of the seizure of their 
property by the Treasury, requesting the restoration of the said property.841  The High 
Court of Appeals unanimously decided that, “The legal entities formed by those who 
are not Turks are prohibited from acquiring property”.842 Hence an innovative yet 
explicitly discriminatory legal categorization was created by case-law. Those who had 
formed non-Muslim community foundations were considered non-Turks thus subject 
to laws that were applicable to foreigners in the sphere of property rights. It was not 
until 2002 that the application of this discriminatory jurisprudence was made 
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ineffective by the adoption of Law No. 4771, recognizing explicitly the right of 
community foundations to acquire new property, albeit with a highly burdensome 
bureaucratic process.843 
 
(d) New Foundations 
 The Republic’s legal arrangement pertaining to new foundations over the years 
may be characterized as shifting depending on the governing party, yet, always closed 
to the possibility of establishing foundations for the support religious communities. 
Here we will focus briefly on permissible grounds for the establishment of 
foundations.844 The Turkish Civil Code which was adopted in 1926,845 used the term 
tesis,846 and not vakıf  in order to create a sharp distinction between vakıfs that existed 
before the Republic and new vakıfs. Article 74 (2) of the Civil Code allowed the 
establishment of new foundations, however, these could not be contrary to law or 
national interests, neither could they support a certain political thought, a certain race 
or community (cemaat- religious community).847 This neutral provision was applicable 
to both Muslims and non-Muslims. Yet, as far as non-Muslims were concerned, the 
explicit prohibition on establishing new foundations “to support a certain religious 
community” was incompatible with specifically Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty 
guaranteeing the rights to establish, manage and control charity institutions, religious 
social institutions, schools, teaching and education institutions.848  
 
Practice concerning new foundations that were established with a religious intent 
demonstrates the permissible boundaries of vakıf purpose as far as they concerned 
religious activity. Interestingly, the new foundations (tesis) that were established 
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during this time included many that were dedicated to the maintenance of property 
used for religious purposes or support of religious activity. These are viewed as having 
the intent of providing for the possibility of worship. Hence, vakıfs with the purpose of 
building mesjids, mosques, maintenance of churches and sinagogs, the maintenance of 
these and the provision for the needs of persons who would work in these places of 
worship, building of religious schools, providing for the needs of students who would 
study in these institutions were permissible in the application of the law. Many 
religious tesis were established as new foundations.849 The only non-Muslim example is 
the Walter Wiley Foundation which was established in 1962 with the purpose of 
dedicating the revenues of tesis property to the costs of a personnel of a Protestant 
Church adjacent to the Dutch Consulate, the maintenance of the building and other 
related costs.850 It is important to note that the revenues of these foundations are 
allocated to certain church buildings and costs related to the building and not the 
benefit of the church community as such.851 Establishing foundations for the benefit a 
community was and is still prohibited.   
 
6.4.3. Current Legislation and Practice 
 Bearing in mind the complex past of the community foundations, it is not 
surprising that the legal/administrative realm of rules applicable to community 
foundations is “caotic”,852 and that every new regulation pertaining to them involves 
multi-dimensional sensitivities. After the failure to adopt Law No. 5555 as a result of 
the veto of the then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer,853 the new Foundations Law No. 
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5737 that was adopted in 2008 is significant in what it does and does not 
accomplish.854 The new Foundations Law, was adopted, amidst strong opposition, 
within the Third Harmonization Package for the European Union accession, and has 
significant implications for both community foundations and new foundations.    
 
It is worthwhile to briefly consider the case brought to the Turkish Constitutional Court 
(Anayasa Mahkemesi, hereafter AYM) by the main opposition party, Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi (the Republican People’s Party- CHP) challenging the constitutionality of the new 
Law on Foundations; it was claimed that it was in contradiction with the secular nature 
of the Republic and the indivisibility of the state with its people as well as other 
constitutional provisions, such as the principle of equality.855 The arguments put forth 
for and against improving the conditions of community foundations help our 
understanding of the many dimensions of the bar before the legal personality of belief 
communities, as such, in Turkey. The approach taken by the Constitutional Court might 
be indicative of the way forward; this approach overcomes the blanket restrictions on 
religiously based associations that the Turkish secularism and national interests have 
been so far interpreted to justify.  
 
The objections of the main opposition party centred around provisions that brought 
the community foundations to the same category as ordinary foundations in relation to 
                                                                                                                                                                   
was based on the elimination of the exceptional nature and limited capacity of community foundations 
(cemaat vakıfları), claiming that the rigorous supervision established over community foundations and 
their limited capacity aimed the eradication of the “old foundations established within the Sharia Law 
order” that was eliminated by the Turkish revolution. He reiterated that Turkey embraced contemporary 
secular rule of law that was based on citizen-state relationship, rather than on the organization of people 
according to their religious affiliation, each with its respective religious leader.
 
 Veto reasoning of 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Document sent from the Presidency to the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, Doc. No. B.01.0.KKB.01-18/A-10-2006-830 29 / 11 / 2006 
http://hyetert.blogspot.com/2006/12/vakflar-kanunu-veto-gerekcesi.html, accessed 16.01.2015.  The 
exceptional structure of the community foundations, which allows associative activity based on religious 
affiliation and the contrasting Republican tendency to abandon the religion based societal organization 
demonstrate that the community foundations are viewed as an anomaly within the Republican legal 
framework. In fact, one explanation of the restrictive practices against the community foundations might 
be that there has been a will to abolish this anomaly and exception which was accepted reluctantly in 
the first place, within the Lausanne regime, and was always seen as a concession.  
854
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their capacity to enjoy certain rights- that were previously denied. These include, 
establishing branch offices (Article 25), election of the executive board of community 
foundations from among the community (Article 6), acquisition of new property 
(Article 12(1)), possibility of altering “purpose and function” (Article 14), international 
activities, receiving donations from abroad (Article 25), establishing economic 
corporations and companies (Article 26).856 The opposition Party’s case emulated the 
veto reasoning of President Sezer to the previous Law on Foundations, in which he had 
stressed that granting community foundations capacity that had been denied 
previously would undermine their exceptional status- remnant of the multi-
jurisdictional Ottoman regime- and counter the process of their slow elimination from 
the secular modern rule of law which is based on equal citizenship as opposed to a 
society organized on the basis of religious affiliation.857  
 
The TCC’s assessment of the case stands out most in the way in which it refuses to deal 
with the objections in relation to national interests and the indivisibility of the state 
with its nation, secularism and the frequently used principle of reciprocity in the 
protection of the rights deriving from the Lausanne Treaty and instead focusing on 
fundamental rights and their wide interpretation. By adopting such an approach the 
TCC marks an important progress in jurisprudence concerning religious minorities in 
Turkey.858 Some important examples, may illustrate this point.  It was argued that the 
election of the executive board for community foundations needed to be rejected on 
the basis of the principle of reciprocity found in Article 45 of the Lausanne Peace 
Treaty,859 in light of the fact that in Greece non-Muslim communities were not allowed 
to elect the administration of their foundations. Thus according to Article 90 of the 
Constitution international law (Lausanne Treaty) had to prevail. The evaluation of the 
AYM is interesting because it finds that Article 90 is relevant for situations where there 
is an incompatibility among norms pertaining to human rights and in this situation 
there was no incompatibility. Thus, without dealing with the principle of reciprocity the 
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AYM regarded it as a clear fundamental rights issue that did not require reference to 
the Lausanne Treaty.   
 
Another vital provision concerned the right of community foundations to acquire new 
property.860  The opposition to this right centered on this being a concession to 
minorities in Turkey and that there was no “public interest” in granting community 
foundations the right to acquire new property. Strikingly, basing its reasoning on 
provisions found in Article 35 of the Turkish Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of 
the ECHR, protecting the right to property for legal entities, the AYM found that the 
right to property is a human right and hence that there was “public interest” in 
correcting the infringement suffered by community foundations over decades.861 It is 
highly important that the AYM views the practice of recognizing the 1936 Declaration 
as “founding deed” and deducing from this that community foundations do not have a 
capacity to acquire new property because it is not stated in their founding deed, as “no 
longer relevant”. Thus the AYM has rejected decades long judicial practice that resulted 
in significant loss of property for community foundations depriving these communities 
from vital resources needed for their survival as well as their religious acts.862 Again, 
when dealing with the objection to the possibility for community foundations to alter 
their “purpose and function” because this would give them the chance to survive and 
adopt to changing circumstances and thus bring them to the same status as ordinary 
foundations and that this would constitute a privilege, the AYM decided, that on the 
contrary it would be compatible with the principle of equality.863       
 
The adoption of Turkey’s current Law on Foundations has been a move toward bringing 
in line the protection of the rights of non-Muslim minorities closer to the protection 
afforded in international human rights treaties, the Treaty of Lausanne and Turkish 
Constitution.864 The Law on Foundations protects the right of community foundations, 
to acquire property, enjoy the right to manage, to exchange property that they have 
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acquired with more beneficial ones and to turn these into cash under certain 
circumstances. An important gain for community foundations is that they are able to 
register non-movables that they had declared in the 1936 Declaration in the name of 
their community foundation.  In addition, it has brought a limited solution for the 
property that has been transferred to the ownership of the State Treasury or VGM by 
the declaration of null and void the property register of non-movables that were 
purchased by or donated to community foundations. Also, provided that it is stated in 
their deed and they notify the VGM, foundations can receive donations from 
institutions in Turkey and abroad.  Foundations may establish commercial companies 
and be shareholders of companies.  No doubt, these rights have breathed life into 
community foundations and established that community foundations also enjoy the 
rights that new foundations have. 
 
Despite its improvements the 2008 Law on Foundations fails to address past injustices 
and retroactive actions that have resulted in significant loss for community 
foundations. The status of community foundations as mülhak vakıf,865 has not been 
changed.866 The regulation pertaining to seized (mazbut) foundations stands out in this 
respect.    The VGM had, in the past, seized and placed under its administration 
foundations that did not have any administrator and that did not have members of 
community living in its region based on the Law on Foundations No. 2672.867 The 2008 
Law on Foundations closes the door to the recovery of these foundations and the 
return of their non-movables permanently by stating that “election and appointment of 
new administrators for these foundations may not be made”.   For example, in the past 
24 sinagog foundations endowed for the benefit of the Jewish community in Turkey 
and 24 community foundations endowed for the benefit of the Greek Orthodox 
community were seized by the VGM thus transferring the management or control of 
these foundations as well as the property belonging to these foundations to the 
                                                        
865
 Öztürk, supra note 68,  p.45.  
866
 Hatemi views such change necessary for substantial change. The added (mülhak) vakıf status of both 
Muslim and community foundations must change and a regulation that observes equality and advances 
freedom must be instiuted. Hatemi, supra note 67,  p. 806. 
867
 Kurban and Hatemi, supra note 65.  
236
VGM.868   Hatemi and Kurban argue that this provision not only does not provide for 
the restitution of administration and property of seized foundations, but also opens the 
way for the continuation of unlawful and arbitrary bureaucratic practice.869   
 
The inclusion of the principle of reciprocity in the 2008 Law on Foundations has caused 
substantial reaction from the non-Muslim community. The principle of reciprocity 
constitutes the basis of Turkey’s conditional approach to the protection of minority 
rights and it is based on the expectation that there will be reciprocal protection for 
Muslims, particularly those in Western Thrace, has been an integral part of the 
constrictive application of the general minority rights protection scheme. Article 2 
preserves the principle of reciprocity, thus continuing and reinforcing the practice of 
the Turkish state to treats its citizens as foreign citizens.  
 
In the assessment of the associative rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey it is 
important to note that it is not possible to establish new community foundations. This 
practice is contrary to Turkey’s obligations under Lausanne 40 which provides 
guarantees for the associative rights of non-Muslims. It is only possible to establish new 
foundations which are subject to Turkish Civil Code (TCC). Article 101(4) of the TCC 
stipulates that one cannot establish foundations that aim to support a certain race or 
community (religious community).870  
 
Following the significant, nevertheless inadequate, domestic legal improvements that 
were mostly adopted within the context of reforms for Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union in the last decade, community foundations have taken their 
complaints regarding the right of community foundations to the right to property to 
Strasbourg and had success in cases concerning the seizure of property belonging to 
community foundations by the Turkish state.  In the case of the Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi 
Vakfı v. Turkey, the ECtHR decided that the manner in which the 1936 Declaration was 
used to restrict the right of the community foundations to property violated the Article 
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1 of Protocol 1.871   The case of Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfı v. Turkey, 
dealing with the seizure of property that belonged to the foundation resulted with the 
finding of violation by Turkey, which was followed by a friendly settlement between 
the parties.872   This case is significant in being the first case where Turkey returned 
seized property to a community foundation.  
 
In an effort to take further steps to solve the property problems of the Lausanne 
minorities, the Legislative Decree (“the Decree” hereafter) was adopted on 28 August 
to allow community foundations to apply to regain property confiscated from them by 
the state since 1936, has been applauded by many as a “revolution” however, it is best 
seen as a further step in the process of trying to solve the property problems of non-
Muslim community foundations. 873  The Decree amends the current Law on 
Foundations (No.5737) by adding a temporary Article 11. Basically, the Decree aims to 
provide for the restitution of some of the property that was wrongfully taken from 
non-Muslim community foundations.874  On the other hand, it is important to note that 
it is far from creating an overall solution to all the property problems of community 
foundations. A number of exceptions foreseen in the Decree weaken the restitution 
process. One of the exceptions in the Decree concerns property that was "nationalised, 
property confiscated by the state from community foundations and handed back to 
previous owners from whom the foundations had legally acquired, and is important to 
note that the Decree does not address the property of community foundations seized 
by the VGM.  
 
Regardless of their reason,875 reforms pertaining to community foundations in the last 
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decade have brought the protection afforded to some of the non-Muslim communities 
in Turkey closer to the protection ensured in international human rights provisions, the 
Lausanne Treaty and Turkish Constitution. On the other hand, it is difficult to say that 
legal issues concerning associative abilities of non-Muslim communities have been 
freed from national security concerns subject to the national and international political 
context and brought closer to focus on its dimensions as a right to association and a 
right to collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief.   
 
(a) New Foundations 
Legislation pertaining to the establishment and administration of new foundations is 
relevant for our assessment of the adequacy of new foundations as a functional form 
of legal personality in the exercise of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief. The new Law on Foundations,876 does not include an explicit prohibition of the 
establishment of foundations with a religious intent. Yet, Article 101 (4) of the Civil 
Code, prohibits the establishment of a foundation “contrary to the characteristics of 
the Republic as defined by the Constitution, Constitutional rules, laws, morals, national 
integrity and national interest, or with the aim of supporting a distinctive race or 
community”.877 The prohibition of the establishment of foundations dedicated to the 
support of a belief community is potentially problematic because it may be interpreted 
in a way to prohibit the establishment of foundations with a religious purpose or 
dedicated to support the activities of a certain religious community, especially if the 
purpose of the foundation goes beyond support for a specific building or institution set 
aside for religious purposes.878  
 
There appears to be an inconsistency in the way the administrative authorities and high 
                                                                                                                                                                   
European Union membership process and to take a preventive measure against the applications pending 
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courts have dealt with the compatibility of the establishment of foundations dedicated 
to supporting religious and other activities of members of certain belief communities 
and Article 101 (4) of the Civil Code. The cases of the Istanbul Protestant Church 
Foundation (Istanbul Protestan Kilisesi Vakfı-IPKV), Kurtuluş Churches Foundation 
(Kurtuluş Kiliseleri Vakfı- KKV) and the Seventh Day Adventists Foundation (Yedinci Gün 
Adventistleri Vakfı-YGAV) illustrate the ambiguity in law and practice and their 
restriction on the associative abilities of belief communities perfectly. The IPKV,879 was 
established by a court decision and its aim as stated in its founding deed is “to meet 
the religious needs of citizens affiliated with the Protestant faith and foreigners 
residing in Turkey who are affiliated with the same religion”.880 In the case of the IPKV 
the VGM appealed the first instance court decision and took the case to the High Court 
of Appeals, yet the latter upheld the decision concerning the establishment of the 
foundation.881 It is not clear from the case report on what basis the VGM opposed the 
establishment of the foundation.882 The application of the KKV  on the other hand was 
not successful.883 The founding deed of the KKV stated in Article 3,  
 The main aim of the foundation is to meet the religious needs of citizens affiliated with the 
 Protestant faith and residents in Turkey and those living in Turkey affiliated with the same faith, 
to  ensure their educational, social and cultural development within the framework of freedom of 
religion  or belief, and by providing every kind of material and moral support and to provide supportive 
services  to people in need and those affected by natural disasters.
884
  
 
The application was rejected on the basis of the prohibition of Turkish Civil Code 
Article 74,885 that prohibits the establishment of a foundation with the purpose of 
supporting a certain denomination or religious community.886 The Court referred in its 
reasoning to an Opinion of the VGM, which underscores that the said foundation’s aim 
was to “meet the religious needs of persons affiliated with the Protestant faith” and 
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that this was prohibited in the Article 74 of the Civil Code.887 The Court recognized that 
the freedom of belief of persons is protected by international treaties, however, that 
these must be exercised in accordance with “legal norms related to public order that 
reflect the basic philosophy of the state”.888 Interestingly, the Court pointed out that 
while it is possible to critique Article 74(2) of the Turkish Civil Code in the context of 
abstract human rights and related regulations, because of the explicit prohibition in 
law, bearing in mind that the foundation deed states clearly in its Article 3 that its 
purpose is to meet all kinds of need of persons affiliated to the Protestant faith, it is not 
possible to approve the establishment of the foundation in light of national 
legislation.889 While the Court observes the incompatibility of domestic law with 
international law, it does not go so far as to invoke Article 90 of the Turkish 
Constitution,890 and give primacy to Article 9 or Article 11 of the ECHR and Article 18 or 
Article 20 of the ICCPR. The High Court of Appeals upheld this decision, observing that 
while it is possible for members of the Protestant belief who live in Turkey to establish 
foundations to exercise their rights to freedom of belief and religion, as protected by 
the Turkish Constitution, by building places of worship, carrying out necessary 
educational, social and cultural activities within the framework of freedom of religion 
or belief, the purpose of the KKVF was different, in that “it especially supports 
members of the Protestant community”.891 The HCA’s perception of exercise of 
freedom of religion or belief presents a focus on facilities which may be used by 
religious groups. A link or focus on the religious group that may use such facilities 
appears to be not compatible with Turkish legislation. Yet, nowhere in legislation or 
jurisprudence is an explanation on the nature of this restriction, its aim, its necessity in 
a democratic society and whether its consequences of religious groups are 
proportionate to the aims pursued. 
 
An application by the YGAV was also rejected by the Court based on the same 
justification as in the case of KKV. It has been observed that the primary concern of the 
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High Courts in KCF and YGAV have been the protection of public order and security.892 
In the Turkish judicial practice, there have been situations where non-judiciary actors 
have tried to influence the decisions of courts.893 In the cases of KKV and YGAV 
missionary activities and Turkey’s identification of it as a national threat,894 may 
constitute the decisive element. However, since the judgment does not include a 
discussion of these issues as a basis for restrictions it is not possible here to discuss 
substantively the validity of this argument. Despite an almost identical founding deed 
with the IPKV, the YGAV’s attempt to establish a foundation was thwarted. This raises 
the question of whether the decision of the Court is based on conjecture.895 It will be 
very interesting to see the proceedings on the case of the YGAV which is now pending 
with the ECtHR.896   
 
A case dealing with an Alevi foundation demonstrates how the High Court of Appeals 
chose to resolve competing interests. The case deals with an objection to the 
establishment of the Anatolian Science Culture and Cem Foundation (Anadolu Bilim 
Kültür ve Cem Vakfı- ABKCV) where the VGM objected to the words “Alevism”, 
“Cem”,897 “Halk semahları”,898 arguing that the purpose of the foundations “to research 
Alevism in a scientific manner, transmit it to young generations” would lead to support 
of a certain religious community (the Alevi community).899 The High Court decided that 
the removal of the word “Alevi” would weaken the purpose of the foundation and it is 
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not possible to say that this word, which conveys a fact in the society, expresses 
anything unlawful. As for the word “cem”, since it refers to muted meetings among the 
Alevi, the Law on the Closure of Dervish Lodges was not applicable.900 Lastly, the High 
Court held that the “halk semahı” is known as a cultural activity hence legally speaking 
there was not problem.901 It seems that, in order to facilitate the establishment of the 
foundation, the High Court chose to focus on the cultural dimensions of the 
foundation’s purpose and disregard, even downplay, its religious dimensions, 
particularly those related to manifestations of religion in worship through cem 
(gathering) for worship purposes. The fact that the establishment of the foundation 
could not be justified as a right under freedom of religion or belief indicates, among 
others, the vague and weak protection of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief. 
  
In practice, the rule concerning the ban on the establishment of vakıf institutions with 
the purpose of supporting a certain religious community may have its exceptions. The 
Turkish Diyanet Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı - TDV), which is a foundation under 
the Civil Code, established in 1975 with the purpose of fostering knowledge of Islam, 
building mosques, and doing charitable work.902 The purpose of the TDV has not been 
challenged by courts or administrative authorities. Taking into account that  “fostering 
knowledge of Islam and building mosques” would benefit a certain community, namely 
Muslims, how is the purpose of the TDV reconciled with the prohibition found in Article 
101 (4) of the Turkish Criminal Code which stipulates that one cannot establish 
foundations that aim to support a certain race or community (religious community)?903        
 
Even if members of belief groups manage to establish foundations, for small 
communities the management of a foundation proves to be burdensome financially 
and administratively. The reason for this is that managing a foundation requires legal 
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and accounting know-how as well as financial resources.904 These include detailed 
declarations related to finances and activities.905 Foundations have to conduct internal 
auditing, or have it done through independent external financial auditors, but in both 
cases the auditors must have a certificate required by the VGM. 906  For small 
communities it might not be possible to have skilled persons who can acquire the 
required certificate for auditing and expensive to hire an external auditor. Taking into 
account the burdensome administrative requirements involved in managing 
foundations and the heavy risk of repercussions that may follow, it does not seem 
possible to manage a foundation without legal counsel and accounting support. These 
burdensome processes cast doubt on the suitability of foundations as a legal entity 
formula in the exercise of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief.   
 
The oversight of the VGM also constitutes a significant shortcoming of the foundations 
formula. For years, VGM has been the state agency empowered to take control of 
foundations that allegedly were not being used for their original purpose or did not 
have a legally constituted board.907 Hatemi points out that the VGM “feels obligated to 
open court cases” for the dissolution of foundations and the removal of the managers 
of foundations upon receipt of memorandums from security institutions.908 The VGM 
the central body dealing with foundations, can apply to the court against this 
approval.909 
 
In conclusion, the suitability and adequacy as well as accesibility of the foundation 
formula needs to be questioned in the context of the enjoyment of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief and the right to property. The foundation provides an 
indirect arrangement for property ownership and the financing of related activities 
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(place of worship, charitable activities, etc). However, there are many obstacles with 
registering property indirectly, in the name of a foundation when compared to owning 
it directly,910 as it has been demonstrated above. While it may be possible to carry out 
some religious activities through foundations, even as such, the extensive supervision 
of the VGM gives rise to a situation where the foundation system for religious 
communities compromises autonomy and makes them vulnerable to interference by 
the state, such as the confiscation of property. In addition, the management of 
foundations is a highly burdensome process not compatible with a facilitative approach 
by states. 
 
(b) Associations  
 The establishment of an association is another legal entity option that is 
available for members of belief communities. Still, the possibility for members of belief 
communities to establish ordinary associations with religious purposes is a relatively 
recent development. The Law on Associations that was adopted in 2004 in accordance 
with the 4th Harmonization Package in the context of the European Union Accession 
process omits the explicit prohibition on establishing associations based on certain 
religion or denomination that was found in the previous law.911 The association 
formula, however, is not an option that is designed particularly as a legal entity through 
which religious activity may be conducted or with particular reference to the nature 
and needs of religious communities in the exercise of their right to manifest their 
religion or belief together. An association is a private law legal person that is formed by 
real or legal persons for the objective of realizing a certain purpose by bringing 
together their knowledge and efforts and that is not contrary to law.912 The current 
Civil Code and the Law on the Associations do not explicitly bar members of religious 
communities from establishing associations with religious purposes. There is no explicit 
prohibition in the Turkish Civil Code analogous to that which applies to foundations in 
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Article 101 (4) of the Civil Code. The Turkish Civil Code stipulates that associations 
“contrary to law and morals may not be established.913 
 
In the context of freedom of religion or belief, the association formula has been utilized 
as a step for the building of worship places; associations are, often, established for the 
purpose of constructing places of worship. The function of associations as supporters 
of the construction of worship places other than mosques may have been inspired by 
the common practice of establishing associations for the construction of mosques.914 
However, there appear to be serious limitations and ambiguities of this formula, which 
create a lack of clarity and foreseeability as to the application of law. The application of 
the LA becomes particularly ambiguous in relation to places of worship. The association 
option has been used by a number of belief communities, such as the Alevi, the 
Protestant churches and Jehovah’s Witnesses. 915  Members of the Protestant 
community welcomed the possibility of establishing associations since it seems to have 
opened a route to acquire a certain legal entity status as well as providing a first step 
for the establishment of places of worship.916  
 
On the other hand, while the association formula may open the way for carrying out 
certain activities and thus meet some of the associative needs of these long-
established belief communities it is not designed as a form of religious institution or a 
legal entity status for a belief community. The association formula does not seem 
suitable for the organizational and institutional set-up of churches such as the 
Orthodox Patriarchate and the Armenian Patriarchate, or the Chief Rabbinate. The 
reason for this is they are not individuals coming together to accomplish a certain goal, 
which is the rational of the ordinary association. They are leaderships of assumed 
communities, the members of which change all the time- yet the “assumed” 
community, per se, remains. In addition, in light of the ambiguity of the nature of their 
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legal entity status, it is likely that they could not establish an association in any case.  It 
has been observed that some of the churches and communities may not consider it 
proper to register as ordinary “associations”, on par with and under the same 
regulations and conditions as for example fitness clubs and automobile associations.917 
 
There are a number of features of the LA and its Regulation, that raise questions on the 
level of protection of the right to association as well as the right to manifest religion or 
belief. These give rise to increased interference by the state in the associative activities 
of belief communities who opt for the association possibility. The number of real or 
legal persons that are needed for the establishment of an association is seven and must 
increase to fifteen by the end of the first year of the association.918 The minimum 
number of founding members ranges between 2-5 in European countries.919 This 
number may be a restrictive element that is incompatible with Article 18 of the ICCPR 
and Article 9 in light to Article 11 of the ECHR. The incompatibility becomes more 
evident when one considers belief communities that are very small and whose 
members may not wish to disclose their religious affiliation due to fear of 
discrimination and repression.  
 
The required manner of operation for associations is highly burdensome; inter alia, 
associations have to keep six different books plus three others for taxation and 
financial auditing purposes,920 the books must be kept in Turkish,921 and the books 
must be approved by the City Directorate of Associations or the notary,922 the manner 
in which general assemblies are made are regulated in detail and a copy of the general 
conclusions declaration must be sent to the highest administrative authority in the 
city.923 Associations must provide the civilian authority with a written statement on 
their national and international activities, personnel, financial situation, property etc. 
on a yearly basis, then these are audited by the city governorship or the Interior 
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Ministry.924 Acceptance of donations or aid from outside of Turkey is closely monitored 
by the state through the requirement of a notification of civilian administration before 
the receipt of the aid.925 This process is burdensome on minority associations, including 
religious groups, which have scarce resources, including human and financial resources 
as well as necessary know-how.926 The European Commission Progress report also 
notes that some of the requirements are subject to controls that do not observe 
proportionality.927  
 
Despite the absence of an explicit prohibition of establishment of associations with a 
religious intent, the general requirement that the establishment of associations must 
be in accordance with the law combined with the particular interpretation of the 
principle of secularism creates a lack of precision and foreseeability of whether 
associations with religious purposes can be established and if they are established, 
whether their activities may be found illegal at some point. An example of this was 
demonstrated in 2005, when Jehovah’s Witnesses tried to set up an association with 
“religious, informational and charitable” purposes.928 The authorities rejected this on 
the ground that it was against Article 24 of the Constitution.929 However a first instance 
court decided that the stated purpose was not in breach of Article 24, and rejected the 
claim to close the association.930 A recent application to set up a foundation which inter 
alia aimed to carry out some religious and educational activities for Armenians was 
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rejected by the 5th Court of First Instance in Istanbul relying on Article 101/4 of the Civil 
Code, which forbids setting up foundations that aim to support members of a specific 
race or community.931 
 
The nature of religious activity that can be carried out within the legal structure of an 
association and in its premises is not clear. This was demonstrated in a case against a 
private person, E.L.D., in relation to alleged church activity in the Word of Life (Hayat 
Sözü Derneği - HSD) premises.932 Allegedly, she had accepted that the premise was 
used as a “house church” to the policeman who came to the association premises for 
investigation.933 During the trial E.L.D. contended that she did not say that she was 
engaged in “house church activity” and that her activities were in line with the 
purposes of the Association that were found in its statute, namely, “to meet the needs 
of believers affiliated with the Christian Protestant faith”.934 The case was dismissed 
because the defendant refused the allegation that the premises were used as a “house 
church”.935 Even though the premises were not officially assigned or recognized as a 
place of worship, some of the activities, apparently, seemed similar to activities that 
one might expect to see in a church. Yet, it must be noted that a number of Protestant 
associations have been served notifications and in some cases they have been fined for 
using their respective association buildings for worship purposes.936 Yet, an association 
may be established to built a place of worship, but the designation of such a place as a 
place of worship requires a different process.   
 
The supervision of associations through the Directorate of Associations under the 
Ministry of Interior may be considered a component of the association formula that 
weakens the suitability of this option for belief communities by increasing the 
vulnerability of belief communities against unjustified state interference and 
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diminishing the autonomy of belief communities. The case of an Alevi association, 
Association for the Construction of Çankaya  Cemevi (Çankaya Cemevi Yaptırma 
Derneği, CCYD hereafter), illustrates this point; the CCYD which referred to their 
worship place cem house,937 as a place of worship in its statute has been the subject to 
a legal dispute.938 The Ministry of Interior, asked the Directorate of Associations to 
request the Alevi Association to remove the reference to cem houseas a place of 
worship.939 The request was based on an opinion of the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
of the Prime Minister’s Office, which asserts that Muslims worship in mosques, thus 
ruling out the possibility of the reckoning of the cem house as a place of worship. The 
case raises issues on the interference in the internal affairs, not least the building and 
maintenance of places of worship in accordance with the particular dogma of the belief 
community and the neutrality of the state.  The case has been decided in favor of the 
association by the Court’s rejection of the request for closure,940 yet in contrast, 
considering the same case and overturning its decision, the High Court of Appeals 
referred to the Law No. 677 saying that it closes tekke and zaviye, however, allows the 
existence of mosques and mesjid and thus decided that the statute of the association is 
contrary to law. Although the Law No. 677 does not refer to cem houses, when 
considering the legitimacy of referring to cem house as a place of worship.941 The High 
Court of Appeals also recalled the status of Law No. 677 and has said that none of its 
provisions may be interpreted in a way to be understood to be incompatible with the 
provisions of the Constitution.942 The HCA interprets the Law. No. 677 in a way to mean 
that no Islamic place of worship other than a mosque or mesjid may be established.943 
It does not consider the cem house as an equivalent of tekke or zaviye. The HCA also 
recalled that no provision of Law No. 677, which seeks to protect secularism, contrary 
to the Turkish Constitution. The reasoning also recalls that the Diyanet is tasked with 
the management of places of worship and mosques and mesjid may be opened with 
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the permission of the Diyanet.944 Thus it is inferred from the permission to operate 
mosques and mesjid that no Islamic place of worship other than these may be lawful. 
Thus reference to an “unlawful” place of worship leads the HCA to conclude that the 
statute of the association is contrary to law and therefore necessitates the dissolution 
of the association by a court decision.945 Interestingly, while numerous previous 
administrative or judicial decision relied on the Diyanet Opinion, in this reasoning HRC 
does not refer to the Diyanet Opinion to the effect that Muslims worship in mosques. 
The reason for this may be to strive for a reasoning that is based on legislation instead 
of a theological opinion thus, perhaps, taking into account public criticism generated by 
taking into account Opinion of the Diyanet in the decisions of public authorities.   
 
There are significant flaws in the construction of the reasoning by the HRC. The HCA did 
not consider the question of whether cem houses and tekke and zaviye are identical or 
not. If they had concluded that cem houses are identical to tekke, it would not be 
possible to allow their existence of cem houses without amending Law No. 677. The 
HRC, however, concludes that only “mosques and mesjid” are allowed and this is based 
on the reference in Law No. 677 to allowing mosques and mesjid to remain where 
tekke and zaviye are used for these purposes. In addition, the Diyanet is given the 
mandate to operate only mosques and mesjid. Since cem houses are not considered as 
tekke these are not prohibited as such. This is also evident in the fact that there are 
hundreds of cem houses operating in the country and they are not closed or 
considered illegal.946 Thus their existence is not contrary to law. The fact that the 
Diyanet is given the task to administer mosques and mesjid does not necessarily mean 
that no other Islamic places of worship is allowed. Indeed, it only means that if there 
are Islamic places of worship other than mosques or mesjid, the Diyanet does not have 
a mandate to operate them. Therefore the decision to consider the reference to cem 
house as a place of worship is not based on law.  
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The reasoning does not include any reference to the right to freedom of religion or 
belief, not does it consider the consequences of the denial of the recognition of the 
cem houses as places of worship for the association or the Alevi community.  
 
The association option has also been used to a limited extent by the traditional non-
Muslim communities that have existed in Turkey before the Republic was established. 
Members of the Greek Orthodox community have established RUMVADER association 
which was established with the purpose of coordinating the support for the community 
foundations dedicated to meet the needs of the Greek Orthodox community.947 Some 
members have expressed that there is a certain hesitation on the part of the 
community to join the association as members based on a fear that there will be 
government intrusion in their activities.948  
 
Consequently, the association does not provide a means for religious or belief groups 
to acquire legal personality, as such. Overall, however, the association formula appears 
as a useful auxiliary legal entity option that members of religious communities may 
avail themselves from. The burdensome bureaucratic processes it involves, the strict 
oversight of public authorities, the unclarity of acts that can be performed under the 
association structure appear as elements that diminish the effectiveness of this 
formula.  
 
6.5. Assessment of the compatibility of Turkey’s legislation and practice with 
international law  
  
 The purpose of this Chapter has been to review Turkish legislation and practice 
on the right of belief communities to acquire legal personality and make an evaluation 
of their compatibility with Turkey’s international law obligations. International 
standards related to legal personality of belief communities have been reviewed in 
Chapter 3 in detail, below is a succinct recollection of the essential framework within 
which an assessment of the Turkish case will be made. 
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 The right to acquire legal personality is an integral part of the effective protection of 
the right to freedom of religion or belief directly linked to the rights to association, 
judicial protection and property. Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR 
guarantee believers the right to manifest their religion or belief either alone or in 
community with others. As the ECtHR held: "religious communities traditionally and 
universally exist in the form of organized structures".949 Therefore the organizational 
aspects of religious communities’ activities are inseparable from Article 9. The ECtHR 
also observed the significance of ensuring the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief saying, "Were the organizational life of the [religious] community not 
protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all other aspects of the individual's freedom 
of religion would become vulnerable".950 Many acts representing the organizational life 
of belief communities are listed by the HRC as protected under the right to manifest 
religion or belief,  such as, inter alia, worship including ritual and ceremonial acts, the 
building of places of worship, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays 
and days of rest, freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the 
freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom to prepare and 
distribute religious texts or publications.951 In the case of the Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova it was observed that not being recognized, the 
Church could not operate, its priests could not conduct divine service, its members 
could not meet to practice their religion and, not having legal personality and that it 
was not entitled to judicial protection of its assets.952  As demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
more often than not, in domestic legal systems, legal personality is a crucial pre-
condition for many activities that belief communities engage in, in the manifestation of 
their religion or belief as well as a way of direct exercise of rights by belief 
communities. Therefore, practically speaking, there is a positive obligation on the part 
of states to create an adequate legal framework for acquiring legal personality. This 
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positive obligation was recognized explicitly the ECtHR’ jurisprudence; “there is a 
positive obligation incumbent on the State to put in place a system of recognition 
which facilitates the acquisition of legal personality by religious communities”.953 This 
must be coupled with the absence of arbitrary and undue interference by the state in 
this process.  
 
The European Court has also relied on the right to association. The ECtHR held in the 
case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria that,  
 Where the organization of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 of the Convention must 
be  interpreted in the light of Article 11, which safeguards the associated life against unjustified 
State  interference. Seen in this perspective, the believers’ right to freedom of religion encompasses 
the  expectation that the community will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary State 
 intervention.
954
  
 
The refusal by state authorities to grant legal entity status to an association of 
individuals amounts to an interference with the right to freedom of association.955 This 
is also applicable to religious communities. The Guidelines prepared by the ODIHR and 
the Venice Commission, although not legally binding, state that restrictions on the right 
to legal personality for the religious communities are “inconsistent with both the right 
to association and freedom of religion or belief”.956  
 
The denial to acquire legal personality results in the impossibility for belief 
communities to access courts with direct legal capacity and benefit from judicial 
protection. The ECtHR addressed this problem eloquently by observing that, “one of 
the means of exercising the right to manifest one's religion, especially for a religious 
community, in its collective dimension, is the possibility of ensuring judicial protection 
of the community, its members and its assets, so that Article 9 must be seen not only in 
the light of Article 11, but also in the light of Article 6”.957 Thus the denial of legal entity 
status may result in an infringement of Article 6 (1) of the European Convention.  
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 The denial of legal personality or capacity to own, renders the right to property 
meaningless for belief communities.  
 
The inhibition in the Turkish legal system that denies belief communities the right to 
acquire legal personality, as such, results in the infringement of a number of human 
rights. The denial by Turkey to allow belief communities to acquire legal personality 
results in the impossibility of belief communities to directly exercise certain key aspects 
of their right to freedom of religion or belief, in particular many aspects of its collective 
dimension. Thus leading to an interference in the right to manifest their freedom of 
religion or belief in conjunction with the right to association. A number of examples of 
recognition of legal personality of belief groups or their representatives in some court 
cases have been presented above, yet they fail to provide a adequate legal framework. 
Since belief communities cannot acquire legal personality, they cannot exercise certain 
key aspects of the right to freedom of religion or belief directly and effectively. This 
means that a belief community cannot for example directly purchase or own a place of 
worship or even open a bank account.  
   
In order to acquire a limited form of legal personality, members of belief communities 
must establish foundations or associations which provide only indirect access to the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights. This formula allows some of their members to 
establish foundations or associations and, indeed may be instrumental in meeting 
certain needs related to worship, practice and teaching. However, these will not be 
exercised directly by the belief community as such, i.e. the community will not be the 
owner of a place of worship.  It has been demonstrated above that the foundations 
formula and the association formula involve significant degree of state supervision and 
interference as well as risk of discrimination based on religion. These formulas only 
allow the foundation or association to exercise the right to ownership as entities that 
are distinct from the belief community itself. Also, it has been explained in the relevant 
sections above, that the requirements for the maintenance and operation of 
foundations and associations have been and still are subject to various legislative and 
administrative measures that entail high risk of arbitrary and unjust interference by the 
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state. Hence foundations and associations run a high risk of losing control over 
property. Whereas an appropriate legal entity status particularly drawn up for belief 
communities must protect the right of belief communities to own property without 
undue state interference. Moreover, the right to freedom of religion or belief is rarely 
considered by the Turkish judiciary in the assessment of cases pertaining to 
associations and foundations even though there are significant implications for FORB.   
 
The Venice Commission’s Opinion does not consider the availability of alternative legal 
entity status as an adequate formula: 
 The fact that leaders and members of a religious community can use alternative forms of 
organizing  their religious life different from establishing an association with legal personality does 
not change the  legal situation. The mere fact that the religious community concerned may have 
certain  alternatives  available to compensate for the interference resulting from State measures, 
while it may be relevant in  the assessment of proportionality, cannot lead to the conclusion that 
there was no State interference  with the internal organization of the community concerned.
958
 
 
Indeed, the association and foundation formulas may be seen as, only, auxiliary 
options for religious or belief communities and not as substitutes for an adequate form 
of legal entity status necessary for the exercise of the collective dimension of freedom 
of religion or belief. 
 
The general obstacle before acquisition of legal personality as belief communities and 
the limitations of existing associative possibilities, such as foundations and 
associations, in the Turkish legal framework constitute interference in the right to 
manifest one’s religion or belief in community with others.  The question then is 
whether such interference may be justified under international provisions protecting 
freedom of religion or belief. This assessment is bound to be a hypothetical one since 
the Turkish Government is not in a position to present their arguments for this 
interference.   
 
The ECtHR considers that states are entitled to verify whether a movement or an 
association “carries on, ostensible in pursuit of religious aims, activities which are 
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harmful to the population or public safety.”959 Hence supervision or monitoring of 
activities of legal entities established by belief group may not be deemed incompatible 
with the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief.  Nevertheless, a 
general ban on or denial of acquisition of legal personality by belief groups as such 
seems incompatible with the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief and 
the right to association.960 Particularly when many peaceful religious groups are subject 
to infringement on a number of rights as it has been observed in this Chapter. Indeed it 
is expected that communities of believers should be ready to “practice their faith 
within the constitutional framework of their states.”961  
 
On the other hand, Turkey may argue that the denial is justified considering that such 
association based on religious affiliation may pose a threat to secularism and public 
order. It may be, indeed, reasonable to foresee a situation where groups of believers 
organize themselves as a legal entity which is strictly opposed to a secular nature of the 
state or which seek the creation of divisions in the country based on religious 
affiliation. In such a case however, Turkey would not be unguarded since it is possible 
to restrict the right to manifest religion or belief and the right to association by law, in 
pursuit of the protection of public order or the rights and freedom of others in a 
democratic society in a manner compatible with respective restriction clauses found in 
relevant provision. It has to be remembered that the purpose of the international 
provisions on the right to manifest religion or belief is to protect the rights of the 
individuals rather than the protection of state interests. In cases where state interests 
mandate the restriction of fundamental human rights these must be in strict 
compliance with the relevant restriction clauses enshrined in the ECHR and ICCPR.   A 
categorical denial of acquisition of legal personality, particularly when considering the 
effect such denial has on the rights to freedom of religion or belief, right to association, 
right to judicial protection and right to property, seems not proportional to the aim 
pursued. Therefore such denial is not in harmony with the protection scheme the 
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international provisions on freedom of religion or belief.    
  
The formulation of a legal entity for belief communities that takes into account the 
nature of belief communities and their activities will bring Turkey closer to complying 
with international human rights obligations. In this regard, the Venice Commission 
recommended that Turkey provides a legal framework that would allow the non-
Muslim religious communities, as such, adequate access to court and the right 
themselves to hold property, without having to do this through the foundation 
model.962 Surely this recommendation is valid for any belief community, Muslim and 
non-Muslim. 
 
6.6. Toward the formulation of a legal entity status for belief communities 
 
The OSCE-Venice Commission guidelines for the assessment of legislation pertaining 
to religious freedom are applicable for the creation of such a category. Hence if/when Turkey 
drafts legislation on legal entity status of religious or belief communities these principles 
should be followed:  
 In general, out of deference for the values of freedom of religion or belief, laws governing access to 
legal  personality should be structured in ways that are facilitative of freedom of religion or belief;  
 at a minimum, access to the basic rights associated with legal personality – for exam-  
 ple, opening a bank account, renting or acquiring property for a place of worship or for  
 other religious uses, entering into contracts, and the right to sue and be sued – should  
 be available without excessive difficulty.
963
  
 
The possibility and need to establish supra bodies with certain functions such as 
coordination or oversight of legal entities formed by belief communities and/or formed 
by members of belief communities as well as the nature of such bodies are questions 
that must be   addressed when creating an adequate legal framework for the 
protection of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief.  A report 
prepared by a group of members of the Armenian Apostolic community states the 
purpose of the recognition of legal personality for minorities: 
 The purpose is to ensure that the assets of the community are protected through central 
                                                        
962
 The Council of Europe Venice Commission, Opinion on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in 
Turkey, 15 March 2010, supra note 15, para. 71. 
963
 OSCE-Venice Commission Guidelines for the Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief, 
supra note 3.   
258
coordination,  planning and inspection, that the fate of institutions are not left alone to the goodwill 
of independent  foundation management, the prevention of  waste of resources, and that these are 
used appropriately  in accordance with their purposes.
964
   
  
A draft law proposal prepared by Prof. Hüseyin Hatemi  foresees the 
establishment of certain religious supra bodies with certain functions that may create 
coordination with community foundations.965Accordingly, the supra bodies include the 
Istanbul Orthodox Patriarchate, Istanbul Armenian Orthodox Patriarchate, Rabbinate of 
Turkey and the Syriac Deputy Patriarchate of Turkey.966  
 
Whether supra bodies will be of religious nature appears as an immediate question to 
be solved. If religious communities formed religious institutions it would be reasonable 
to expect that the supra bodies that might be established would be also be of a 
religious nature. Yet, considering the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey which are also 
ethnic minorities, in particular, Greeks, Armenians and Jews, they also have a non-
religious dimension to their associative activities. These may include hospitals, schools, 
old-people homes etc. which have evolved to gradually exclude their religious ethos. 
Community foundations that benefit such community endeavors may well prefer to be 
organized under a non-religious supra body. Yet, historically the religious heads of their 
communities have also been the heads of these institutions. In fact as it has been 
discussed in Chapter 5 The Lausanne Treaty refers to the minority beneficiaries as non-
Muslims and not as ethnic groups. This issues remains as an unresolved matter and has 
been increasingly subject of discussion among the so-called Lausanne minorities.  A 
solution that permits the establishment of non-religious supra bodies that may have 
oversight and coordination functions over community foundations that provide 
resources for activities that are not of a strictly –religious nature seems reasonable. 
Similarly, a legal framework that permits the establishment of supra religious bodies, 
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 Non-Muslim Minorities Report, K. Döşemeciyan, M. Bebiroğlu, Yervant Özuzun, February 2011, 
http://hyetert.blogspot.com/2011/02/musluman-olmayan-azinliklar-raporu-2011.html accessed 
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 Hatemi, supra note 67, p.812. 
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 As for Turkish citizen who are affiliated with the Catholic denomination, Hatemi’s proposal includes 
the establishment through a special law of a Union of Foundations of the Catholic Community. For 
Protestant Community Foundations the related supra body will be the State Ministry responsible for the 
Religious Public Services unless a Union of Protestant Community Foundations, Hatemi, supra note 67, p. 
815-817.   
259
such as those in Hatemi’s proposal above, that may assume an oversight role over 
community foundations or other institutions that benefit the acts that flow from the 
work of the religious community would be reasonable and necessary. It must be added 
immediately that it may not be always easy to draw the line between the work of the 
religious community and the work of non-religious community. Dialogue within these 
communities will determine the course that will be taken. What is clear, however, is 
that the supra body and its nature are questions that must be tackled in the process of 
creating an adequate legal framework.    
 
 
In sum, the impossibility for belief groups to acquire legal personality, as such, 
undermines the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief in Turkey by 
significantly weakening the rights to associate, assemble, own, worship, establish 
places of worship and schools and thus also train clergy, which constitute vital 
components of the right to freedom of religion or belief. It denies belief communities 
the right to access to court which is the sine qua non for effective remedy for all rights 
violations.  It also weakens the position of belief communities vis a vis the state by 
depriving them of a legally recognized status. These manifestations would include 
actions, inter alia, electing / appointing leaders, employing religious personnel, 
establishing and maintaining worship places, training clergy, including the 
establishment of relevant schools for this purpose, engaging in charitable work, 
collecting donations etc.967 From Turkey’s perspective the acquisition of legal 
personality by belief communities, as such, appears to be incompatible with Turkey’s 
unique circumstances. Yet, a substantiated justification is not presented for this 
categorical ban. The latter results in the vulnerability of belief communities as they 
cannot benefit from the empowering and enabling function of legal personality.    
 
Legal entity formulas that are available for belief communities in Turkey provide an 
inadequate protection of the associative rights of members of belief communities that 
are protected by the right to freedom of religion belief and the right to association in 
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international human rights law.968 They provide a certain indirect legal personality, yet, 
fall short of providing vital elements of effective and direct legal personality; the 
existing models do not allow for direct ownership by and direct representation of 
religious communities, particularly in the exercise of the right to access to court.   
Instead belief groups are obliged to own property or represent themselves in courts 
through an indirect institution. Such an approach fails to take into account the direct 
connection to and use of property by communities and the nature of belief 
communities.  On the contrary, the existing forms of legal entity impose structures 
upon belief communities that do are not compatible with their nature.  The available 
legal personality formulas then are further weakened by the fact that these indirect 
institutions are under the supervision of General Directorate of Associations and 
General Directorate of Foundations respectively. The extensive control of these 
institutions is further politicized by their direct relationship to the Prime Minister’s 
Office and the Ministry of Interior respectively, thus making belief communities that 
benefit from these models vulnerable to internal and international political conjecture. 
 
The quasi recognition of a certain legal personality by some court decisions and the 
conjectural decisions of some of the courts related to foundations and associations 
constitute clear signs of the lack of a clear and predictable law and uniform application 
of it.  In addition, since the association and foundation entities are not designed as 
religious institutions, as such, belief communities that opt for them, always run the risk 
of trespassing outside their respective legal frameworks when they act like religious 
communities. Unclear constitute the source of lack of effective exercise and protection 
of the right to freedom of religion or belief in its collective dimension and the 
accompanying discriminatory and unsystematic administrative and judicial practice. 
The failure to provide an adequate legal standard inevitably results in an extensive 
sphere of discretion that is created for those who apply the law, both courts and 
administrative authorities. Such lack of clarity and unpredictability are far from the 
requirement of prescribed by law condition stipulated in the restrictions clauses of 
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Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR Article 9. The lack of clarity results in 
practice that is far from uniform and many times discriminatory.   
 
The right to acquire legal personality has not been viewed as a right protected within 
the scope of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Instead it appears to be viewed 
on the axis of secularism, national security and interests where national and 
international political context appear to remain important factors. Turkey’s 
improvement of the foundation and association formulas has been limited and to a 
great extent depending on the European Union accession process. In order to ensure 
the protection of the right to acquire legal personality the adoption of rights based 
approach that views the issue primarily a right that Turkey has an obligation to protect 
is vital. Any restriction thereof must be duly justified in line with international treaty 
provisions.   
 
In order to comply with her international human rights obligations Turkey must create 
an adequate and suitable legal personality entity for belief groups that enables and 
empowers them to effectively enjoy the right to manifest freedom of religion or belief 
in worship, teaching, practice and observance. The formulation of such a legal entity 
status must be informed by the nature of belief groups, their acts, their needs and 
include the participation of diverse belief groups in the drafting of this status and 
guided by the implications of international human rights provisions. The challenge in 
this process will remain to seek a balance between facilitating the enjoyment of the 
right to freedom of religion/belief by belief communities and pursuing the legitimate 
aim of guaranteeing that the actions of these groups do not present any danger for a 
democratic society and that they do not involve activities directed against the interests 
of public safety, public order, health, morals or the rights and freedoms of other.  
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 Chapter 7 
The Right of Religious/Belief Communities in Turkey 
 to Freedom in their Internal Affairs  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
As it has been discussed in Chapter 4, the right of religious or belief communities to 
freedom in their internal affairs can be an expansive right depending on the dogma and 
traditions of individual religions or beliefs.  Accordingly, here, the purpose is not to 
present an exhaustive review of issues that may be raised while considering freedom in 
the internal affairs. This would indeed be an impossible task because of the potentially 
countless forms of manfestations in worship, teaching, practice and observance that 
are also matters of internal affairs.969 Instead, the focus will be on four key rights that 
raise issues pertaining to the protection of freedom in the internal affairs in Turkey; the 
right to establish places of worship, the right to teach religion or belief in places 
suitable for this purpose, the right to elect and appoint leaders and finally the right to 
observe days of rest and holidays. Deliberation on these components of the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief will provide a comprehensive review of the 
extent of protection conferred to the freedom in the internal affairs of belief groups in 
Turkey. The discussion and analysis will be based primarily on the consideration of 
applicable national legislation. Although this study has sought to include jurisprudence 
in relevant issues, it will be seen that numerous issues that are addressed have not 
become the subject of legal dispute. Therefore, in order to understand the manner in 
which legislation has been applied, and rules of practice when there is no directly 
applicable legislation, I have sought to include administrative pratice and the input of 
belief communities through in-depth interviews.  
  
7.2. Freedom in Internal Affairs 
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7.2.1. The Right to Worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish 
and maintain places for these purposes 
 
 The protection of the right to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or 
belief and to establish and maintain places of worship in Turkey serves as a good illustration of 
the nature of de jure and de facto restrictions in contrast to what appears to be a general 
recognition of the right to freedom to worship. There are 85,413 mosques in Turkey,970 yet 
they may be only administered by the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DIB, the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs; hereafter the Diyanet), which means that a group of Muslims may not establish and 
maintain their own mosque if they wished to remain outside the Diyanet structure. The 
Alevi,971 may establish cultural associations where they assemble for worship, yet these are 
often denied the status of a place of worship based on the Diyanet’s view that “Muslims 
worship in mosques”.972 While relatively newer religious groups, like the Protestants and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, are generally tolerated by public authorities when they assemble and 
worship in premises they consider places of worship, so far very few applications to acquire 
place of worship status have been successful.973 Tolerance implies allowing the existence of 
these worship places as well as the gathering for worship and not pursuing prosecution, 
however, tolerance does not confer any rights. The Latin Catholic community continues to lose 
church property—which has been in its possession over the past centuries—as a result of not 
having legal personality and thus not being able to prove ownership of church property.974 The 
Syriac community is still waiting for its application for a place of worship which it has made in 
2010 for a second church building for their community which has grown in numbers as a result 
of immigration from their traditional homeland in South-East Turkey.975 These are only, some 
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of the indicators of the problems that are encountered in the exercise of the right to establish 
and maintain places of worship in Turkey. As duly noted in the European Union 2012 Progress 
Report on Turkey there is “urgent need to continue vital and substantial reform in the area of 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion”.976 
 
Here we will examine the protection of the right to establish and maintain places of worship in 
the national legal system by looking at three key areas where restrictions appear. These 
restrictions will be assessed in light of international law standards identified in Chapter 4. The 
purpose is to both identify the inconsistencies between Turkish legislation and practice and 
international standards, as well as, to determine, if necessary, how the standard of 
international review may be improved. Following a presentation of generally applicable 
legislation the assessment will look at the following: a) Planning regulations, b) Permission of 
public authority, c) Legal Personality.   
 
Though not explicitly stated, the general protection of the right to worship or assemble in 
connection with religion or belief and to establish and maintain places for these purposes is 
found in Article 24 in the Turkish Constitution: 
 Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. 
 Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do 
 not violate the provisions of Article 14. 
 No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal 
 religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and 
 convictions.
977
 
 
Here the emphasis is on “acts of worship” and “religious services and ceremonies”, in 
addition to an explicit protection against coercion to worship. On the other hand, acts 
inextricably linked to worship, such as establishing and maintaining places of worship are not 
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included. Thus the substantive content of the right to worship is established and shaped 
through legislation and regulations, decisions of public authorities as well as jurisprudence.  
 
There are a number of legislative regulations that are applicable to the establishment and 
maintenance of places of worship. In this context, an important legislative change has been 
introduced by the AK Party Government in 2003 in relation to the harmonization packages for 
the European Union accession pro- cess which opened the way to establish places of worship 
other than mosques.978 Before this date, only mosques and mesjid could be established. 
Through this amendment the word “mosque” in the Law was changed to “place of worship”.979 
While the phrase “place of worship” implies a neutral and broad scope of protection, in 
practice this term has been interpreted narrowly to encompass mosques and mesjid, churches 
and synagogues. As will be briefly explained below, the cem houses, where significant group of 
Alevi community worship, have not been understood by the authorities to be protected under 
Article 9 of the Public Works Law since they have not been recognized as places of worship. 
The implications of this significant change in legislation cannot be emphasized enough for 
religious or belief groups that worship in places of worship other than mosques and mesjid, in 
particular Christians and Jews. For example, in 2002, the places of worship of 23 congregations 
of Turkish Christians were declared to be in violation of municipal building laws and were 
notified that these would be shut down if worship acts continued in these premises.980 
 
Practice and outcomes, however, demonstrate that the right to establish places of worship 
fails to be effectively protected in Turkey. The legislative change brought by reforms to 
harmonize Turkish legislation with EU standards in the field of freedom of religion or belief has 
not been supported by facilitative regulations, interpretation and practice. Since the legislative 
change of 2003, less than a handful of non-Muslim places of worship—churches and 
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synagogues—have gained place of worship status,981 and cem houses continue to be denied 
the recognition of place of worship.982 
 
Nevertheless, in practice, religious or belief groups continue to assemble and worship in 
premises that are not legally recognised as places of worship. While assembly for worship in 
these premises is not generally interfered with by public authorities, it is important to note 
there are, financial, legal and social consequences of non-recognition. Financially, recognized 
places of worship enjoy exemptions from certain taxes, for instance, property tax, electricity 
and water tax. Belief communities whose buildings do not have a legal place of worship status 
cannot benefit from these exemptions, and thus have to deal with increased financial burdens. 
In addition, legal and social recognition is highly important as it confers certain legitimacy and 
acceptance to religious or belief groups both in the eyes of the public authorities and society in 
general. This is particularly important for groups that may be new and/or that are seen as 
marginal. Not having the legal status of worship place, believers who assemble in their place of 
worship run the risk of interference by public authorities for worship in premises that are not 
recognized by public authorities as places of worship. More fundamentally, however, the 
persistent denial of granting of place of worship status—despite formal equality and general 
protection of freedom of religion or belief- undermines justice and continues to nurture the 
deeply entrenched inequalities. This gives rise to violations of the right to manifest religion or 
belief in worship and  
discrimination. Therefore the importance of changing the paradigm in which this right is 
exercised—from tolerance to respect, fulfil and promote the right to freedom of religion or 
belief—cannot be overemphasized.983 
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a) Suitability of Planning Regulations 
 For a long time local   planning   regulations   have constituted an important and 
common constraining factor on the right to establish and maintain places of worship. 
Authorization and permission for places of worship constitute a key sphere where decisions of 
public authorities lead to serious constraints. The right to establish places of worship is partly 
regulated by the Zoning Law (ZL) which stipulates that:   
 In the development of zoning plans, the required places of worship shall be designated, taking into 
 account the conditions of the planned districts and regions and their future needs. Provided that the 
 permission of the highest civilian administrator is obtained and the zoning legislation is respected, 
 places of worship can be built in the provinces, sub-provinces and towns. Places for worship cannot 
 be allocated for other purposes in violation of the zoning legislation.
984
  
 
In the process of city planning, municipalities “plan for worship places”.985 Non-Muslim 
minorities who have applied to municipalities for designation of places of worship report that 
municipalities tend to designate in the city plans only mosques and are told that there is no 
designated place for a church for Christians or meeting hall for Jehovah’s Witnesses.986 
Outcomes are consistent with this claim; none of the 22 worship halls of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses are recognized as places of worship and in response to the application by the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses for each to relevant municipalities they received responses saying that 
“there is no religious premises designated in our city plan other than the existing mosques”.987 
Protestants have similar experiences; in response to more than 10 applications, only one of 
the church communities had success to gain place of worship status for the church building 
they have been using.988 The experiences of Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses are 
important indicators of the state of the right to establish places of worship in Turkey because 
these groups are relatively new and in need of acquiring new places of worship. Since 
municipalities do not take into account the needs of these communities in city planning the 
communities are left with premises which they use for worship purposes but seem unable to 
gain place of worship status. Were the municipalities take into account the needs or requests 
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of the people in their areas that worship in places other than mosques, they could designate 
suitable places and the problem could be easily resolved. The reasons underlying this practice 
must be the subject of further study. 
 
In addition to zoning plans, until 2013, local municipalities have drafted regulations which lay 
down the standards pertaining to structure and construction that are required of places of 
worship. It should be remembered that these regulations were relevant only for worship 
places other than mosques since the latter must be built in conformity with the standards 
determined by the Diyanet.989 The Regulations outlined fairly strict standards which did not 
seem to take into account the diverse nature, needs and financial capabilities of 
religious/belief groups. For example, according to the Izmir Greater City Municipality 
Regulation, a place of worship, in a new planning sector, could not be built on a zoning parcel 
that is smaller than 2500 metre square.990 The suitability of standards pertaining to the 
structure of the places of worship and the nature and needs and indeed the dogma of belief 
groups pertaining to their places of worship is also relevant for the effective protection of this 
right.  Often belief communities are small in number and they neither need such a large 
premise nor do they have the financial resources needed for buying such sizeable land.991 The 
Jehovah’s Witnesses observe that the criteria established by the municipalities are designed 
for mosques and are not suitable for their meeting halls.992 
Again, until 2013, there was no guideline as to the nature of the criteria for a place of worship 
in an area of the city which has not been newly opened for development. This meant that 
when a religious/belief group seeks to establish a new place of worship in an already 
developed area there was no standard which these communities could base their  application 
                                                        
989
 Izmir Greater City Municipality Public Works Regulation, Article 84, revised on 12 April 2013, accessi- 
ble in Turkish at 
https://www.izmir.bel.tr/YuklenenDosyalar/Dokumanlar/23.12.2013%2015_23_45_201304291521_58.p
df , accessed 16.01.2015.  See also the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur following his Turkey visit 
A/55/280/Add.1, para. 160 (country visit to Turkey): 
"160. The following recommendations are made to the Turkish authorities with respect to the Christian, 
Greek Orthodox and Armenian minorities: [...] (d) The Government should guarantee minorities the right 
to establish and maintain their own places of worship, and should allow them to build such facilities in 
places where new communities have taken root. Any limitations in this respect, for example urban 
development regulations, should be consistent with international jurisprudence (see General Comment 
of the Human Rights Committee), and this means that any non- conforming regulations should be 
repealed or revised." 
990
 Ibid. 
991
 Supra note 18, interview with Umut Şahin.  
992
 Supra note 18, interview with Ahmet Yorulmaz. 
269
process and which public authorities could refer to when they processed such applications. In 
the absence of any guidelines, it is difficult to ensure due process and avoid arbitrary 
decisions.  
 
The experience of the Protestant community in Turkey is a vivid illustration of the power 
relations that seem to take over the process and compromising a clearly defined due process. 
In a typical application process members of the community apply to the municipality for either 
the recognition of their existing premises as a place of worship, where that is not possible, a 
request is made to the municipality to request to be shown a place where a place of worship 
may be built.993 A typical response stipulates that the existing premises do not comply with the 
Regulation- in the absence of criteria for already developed areas- and there is no available 
plot which may be used for the construction of a new place of worship other than mosque.994 
The procedural complexities, including vagueness, compels the applicants to always rely on 
the good-will of the public authorities, thus strengthening the status of public authorities in 
this power relation vis a vis the religious group. The explanation given by a Protestant for 
unsuccessful applications is typical and reflects the multi-dimensional nature of the problem:  
 Local administrations, and in particular municipal governments, concerned with losing votes because 
 people see them as involved in opening churches or letting churches be opened, respond negatively 
 to requests for places of worship. This behaviour reveals the depth of the problem and the need for a 
 multi-pronged solution.
995
 
 
A report published by the Association of Protestant Churches in 2010 underlines that 
local municipalities have occasionally sought the opinion of the Diyanet in the process of 
dealing with their applications for a place of worship.996 It is not clear how systematically 
public authorities include the Diyanet in processes dealing with applications for places of 
worship other than mosques and mesjid. It is difficult to see the purpose and the legal basis for 
consulting the Diyanet. Notwithstanding the fact that the opinions of the Diyanet do not have 
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a binding nature, the inclusion of a certain religious authority or institution in the decision 
making process of a public authority raises serious questions, not least in regards with the 
principle of neutrality. When such decision pertains to a religious/belief  community that is not 
affiliated with that particular religious authority or religious institution that is consulted the 
incompatibility with international law becomes more obvious. 997 
 
The continued failure of the process of establishing places of worship other than mosques, the 
absence of a due process in line with the required respect and fulfilment of obligations ensuing 
from freedom of religion or belief leaves minority religious communities without power and 
vulnerable. As a result, communities remain in their premises- without a place of worship 
status- where the group of believers are only tolerated to continue to worship and assemble. 
Clearly, such a situation stands in contrast with one where a group of believers – empowered 
as right holders- follow clear and appropriate guidelines and a due process which they can 
foresee and that, if followed, will lead to a positive outcome. While these groups are most of 
the time tolerated, without a place of worship status the risk of interference is ever present. 
Closure of premises and court cases are not non-existent. Numerous cases are ongoing as a 
result of closure by public authorities of premises used for worship purposes, churches and 
meeting halls, without place of worship status.998 For one such case of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, domestic remedies have been exhausted and two applications have been made to 
the ECtHR.999 
 
The municipal regulations pertaining to places of worship have been deserted together with 
the relevant provision of two regulations published by the Ministry of Environment and 
Urbanization.1000 Accordingly the only rules pertaining to the construction of places of worship 
other than mosques do not deal with the size of the plot of land or the structure of the 
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building. This arrangement is valid as of 2013 therefore there are is no information about its 
application. 
 
b) The Approval of the Public Authority 
 Under the Zoning Law in order to acquire a place of worship status the “approval of the 
highest civilian administrator” is also necessary.1001 The criteria taken into account in the 
assessment of applications for approval are, however, not explicitly stipulated. Therefore, 
religious or belief groups applying to the relevant public authorities do not have access to clear 
and foreseeable criteria according to which they can make their application or which they can 
challenge through legal remedies. 
 
The court cases concerning the approval of places of worship are scarce in number. Since most 
applications of Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses to the municipalities for the designation 
of places of worship have not been accommodated, these applications did not come to the 
stage of being considered by the “highest civilian public authority”.1002 It has been reported 
that two applications, Diyarbakır Protestant Church and Van Protestant Church, are pending 
with the respective public authority.1003 These have not yet been subject to any court 
proceedings. 
 
The court cases concerning places of worship and the approval of public authorities have so far 
been related to Alevi worship places, cem houses, where the relevant Governorships have 
denied approval.1004 Two reasons stand out for the rejection of applications for the recognition 
of cem houses by civilian authorities; the Diyanet opinion and the Law No. 677 concerning the 
closure of tekke and zaviye. 
 
A Communication (No. 1773), sent by the Diyanet to the Interior Ministry on 17 December 
2004, states that:  
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 İmar Kanunu (Public Works Law), supra note 10. 
1002
 In practice, as noted above, there have been two successful applications for designation of places of 
worship. These obtained both designation of place of worship by the respective municipalities and the 
approval of relevant public authorities. 
1003
 E-mail correspondence with the representative of the Association of Protestant Churches on 23 July 
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 See for example the case of the Çankaya Cemevi Yaptırma Derneği below. 
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 It is not possible to consider cemevi and other places as places of worship because Alevism, which is a 
 sub-group within Islam, cannot have a place of worship other than mosques or mesjid that are 
 common places of worship within Islam.
1005
 
 
 The Alevi highly criticize the Diyanet for issuing an Opinion on Alevism and the public 
authorities for taking this Opinion into account in their decisions concerning the Alevi.1006 
 
The second objection centres on the Law on the Obstruction of Dervish Lodges (Tekke) and 
Shrines (Türbe) and the Prohibition of Abolition of the Position of Caretakers of Shrines and 
Certain Titles (hereafter “Law No. 677”) which has been the basis for the nationwide closure of 
the tekke,1007 in 1925.1008 It is helpful, here to briefly consider this law in order to help the 
outside observer to understand the sensitivity around this law as well as its function. The Law 
No. 677 has a special legal status; according to the Turkish Constitution, since it is part of the 
reform laws that aim to protect secularism, it cannot be amended and cannot be understood 
to be contrary to the Constitution.1009 The justification for the law states that firstly, there is a 
contradiction between the fundamental understanding of the state and the tekke and 
secondly that the Turkish Republic, which is on the route to becoming a stable state, cannot 
tolerate these kind of “medieval incidents and institutions”.1010 Article 1 of Law No. 677 
declares the closure of all tekke and zaviye and türbe which have been traditional places of 
worship or centres of religious activity for various Islamic traditions, including the Alevi 
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 A Communication (No. 1773), sent by the Diyanet to the Interior Ministry on 17 December 2004. For 
example, an application for the opening a cem house at the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, TBMM) where there is currently only mesjid found, the Presidency of the TBMM 
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Talebine Ret” [Refusal to Cemevi Request at the Assembly], Milliyet, 09.07.2012.   
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 See for example, EnSonHaberler, “Çamuroğlu: Diyanet Alevilik Üzerinden Fetva Veremez”, 
12.07.2012, http://www.ensonhaber.com/camuroglu-diyanet-alevilik-uzerine-fetva-veremez-2012-07-
12.html , accessed 16.01.2015. 
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 Tekke are places where sufi thought, understanding and discipline are studied, deepened and pre- 
sented to the people. Mustafa Kara, Din Hayat Sanat Açısından Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler [Dervish Lodges 
from the Perspective of Religion, Life, Art], (İstanbul: Dergah Publications, 1999), p. 43. 
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 Tekke ve Zaviyeler ile Türbelerin Seddine ve Türbedarlar ile Bazı Unvanların Men ve İlgasına Dair 
Kanun [Law on the Closure of the Dervish Lodges and Shrines] Law No. 677, 30 November 1925. 
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 Article 174 of the Turkish Constitution. 
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 The resurgence in the Eastern part of Turkey led by Sheikh Said, seemingly, against the secular 
reforms seems to have played a major role in the decision for the closure of the tekke.  Kara, supra note 
38, p. 267. The author is quoting from a book written by a foreign observer, “The great secularization 
reforms of the 1924 related to the ulema and not the dervish. It became clear however that the most 
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who were used to utilize state authority for a long time were not inclined to rise up against the state. The 
dervish on the other hand were used to independence and resistance. They took advantage of the 
people’s trust and loyalty.” 
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tradition.1011 The law is not a neutral law in the sense of closing places of worship generally; 
instead it names the kinds of places of worship it abolishes.1012 
 
The Law No 677 has been, at times, critical in relation to the non-recognition of cem houses as 
places of worship. In a case related to the construction of a cem house the Çankaya Cemevi 
Yaptırma Derneği (Cankaya Cem House Building Association, hereafter ÇCYD) has been 
prosecuted for describing the cem house as a place of worship in its statutes. Following the 
refusal by the ÇCYD of the request from the Interior Ministry to remove the references to cem 
house as a place of worship from its stature,1013 the Governorship initiated a court case via the 
Ankara Prosecutor's Office to close the CCBA down.1014   The first instance court relied on 
Article 9 of the ECHR and held that the right to freedom of religion or belief includes the right 
to establish places of worship. The first instance court did not consider the cem houses as 
tekke or zaviye—which cannot be opened according to Law No. 677.1015  The explanation for 
this was that the tekke and zaviye were places which housed the sheik or dervish and that the 
cem houses do not have such a function.1016  It, however, held the rituals in the cem houses 
may indeed be prohibited by Law No. 677, but these needed to be assessed in light of 
contemporary legal regulations. The first instance court held that according to Article 9 of the 
ECHR and taking into account the principle of secularism in the Turkish Constitution the state 
cannot determine what constitutes “worship or a place of worship” and found that the 
establishment of cem houses are not contrary to the ECHR or the Turkish Civil Code,1017 and 
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 The Memoirs of Hamdullah Suphi, a member of Parliament who openly opposed the closure of the 
turbe, testify that Mustafa Kemal viewed the closure of türbe (religious shrines) as the elimination of a 
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the Law on Associations.1018 In conclusion, there was no need to dissolve the association 
because of the reference to cem house as a place of worship in its statute. 
 
In contrast, the Yargıtay (Court of Appeals) overturned the decision of the first instance court 
and referred to the Law No. 677 saying that it closes tekke and zaviye, however, allows the 
existence of mosques and mesjid.1019 It is important to note that the Law No. 677 does not 
refer to cem houses. The Court of Appeals also recalled the status of Law No. 677 and has said 
that none of its provisions may be interpreted in a way as to be incompatible with the 
provisions of the Constitution.1020  It went on arguing that the Law No. 677 excludes the 
establishment of any Islamic place of worship other than mosque or mesjid.1021 Interestingly, 
the reasoning does not consider whether the cem house is equivalent to tekke or zaviye, 
instead, proceeds with the assumption that Law No. 677 only allows mosques and mesjids. 
 
The reasoning also recalls that the Diyanet is tasked with the management of places of 
worship and that these may be opened with the permission of the Diyanet.1022 Thus it infers 
from this permission to operate mosques and mesjid that no Islamic place of worship other 
than these may be lawful. Therefore based on the reference to an ‘unlawful’ place of worship 
in the association’s statute the Court of Appeals concludes that the statute of the association 
is contrary to law and therefore necessitates the dissolution of the association by a court 
decision.1023 
 
Interestingly, while numerous previous administrative or judicial decisions relied on the 
Diyanet opinion, in this reasoning the Court of Appeals does not refer to the Diyanet opinion 
which states that Muslims worship in mosques.1024 The reason for this may be to strive for a 
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reasoning that is based on legislation instead of a theological opinion, thus, perhaps, taking 
into account public criticism generated by taking into account opinion of the Diyanet in the 
decisions of public authorities. 
 
There are significant flaws in the reasoning by the Court of Appeals. It did not consider the 
question of whether cem houses and tekke and zaviye are identical or not. If they had 
concluded that cem houses are identical to tekke for example, it should not be possible to 
allow the existence of cem houses without amending Law No. 677. Instead, it is concluded that 
only “mosques and mesjid” are allowed and this is based on the reference in Law No. 677 to 
allowing mosques and mesjid to remain where tekke and zaviye are used for these purposes. 
In addition, the Diyanet is given the mandate to operate only mosques and mesjid. Since cem 
houses are not considered as tekke these are not prohibited as such. This is also evident in the 
fact that there are hundreds of cem houses operating in the country and they are not closed or 
considered illegal.1025 Thus their existence is not contrary to law. The fact that the Diyanet is 
given the task to administer mosques and mesjid does not necessarily mean that no other 
Islamic places of worship are allowed to exist. In fact, it would mean that if there are Islamic 
places of worship other than mosques or mesjid, the Diyanet does not have a mandate to 
operate them. Therefore the decision of the HCA that regards the reference to cem house as a 
place of worship in the association’s statute as unlawful cannot be prescribed by law. 
 
The reasoning of the HCA does not include any reference to the right to freedom of religion or 
belief, not does it consider the consequences (proportionality) of the denial of the recognition 
of the cem houses as places of worship for the association or the Alevi community. 
 
Paradoxically, despite the strong refusal to grant place of worship status to cem houses, 
according to the Office of the Prime Minister there are 598 cem houses is Turkey.1026 None of 
them has a place of worship status. This results in the impossibility for members of the Alevi 
community to avail themselves of the benefits granted to places of worship, as well as denying 
these Alevi houses of worship the social status and prestige other places of worship enjoy. 
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 See below. 
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 Response of the Office of the Prime Minister to a communication of Member of Parliament Doc. No. 
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July 2012, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21077587.asp , accessed 16.01.2015. 
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Socially, having a legally-recognised place of worship gives a religious community a high social 
standing and helps their followers not to be marginalised. The importance of the latter is 
increased in light of widespread intolerance in the Turkish society towards members of other 
religions.1027 
 
Mosques and mesjid are subject to a different regulation based on the requirements of the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs.1028 Mosques must be opened with the permission of the 
Diyanet and are administered by the Diyanet.1029 In 1998, following political developments of 
‘28 February’,1030 an amendment was made to the Law on the Diyanet to the effect that the 
administration of any mosque built by real or legal persons, opened for worship whether with 
or without permission, must be transferred to the Diyanet.1031 Thus mosques built by private 
citizens were nationalized according to a report by the Mazlum-Der.1032 Indeed the Cadastral 
Law stipulates that buildings that are used for public service will be registered under the name 
of public institutions and mosques and cemeteries are listed as building used to provide 
“public services”.1033 Names of other places of worship, such as churches, synagogues or cem 
houses are not mentioned. 
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The perspective of viewing certain manifestations of religion or belief solely as enjoyable 
through public religious services certainly raises questions when assessing compatibility of 
national legislation in the light of international standards. The practical outcome of this 
perspective and ensuing legislative arrangement is that it is not possible to establish a mosque 
and appoint religious personnel outside of the Diyanet structure. Members of religious 
communities may collect funds toward the construction of mosques and have them built but 
they cannot own them even through associations. Such regulation singles out the Diyanet as 
the sole subject of the exercise of the right to establish places of worship and appoint religious 
leaders in the context of Sunni-Muslim practice. While there may be demands to establish and 
maintain mosques outside of the Diyanet structure these demands have not, yet, been subject 
of court cases, instead, negotiations with political leaders, seeking factual changes have been 
the processes of engagement by religious minorities. 
 
c) Acquisition of Legal Personality 
 Apart from the status of the premises as a place of worship, the question of the linkage 
between legal personality of a belief community and ownership of a place of worship also 
becomes an important factor for the protection of the right to establish and maintain places of 
worship. The fact that in Turkey no belief community may acquire legal personality, as 
such,1034 negatively affects the enjoyment of and, creates a gap, in the effective protection of 
the right to establish and maintain places of worship in Turkey. Groups of believers cannot 
own a place of worship as a composite body through an adequate form of legal personality. 
The association and foundation formulas,1035 only create an indirect form of legal entity status 
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which is substantially different than the community as such, having direct ownership that 
bears a resemblance to the ownership of an individual or a corporation. The far-reaching 
supervision involved in the foundation and association formulas may also place the places of 
worship at risk as changes in legislation and/ or practice may create conditions that allow the 
state to confiscate the buildings or exercise control over repairs etc.1036 The strategic 
importance of legal personality in the process pertaining to the establishment, maintenance 
and ownership of places of worship illustrates the nature of vulnerability of belief communities 
that is created by the denial of legal personality to them. An appalling example is the Latin 
Catholic Church in Turkey; lacking legal personality of any kind,1037 the community can neither 
own property, nor seek judicial review of cases where it has lost possession of property as a 
result of not having legal personality. The Latin Catholic community has not sought legal 
remedies and instead seeks to find a political solution to the problem through negotiations 
between Turkish authorities and the Holy See.1038 
 
Legally speaking, gathering for worship in a building that is not legally recognised as such, or 
calling it a cem house, church or a similar name may result in prosecution. A number of 
churches lacking status as place of worship, but with legal associations, have been formally 
warned by local police that worship in their buildings is unlawful.1039 The reason given is that 
the buildings are not legally recognised as places of worship and therefore they cannot be 
used for worship purposes. The Government has also shown good-will toward the so-called 
Lausanne minorities allowing them to assemble for worship in churches that have historic 
significance for them, such as the Ahtamar Church in Van for the Armenian Apostolic 
community,1040 and the Sumela Monastery for the Greek Orthodox community.1041 While 
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these may be considered as gestures of a certain tolerance toward assemblies for worship and 
non-Muslim minorities, it is important to remember that these actions do not go as far as 
conferring rights and fall short of solving the problems concerning the right to establish places 
of worship. 
 
As outlined above in Turkey there is indeed a general recognition of the right to assemble for 
worship and establish and maintain places of worship in the Constitution and it is regulated 
through applicable legislation. Processes pertaining to building places of worship and acquiring 
place of worship status ostensibly appear neutral; however, as the input from minority 
religious groups demonstrates the process does not appear to be designed for worship places 
other than mosques in mind. This is also evident in the outcomes: the number of successful 
applications for place of worship status—other than mosques—is scarce. It is difficult to see 
the justification for this practice. It is clear that the consequences of the process, including 
planning regulations and authorization from public authorities for belief groups, the right to 
establish places of worship and acquire legal status as such, is interfered with or risks being 
interfered with and financial and social benefits ensuing the recognition of a place of worship 
are denied. The results of these restrictions—the non-recognition as a place of worship—are 
numerous; inter alia, the risk of interference and inability to benefit from benefits flowing 
from the recognition as a place of worship. This leads to the result that what should be a 
routine procedure, recognition of place of worship, seems nearly impossible to obtain. Such 
restrictions and refusals, rather, must be exceptional, must be justified, and proportionate and 
necessary in a democratic society. 
  
In conclusion, it follows from the above account that the right to establish and maintain places 
of worship is restricted in a number of ways which, often, cumulatively create obstacles before 
the effective enjoyment of this right. It is in the processes involving the municipalities and the 
governorship where this right is denied. The fixed and burdensome planning regulations 
drafted by municipalities are, more often than not, suitable to the nature and demands of 
belief groups in Turkey. In the face of rigid planning regulations freedom of religion or belief 
and the proportionality of the effect of the denial on belief communities is not considered. The 
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process involving the approval of the Governorships lacks transparency and foreseeable 
criteria. The rejection of the Alevi cem houses as place of worship by the public authorities, 
Governorships, involves an assessment of the legitimacy of a place of worship. The Turkish 
courts have not, so far, been able to agree on jurisprudence which upholds the view that the 
right to freedom of religion or belief excludes any assessment by the state of the legitimacy of 
religious beliefs.86 The fundamental problem of lack of legal personality demonstrates the 
inter- dependency of the various components of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Not 
having legal personality, religious communities cannot enjoy the right to own property and 
seek judicial protection. 
 
The importance of clear, foreseeable and adequate and suitable procedures as well as 
facilitative administrative processes is clearly illustrated in the Turkish case; indeed it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the right to establish places of worship is a ‘trapped right’. The 
Turkish case also shows that international compliance control mechanisms need to exercise 
strict scrutiny when assessing restrictions on the right to establish places of worship. The wide 
margin or appreciation given to states and the accommodation of the planning regulations will 
not contribute to upholding the right to establish places of worship domestically in accordance 
with international human rights law. Thus, subtle forms of discrimination will remain veiled. It 
is the task of review mechanisms to unveil the less obvious ways of discrimination such as 
through ostensibly neutral planning regulations and city plans. 
  
7.2.5. To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes 
 
 As it has been discussed in Chapter 4 the right to manifest religion or belief in 
teaching and more specifically the right “to teach” religion or belief “in places suitable” 
for these purposes is an important component of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief. Though both individuals as well as collectivities exercise this right, it is important 
to note that for the religious or belief group this right plays a key role in the 
preservation, development and transmission of religious dogma, tradition and identity. 
Manifestation in teaching may take diverse forms, inter alia, the right to teach one’s 
own group about the fundamentals of the faith, the right to teach others about one’s 
faith with a view to proselytise, to teach with the purpose of training clergy, to open 
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schools as well as extending to engage in acts necessary to fulfil the aforementioned 
acts such as establishing schools for religious instruction and publishing and 
disseminating relevant materials. Here the assessment will be restricted to the 
protection of this right as it is manifested in teaching for the purpose of educating 
one’s congregation and formal teaching aimed at training religious personnel since 
these two forms are crucial for the protection of the collective identity of a religious or 
belief group.   
 
Currently, teaching of religion in Turkey is a highly regulated and,  a significantly 
restricted affair and results indicate serious inequalities in the accessibility of this right 
for diverse religious/belief communities. There is no legislative framework for 
establishing schools by religious/belief communities with the purpose of educating 
their followers in their religion or belief. Similarly, schools or seminaries may not be 
established to train of religious personnel. As a result, no faith based school may be 
established by any religious/belief community.  Bearing in mind these limitations, the 
state’s involvement in teaching religion, solely Islamic and based on the Hanefi 
tradition, presents a striking contrast. National education curricula which must be 
adhered by all schools, instates, in practice, compulsory Islamic religious instruction 
through the Religious Culture and Ethics lessons. Programs of public theological 
faculties are designed to teach only Islam and as far as training of religious personnel is 
concerned only accomodate the needs of the Sunni-Muslim community. While the 
Sunni-Muslim community has the possibility of benefiting from state funded and 
provided religious instruction services, still, they cannot exercise the right to manifest 
religion or belief by actively establishing schools or providing formal education to their 
followers or train religious personnel. Muslim minorities within the majority Muslim 
population and non-Muslim communities are not able to train religious personnel and 
teach their followers their religion or belief freely, neither does the state provide any 
religious training services aimed at meeting the needs of these communities. 
 
It is useful to note and underscore the following concerning the meanings attributed to 
“religion”, “theology” and “Islam” in the context of relevant national legal instruments. 
References in the Turkish Constitution and legislation pertaining to education to “religion” 
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usually are taken to mean Islam by public authorities,  and Islam is understood in accordance 
with the teachings on “true Islam” of the Diyanet.1042  Theological education and theology 
faculties in universities categorically deal with “Islamic theology”. While it is not possible to go 
into depth about the use of these terms and their implications for the protection of freedom 
of religion or belief, it is important to know that references to these terms in legislation do not 
necessarily comprise neutral meanings- such as “religion” referring to all religions or 
“theology” referring to theology of all religions- and that there is a need to establish what 
meaning is attributed to each term.     
 
Legislation pertaining to the Turkish national education system and its implications to 
the right to manifest religion or belief in teaching can not be adequately understood 
without highlighting the emergence of this system as a reaction to the fragmented and 
religiously based/influenced education system of the Ottoman Empire. Historically, 
teaching of religion and training of religious personnel had been viewed as an activity 
carried out within the realm of religious communities. Together with the numerous 
reforms following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the fragmented old 
education system was abolished and a new unified national education system was 
created through the Law No. 430 on the Unification of Education in 1924 which also 
had the purpose of redefining the role of religion in education.1043 The Law on the 
Unification of Education enjoys special protection as a Reform Law and it cannot be 
interpreted in a way where it is deemed unconstitutional.1044 Consequently, the 
Madrasah, that had been the religious schools of the Ottoman era, were abolished and 
in the sphere of religious education, the new law foresaw the establishment of 
vocational theological schools and theology faculties in universities.1045    
 
Not surprisingly, policies on religious instruction have been and continue to be, important 
means of shaping society for all political parties. Between the years 1927-1949, no religious 
instruction was permitted in schools and only in 1949 the Ministry of Education allowed a 
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course on religion in 4th and 5th grades of primary school.1046 The course was optional, 
depending upon a written request from parents, and it was taught outside the regular school 
hours. Together with the passage to multi-party democracy, a new government (the Demokrat 
Parti) was established in 1956 and the openness of this party led to the introduction of a 
religion course into secondary schools, with the possibility of exemptions.1047 Finally, following 
the military coup in 1980, the “Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics” course became 
obligatory for all secondary level schools thus constitutionally securing the status of the 
religion course in all school public and private.1048 The restrictions on the right to manifest 
religion or belief in teaching are inevitably and intricately linked to the contextual state-
religion relations reflected in the national education policy with its unique goals and 
sensitivities. The latter has been inadequately guided by human rights obligations.  The 
account above only begins to demonstrate the various political considerations affecting the 
nature and extent of protection of the right to manifest religion or belief in teaching.  
 
Turkish Civil Code grants the right to “determine the religious education of the child” to the 
mother and father.1049 Moreover, any contract that would restrict the rights of the mother and 
father in this respect is considered null and void.1050 “Determine”, however, does not 
necessarily amount to the right to raise children in line with one’s religious or philosophical 
beliefs. Indeed, Turkey has placed a reservation to Article 2 of Protocol I of the ECHR which 
protects the right to education and recognizes that states will respect the right of parents and 
legal guardians to raise their children in line with their religious or philosophical 
convictions.1051 Turkey’s reservation states that Article 2 of the Protocol of the European 
Convention shall not violate the provisions of Law No. 430 on the Unification of Education.1052 
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Under the general framework of the secular education system, teaching of religion or 
belief in Turkey may be carried out only under state supervision according to the 
Turkish Constitution.1053   There is no legal framework for the formal teaching of 
religion or belief outside of state supervision. There exists no school that would provide 
a formal degree, similar to, for example, the public vocational theological schools or 
theology faculties where instruction is based on Islam as interpreted by state 
institutions. State holds monopoly over religious education in primary, middle and high 
schools. Under the Law on Private Educational Institutions “education institutions 
identical or similar to one’s that provide religious education cannot be opened”.1054 
Hence, the practice has been that religious/belief groups teach their religion or belief, 
inter alia, in their places of worship, receive formal education outside the country or 
establish associations or foundations for the purpose of research and teaching through 
which teaching may be possible. Yet, these cannot provide degrees comparable to 
those provided in schools within the Ministry of Education system.  
 
Thus, for individuals or groups who cannot or, prefer not to make use of the public religious 
training or instruction opportunities, the right to manifest religion or belief in teaching 
continues to be a denied right. Non-Muslim groups and non-Sunni Islamic groups and, indeed, 
some Sunni Muslim groups that would wish to provide religious education outside the public 
education system,  suffer the consequences. In an effort to provide for the needs of the 
communities and transmit religious dogma, in particular with respect to children and youth, 
religious instruction, often, takes place in the communities’ places of worship, albeit without 
formal accreditation. The view that “beyond the official school system, there is no restriction 
on private religious instruction”,1055 may fail to represent the factual situation. The 
constitutional provision stating that “other religious instruction may be carried out under state 
supervision” may be interpreted in a narrow fashion to mean that “other formal religious 
instruction” or broadly to mean “any other religious instruction”. There have been cases 
where it has been broadly interpreted. For example, in 2002 Protestant congregations were 
served notifications that “religious instruction could only be carried out under state 
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supervision”.1056 The nature of the acts of teaching religion by these congregations was to 
teach their own congregants and those who are interested visiting their churches, which did 
not have a legal place of worship status. The, less than certain and clear, respect for the right 
to teach one’s religion to one’s members results in fear of religious communities that such 
teaching may be interfered with by the public authorities.1057 This adds to the vulnerability of 
religious/belief communities. In order to avoid conflict, there are cases where summer camps 
or courses that in reality aim to teach children about religion are named “vacation camps” or 
“clubs” in order avoid potential problems.1058 
 
In fact, the existing arrangement “leads” individuals or groups to be the recipients of the public 
services pertaining to teaching of religion. Compulsory Religious Culture and Knowledge of 
Ethics classes are available for all however, would only benefit certain groups of Muslims and 
indeed interfere in the right to have a religion or belief of many students and the right of 
parents to raise their children in line with their religious or philosophical beliefs.1059 Middle 
and high school education with Islamic emphasis is available for Muslims,1060 optional lessons 
on the Quran and the Life of the Prophet Mohammed have become available in public school 
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in 2012-2013 school year.1061 It is important to note here that the public religious instruction in 
schools is criticised for being fundamentally based on Sunni Islam and for excluding, other 
Islamic traditions, inter alia, the Alevi tradition.1062 Religion classes are available at the so-
called officially recognized Lausanne non-Muslim minority  schools under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Education.1063        
  
Quran courses are available outside of school curricula only through programs administered by 
the Presidency of Religious Affairs.1064 This arrangement also contains numerous restrictions. 
Apart from the Presidency of Religious Affairs, no real or legal persons, including foundations 
and associations may open such courses.1065 Some Sunni Muslims also often complain that two 
hours per week cannot be enough to meet the “need for religion”.1066 It is reported that the 
age limit for taking part in the Quran courses constitutes an interference considering that in 
order to train as hafız (individuals who memorize the Quran).1067 Adults may also apply for 
evening courses on the Quran to be opened.1068 In the course of these courses, all materials 
must be found “appropriate” by the Diyanet.1069 Training on the Quran in mosques is subject 
to the approval of the administrative authority,1070 which is indicative of the powers of the 
public authorities which includes approval of basic religious services.  
  
As noted above, only the Diyanet may organize Quran courses. Numerous associations that 
have opened Quran courses have been sanctioned, where the cases are decided on opening 
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private courses unlawfully.1071 According to Mazlum-Der, an Islamic human rights organization, 
even for the legal dormitories connected to legal Quran courses may be closed “upon rumours 
that actions against Atatürk’s principles and reforms, actions towards dividing the undividable 
unity of the country with its nation, as well as racism” may lead to the closure.1072 In a case 
dealing with a child activity centre where children were taught the Quran, the namaz ritual as 
well as religious songs, the Court of Appeals dealt with the case on the basis of using the 
centre for purposes other than for which it had permission for.1073 The right to freedom of 
religion or belief has not been considered in the judicial assessment. In 2013, these rules were 
relaxed with the annulment of Article 263 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which prescribes 
imprisonment of individuals who open education institutions that are contrary to law and has 
been used as the basis of closing unauthorized Quran courses.1074    
  
In short, the right to teach religion or belief to a religious or belief group’s followers is not 
ensured and highly restricted – arguably a denied rights. When this state of affairs is viewed in 
contrast to the enourmous funding and institutional support to state imposed and supplied 
religious instruction based on the majority’s religious tradition    
 
The inability to train religious personnel remains at the forefront of the various issues raised 
by the obstacles before the right to teach religion or belief. A number of religious 
communities, such as the Caferi, Jewish and some Christian communities, send potential 
candidates for religious instruction abroad. Certain Christian communities, on the other hand, 
have been demanding a solution to the problem of training clergy in formal theological 
schools, including universities, in Turkey. The Armenian Church is anxious to train more priests 
and, in 2006, asked the Ministry of Education to allow the establishment of a state university 
faculty on Christian theology which also includes instruction by the Patriarchate.1075  In the 
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meantime, Armenian Apostolics continue to seek religious training abroad.1076 In an effort, 
perhaps, to solve the problems concerning higher education for Christian religious personnel, 
the Government has been for long considering the possibility of opening a suitable 
department in the existing faculties of theology which teach Islamic theology.  Nevertheless, 
no substantive step or outcome seems to be in sight. The Department of The Cultural Studies 
of World Religions established in 1999 in Istanbul University, proposed as an alternative to the 
Halki Seminary, has been closed in 2011 because the Higher Education Council has failed to 
allocate faculty and student quota.1077  Still, trying to solve this problem through the public 
education system, the Greek Patriarchate insists on the re-opening of the Halki seminary.1078 
As a result of the obstacles before establishing appropriate educational institutions, many 
religious communities must send their candidates for religious teachers or leaders abroad for 
religious training, which has many disadvantages like the financial burden on the communities 
and the reluctance of candidates to return to Turkey after training abroad.1079  
 
As far as, the so-called Lausanne minorities are concerned, as in many other aspects of 
freedom of religion or belief, the right to teach religion, is viewed from the “reciprocity” lens 
by the Government,1080 where formulas are developed by the state in a way to ensure similar 
solutions for the Turkish minority in Greece.1081  For example, throughout the Republic, 
religious communities have been denied the right for formal private teaching based on their 
religious traditions, nevertheless, the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary (vocational middle 
school) continued to train religious personnel until 1971 when it was closed ensuing tensions 
in relations with Greece, thereby significantly undermining rights protected, among others, by 
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the Lausanne Treaty.1082  While the use of the reciprocity principle by Turkey  does not change 
the crux of the issue as a human right, the reciprocity perspective embraced by the state does 
add another dimension that cannot be ignored when seeking corrective action by the Turkish 
state. 
 
As far as teaching of religion in university education is concerned, we will try to explain 
the intricacies of establishing universities and identify the difficulties for religious or 
belief groups   Public and Foundation (non-profit) Universities in Turkey are established 
by the decision of the Council of Ministers and all university education must be carried 
out under state supervision.1083 The Turkish higher education system has a centralized 
structure and all universities are subject the same law and regulations/rules. State and 
private universities must be founded through the adoption of law.1084  Private 
universities are under the supervision of the Council of Higher Education and their 
programs must be regularly accredited. The establishment of new faculties are subject 
to the approval of the content, and that of new departments to the approval of the 
Council of Higher Education.1085  
 
Yet, for example, Islamic religious groups have been able to establish Islamic theology 
faculties through foundation universities where a community would establish a 
foundation which would then establish a university with theological faculty.1086 There 
is, however, no example of a non-Sunni or non-Muslim private university that has a 
theological program formed according to the needs of these groups. Despite the 
absence of a ban on establishing a theological faculty through a foundation university 
the difficulties and complexities of the bureaucratic process and needs in terms of not 
least, the financial,1087 and human resources make it very difficult, if not impossible, for 
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most religious groups to establish private theological faculties.1088 The first private 
theological faculty was established within Fatih University in 2010 with the decision of 
the Council of Ministers.1089 In 2014 the Islamic Research Centre under the 29 Mayıs 
University, owned by the Diyanet Foundation, has applied to establish the first 
International Islamic University.1090 
 
Bearing in mind that the assessment of the protection of a human right  should include 
indications of the outcomes expected as a result of the protection of the right in 
question, the non-existence of any high education institution that provides education 
in minority religions and religious traditions demonstrates that the necessary structural 
and process related foundation is yet to be established. This shortcoming, when viewed 
in contrast to the institutional and financial state support evident in the existence of 
theological faculties established in public universities must have implications for the 
effective protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief in Turkey. Human rights 
law is yet to find a way to address these kind of inequalities. Since adjudication 
generally asks the question “is there an intereference in the right to manifest religion 
or belief?” the state support of certain religions or religious groups, as such, has not 
been usually seen as amounting to interference in the right to freedom of religion or 
belief of other groups.  
 
Teaching of religion or belief is a fundamental component of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion or belief. It is expressed explicitly in the core international religious 
freedom provisions. Everyone has the right to manifest religion or belief, alone or in 
community with others in worship, teaching, observance or practice.1091 As noted earlier, 
Turkish Constitution does not explicitly protect the right to manifest one’s religion or belief in 
teaching.1092 Instead, it regulates education and instruction in religion and makes it strictly 
subject to state supervision and control: 
 Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and 
 control.  Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of 
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 primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the 
 individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.
1093
 
 
“Other religious instruction” that is under state supervision and control is restricted to 
formal schooling in the Hanafi Islamic tradition only. Formal religious teaching and training is 
provided in the theological faculties solely based on the Hanefi Islamic tradition. There is no 
theological or other faculty that teaches other Islamic tradition or non-Islamic beliefs. In 
middle and high school level, there are the state-run Imam Hatip schools, which are vocational 
schools for raising imams and hatips,1094 again, these provide teaching based on the Hanafi 
Islamic tradition. At the middle school level, it is not possible to establish formal schools that 
provide other religious instruction or training.  
  
The lack of an adequate legal framework which would allow religious communities to establish 
schools, both to teach their followers and to train religious personnel, makes the right to 
manifest religion or belief in teaching highly ineffective in Turkey. The failure to solve this 
problem has a direct consequence on the inability to preserve their identity and community as 
well because their efficiency in transmitting their dogma and traditions to new generations 
and their efficiency in training religious leaders and teachers is weakened. Their situation is 
further weakened because of the enormous state financial and institutional funding provided 
for the state trained religious personnel- following the Hanafi Islamic tradition.     
 
The lack of a provision in Turkish legislation for the training of religious leaders leaves 
religious/belief groups to improvise solutions for their communities. The Caferi, who 
are close to the Shia tradition of Islam, send their clergy to Iran and Irak for theological 
education in Shia Islam.1095  Some of the clergy have received adequate education and 
training to teach others, however, it is not possible for them to establish a school, 
therefore all training must be in the mosque, where one cannot receive a degree, 
and/or outside of the country. Some religious communities have established 
associations with the purpose of research and education of their religion, often training 
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here takes place through seminars.1096 None of these institutions may provide formal 
degrees comparable to offered by the state institutions. 
 
7.2.7. To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called by 
the requirements and standards of any religion or belief 
 
While the right to train and the right to appoint religious leaders are inter-
related, not least because they are in many ways dependent on each other, the right to 
train leaders and the right to appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate 
leaders need to be assessed separately since the former is subject to legislation on 
education and the latter is regulated based on other laws and, often, by administrative 
decisions in Turkey.  Here our analysis will focus on the right to appoint, elect or 
designate by succession appropriate leaders called by the requirements and standards 
of any religion or belief since we have discussed issues pertaining to training of 
religious leaders in the previous section. 
 
Appointment of religious leaders and their proper functioning as foreseen in respective 
religious traditions are vitally important for the healthy life of any religious/belief 
community. While the role of religious leaders in various religious traditions may vary, 
their role in giving a vision to the community as well as management of, not least, 
religious functions, are common to most traditions. Generally speaking, the leadership 
organization in itself is in fact an expression of their beliefs, deeply rooted in their 
understanding or interpretation of sacred texts or traditions.1097 This is also true for the 
titles used by religious leaders. Therefore any interference in this sphere must be 
rigorously assessed with reference to international human rights standards. 
 
Current legislation and administrative practice in Turkey applicable to the right to 
appoint, elect and designate religious leaders is far from being uniform, clear and 
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foreseeable. There is no general legislative regulation pertaining to the internal affairs 
of religious/belief communities in Turkey. Legislation and administrative practice differ 
based on certain categories of religious leadership; the Presidency of Religious Affairs, 
religious leaders of the so-called Lausanne religious minorities that are recognized by 
the Turkish government as protected by the Lausanne Treaty (Jewish, Armenian 
Apostolic and Greek Orthodox), Muslim communities organized outside the Diyanet 
framework and non-Muslim religious communities outside the Lausanne framework. 
Since this thesis focuses on the protection of freedom of religion or belief for groups 
that seek to exercise the right to freedom of religion or belief outside the PRA 
structure, legal issues pertaining to the appointment of leaders within the PRA 
structure will be only briefly described.  
  
General legislation laying down neutral rules for the appointment or election of religious 
leaders is non-existent in Turkey. Similarly, there are no specific requirements or guidelines for 
seeking permission or procedures to be followed in the appointment of religious leaders of any 
religious community. While the lack of general regulation may give the impression that there is 
complete freedom in the sphere of electing religious leaders, as it will be shown below, with 
regard to selected communities there is a significant degree of interference, at times 
amounting to obstruction. In contrast to the absence of general rules in this sphere, the Law 
No. 677 is explicitly and directly applicable to the prohibition of the use of certain Islamic 
religious leadership titles.1098 Other Muslim religious leaders within the Diyanet structure, 
namely the imam and mufti, are subject to the legislation governing the Diyanet and Public 
Servants.1099 The Law No. 677, thus, categorically bans the election or selection of certain 
religious leaders by making positions with certain capacity and title unlawful.  The law is not a 
neutral law prohibiting the use of all religious titles.  Christian and Jewish titles or religious 
titles found in the Sunni-Islamic tradition are not mentioned in the law. Moreover, the three 
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so-called Lausanne religious minorities are subject to an unclear administrative process over 
which they have little control. 
 
Following Turkey’s independence war and the establishment of the Republic in 1923, in 
the evolved state-religion relation a certain political sensitivity prevailed and this has 
been reflected in the concrete cases of religious leaders of certain religious 
communities. For example in 1933, the Syriac Patriarchate in Mardin, could no longer 
resist the subtle and open pressure of the state and moved to Syria “temporarily” when 
the community considered the move necessary.1100 The Alevi-Bektashi centre – dergah- 
was moved to Albania following the closure of tekke and zaviye through the adoption 
of the Law No. 677.  Similarly, in 1925 Konstantinos who had been elected the Greek 
Patriarch, was sent by the public authorities to Thesseloniki in Greece. When Greece 
took the matter to the League of Nations claiming that this act violated the Lausanne 
Treaty, Turkey threatened to close and send the Patriarchate out of Turkey, Greece 
withdrew its complaint and the matter was closed by presenting the situation as if 
Konstantinos had resigned on his own accord.1101  
 
Since this thesis deals with the assessment of the right to manifest religion or belief 
outside the Diyanet structure we will not examine the leadership appointment process 
in this public body in depth. It is important to note, however, that the religious 
leadership scheme within the Diyanet structure is highly regulated. The Prime Minister 
appoints the Head of the PRA.1102 Officially, he does not represent the Muslim 
community; he represents the PRA.1103  The Muslim population that worships in the 
mosques run by the Diyanet are not involved in the appointment of the imam, the 
mufti and the Head of the Diyanet. There have been calls to review and change the 
selection method of the Head of the PRA toward the participation of the community in 
the selection process.1104 These have not yet produced any results. 
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State interference is most evident in the appointment of religious leadership of three 
non-Muslim religious communities - the Jewish, the Greek Orthodox and the Armenian 
Apostolic. It will be remembered that Turkey recognizes solely these communities as 
religious communities subject to the minority protection scheme of the 1923 Lausanne 
Treaty.1105  The Lausanne Treaty protects the right to freedom of religion or belief and 
the right of non-Muslims to run their religious institutions freely, however, does not 
specify a certain procedure for the election of religious leaders, implicitly leaving this to 
the communities to decide for themselves in accordance with their traditions.1106 As 
will be shown below, the process of selecting leaders for these three communities 
takes place in the state apparatus’ administrative/executive section lacking precise, 
accessible and foreseeable rules.  
 
According to the Ministry of Interior, Directorate of the Minority Issues Evaluation 
Section, for example, in the appointment of the Armenian Patriarchate, a certain legal 
framework exists;  
 The affairs and transactions related to minorities are carried out in accordance with Articles 
 37-45 of the Lausanne Treaty, affairs and transactions concerning our Armenian citizens are 
 carried out in accordance with the ancient precedents and customs of the community.
1107
  
 
 This statement, however, raises a number of questions. Among others, who 
determines what ancient customs are, the state or the community, how is the content 
of these ancient customs and precedents determined, if it is the community’s rules or 
customs, do they have the right to modify them, what rules will apply if there is a 
disagreement between the state and the community or within the community on the 
substance of these rules? The validity of Regulations pertaining to the administration of 
the millets in the Ottoman Empire is far from clear.1108 While the state administration 
does not provide a definitive answer on the nature of the validity of these Regulations, 
its practice indicates that certain elements of the Ottoman practice are continued. The 
lack of certainty and foreseeability in this context leads to the state being ultimately 
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the sole actor who determines the applicable legal rules and the minorities in question 
dependent on the public authorities to determine applicable rules. The dependence of 
minority communities to the decisions of public authorities aggravates the weak 
position of these communities vis a vis the state.  
 
Notwithstanding the legal vacuum concerning the election of the religious leaders, 
since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Jewish, Greek Orthodox and 
Armenian Apostolic communities have applied for state permission when electing or 
appointing their religious leaders. By doing this, the practice established during the 
Ottoman period has been maintained to a certain degree. Without a legal basis the 
election process, however, becomes ultimately outside of the control of the religious 
communities themselves. The main reason for this is that the process of application for 
state permission in order to elect or appoint the religious leader is not required by any 
law, yet, de facto required by what may be called an established practice.  
  
The account of a typical process of electing religious leaders of these three 
communities will be useful to understand the interferences in the right to appoint, 
elect or designate religious leaders. The elections of the Chief Rabbi and the two 
Patriarchs do not follow a pre- determined procedure. Whenever a need for the 
election of a religious leader arises, permission for that particular election must be 
obtained and the permission is not valid for any subsequent election.  The procedure is 
defined throughout the process, with changes in criteria as well as reciprocal 
negotiations, "each election is different".1109  The draft of the election regulation is 
prepared by the religious communities; this includes the criteria for candidates and 
term of service. However, the Ministry of Interior may advise changes, or declare that a 
certain provision to be incompatible with existing regulations - whether or not this is in 
the regulations.1110 
 
It is very important to note that the communities, in preparing election regulations to 
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submit to the Turkish authorities, are strongly guided by what they think may be 
acceptable to the state, in the light of their previous experiences.1111 This is particularly 
reflected in the criteria for who may be chosen as the leader.1112 Apart from insisting 
that all members of leadership bodies are Turkish citizens, the government does not 
generally interfere at present in the appointments below the level of the head of the 
religious community. In effect the citizenship criteria functions as a restriction on the 
eligibility of spiritual leaders from outside of Turkey and strengthens the state’s 
position as against the religious communities and provides a means of facilitating or 
restricting the right to freedom of religion or belief. For example, in the past the 
Turkish state has terminated the citizenship of Silifke and Alaşehir metropolits,1113 or 
recently, allowed the citizenship applications of non-Turkish clergy.1114 Generally 
speaking the religious leader must be a Turkish citizen, at least of 40 years age, have 
certain religious training, and be trustworthy in the eyes of the Turkish government.1115 
The last condition was a condition required by the Turkish state in all previous 
elections. However, in the 2009 elections the Istanbul Governorship informed the 
Election Committee of the Jewish community that this provision must be changed to 
stipulate that the Chief Rabbi must "have a good reputation in the eyes of the state and 
society".1116 Again this change in the requirement does not have a legal basis or precise 
and foreseeable criteria, it follows from the public authorities discretion. 
  
The experience of the Armenian Apostolic community has been the most recent and 
vivid illustration that interference in the appointment of leadership is far reaching and 
effects the functioning of the community. Following the health-related seclusion of the 
Patriarch elected for life, the question of a successor became an important one for the 
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healthy functioning of the community’s religious affairs.1117 The rules or lack of rules 
concerning appointment of leaders for the Armenian Apostolic community seems to be 
far from clear. According to the public authorities the Armenian Patriarchate seems to 
be subject to an 1863 Regulation,1118 concluded between the Ottoman administration 
and the Patriarchate. A new regulation annulling this has not been drafted since the 
establishment of the modern Turkish Republic, and there are differing views among 
lawyers as to whether or not the 1863 Regulation is still valid.   Also, if it were valid, to 
what extent the 1863 Regulation is included in the established practice of appointing 
religious leaders is not certain. This Regulation does not specify a course of action if the 
Patriarch becomes ill, as it only makes provision for the course of action to be taken if 
the Patriarch dies or resigns from office.1119   
 
Two different factions in the Armenian Apostolic community approached the 
government separately; one asked the government to allow the selection of a Co-
Patriarch, believing that a new Patriarch may only be chosen upon the death of the 
previous Patriarch,1120 the other, the Council of Armenians in Turkey, asked for the 
election to be allowed to select a new Patriarch.1121 Eventually, the Interior Ministry 
wrote to the community via the Istanbul Governor's Office, rejecting both the 
proposals presented from within the Armenian community, arguing that Church 
regulations did not envisage the possibility of electing a new Patriarch while the 
incumbent is still alive or a Co-Patriarch.1122 The Interior Ministry determined that only 
a Patriarchal Vicar-General (Patrik Genel Vekili), could be elected to lead the 
community until the current Patriarch dies.1123  The government justified its decision to 
refuse the election of a Co-Patriarch by stating that such a position is not foreseen in 
the existing Regulations – interestingly, nor is the appointment of a Patriarchal Vicar 
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General.  Bebiroğlu observes that such a position has not existed within the Armenian 
Orthodox Church since 1709 and it is not in their tradition.1124 The government thus 
assumed the role of regulator or arbitrator, and imposed a solution to the problem that 
was not asked for by the community.  The Spiritual Council of the Armenian Apostolic 
Church elected an Archbishop to the newly-created post of Vicar General.1125 Thus, not 
only did the community not select its leader freely it was not even able to determine 
the title of their religious leader.  
 
Practice in this sphere varies, however. For example, when the current Chief Rabbi was 
elected in December 2002 for the first time the office of Chief Rabbi was decided by the 
community to be for a seven year term, not a lifetime appointment as it has been 
previously.1126 Taking a step that broke with established practice, in 2004 Patriarch 
Bartholomew had named several foreign citizens to membership of the Holy Synod, 
without consulting the government.1127 Amid an outcry by Turkish nationalists, who 
called for the Patriarch to be expelled from the country, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
indicated that this was an internal issue for the Church. After years of urging on the 
part of the Patriarchate and apparently as a result of the August 2009 meeting 
between Bartholomew and Erdoğan, the government finally agreed that foreign 
bishops of dioceses under the Ecumenical Patriarchate could apply for Turkish 
citizenship. Patriarch Bartholomew immediately wrote to the bishops urging them to 
do so, pointing out that when the election of his successor takes place, "they will have 
the right to elect and to be elected".1128 
 
The title used by the leaders of the so-called Lausanne religious communities has  also 
been interfered with by public authorities. When the Chief Rabbi Haleva's term expired 
in late 2009, the government refused to allow an election (by direct vote of members 
of the Jewish community throughout Turkey) to take place, unless the post title was 
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changed from “Chief Rabbi of Turkey” to “Chief Rabbi of Turkish Jews”.1129  After 
finalising the election criteria the government permitted an election to the post of 
Chief Rabbi of Turkish Jews, which Haleva won in May 2010.1130  The Turkish authorities 
do not officially recognize the Greek Orthodox Patriarch as “ecumenical”, instead insist 
on calling the Patriarch the "Fener Rum Patriği" (Patriarch of Fener).1131 Whereas the 
Patriarchate considers itself “ecumenical”.1132  The Turkish Court of Cassation has made 
a legal proclamation on the ecumenical title of the Patriarchate saying, “the 
Patriarchate is an institution which bears only religious powers as the church of the 
Greek minority in Turkey”, and that “there is no legal basis for the claim that the 
Patriarchate is ecumenical”.1133  The Armenian Patriarchate also has jurisdiction outside 
Turkey, having jurisdiction over the tiny Armenian community on the Greek island of 
Crete.1134 The Turkish Government - as with the Ecumenical Patriarchate - rejects the 
terminology used by the Armenian Apostolic Church itself for its Patriarch: "Patriarch of 
Constantinople". Instead, the state refers to him as Ermeni Patrik (Armenian Patriarch). 
The government also tries to reject the Ecumenical Patriarch's wider jurisdiction or 
authority over Orthodox communities outside the country - including direct jurisdiction 
over dioceses in eastern Greece.1135   
 
In contrast, the practice concerning the small Armenian Protestant community stands 
out as the exception to the high level of interference in the election of leaders of the 
so-called Lausanne minorities; they do not experience any interference in the election 
and/or appointment process of their religious leaders.  Religious groups that are not 
interfered with in the appointment of spiritual leaders include the Latin Catholics, 
expat communities of the Anglican Church and the German Evangelical congregation - 
have not faced Turkish government involvement in their choice of leaders. Turkish 
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Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnessed and the Bahai. This practice lends support to the 
notion that Jewish, Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox communities have a 
special significance that triggers rigorous oversight and interference by the state. 
Interference in the appointment of Islamic religious leaders varies significantly as 
illustrated above. The different rules and practice concerning the appointment of 
leaders of religious groups demonstrate that interference is deemed necessary at 
varying degrees by the state.   
 
For the so-called Lausanne communities the seal of approval ensuing the complicated 
process of election of the religious leader appears to retain certain significance in a 
number of ways. For instance, this process confers the head of the religious community 
a status, as such, that creates a de facto state recognition of him as the representative 
of the community and ensures no other self-appointed person may claim such a 
position.1136 The significance attributed to the de facto status contrasts with the de jure 
status that reduces the position of the head of the religious minority to top religious 
clergy of a certain church in the case of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch.  Secondly, 
arguably, the possible consequences of not applying for permission also force religious 
communities to follow the imposed practice. It is highly unlikely that any of these three 
ethnic/religious minority groups would challenge this established practice, wanting to 
avoid the conflict this might create. The possible consequences of not applying for 
permission might include non-recognition of the religious leader by the state for the 
purpose of representing their ethnic/religious community and withholding permission 
to wear religious clothing in places outside of places of worship which is given to one 
clergy of each religious community by a decision of the Committee of Ministers.1137 The 
diverse issues and interests to consider and the delicate balance that the so-called 
Lausanne minorities have to seek in the process of appointing their religious leaders 
illustrates the need for particular protection for the right to appoint leaders. 
  
In contrast to a lack of regulation concerning the religious leadership of non-Muslim 
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communities, there is a specific legislation that prohibits the use of certain religious 
titles as well as the exercise of these capacities that specifically involves certain Islamic 
traditions. The Law No. 677 has important implications for leadership within certain 
Islamic traditions. 1138  According to the Constitution Law. No. 677 is considered part of 
the reform laws category that seek to protect secularism, no constitutional provision 
may be understood or interpreted in a way to render Law No. 677 unconstitutional.1139  
Article 1 declares the closure of all tekke and zaviye and türbe and explicitly prohibits 
the use of a variety of Islamic and superstitious titles:  
 In all tarikats, the use of titles and attributes like Sheikh, Dervish, Mürit [Disciple], Dedelik 
 [Elder],  sayyid [descendant of Prophet Mohammed], Çelebi [a title for a leader of  dervish 
 order], Babalık [Father], Emirate, Naiplik [Regency], Khaliphat, sorcery, breathers  on sick 
people for healing, fortune-telling and soothsaying, and nüshacılık [writing prayers]  for the purpose 
of  murada kavuşturmak, and the exercise of these services and the wearing  of garments for them is 
prohibited.
1140
  
 
 The same Article foresees a prison sentence, not less than three months and a 
monetary fine not less than 50 Turkish Lira.  
 
These prohibited titles are commonly used to refer to historical religious figures as well 
as religious leaders of today, yet this explicit prohibition is seldom applied. It has been 
reported that in practice “when the dede administered the cem”, there was “warning 
and threat” but no sanctions.1141 As far as the judicial process is concerned, in a case 
concerning the act of fortune telling, also prohibited by the Law No. 677, the Court of 
Appeals held that the purpose of the Law No. 677 was “to protect the society from 
superstition and protect the people from abuse that these might cause”.1142 Other 
elements necessary to establish this crime include, that the person must be known as a 
person who is engaged in these acts and the fact that the person should be engaged in 
these acts in a routine manner.1143 On the other hand, reading the Quran and writing a 
prayer for a person that is ill with the purpose of wishing that he/she gets well is not 
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considered “breathing or nüshacılık”.1144 Since such abuse could not be established in 
the case- the fortune telling appeared to be a form of entertainment and the person 
did not do this activity as a source of income- the person in question was acquitted.1145 
A village imam was convicted for violating the Law No. 677 Article 1(2) for “making 
muska- written charm- and engaging in üfürükçülük- breathing on sick people in order 
to cure them-” and thus profiting/ taking advantage from the village community.1146 In 
another case a person was convicted for breathing on persons for the purpose of 
breaking a spell, yet, whether there was profit or not was not considered.1147 Yet, 
“profiting or benefiting” was considered an indispensible element for the crime of 
“breathing and writing prayers” as well as the fact that the person in question is 
“known by the title of breather”.1148    On the other hand, a Court of Appeals held that 
a person charged with using the title “khalifat” and engaging in acts that a khalifat 
would engage in, like gathering people around him to form a tarikat (Islamic 
brotherhood, literal meaning the way), should be found guilty for violating the Law No 
677 Article 1(2).1149  
 
Interestingly, it appears that individuals who are Alevi dede or mürşid have not been 
convicted for violating Law No. 677 despite the widespread existence of this office, 
albeit informally.1150 Ersal, in his study on the Veli Baba Sultan Dervish Lodge (Veli Baba 
Sultan Dergahı), describes a very lively religious community where religious leaders use 
some of the titles that are prohibited in Article 1 of the Law No. 677.1151 They do not 
use the Dervish Lodge, except for religious visits, but continue their religious activities 
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in homes with various religious leaders, dede or mürşid, actively administering religious 
services and rituals. The application of the relevant legal provisions seems to be 
inconsistent. Ersal observes that there was a position of Watchman in times of 
“prohibition” who would watch for the gendarmerie while the people and their leaders 
would hold religious activities in a home but they say this position no longer exists.1152  
For the first time an Alevi customary jurisdiction decision was- albeit indirectly- the 
subject of a court decision; an Alevi complained of “defamation” because an Alevi 
customary system the dede and other members of the group declared him 
“düşkün”1153 and expelled him from the community because of adultery.1154  The court 
decided the case on the basis of “defamation” and did not review the case on the use 
of the dede title nor on the customary legal system involved.  
 
The account above illustrates the differing and fragmented de jure and de facto rules 
that are applicable to the right to elect and appoint leaders for diverse religious 
communities in Turkey. Now, we will turn to examine the compatibility of key elements 
of these practices with standards established by international law, freedom of religion 
or belief in its collective dimension.  
 
Both the UN and ECHR protection schemes attribute strong protection to the right to 
appoint leaders for religious groups which demonstrates a conception of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief that recognizes the importance of this component of the 
collective dimension for both groups of believers and individuals as well as not seeing 
state intervention necessary only in exceptional cases. The HRCttee has not considered 
a communication on this issue, however, in its General Comment on Article 18, held 
that the right to freedom of religion or belief includes the protection of “acts integral to 
the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose 
their religious leaders, priests and teachers”.1155 Whenever states decide to interfere 
with these “internal” aspects of organization of a religious group, they also interfere 
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with its “autonomy” of the group in question.  
 
The ECtHR has noted in a number of cases, that the personality of the religious leaders 
is of importance to the members of the religious community and that participation in 
the organizational life of the community is a manifestation of one’s religion, protected 
by Article 9 of the Convention.1156 If there were a scale of acts protected within the 
scope of freedom of religion or belief, acts pertaining to the internal organization of 
belief communities would arguably on the part of the scale indicating strong degree of 
recognition. The Strasbourg organs also attribute strong protection to the international 
organization of religious communities, and remarkably not necessarily based on the 
high status of the right to association in the ECHR system, as an issue falling under 
Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11.1157  
 
The requirement for state permission or regulation involved in the process of election 
and appointment of religious leaders raises issues with regard to the right of religious 
communities to be free in their internal affairs, particularly one as critical as the right to 
appoint their own leader in accordance with their own doctrines and traditions. The 
effect of requirements or in fact, in some cases, prohibition, must be felt at varying 
degrees in individual religious communities. Yet, it is not difficult to imagine that these 
regulations or prohibitions would amount to interference in the right to manifest 
religion or belief in its collective dimension. Such interference must be justified in 
accordance with international law provisions; prescribed by law, pursuing a legitimate 
aim to protect public order, health and rights and freedoms of others and necessary in 
a democratic society. In the cases of the so-called Lausanne minorities, it is hard to find 
the legal basis for the current practice which seems to be based on “established 
practice” yet lacking foreseeability and precision. The incompatibility of the practice 
with the requirement that any restriction must be prescribed by law is also evident in 
that fact that every election is and has been different. Interestingly, these claims have 
not been the subject of any legal dispute in the domestic jurisdiction therefore we do 
not have information on how the judiciary would decide these cases. 
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 Moreover, the fact that each and every election is arbitrarily treated differently puts 
the religious communities in a highly vulnerable position. The main reason for this is 
that the government's arbitrary decisions are affected by factors which these religious 
communities cannot expect or control. The lack of an adequate legal framework that is 
not compatible with international human rights law may be an indication of mistrust of 
these minorities.  At the core of the changing nature of administrative practice may be 
that the Turkish state views relations with these three communities as strongly linked 
to foreign policy matters – not as a matter of the freedom of religion or belief of 
Turkish residents.1158 As it has been illustrated in Chapter 6 for decades, these 
communities have been subject to the changing relationships between Turkey and 
other countries.  
 
Active interference by Turkey in the right of religious leaders in the use of the title that 
they consider appropriate in accordance with their religion or belief would constitute 
an interference with the religious freedom of the community in question. Such 
restriction must be justified it must be prescribed by law, justified by reference to 
legitimate requirements and proportional in line with the relevant international 
provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief. Indeed, it is difficult to 
see why and when any state would need to interfere in the usage of a title by any 
religious groups. This implausibility was also observed by the Venice Commission in 
relation the obstacles before the use of the title “ecumenical” by the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarch”. The Venice Commission Opinion held that “only in exceptional cases it may 
be justified to deny to a religion the right to choose and use a certain name”.1159 In 
addition, the opinion notes that it is not possible to see how any of the requirements 
listed in Article 9 paragraph 2 would possibly be applicable in such a case, as neither 
public safety or public order nor any of the other concerns can be affected at all, and 
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of an interference when it is combined with other measures discriminating the religious group on 
grounds that are not in line with the ECHR and in particular with Article 14.” Supra note 29. 
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certainly not proportionally, by the Patriarchate using its ancient title of 
“ecumenical””.1160  The Council of Europe's Venice Commission in March 2010 urged 
Turkey to recognize the right of the Patriarchate to use the title "ecumenical".1161 The 
same arguments could be relevant for the ban on the use of certain titles by the Law 
No. 677.  The implications of the application of the Law No. 677 for the right to 
manifest religion or belief in the internal organization of a religious community and in 
particular the use of certain titles and the appointment of religious leader needs to be 
further explored. In some cases above we have seen that for the crime to occur a 
certain “advantage” by the use of the title and performance of function was considered 
necessary by the judiciary, depending on the individual circumstances of the case. 
Where “taking advantage” would amount to, for example interference in the rights of 
others or public order or health, state interference could be justified. In order to ensure 
the right to appoint leaders and use titles in accordance with a religion or belief, 
legislation could be drafted differently, rather than a categorical ban on the use of 
certain titles. In fact, certain provisions of civil or criminal code could already be 
applicable to provide protection against abuses of the use of the title.  
  
7.2.4. To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with 
the precepts of one’s religion or belief 
 
The right to observe days of rest and celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance 
with the precepts of one’s religion or belief may be a right with a broad scope depending on 
the content of the dogma in question. As it has been observed in Chapter 4, in addition to, for 
example, having a right to taking the holidays off from work, manifestations pertaining to 
diverse forms of ceremonies in accordance with the religion or belief in question are also 
within the scope of this right. Here our focus will be limited to the right to take days off from 
work in order to be able to observe a day of rest or celebrate and observe relevant holidays 
and ceremonies.  
 
                                                        
1160
 The OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE and Venice Commission Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to 
Religion or Belief, supra note 29, para.93. 
1161
 Supra note 67.  
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Days that are special in a particular religion or belief are also days when believers generally 
gather together for, inter alia, worship, celebration and special ceremonies. Participation in 
these events or ceremonies is important, not least, for the preservation and transmission of 
dogma and identity. Hence whether believers are free from work to gather becomes a crucial 
precondition of whether such worship can take place or not. On the other hand, 
accommodation for the needs of various religious communities in this sphere certainly require 
macro level arrangements by states and raise diverse policy issues. The Alevi community in 
Turkey have expressed demands for the recognition of the Ashura Day as a national 
holiday,1162 yet without any results. The religious holidays of the Bahai, Christians, Jews are not 
set aside as national holidays, neither do they have a right to take these days off from work or 
school.  
 
In the public and private sector, accommodation for “time off” to observe religious holidays 
appear to be strictly in the sphere of administrative decision processes that lack a legal basis 
that is apparent both for employers and employees. In the recent years, there have been 
reports that at public universities Christian and Jewish faculty have been allowed 
administrative leave on Jewish and Christian holidays, provided that these days are deducted 
from their annual leaves.1163 Whether Muslims are allowed to take time off to take part in the 
customary Friday prayers and daily namaz is dependent on the employers’ discretion; there is 
no obligation on the part of the employers to accommodate such requests.1164 Some 
employees wishing to take time off to perform their daily prayers, have been reportedly 
threatened with dismissal from their jobs and in job interviews applicants have been asked 
whether they perform namaz or not and those who did were not employed.1165 On the other 
hand, it has also been reported that at a university the deans of faculties were given directives 
by the rector not to schedule lectures at the time of Friday prayers.1166 When such 
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accommodation is wholly left to the discretion of the authorities, it is difficult to establish a 
non-discriminatory practice that would accommodate the right to observe days of rest or 
holidays for all regardless of religion or religious tradition. It is not difficult, then, to expect 
that the rights of any religious group will be effectively protected. 
 
Official religious holidays in Turkey include the Islamic -Ramadan and Sacrifice- Holidays.1167  
Sunday is the weekly holiday, and, in contrast to many Muslim countries, Friday is not a day of 
rest in Turkey.1168 Individuals affiliated with religions or beliefs that celebrate holidays other 
than or in addition to these the officially recognized Ramadan and Sacrifice holidays must use 
from their annual leave days in order to be able to observe their days of rest or holidays. A 
right to take time off from work to observe periods of prayer at particular times of the day and 
to observe a religious holiday is not legally recognized.   
 
Neither public nor private employers are legally required to make reasonable accommodations 
for employees' religious observances. Rules concerning taking time off from work for times of 
prayer or observing religious holidays are determined explicitly or implicitly by private 
companies through company culture and image, professional chambers and the legislation 
that affects the intersection of public and private. Labour Law protects against religious 
discrimination.1169 But anti-discrimination legislation in Turkey is weak and existing legal 
remedies are rarely accessible.1170  The possibility to effectively benefit from the available legal 
protection against religious discrimination is significantly diminished by the lack of information 
among employees, the difficulty of proving that the discrimination was based on religion and 
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 Ulusal Bayram ve Genel Tatiller Hakkında Kanun [Law on National Holidays and General Vacations], 
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the general powerlessness felt by those affected, e.g. religious minorities, women and 
students, in light of the power dynamics involved in the available complaint procedures.  
  
Recognition of special holidays or days of rest and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts 
of one’s religion or belief in Turkey seems to be at the periphery of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief. There is a lack of court cases pertaining to the right to observe periods of 
prayer at particular times during the day and the refusal to permit individuals to take time off 
to observe religious holidays. This may be an indication of the fact that the right to freedom of 
religion or belief is not understood in a way to include a right for the recognition of special 
religious holidays or days of rest or days for special ceremonies or, perhaps that believers have 
internalized this lack of accommodation and do not have hope that legal remedies will achieve 
results. Hypothetically, if non-accommodation for observance of special days of rest or 
religious holidays were the subject of court cases, in light of high courts' decisions reflective of 
the Turkish judiciary’s approaches to secularism, we may expect that the denial of such 
requests will be accepted by courts on grounds of “having a politically and religiously neutral 
workplace” as a legitimate aim.1171   
 
It is useful to recall international standards for the right to observe days of rest and celebrate 
holidays in accordance with one’s religion or belief. The core religious freedom provisions do 
not include an explicit reference to this right. Yet, the HRCTTEE’s GC 22 explicitly refers to “the 
observance of holidays and days of rest” as a form of manifestation protected as such under 
Article 18.1172 In country visits, the UN Special Rapporteur has noted accommodations for 
religious holidays with satisfaction whenever such legislative steps were taken.1173 On the 
other hand, as it has been demonstrated in Chapter 4, the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
organs concerning claims pertaining to requests to take time off from work for daily prayers is 
to the effect that it does not attribute a positive obligation on the part of states to 
accommodate times of prayer or days of rest.1174  
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attend Friday prayers was refused, the European Commission held that, since he had taken the position 
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 As far as international standard setting is concerned, indeed, a positive obligation to grant 
believers time off from work, either to observe their days of rest or to participate in religious 
ceremonies or celebrations is far from established. Perhaps, accommodations made for 
individuals or groups who wish to take days off in order to participate in holidays or special 
days set aside for special ceremonies or recognition of holidays of religious minorities are seen 
more as “steps or measures that could be encouraged” in multi-cultural societies, less so as a 
right that creates positive obligations for states and that can be enforced. Indeed, this right 
remains at the periphery of the right to freedom of religion or belief as it is protected in 
international law. 
 
The legislation and practice in Turkey does not protect a right to take time off from work to 
observe days of rest or to participate in religious ceremonies, worship or celebrations. In is 
respect, Turkey’s stance appears to be consistent with the weak international protection 
afforded to this right. 
 
Indeed the Turkish case is a useful example of how less than clear standard setting at the 
international level may lead and/or contribute to weak and ineffective compliance review at 
the domestic level. Key factors contributing to this situation are the lack of clear obligations of 
states, including the scope and nature of obligations, and the seemingly inconsistent standard 
setting at the universal and regional level. Whereas in compliance review at the UN level 
states are expected to respect the right to observe days of rest or holidays in accordance with 
religion or belief, Strasbourg organs have clearly tended to accommodate states’ practice not 
to create positive obligations to respect the same right.        
 
 
In conclusion, the key components of the right to freedom in the internal affairs of 
religious/belief groups examined above illustrate the harsh restrictions on the right to 
freedom of religion or belief in its collective dimension. Despite a general protection of 
freedom of religion of belief in the Turkish legislation and occasional legislative 
                                                                                                                                                                   
accepting the conditions of the employment there was no violation of Article 9.   X. v. the UK, 12 March 
1981, European Commission on Human Rights (Admissibility), No. 8160/78. 
312
improvements, results or outcomes show that that there is a serious failure to respect 
and protect the right to freedom of religion or belief in Turkey. This calls to mind the 
assertion- which has been made in the racial discrimination context- that there might 
be a need for paradigmatic change otherwise “the system merely swallows of the small 
improvement one has made and everything remains the same”.1175  
 
In numerous cases pertaining to the right to freedom of religion or belief, the judiciary 
does not refer to the relevant Constitutional or international provisions to which it can 
actually refer, however, deals with the claims with reference to legislative provisions 
that deal with other fields of law, such as Public Works Law or Civil Code, and does not 
see the religious freedom issues  that are raised. Alternately, it could be argued that 
the provisions that are chosen by the judiciary in the construction of the reasoning are 
aimed at producing a certain outcome; to overlook the implications of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief. 
  
In the exercise of the right to establish places of worship it is possible to identify a 
pattern of wide discretion left to public authorities in the determination and 
application of regulations and plans that are instrumental in the effective protection of 
this right. The right to manifest religion or belief in teaching is by far the most 
restricted right with the state holding a tight monopoly in the field of religious 
education. The inconsistent and arbitrary practice pertaining to the election and 
appointment of religious leaders indicates that despite strong international protection 
of the right to freedom in the internal organization of religious communities Turkey 
choses not to take corrective action. Finally, the right to observe days of rest and to 
celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or 
belief remains at the periphery of the right to freedom of religion or belief at the 
national level as it is at the international level. Whether a component of freedom of 
religion or belief enjoys a robust international protection or not is not the only factor 
determining Turkey’s performance on the issue. However, it determines the standard 
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setting that can be advocated at the national level as well as the nature of legal 
remedies that religious or belief groups can seek.   
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
“Silence speaks loudest.” 
 
The subject of this thesis is the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief in 
international human rights law. The purpose of the thesis has been to explore the 
notion of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief with a view to seek 
ways to improve the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief in 
international law.  
 
To this end, in Section I, the thesis has sought to explore the substantive scope of the 
collective dimension and the manner in which it has been interpreted by relevant 
international law adjudicators and to identify to what extent- if any- the international 
standard of compliance review may be improved when dealing with national protection 
systems. A comprehensive theory of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief in international law has not been developed so far in legal doctrine and it is 
hoped that a substantial contribution of this thesis is that which it makes to our 
understanding of the notion of the collective dimension.  International human rights 
standards applicable to the protection of the rights to acquire legal personality and to 
freedom in the internal affairs of religious/belief have been examined in order to 
understand the nature of protection and identify challenges and ways to move 
forward.    
 
Section II of the thesis has critically assessed the protection of the collective dimension 
of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey based on the standards identified in Section I. 
The case study on Turkey is valuable and useful in, not least, two ways; first, the study 
provides a comprehensive, albeit not exhaustive, normative assessment on the 
protection of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey thus making a contribution to the 
academic literature, secondly, the case study helps to identify gaps in international 
standard of review.  
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As far as legal sources are concerned, the discussions in Section I have been based 
primarily on the ICCPR and the jurisprudence of the HRCttee and the ECHR and the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs. When relevant, other sources of soft law 
nature have also been relied upon, such as the work of the UN Special Rapporteur and, 
to a lesser extent, the relevant OSCE guidelines. This deliberate comparative approach 
has enabled the study to, on the one hand, draw from global and regional systems 
when seeking to understand the notion of the collective dimension of FoRB, on the 
other hand, to identify and critically assess similarities and differences in the 
approaches of these protection schemes. 
 
A central assumption of this thesis has been that the international protection of the 
collective dimension of the right to freedom of religion or belief would provide a solid 
substantive normative basis and protection for the claims pertaining to the right to 
freedom of religion or belief that have a collective nature. Throughout the study this 
assumption has been tested in concrete cases that have been addressed, principally, 
based on the standards established by human rights instruments and the respective 
jurisprudence of the HRCttee and the European bodies. It would seem that the central 
assumption of the thesis presents itself as an ideal to strive for, instead of an already 
established matter. It appears that the scope and nature of obligations, the 
understanding and willingness to address the collective nature of claims as well as to 
tackle broad-scale, often repressive, policies and legislation behind restrictions, and, as 
far as the European context is concerned, the wide margin of discretion granted to 
states remain as challenges that must be overcome in order to advance the 
effectiveness of the protection that is already enshrined in the relevant religious 
freedom provisions. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the normative basis of the 
collective dimension both at the global and European regional levels create a 
potentially comprehensive basis for the normative protection of acts and diverse forms 
of collectivities involved in the exercise of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief as discussed in Chapter 2.     
 
Important assumptions with regard to the Turkish case have been that a better 
understanding of the international obligations pertaining to the right to FoRB in its 
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collective dimension and improved international review mechanisms are necessary to 
improve the protection of FoRB in its collective dimension in Turkey. Yet, it apears that 
a “better understanding” and “good international review mechanisms” would not 
necessarily result in the effective protection of this right.  A particularly good test of 
this pertains to the restrictions on the claims of religious/belief communities and 
individuals belonging to the communities pertaining to legal personality and the rights 
to establish associations and foundations. With regard to the latter rights, international 
positive obligations are clearly defined and strong, these obligations are apparent to 
the Turkish judiciary as they allude to them in numerous cases yet, the willingness to 
apply these standards ensuing the obligations appears to be the key factor that is 
missing. This does not however mean that “better understanding” and “good 
international review mechanisms” of no use. On the contrary, these hold important 
functions in pointing to the standard that must be strived for and lay the foundations 
for legal claims brought by those who wish the exercise the right to freedom of religion 
or belief in its collective dimension.  
 
In Chapter 2 we began by exploring the notion of the collective dimension of freedom 
of religion or belief with a view to examine its legal basis and determine its scope, 
nature of obligations as well as boundaries. While the thesis has demonstrated the 
importance of the collective dimension of freedom of religion or belief for both, various 
forms of groups of believers and individuals, it has also become clear that we do not 
yet have a coherent and well-developed theory of “the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief”. The latter term is viewed with suspicion, at times, 
particularly when it is perceived to mean “the right of a religion or belief”, “on the axis 
of individual and collective rights, a hierarchically supreme right that leads to 
unjustifiable restrictions on the rights and freedoms of others”, or even “a particular 
constitutional arrangement defining strong entanglement of state with a certain 
religion”. Or, often, it is given a limited recognition as solely the rights of religious 
institutions. It has been an aim of the thesis to distinguish the scope of the right as well 
as the subject- the who- of the right in order to better understand its scope and 
boundaries. The thesis does not constitute an exhaustive theory of the collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief, yet, by exploring questions pertaining to the 
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substantive content of the right, the study has shown that the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief is not solely limited to “the rights of religious institutions”, 
that it protects all acts/manifestations of freedom of religion or belief that have a 
collective dimension. The study has also demonstrated that the collectivities as rights 
holders may vary, including natural groups, religious/belief groups that have acquired 
legal personality, and individuals who come together to exercise an act informally. The 
key for international adjudication appears to be the ability to see and the willingness to 
address the collective nature of claims pertaining to the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief cases. This remains a challenge. Indeed, a greater 
understanding, recognition and enforcement of the scope of the collective dimension 
of freedom of religion or belief will significantly contribute to advancing the protection 
of freedom of religion or belief through international law.     
 
Despite their limitations, international human rights norms pertaining to freedom of 
religion or belief potentially provide a solid substantive basis for the right to acquire an 
adequate form of legal personality for belief groups. The key enabling and empowering 
role of legal personality, in the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief has been illustrated in Chapters 3 and 6. The recognition of the right 
to acquire legal personality as an essential component of the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief may be further strengthened with the substantive focus by 
international review mechanisms. This study has shown that this inquiry should not, 
however, be limited to the question of the mere availability of a legal personality 
option for belief groups, instead it should be qualified by exploring the directness of 
the linkage between the belief groups and legal entity in question as well as the acts 
that become possible once legal entity status is obtained. Moreover, the adequacy and 
suitability of the existing legal entity statuses for belief communities’ enjoyment of the 
right to manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, observance and practice as well 
as the accessibility of the legal entity status in question for belief communities in a non-
discriminatory manner and state supervision involves must be critically examined.  As 
the Turkish case has shown, the mere existence and availability of certain legal entity 
formulas do not sufficiently amount to fulfilling the positive obligation to provide legal 
personality for belief groups to exercise the right to freedom of religion or belief in its 
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collective dimension. The potential of rigorous and probing application of the 
restriction clauses has become evident in the review and analysis of particularly the 
relevant case-law pertaining to legal personality matters. This potential must be 
realized by adjudicators by taking on a more active role; evaluation of the grounds for 
including probing, scrutiny, requesting and relying on statistical information as well as 
asking for comparative information from states that can help identify patterns of 
discrimination.  
 
Focus on the collective nature of acts and diverse forms of collectivities has also led to 
a broader view of the meaning of the freedom in the “internal affairs”- autonomy- of 
religious/belief communities, as opposed to understanding internal affairs solely with 
reference to “internal organization”. As it has been illustrated in Chapter 4 autonomy 
can be an expansive issue depending on the dogma of the belief group in question. A 
comprehensive, yet not exhaustive, review of various forms of manifestations, inter 
alia, the right to establish places of worship, train and appoint clergy, to teach religion 
or belief, the right to observe days of rest, has revealed that international protection 
varies, not least, in terms of the identification of positive obligations as well as the 
assessment of restriction clauses as applied to these rights.  In addition to the generally 
recognized forms of the aforementioned manifestations, in Chapter 4 I have also 
argued that a right to use religious law can also be deduced from the provisions 
protecting the right to manifest religion or belief in practice.  
 
The comparative approach adopted in the study has aimed to demonstrate the 
similarities and differences of the standard setting by the Strasbourg organs and the 
HRCttee in their respective jurisprudence on the right to FoRB. The comparative review 
in this thesis confirms the finding of Paul Taylor that that the European Court has 
shown an evident willingness to allow states a wide discretion through broad 
interpretation of limitation clauses, distinct from the more consistent approach taken 
by the HRCttee.1176 The ECtHR has interpreted the scope of manifestations of religion 
or belief in a narrow fashion and has relied on other rights, such as the right to 
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freedom of association and right to fair trial (right to judicial protection), when 
assessing claims that at the same time raise issues pertaining to FoRB and other human 
rights. While this may be reflective of the conception of the nature and scope of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief of the European Court, on a positive note, since 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is solid and coherent this has resulted in stronger 
protection of the right to manifest religion or belief.  In contrast, the HRCttee has 
demonstrated a consistent and coherent conception of freedom of religion or belief, 
embracing a broad conception of manifestations as outlined in GC 22 and did not feel 
the need to rely on other rights, such as the right to association, when claims 
pertaining to associative rights of religious/belief groups were addressed. Notably, 
states have not been granted a margin of appreciation when the HRCttee assessed 
justification of restrictions on the right to manifest religion or belief, including the 
collective dimension where sensitive state-religion relations added complicating 
dimensions. It is interesting that considering that the HRCttee deals with diverse 
arrangements of state-religion relations it would seem that this exposure has not led to 
granting a wide margin of appreciation where it is not possible to identify a “common 
global standard”, instead the international scrutiny remained same regardless of 
whether the latter existed or not. It might be argued that it is precisely this exposure to 
global variations of forms of manifestations and diverse state-religion arrangements 
that led the HRCttee to both appreciate different forms of manifestations as well as 
consistently apply restrictions clause. It should be borne in mind, however, that so far 
the ECtHR has had to deal with  more and more  complex questions involving balancing 
of interests based on FoRB than the HRCttee.  
 
The Turkish case study has illustrated that, often, restrictions of FoRB in its collective 
dimension involve underlying factors derived from the certain state-religion relation 
constructions as well as certain sensitivities- in the Turkish case, such as nationalism 
and minority issues- which seem to be considered as “given” and “legitimate” grounds 
for restrictions by national authorities, including the judiciary. These grounds for 
restrictions are rarely assessed with scrutiny at the domestic level as the analysis of 
relevant jurisprudence has shown. Yet, when states are given a margin of appreciation 
in such cases, indeed, international review suffers and victims suffer as a result. 
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Therefore, for effective international review, it is vital to bring out the potential within 
relevant restriction provisions and exercise rigorous examination of the latter.  
 
The, at times, distinct conceptions of the HRCttee and the Strasbourg organs on the 
scope of the right to freedom of religion or belief and the nature of ensuing obligations 
appear as a factor weakening the standard of international review. It is important to 
maintain universal human rights standards without differences in the substantive 
content of the right to freedom of religion or belief.   
 
Overall, the Turkish case study has illustrated the need to change the paradigm in 
which the right to freedom of religion or belief in its collective dimension is exercised, 
from tolerance to respect, fulfil and promote of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief. The substantial need to urgently improve the understanding of the scope of 
freedom of religion or belief in its collective dimension in Turkey and corresponding 
standard setting and implementation has become evident throughout the study. 
International obligations pertaining to the collective dimension of freedom of religion 
or belief are effectively utilized in standard setting and adjudication, despite significant 
human rights consequences for all groups of believers, including non-believers.  
 
In Turkey, the right to freedom of religion or belief has a narrow scope; the strongest 
protection appears to be afforded to the protection against coercion to believe or 
worship in a particular way- yet, not extending to the recognition of the right to 
conscientious objection to military service-, a passive recognition of the right to 
worship- not effectively extending to related acts-, and a significant degree of 
regulation of other aspects of the right to manifest religion or belief.  The collective 
dimension of freedom of religion or belief is highly restricted, arguably, precisely 
because of the collective nature of the rights –claims- it protects. While Turkey appears 
distant to the protection of the exercise of the collective dimension, it, at the same 
time, assumes selected roles with implications on the collective dimension where the 
Turkish state functions as the provider of public religious services. This arrangement 
often leaves the state as the sole holder of control –monopoly- over certain forms of 
manifestation. Certain elements of the collective dimension that groups of believers 
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would together exercise, are taken over by the state which functions as, inter alia, a 
public service provider, facilitator, funder. Moreover, in the process of providing these 
“services” the relevant state institutions function as shapers of religious dogma and 
tradition. This state involvement presents itself in varying degrees, for example, with 
absolute monopoly over the management of mosques and Islamic religious instruction 
through Quran courses; the legal framework does not allow any private acts in these 
spheres, including Muslims and non-Muslims. On the other hand, there exists the 
possibility, albeit highly restricted, for the selection of religious leaders and 
establishment of places of worship. Yet, the case-study has shown that the processes 
that religious/belief groups engage in while exercising these rights leave a large sphere 
of discretion to the public authorities; far from ensuring a legal framework that 
effectively protects these rights. The outcomes may be taken as indications of patterns 
of discrimination in the exercise of these rights. Teaching of religion stands out by far 
as the most restricted component of the collective dimension of the right to freedom 
of religion or belief. The extent of obstruction of this right becomes particularly grave 
when viewed in contrast to the state’s engagement in teaching of religion based on the 
Sunni-Muslim tradition. Indeed, the collective dimension of FoRB in Turkey has a 
narrow scope that delivers little possibilities for religious/belief groups. 
 
In contrast to a general commitment to the protection of freedom of religion or belief, 
the lack of coherent and solid basis for freedom of religion or belief in its collective 
dimension becomes strikingly concrete in relation to specific components of this right. 
Legislation pertaining to various components of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief is dispersed in different laws, such as Cadastral Law, Public Works 
Law, or Civil Code. While such fragmentation is not necessarily a hindrance to the 
protection of FoRB, the fact that when considering claims, the public authorities, 
including the judiciary, do rarely consider the issues raised in relation to FoRB, presents 
a significant setback. In this context silence about the right to freedom of religion or 
belief speaks loudest.  This lack of consideration is also reflective of the conception 
pertaining to FoRB. Such conception appears to fail to draw connections with concrete 
cases of FoRB, albeit not formulated with direct link to FoRB, with the general 
protection of FoRB in the Constitution and international instruments to which Turkey is 
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a party. Indeed, the lack of utilization of the Turkish Constitutional provisions and 
international norms pertaining to the right to freedom of religion or belief by the 
Turkish judiciary is particularly striking. Thus, claims brought by stakeholders end up 
being situated as weak claims in the constructions of reasoning where numerous 
aspects of FoRB are perceived as merely “acts” that are in contradiction to secularism 
or national security and not acts that are protected under various FoRB provisions. 
Arguably, such normative terms actually disguise ‘state interest’ which appears to be 
the underlying interest in applied restrictions. 
 
Strikingly, the study has shown that the judiciary often fails to consider the right to 
freedom of religion or belief as protected in international law in its assessment of cases 
that directly raise questions pertaining to this right. The reason for this silence is 
unclear and there could be numerous explanations. The general findings pertaining to 
the Turkish judiciary, which indicate that it is influenced by a perception of “threat and 
danger”,1177 and that “political climate” is important in the judiciary, are certainly 
compatible with and explain the findings concerning the Turkish case-study, 
particularly of Chapter 6. Yet, taking into account the historical and political context 
that this thesis has sought to provide along with the legal issues it explored, it is 
possible to foresee that were the judiciary to apply and interpret FoRB in line with 
international standards, it is likely that ensuing decisions will be politically controversial 
given the underlying sensitivities behind the restrictions in the first place. Thus, in order 
for substantial improvement of the right to FoRB in its collective dimension in Turkey, 
an exceptionally independent and willing judiciary that is ready to understand and 
address FoRB in assessing relevant claims, as such, and public authorities who are 
willing to enforce ensuing decisions are indispensible. Alternatively, broad changes in 
the political context in the long run, may make it possible to change the approach of 
the judiciary and other public authorities to issues concerning FoRB in its collective 
dimension.  
 
                                                        
1177
 Mithat Sancar, Adalet Bazen Es Geçiliyor [Justice is Sometimes Overlooked],  (TESEV, 2009), p. 142 
and p. 143. 
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In the Turkish context, the denial of legal personality to religious/belief groups, as such, 
stands out as a key issue that presents itself as a challenge to the Turkish conception of 
the right to freedom of religion or belief in its collective dimension. The implications of 
this denial and the inadequacy of alternative formulas, in the form of associations and 
foundations, have been illustrated in Chapter 6. The notion that legal personality of 
religious/belief communities is categorically incompatible with Turkey’s laik (secular) 
nation(-alist) state model must be informed by and harmonized with a new conception 
of freedom of religion or belief that respects the elements of the latter established by 
international law instruments. International review mechanisms and national and 
international human rights bodies are compelled to seek corrective action on the part 
of the state so that the positive obligation on the part of states to create an adequate 
form of legal personality may be realized in Turkey.  
 
Chapter 7, focusing on four key components of freedom in the internal affairs, inter 
alia, establish places of worship, freedom to teach, observe days of rest and holidays in 
accordance with religion or belief, has presented the complexities involved in the 
protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief in its collective dimension in 
Turkey. Again, despite a general constitutional commitment to the protection of 
freedom of religion or belief, the concrete cases that were examined indicate the 
importance of scrutiny of administrative processes and the outcomes. The case of the 
right to establish places of worship and the right to appoint religious leaders, indeed, 
appear to be “lost in administration” through the wide discretion granted to public 
authorities and what ostensibly seems like neutral criteria. Any meaningful assessment 
of the state of the right to freedom of religion or belief ought to include an assessment 
of outcomes – information on to what extent diverse religious/belief groups can 
exercise rights. The importance of this has become evident in the Turkish case study, in 
particular with reference the right to establish places of worship and teach religion or 
belief.    
 
What does the future hold for the protection of the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief in Turkey? It would seem that a willingness to better understand the 
implications of Turkey’s human rights obligations under international law as well as to 
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implement them with courage could substantially improve the standard of protection 
the right to freedom of religion or belief. As long as rightful claims pertaining to the 
enjoyment of the latter are viewed as incompatible with, inter alia, certain 
understandings of nation-state, laiklik (secularism), an underlying assumption that 
Turkey’s particularities mandate a public interest to regulate and restrict public 
manifestations of religion or belief control a coherent and well founded conception and 
an ensuing legislative and administrative practice upholding international standards 
seems difficult to achieve. In this process, the main actor of change is the Government 
which is also the primary actor responsible for Turkey’s human rights obligations. The 
continuing process of change in Turkey, upcoming new Constitution for Turkey, 
engagement of civil society institutions in the change as well as global and regional 
international mechanisms involved in the review of Turkey’s implementation of 
international law hold significant opportunities for influencing change to bring the 
protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief closer to adhere to international 
law standards.  Since if human rights law is not made an active part of the process of 
change, in terms of setting the standard and being given due consideration in drafting 
and applying legislation, it will have very limited transformative power in Turkey.  
Human rights standards are to play the role of “conscience”1178 – saying what ought to 
be-, while it is the “will” of the decision makers that is key to change. In the process of 
eradication of the conditions that result in a failed system of protection, human rights 
law can contribute, although surely it cannot by itself provide the cure, significantly. In 
this context, the state’s role in religion is in need of being re-formulated- it must 
continuously evolve- embracing impartiality and neutrality, ensuring pluralism and 
respecting equal rights and equal access to rights, withdrawal from the religious sphere 
by respecting the right to freedom in the internal affairs of religious/belief groups as it 
has been broadly described here.  
 
One of the aims of this thesis has been to explore and identify ways in which the 
standard of international review could be improved based on the Turkish case study 
and the latter has shown some areas in which improvements can be sought. At least 
                                                        
1178
 Therefore it is of extreme importance that internationally upheld standards are coherent. 
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three areas for possible improvement may be identified. First, the little and selective 
attention given to the right to freedom of religion or belief in the assessment of claims 
pertaining to the latter, should lead international adjudicators to rely on the national 
authorities, including the judiciary, to review and assess the application of restrictions 
clause with utmost scrutiny and showing restrain to rely on the margin of appreciation 
of national authorities. This assessment must include focus on administrative processes 
and outcomes. Secondly, it appears that a coherent and precise approach to the scope 
and nature of obligations pertaining to the collective dimension of would be a factor 
that could strengthen domestic protection efforts therefore international standard 
setting could further be improved. Finally, international mechanisms tasked with 
international review of domestic protection schemes would be more effective if they 
sought to improve their capacities to increase their ability to address and tackle general 
repressive legislation and practices and establish means for follow-up and 
implementation. The Turkish case has demonstrated that many issues do not become 
the subject of court cases thus compliance control mechanisms other than those 
dealing with individual complaints gain greater importance in the cases of countries 
where the situation is similar to Turkey.    
 
Regarding limitations of the thesis, the fact that a number of possible sources could not 
be included needs to be stated. It would be useful to underscore again that originally 
this study aimed to include the decision making processes of public authorities- who 
implement relevant laws and regulation- in the themes explored in this thesis. However 
the reluctance on the part of public authorities to participate in the study has not made 
this possible. A better understanding of the criteria employed by public authorities 
through the information presented by the latter, would have made the identification of 
gaps and problems as well as patterns in the protection of the collective dimension 
more complete. The inclusion of statistical analysis pertaining to affected groups would 
also have contributed to drawing a fuller picture as well as illustrating diverse 
dimensions of processes and outcomes in the enjoyment of the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief. While such statistical analysis is lacking, I have made 
effort to include the perspectives of affected groups through in-depth interviews with 
the representatives of religious/belief groups. 
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 As far as future research is concerned, an in depth and multi-disciplinary examination 
of the effects of financial or other state support to certain religion/s or certain religious 
institutions in state on the protection and enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion 
or belief of that and other religions or beliefs and what elements are necessary for such 
support to raise issues pertaining to impartiality and neutrality and prohibition of 
discrimination in relation to the right to freedom of religion or belief would surely 
contribute to our understanding of the latter.  A study on the decision-making 
processes of public authorities related to the exercise of the collective dimension of 
freedom of religion or belief would contribute to our understanding of the protection 
of freedom of religion or belief. Studies involving statistical data pertaining to 
outcomes of the exercise of FoRB by various religious or belief groups in Turkey would 
make comparative assessments possible.    
 
--- 
 
This study has shown the importance of a the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion or belief for the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief as well 
as the shortcomings, such as the lack of a coherent approach to recognize the 
collective nature of claims at the global and regional levels of human rights protection 
schemes, the lack of positive obligations as well as, at times, tendency to accommodate 
state restrictions, of international law jurisprudence in the protection of this right.  It 
has also highlighted the implications of historically evolved of state-religion relations 
on the protection of, in particular, the collective dimension of freedom of religion or 
belief and the normative demands created by the latter and the challenge faced by 
international law adjudicators to present effective way of engagement that would 
advance the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief.  
 
Moreover, the thesis has shown the paradoxical state of affairs concerning the 
protection of freedom of religion or belief in Turkey, in particular in its collective 
dimension. On the one hand the general protection of freedom of religion or belief as a 
constitutional right exists, yet, on the other hand lack of effective protection of basic 
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components of the right in practice. A willingness to incorporate a coherent 
understanding of the implications of the right to freedom of religion or belief in 
legislation and practice will greatly contribute to advancing the protection of the right 
to FoRB in Turkey. Such an understanding that may constitute the cornerstone of 
standard may lead to harmonizing the understandings of national interest, laiklik and 
nationalism- which have been and continue to be- underlying reasons of many 
restrictions- with human rights standards. While Turkey’s involvement in religion does 
not change the crux of the issues pertaining to the extensive interferences in the 
manifestations of religion, it surely adds new complicating dimensions to it that cannot 
be ignored.   
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